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INTRODUCTION: 
WOUNDS OF WAR:  MEETING THE NEEDS OF ACTIVE-DUTY 
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND VETERANS WITH POST-
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
KATHY CERMINARA* 
OLYMPIA DUHART** 
Nearly twenty percent of all returning troops are reporting symptoms of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).1  And those are just the ones we 
know about. 
Despite a heightened social awareness of the problem, the numbers con-
tinue to rise.  “Of the more than 2.6 million active-duty, National Guard, and 
reserve service members who have been deployed to Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan since 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) since 2003, an estimated 13–20% of them have or may develop 
PTSD.”2  Almost 30% of veterans treated at Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) hospitals and clinics have been diagnosed with PTSD.3  Veterans advo-
cates say even those numbers do not tell the whole story.4 
While PTSD is typically associated with high anxiety and depression, 
the disorder is complex.  Like its origins, PTSD manifests in complicated 
and numerous ways.  Symptoms include, among others, distressing night-
mares, flashbacks, diminished interest in significant activities, detachment 
from others, sleep problems, irritability, concentration problems, and hyper-
vigilance.5  The symptoms can be debilitating, so much so that the disorder 
  
 * Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Development, Nova Southeastern Universi-
ty Shepard Broad Law Center.  This symposium could not have been organized without the 
superlative assistance of Amanda Sejba and Lydia Harley. 
 ** Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.  
Thanks to Lydia Harley and Joseph Morgese for their help with this introduction. 
 1.  One In Five Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Suffer from PTSD or Major Depression, 
RAND CORPORATION (Apr. 17, 2008), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/04/17.html. 
 2. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TREATMENT FOR 
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN MILITARY AND VETERAN POPULATIONS:  INITIAL 
ASSESSMENT xiii (2012). 
 3. JAMIE RENO, Report:  Nearly 30 percent of Iraq, Afghanistan veterans have PTSD, 
DENVER POST, Oct. 24, 2012, http://www.americanhomecomings.com/news/2012/10/24/report 
-nearly-30-percent-of-iraq-afghanistan-veterans-have-ptsd/. 
 4. Some advocates, for example, says the VA has been “underestimating” the number of 
veterans with PTSD for years.  Id. 
 5. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 4 at 27. 
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can result in marital and family difficulties, loss of jobs, bankruptcies, and 
even suicide.  According to reports, Pentagon records show 349 suicides 
among active-duty troops in 2012.6  This number exceeded the 301 suicides 
recorded in 2011 and the Pentagon's own internal projection of 325.7 
In our own backyard—in suburban South Florida—a decorated veteran 
machine gunner in the Marine Corps who had been diagnosed with PTSD 
took his own life.8  John Lutz had earned thirteen commendations while serv-
ing in Afghanistan and Iraq, but had struggled with PTSD and depression 
since his discharge eighteen months prior to his death.9 
These alarming statistics and the stories of people such as John Lutz 
drive home the importance of focusing attention on the epidemic of PTSD. 
The legal system has tried in some ways to address issues raised by 
PTSD.  Once veterans struggling with the disorder encounter the legal sys-
tem through criminal charges, for example, veterans’ courts have been de-
veloped across the country as pretrial diversion programs assisting veterans 
in obtaining the assistance they may need.  Nova Southeastern University 
(NSU) was an appropriate place to host a national PTSD symposium because 
we are fortunate here in South Florida to have a veterans’ court in each of 
Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties.  The Honorable Edward 
Merrigan, who recently became judge of the Broward County Veterans 
Court, shared his expertise with us at the symposium and discussed the func-
tioning of that problem-solving court. 
Those problem-solving courts build upon the important work of another 
distinguished symposium participant.  The Honorable Ginger Lerner-Wren 
created the nation’s first mental health court, another form of problem-
solving court, here in Broward County around ten years ago. 
Indeed, committed and innovative members of the judiciary exemplify 
the myriad ways in which the community has mobilized to combat the in-
crease in incidence of soldier suicide and other manifestations of PTSD 
among veterans and active-duty military personnel.  Problem-solving courts 
are a critical component to finding help for those struggling with PTSD. 
All such problem-solving courts build upon the work of two law profes-
sors who developed and nurtured “therapeutic jurisprudence,” or “TJ,” as a 
  
 6. Robert Burns, 2012 military suicides hit a record high of 349, AP, (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2012-military-suicides-hit-record-high-349. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Mike Clary, Marine From Davie Takes Own Life After Battling Demons of War, 
SUN-SENTINEL, January 16, 2013, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-01-16/about/fl-marine-
suicide-20130115_1_john-lutz-8th-marine-regiment-helmand. 
 9. Id. 
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legal theory.10  TJ “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s 
lives” and focuses on the law’s influence on emotional life and psychological 
well-being.  It suggests that “law should value psychological health, should 
strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, 
and when consistent with other values served by law should attempt to bring 
about healing and wellness.”11 
However, the law cannot repair all of the problems created by PTSD.  
In organizing the symposium at NSU, we worked hard to reach out to vari-
ous experts and showcase creative approaches to the problem of PTSD as a 
medical, psychological, social, interpersonal, and legal problem.  Speakers, 
for example, ranged from a physical therapist currently practicing with the 
Army to a representative of the National Alliance on Mental Illness; from an 
NSU alumnus/officer in the Florida Army National Guard to a psychiatric 
clinical social worker with the Broward County Veterans Administration 
Clinic.  Most important, we were also honored to host veterans struggling 
with PTSD who courageously shared their stories with us.  The presentations 
from veterans and members of veterans’ families gave all of us—organizers, 
participants, and attendees alike—unique insight that helped us all better 
understand the complexity of the issues PTSD raises. 
Michael Cubbage was brave enough to take the stage at our symposium 
and share his story with the world.  We are incredibly grateful for his will-
ingness to help us truly see and hear the veterans who give up so much for us 
but often get so little in return.  Cubbage, 1LT United States Army, was 
joined at his panel by Carlo Galluccio and Paula Lawler Gallucico, a married 
couple who addressed the impact of PTSD on veterans and their families.  
On that panel as well, D. Nicole Johnson Starr, founder of the PTSD Retreat, 
gave everyone in the audience a taste of what PTSD feels like with an inter-
active demonstration; and Dr. Kate McGraw of the Defense Centers of Ex-
cellence addressed the effects of PTSD on women warriors.  And though he 
could not join us in person, Pulitzer-Prize-winning photographer Craig 
Walker shared a slide show of photographs of Scott Ostrom, a veteran living 
with PTSD.  In raw and unforgettable images, we were able to see up close 
the constant and overwhelming impact of PTSD.12 
  
 10. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996). 
 11. Michael L. Perlin, “John Brown Went off to War”: Considering Veternas Courts as 
Problem-Solving Courts, 37 NOVA L. REV. 3, 9 (2013). 
 12. Craig F. Walker of Denver Post Wins Pulitzer Prize for Feature Photography, THE 
DENVER POST, Apr. 16, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_20408466/craig-f-
walker-denver-post-wins-pulitzer-prize#ixzz2J1QEIZNW. 
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The articles in this symposium reflect the desire to craft creative solu-
tions—both in and outside the box—to combat the PTSD problem.  This 
symposium features articles from a variety of psychological, psychiatric, 
medical, sociological, and philosophical experts. 
Clinical psychologists Raquel Andres-Hyman and Scott M. Hyman, 
from the Miami Veterans Affairs Healthcare System and Carlos Albizu Uni-
versity respectively, lead this special issue of the Nova Law Review with An 
Overview of Combat-Related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).13  
These two authors introduce us to the difficulties faced by those fighting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, in Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, many of whom, as reservists and National Guard soldiers, lack the 
security and support inherent in residence on base as active-duty service per-
sonnel.  Combined with the inherent stressors of combat; the inability to dis-
tinguish between combatant and non-combatant, friend and foe, the circum-
stances of deployment have combined to lead to an unprecedented number of 
returning warriors suffering from PTSD.  PTSD is “an anxiety disorder in-
duced by exposure to a traumatic event.  Although the psychological effects 
of combat have long been recognized (in previous wars, the symptoms now 
associated with PTSD were known as ‘shell shock’ or ‘battle fatigue’), the 
American Psychiatric Association did not codify PTSD as a separate mental 
disorder until 1980.”14  These authors introduce the reader to the diagnosis 
and its co-morbidities, effects, and treatment.  Their article thus equips the 
reader to absorb the remaining articles in this issue with a solid grounding in 
clinical facts. 
The most devastating effect of PTSD is suicide, and psychologist Dan-
iel Reidenberg tackles that subject with law student co-author Natasha 
Shaikh in Making Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder A Priority:  Saving Veter-
ans From Suicide.15  Suicide is rampant among the armed forces; in late Jan-
uary 2013, just a few days before this symposium, the Associated Press re-
ported that Pentagon records revealed 349 suicides among active-duty troops 
last year, up from 301 the year before and exceeding the Pentagon's own 
internal projection of 325.16  These authors discuss not only the problems 
  
 13. Raquel Andres-Hyman & Scott M. Hyman, An Overview of Combat-Related Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 37 NOVA L. REV. 3 (2013). 
 14. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION’S 
TREATMENT OF PTSD AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY AMONG RECENT COMBAT VETERANS 
app. A at 23 (2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/02-09-
PTSD.pdf. 
 15. Daniel Reidenberg & Natasha Shaikh, Making Posttraumatic Stree Disorder a Pri-
ority: Saving Veternas From Suicide, 37 NOVA L. REV. 3 (2013). 
 16. Burns, supra note 8. 
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faced by professionals attempting to treat combat-related PTSD, but also the 
ways in which the legal system contributes to those problems.  Specifically, 
they take to task the VA’s almost untrammeled authority over veterans’ ben-
efits decisions, flaws in the law governing the awarding of those benefits, 
and a federal law preventing the VA and the Department of Defense from 
learning whether military personnel and veterans own firearms.  Despite ef-
forts to improve the current state of affairs, the authors conclude that the 
current system is lacking.  In fact, they conclude, “if we were as quick to 
help veterans as we are to send them off to war, suicide rates among veterans 
with PTSD would not be as high.”17 
As Reidenberg and Shaikh acknowledge in their article, the legal sys-
tem has tried in some ways to address issues raised by PTSD.  As discussed 
previously, veterans’ courts exist as a form of pretrial diversion, assisting 
veterans in obtaining assistance after they encounter the criminal justice sys-
tem as a result of their disorders.  Professor Michael Perlin from New York 
Law School analyzes the operation of those courts in his article “John Brown 
Went Off to War”:  Considering Veterans’ Courts As Problem-Solving 
Courts.18  With a long history of representing those with mental disabilities, 
including representation of the plaintiff class in the case that prompted the 
VA to promulgate its first Patients’ Bill of Rights,19 Professor Perlin is 
uniquely situated to discuss veterans’ courts as problem-solving courts with-
in a broader TJ movement. 
In efforts to assist those with mental disabilities in healing (or rehabili-
tating), courts such as mental health courts have sometimes pursued TJ goals 
without fully honoring the guarantees of due process.  Professor Perlin urges 
that veterans’ courts have the potential to significantly improve treatment of 
veterans with PTSD within the criminal justice system even while cautioning 
that the judges of those courts must respect their veteran-defendants as hu-
man beings in order to fulfill their promise. 
Indeed, the law cannot provide all the answers, or even most of them.  
Better practice is to prevent encounters with the criminal justice system at 
all, rather than the use of problem-solving courts for veterans with PTSD.  In 
Dismantling America’s Largest Sleeper Cell:  The Imperative to Treat, Ra-
ther Than Merely Punish, Active Duty Offenders With PTSD Prior to Dis-
  
 17. Daniel Reidenberg & Natasha Shaikh, Making Posttraumatic Stree Disorder a Pri-
ority: Saving Veternas From Suicide, 37 NOVA L. REV. 3, 102 (2013). 
 18. Michael L. Perlin, “John Brown Went off to War”: Considering Veternas Courts as 
Problem-Solving Courts, 37 NOVA L. REV. 3 (2013). 
 19. Falter v. Veterans Admin., 632 F. Supp. 196, 203 (D.N.J. 1986) (“In December 1982, 
the V.A. Patients’ Bill of Rights was promulgated.”). 
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charge From the Armed Forces,20 U.S. Army Major Evan R. Seamone, Chief 
of Military Justice, Maneuver Center of Excellence & Fort Benning, Geor-
gia, argues that the armed forces must take PTSD into account within its 
disciplinary structure.  Currently, those who have violated the military code 
due to PTSD are likely to be dishonorably discharged, thus effectively pre-
cluding their receipt of benefits funding treatment of that condition.  Major 
Seamone argues that, instead, the armed forces has an obligation to recognize 
defendants’ PTSD and to cooperate with civilian agencies in obtaining 
treatment for it while offenders are still under military control.  Indeed, be-
cause the military has trained these offenders specifically to injure, even kill, 
and then discharges them into the civilian society without realistic chances of 
obtaining treatment, Major Seamone argues that the obligation to assist of-
fenders in obtaining treatment before discharge rises to the level of a “man-
date under the precautionary principle which guides the laws of public health 
and safety.”21 
Philosopher E. Ann Jeschke agrees with Major Seamone that it is not 
sufficient to rely upon the legal system to remedy PTSD’s effects.  In The 
Moral Trauma of America’s Warriors:  Why We Must Treat Combat Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder as a Bio-Psycho-Social-Spiritual Phenomenon,22 
Ms. Jeschke argues that combat “dismantle[s] a warrior’s moral identity and 
must be addressed in order for the holistic healing of the warrior to occur.”23  
Drawing on resources as diverse as literature and philosophy, Ms. Jeschke 
analyzes and finds wanting currently recommended VA and Department of 
Defense treatments for PTSD.  Specifically, she argues that, rather than rely-
ing solely on currently recommended treatments, which address PTSD as an 
individualized, trauma-induced phenomenon, clinicians also should be at-
tuned to the spiritual needs of their patients.  She concludes that it is only by 
treating their entire condition, biologically, psychologically, socially, and 
spiritually, that America’s wounded warriors can be healed. 
This symposium explores nontraditional solutions for an extraordinary 
and persistent problem.  It also represents the best of collaborative efforts 
among those committed to finding a solution.  We hope it inspires our read-
ers. 
  
 20. Evan R. Seamone, Dismantling America’s Largest Sleeper Cell:  The Imperative to 
Treat, Rather than Merely Punish, Active Duty Offenders with PTSD Prior to Discharge from 
the Armed Forces, 37 NOVA L. REV. 3 (2013). 
 21. Id. at 36. 
 22. E. Ann Jeschke, The Moral Trauma of America’s Warriors:  Why We Must Treat 
Combat Posttraumatic Stress Disorder as a Bio-Psycho-Social-Spiritual Phenomenon, 37 
NOVA L. REV. 3 (2013). 
 23. Id. at 105. 
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
“JOHN BROWN WENT OFF TO WAR”:  CONSIDERING 
VETERANS COURTS AS PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 445 
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE .......................................................... 452 
III. VETERANS COURTS ............................................................................ 456 
A. Issues Related to PTSD ............................................................. 459 
IV. SOCIETAL AMBIVALENCE .................................................................. 463 
V. CRITICISMS OF VETERANS COURTS ................................................... 465 
A. The “Free Pass” Argument ...................................................... 465 
B. The Disparity Argument ............................................................ 466 
C. The Stereotype Perpetuation Argument .................................... 467 
D. The Costs Argument .................................................................. 468 
E. The Domestic Violence Critique ............................................... 469 
F. The “Cherry Picking” Argument .............................................. 470 
G. The “We Have Other Courts” Argument .................................. 471 
H. The “Already Lenient” Argument ............................................. 471 
VI. COUNSEL AND JUDICIARY ISSUES ...................................................... 472 
VII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 475 
 
MICHAEL L. PERLIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am a child of the 60s.  This is no surprise to anyone who has talked to 
me for more than five minutes or who has read any of my writings about Bob 
Dylan.  But it is much more than musical nostalgia.  I was involved, serious-
ly involved, in the anti-war movement in college and in law school (my 
friends even know about the late night visit from FBI agents urging me to 
change the tone of anti-war editorials I had been writing when I was editor of 
the Rutgers Daily Targum in 1965–1966).1  After I passed the written bar 
examination, it took me over a year to be admitted to practice in New Jersey, 
  
 * Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform Project; Director, Online Men-
tal Disability Law Program; New York Law School, 185 West Broadway, New York, NY 
10013; 212-431-2183; mperlin@nyls.edu. 
 1. This followed a widely-covered university “teach-in” at which Rutgers Professor 
Eugene Genovese stated, “‘I do not fear or regret the impending Vietcong victory in Vietnam.  
I welcome it.’”  Douglas Martin, Eugene D. Genovese, 82, Historian of South, Dies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at A36.  My editorials cited Voltaire in the defense of his right to free 
speech. 
19
: Nova Law Review 37, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
446 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37  
as members of the “character and fitness committee” in my home county had 
questions about anti-war petitions I had signed when I was a law student (I 
solved the problem by moving to a new county).  But during all that time, I 
never “got” the enmity that so many of my contemporaries leveled at those 
who were serving in the Army (many of whom, of course, were doing so 
involuntarily).  Truth be known, at all the marches, rallies, and demonstra-
tions I attended, I never once heard the “baby killer” phrase that was alleged-
ly a common cry at that time (I expect that, like the bra-burning that never 
took place, it simply served as a rallying symbol).  But, it was always clear to 
me that, once Vietnam veterans returned home, the transition to civilian soci-
ety was not an easy one. 
The Vietnam War ended in 1975.  A year prior to that, the State of New 
Jersey created a new office, the Department of the Public Advocate,2 to pro-
vide legal representation to those who had been ignored by the justice sys-
tem, a “voice for the voiceless.”3  As part of this department, a Division of 
Mental Health Advocacy was created,4 and at the embarrassingly-young age 
of twenty eight, I became the first director of that division.  We represented 
persons in individual matters in civil commitment cases, post-insanity acquit-
tal release hearings, refusal of treatment cases, and the full range of law re-
form and test case litigation that challenged the way patients were treated in 
state hospitals and in community settings.5 
  
 2. See  George W. Conk, People's Electric: Engaged Legal Education at Rutgers-Newark 
Law School in the 1960s and 1970s, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503, 513 n. 40 (2012). 
 3. DIV. OF DISABILITY SERVS., N.J. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., NEW JERSEY 2009 
RESOURCES 15 (2009), available at http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dds/documents/RD_ 
09%283%29.pdf.  The public advocate was initially dismantled by Governor Christine Whit-
man, Cynthia N. McKee, Resurrecting Mount Laurel:  Using Title VIII Litigation to Achieve 
the Ultimate Mount Laurel Goal of Integration, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1338, 1345 n.58 
(1997), was revived in 2005, and then once more abolished in 2010, Public Advocate (2005-
2010), N.J. ST. LIBR., https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/handle/10929/19052 (last visited Apr. 
21, 2013). 
 4. N.J. GEN. ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ESTIMATE TO ASSEMBLY, NO. 15, 
A.52:27E-1, at 1 (1994), available at http://law.njstatelib.org/law_files/njlh/ 
lh1994/L1994c58.pdf.  This Division survived the dismantling of the rest of the Public Advo-
cate’s office and is now housed in the Office of the Public Defender.  Id.  “The bill transfers 
the functions performed by the Division of Mental Health Advocacy and the Division of Ad-
vocacy for the Developmentally Disabled within the Department of the Public Advocate to the 
Office of the Public Defender . . . .”  Id. 
 5. Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Patient Advocate, 54 PSYCHIATRIC 
Q. 169, 170–71 (1982); 5 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL § 14-7, at 119–21 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 5 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL] (reprinting the final order of Dixon v. Cahill, No. L.30977/y-71 P.W. 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973)); see Michael L. Perlin, “Justice’s Beautiful Face”:  Bob 
Sadoff and the Redemptive Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 40 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 
 
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] JOHN BROWN WENT OFF TO WAR 447 
One of the facilities in our jurisdictional ambit at the time was the Vet-
erans Hospital in Lyons, New Jersey.  Initially, our staff attorneys went there 
to represent individuals at commitment and periodic review hearings; but, 
after a time, it was clear that there was other work that needed to be done.  
The hospital was a dreary place (not as bad, certainly, as Greystone Park 
Psychiatric Hospital that remains, after nearly forty years, the most wretched 
facility I have ever seen in the United States),6 but dreary nonetheless:  not 
particularly clean, not particularly well-staffed, and with very little sense of 
life. 
But, there was more to it than that.  We realized—and this took a little 
while to sink in—that within the hospital, there were clearly hierarchical 
tiers.  Veterans of World War II (and the few remaining from World War I) 
and the Korean War were, by and large, treated far better than were the Vi-
etnam veterans.  This perplexed me—I certainly never spoke to a staff mem-
ber who had been active in the anti-war movement at any level—and trou-
bled me greatly. 
Why did this happen?  The Vietnam veterans were much younger than 
the others, of course, and were certainly more likely to be dually diagnosed 
as mentally ill and drug-dependent.  Many more had brushes with criminal 
law—usually low-level misdemeanors, though there were some who were 
charged with more serious offenses—and many more were disaffected with 
the world to which they came back.  There were no ticker-tape parades for 
these veterans, no jubilant crowds, no iconic photographs of welcome-home 
kisses.  And these veterans were far, far angrier than veterans of other 
wars—staff told me that the older vets were so grateful and this cohort was 
not.  The more we explored this, the more it became clear that there was a 
dual system at play:  Vietnam vets and everyone else.  We also discovered 
that some of the rights that we had been litigating so tirelessly for at the state 
and county hospitals were not available in the federally funded Department 
of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) hospitals—and that just did not seem right for so 
many reasons. 
So, we filed Falter v. Veterans’ Administration (Falter I),7 a class ac-
tion suit on behalf of all the residents of the VA.8  Following the litigation in 
  
265, 278 n.2 (2012); Michael L. Perlin, “May You Stay Forever Young”:  Robert Sadoff and 
the History of Mental Disability Law, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 236, 236–37 (2005). 
 6. See Doe v. Klein, 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. 475, 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1977) (institutional right to treatment consent order); see also Michael L. Perlin, “Abandoned 
Love”:  The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection Between International Human 
Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 123 n.21 (2011). 
 7. 502 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1980). 
 8. Id. at 1178–79. 
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the Falter I case, the VA promulgated the first Patients’ Bill of Rights on 
behalf of persons in its facilities,9 and attention was paid to substantive areas 
of patients’ rights that all too often were previously ignored.10 
Writing some five years ago about the notion of “equality” in the con-
text of mental disability law, I said this about the Falter case: 
But, what has lasted with me most vividly from Falter I was one line 
of Judge Harold Ackerman’s initial decision:  In this opinion, “I am refer-
ring to how [plaintiffs] are treated as human beings.”11  I read that line in 
the slip opinion, and for a moment, my breath stopped.  Prior to that time, 
I had been representing persons with mental disabilities for nearly a dec-
ade, and litigated other class actions that truly had a vast impact on the 
New Jersey mental health system.12  But never before had a judge written a 
line like this in an opinion in one of my cases.13 
I begin my presentation today with this anecdote, because I think it is 
totally on-point with regard to this entire Symposium.  In my paper, I will 
seek to contextualize veterans courts in light of the therapeutic jurisprudence 
(TJ) movement, the turn to problem-solving courts of all sorts (especially 
focusing on mental health courts), but also, and certainly not least in terms of 
importance, the societal ambivalence that we have shown to veterans in the 
four decades since the Vietnam War. 
I will discuss the meaning of TJ, and then argue that its focus on the ac-
tual impact of law on people’s lives, on the law’s influence on emotional life 
and psychological well-being, and on the need for law to value psychological 
health and avoid the imposition of anti-therapeutic consequences whenever 
possible can serve as a template for a veterans court model—if we are to 
expand these courts robustly.  TJ is the explicit inspiration for many of the 
most important problem-solving courts (including Judge Ginger Lerner-
  
 9. Falter v. Veterans Admin. (Falter II), 632 F. Supp. 196, 203 (D.N.J. 1986) (“In De-
cember 1982, the V.A. Patients’ Bill of Rights was promulgated.”). 
 10. See id. at 203, 205–08 (noting patients’ rights such as rights to privacy while using 
telephones, to privacy in reading mail, to visitation, and to attend religious services). 
 11. Falter I, 502 F. Supp. at 1185. 
 12. See 5 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 14-4, 
at 66–74 (discussing the stipulation settlement of Schindenwolf v. Klein, No. L41293-75 P.W. 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975)); 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL § 3C-7.1i, at 442 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the right of patients to participate in 
voluntary, therapeutic, compensated work programs as an aspect of the right to treatment); see 
also Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing the right of institutional-
ized psychiatric patients to refuse treatment). 
 13. Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke That Word/As If a Wedding 
Vow”:  Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 9, 10 (2008–2009) (discussing this aspect of Falter I); see also Falter I, 502 F. Supp. at 
1178, 1185. 
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Wren’s mental health court in Broward County),14 but it is also clear that 
many such courts—specifically, some drug courts—do not follow TJ princi-
ples, existing instead in a due process-free zone—implicitly rejecting the 
basic TJ “premise that therapeutic outcomes cannot trump due process.”15  
Just as mental health courts should ensure that defendants receive dignity and 
respect and are given a sense of voice and validation, so should veterans 
courts.  And this must be done in the specific context of veterans who have 
returned—not just from Vietnam, but from the first Gulf War, the later Iraqi 
War, and the ongoing Afghanistani War—veterans who have been diagnosed 
with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at frightening rates16 and who con-
tinue to bear the invisible wounds of battle.17 
This must all be weighed through the filter of the way that our treatment 
of injured war veterans provides a vivid example of society’s general ambiv-
alence toward guaranteeing robust social rights, an ambivalence reflected in 
my experiences in the VA hospitals some thirty years ago.  I believe that 
Judge Ackerman’s observation must be at the forefront of any assessment of 
veterans courts. 
  
 14. See Michael L. Perlin, “There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden”:  Mental 
Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity, and the 
Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE:  LAW AND POLICY 193, 206–07 
(Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton eds., 2013) [hereinafter PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO 
TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN”]. 
 15. See id. at 207; Andrew Fulkerson, How Much Process Is Due in the Drug Court?, 
CRIM. L. BULL. (Thomson Reuters), Summer 2012 (“The answer is the same due process that 
is provided in any other case wherein a defendant faces revocation of probation.”).  For criti-
cism of a court decision holding that a defendant had no right to counsel at a hearing to termi-
nate him from a drug program, see Dunson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 847, 850 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2001) and Fulkerson, supra, note 15 (“The Dunson holding renders the drug court a 
court in name only and thus is not required to provide any of the formalities and due process 
protections of a real court.”). 
 16. On how the Iraqi and Afghan war experiences, for these purposes, have been signifi-
cantly different from the experiences of veterans in other wars, see Steven Berenson, The 
Movement Toward Veterans Courts, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y, May–June 
2010, at 37, 37–38. 
First, individual servicemembers have been subjected to more frequent and longer deploy-
ments to the front than in previous conflicts.  Second, the counterinsurgency type of warfare 
blurs periods of battle and periods of rest, prompting the stressful constant vigilance that can 
lead to psychological ailments.  Third, improvements in protective equipment and battlefield 
medicine have allowed more victims of battlefield trauma to survive but often with lingering 
effects from their injuries.  And, fourth, the signature weapon of the opposition—the impro-
vised explosive device—often causes traumatic brain injuries that are difficult to diagnose and 
treat and may not present symptoms until well after the injury. 
Id. at 38 (footnotes omitted). 
 17. See id. at 37. 
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Despite generally low recidivism rates,18 veterans courts have received 
criticism, as some have argued that they provide veterans with a hall pass 
“‘to certain criminal-defense rights that others don’t have,’” and that, from 
an entirely different perspective, they are stigmatizing because they “perpet-
uate the stereotype that veterans are returning ‘war-crazy.’”19  I will address 
these and other criticisms in my paper. 
One issue that has received almost no attention is a critical one that we 
are just beginning to take seriously in the mental health courts context:  How 
can we assure that there is experienced, dedicated, and knowledgeable coun-
sel assigned to represent defendants in such tribunals?  We know that if there 
has been any constant in modern mental disability law in its thirty-five year 
history, it is the near-universal reality that counsel assigned to represent indi-
viduals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective.  
How can we be sure that counsel in these cases will become more effective? 
I will conclude by offering some conclusions and suggestions for those 
jurisdictions that are implementing veterans courts, so as to optimally assure 
adherence to TJ values in a court setting that continues to provide litigants 
with the full range of constitutional rights to which they are entitled. 
Bob Dylan recorded John Brown in 1963.20  The song is a “biting screed 
demolishing Hollywood conceptions of war heroes”21 that “links the antiwar 
mentality with the generation gap.”22  It begins: 
John Brown went off to war to fight on a foreign shore 
His mama sure was proud of him! 
He stood straight and tall in his uniform and all 
His mama’s face broke out all in a grin,23 
but, later, when he returns home: 
  
 18. See Cathy Ho Hartsfield, Note, Deportation of Veterans:  The Silent Battle for Natu-
ralization, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 835, 859 (2012) (concluding that veterans courts “have seen 
great success in reducing recidivism rates”).  But see Jack W. Smith, The Anchorage, Alaska 
Veterans Court and Recidivism:  July 6, 2004–December 31, 2010, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 
107 (2012) (noting the recidivism rate is only “slightly better” in the Anchorage Veterans 
Court). 
 19. These arguments are summarized in Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860.  See also infra 
Part III. 
 20. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN:  THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 339 
(Bob Nirkind & Marian Appellof eds., 2004). 
 21. Id. at 338. 
 22. TIM RILEY, HARD RAIN:  A DYLAN COMMENTARY 51 (1992). 
 23. BOB DYLAN, John Brown, on THE BOOTLEG SERIES VOL. 9–THE WITMARK DEMOS:  
1962–1964 (Columbia Records 2010). 
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Oh his face was all shot up and his hand was all blown off 
And he wore a metal brace around his waist 
He whispered kind of slow, in a voice she did not know 
While she couldn’t even recognize his face!24 
and ends: 
As he turned away to walk, his Ma was still in shock 
At seein’ the metal brace that helped him stand 
But as he turned to go, he called his mother close 
And he dropped his medals down into her hand.25 
The song—the showstopper of Dylan’s 2001 tour “as U.S. bombs were 
falling on Kabul”26—tells the listener “of the deception of war, and its true 
effects on the individual,”27 and is a song “to come [on Memorial Day] after 
we sweep up from the parades and put away the speakers’ microphones.”28  
If there were a soundtrack to this Symposium, it would include this song. 
  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. TRAGER, supra note 20, at 339.  I may have heard Dylan sing this in the 1960s; I 
honestly do not remember.  I do know that I have seen him sing it at least five times in more 
recent years, last in Brooklyn in August 2008, during the heat of the Obama/McCain cam-
paign.  My review of the concert notes the political connection:  “The high points of the night 
were *John Brown* and *Masters of War*, both musically and politically.  Here was Bob, in 
Brooklyn . . . with an audience as blue state as he’ll ever get, and he hammered home the 
reminder that we do, indeed, live in a political world.”  Michael Perlin, Reviews:  Brooklyn, 
New York, Prospect Park Bandshell, BOBLINKS.COM, http://www.boblinks.com/081208r 
.html#10 (last visited April 21, 2013). 
 27. Amy Blanton, Bob Dylan:  An Impact on American Society in the 1960’s 8 (Apr. 10, 
2001) (unpublished student paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~ablanton/BobDylan.pdf. 
 28. A Memorial Day Song:  John Brown, NIGHTLY SONG (May 27, 2011), http:// 
nightlysong.com/category/bob-dylan/. 
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II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE29 
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past 
two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of TJ.30  Initially em-
ployed in cases involving individuals with mental disabilities, but subse-
quently expanded far beyond that narrow area, TJ presents a new model for 
assessing the “impact of case law and legislation,” recognizing that, as a 
therapeutic agent, the law can have “therapeutic or anti-therapeutic conse-
quences.”31  The ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether legal “rules, pro-
cedures, and [lawyer] roles can or should be reshaped . . . to enhance their 
therapeutic potential [while not] subordinating due process principles.”32  
  
 29. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians 
and Protectors of the Mind”:  The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabili-
ties and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1159, 1183–89 (2013) [here-
inafter Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”] and Michael L. 
Perlin, Understanding the Intersection Between International Human Rights and Mental Dis-
ability Law:  THE ROLE OF DIGNITY, IN THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191, 199 (Bruce Arrigo & Heather Bersot eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
PERLIN, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERSECTION]. 
 30. See David Finkelman & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  From Idea to 
Application, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:  DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
587, 588 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); see also 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2D-3, at 534–39 (2d ed. 1989); DAVID B. 
WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:  THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 3–4 (1990); 
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT:  A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 7 (2005) 
[hereinafter WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT]; David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 19 (2008).  Wexler first used the term in a paper he 
presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987.  See David B. Wexler, Putting 
Mental Health into Mental Health Law:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
27, 32–33 (1992). 
 31. Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”:  How Will 
Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 
885, 912 (2009); see Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES & DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91, 91–92 (Ian Freckelton & Kerry 
Petersen eds., 2006). 
 32. Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”:  Sanism in Clinical 
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 719 n.195 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, “You Have Dis-
cussed Lepers and Crooks”]; see Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t 
Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”:  The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse 
Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 752–53 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, “And My 
Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”]; Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody 
is Making Love/or Else Expecting Rain”:  Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Per-
sons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 481, 489–90 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, “Everybody is Making Love/or Else 
Expecting Rain”].  On how TJ “might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a 
means of ‘strip[ping] bare the law’s sanist façade,’” see Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside 
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There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identi-
fies how it must be resolved:  The law’s use of “mental health information to 
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] imping[e] upon justice concerns.”33  
As I have written elsewhere, “an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not 
mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”34 
TJ “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives”35 and 
“focuses on the law’s [influence] on emotional life and psychological well-
being.”36  It suggests that “law should value psychological health, should 
strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, 
and when consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring 
about healing and wellness.”37  TJ understands that, “when attorneys fail to 
acknowledge their clients’ negative emotional reactions to the judicial pro-
cess, the clients are inclined to regard the lawyer as indifferent and a part of a 
criminal system bent on punishment.”38  By way of example, TJ “aims to 
offer social science evidence that limits the use of the incompetency label by 
narrowly defining its use and minimizing its psychological and social disad-
vantage.”39 
  
Your Mirror”:  The Legal Profession’s Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental 
Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your 
Mirror”].  See also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepre-
sented:  The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585–86 (2008); Ber-
nard P. Perlmutter, George’s Story:  Voice and Transformation Through the Teaching and 
Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 561, 599 n.111 (2005). 
 33. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal 
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993); see also David B. Wexler, Applying the Law 
Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179, 179–80 (1996). 
 34. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L. 
Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”:  Mental Disability Law, Theory and 
Practice, “Us” and “Them”, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998). 
 35. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing 
with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009). 
 36. David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  Psycholegal Soft Spots and 
Strategies, in Practicing THERAPEUTIC Jurisprudence:  Law as a Helping Profession 45, 45 
(Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
 37. Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in 
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003). 
 38. Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices:  Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to Know 
the Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47, 59 (2010). 
 39. Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law:  Can Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence Make a Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 (2003).  The most 
thoughtful, sympathetic critique of TJ remains Christopher Slobogin’s Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence:  Five Dilemmas to Ponder.  See Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  
Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 195, 218–19 (1995). 
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In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of topics through 
a TJ lens, including, but not limited to, all aspects of mental disability law, 
domestic relations law, criminal law and procedure, employment law, gay 
rights law, and tort law.40  As Ian Freckelton has noted, “it is a tool for gain-
ing a new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights 
into the law and its applications.”41  It is also part of a growing comprehen-
sive movement in the law towards establishing more humane and psycho-
logically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, 
and respectfully.42  These alternative approaches optimize the psychological 
well-being of individuals, relationships, and communities dealing with a le-
gal matter, and acknowledge concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and 
obligations.43  In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance 
rights, and promote well-being, TJ has been described “as a sea-change in 
ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more dis-
tinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasise[s] psy-
chological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”44  That is, TJ supports an 
ethic of care.45 
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.46  Pro-
fessor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs”—voice, validation, and volun-
tariness47—arguing: 
  
 40. See Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed”:  Looking at Non-Institutional Men-
tal Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 543–45 (2002–
2003). 
 41. Freckelton, supra note 32, at 576. 
 42. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive 
Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:  LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 
465, 465 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
 43. See id. at 468. 
 44. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 
8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329–30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological 
Barriers to Settlement:  Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL:  PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); 
Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School 
Clinical Education:  Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–06 
(2006).  The use of the phrase TJ dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:  
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 100 (1982). 
 45. See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door?  A “Therapeutic” 
Approach to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 
385 (2006); Brookbanks, supra note 44, at 328–30; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party 
Pooper:  An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s Concerns About Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Winick 
& Wexler, supra note 44, at 607. 
 46. See WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT, supra note 30, at 161. 
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 What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic:  [L]itigants 
must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a deci-
sion maker.  If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely lis-
tened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant 
feels a sense of validation.  When litigants emerge from a legal 
proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at 
peace with the outcome.  Voice and validation create a sense of 
voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the 
proceeding as less coercive.  Specifically, the feeling on the part of 
litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that en-
gendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that af-
fects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved 
behavior in the future.  In general, human beings prosper when 
they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their 
own decisions.48 
Problem-solving courts grew out of an interdisciplinary approach—an 
approach immersed in TJ—to address the underlying problem, not just the 
symptoms, of social issues such as substance abuse, domestic violence, child 
abuse, and mental illness.49  The creation of these courts “acknowledge[s] 
that the one-size-fits-all structure of the American criminal justice system 
often leaves much to be desired.”50  There is an extensive literature on the 
relationship between TJ and problem-solving courts in general,51 between TJ 
and mental health courts52 and drug courts53 in particular, and, more globally, 
  
 47. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer:  Clinical Legal Education and Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008).  
On the importance of voice, see Freckelton, supra note 32, at 588. 
 48. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:  Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted); see also AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 23 
(2010). 
 49. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1060 (2003); see also Peggy Fulton Hora, Courting New Solu-
tions Using Problem-Solving Justice:  Key Components, Guiding Principles, Strategies, Re-
sponses, Models, Approaches, Blueprints and Tool Kits, 2 CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 7, 7–8 
(2011); Salmon A. Shomade & Roger E. Hartley, The Application of Network Analysis to the 
Study of Trial Courts, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 144, 146 (2010). 
 50. PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra note 14, at 207. 
 51. See Hora, supra note 49, at 7, 10; see generally Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, Mak-
ing the Case:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem-Solving Practices Positively Impact 
Clients, the Justice Systems and Communities They Serve, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 781 (2005). 
 52. See, e.g., Nicola Ferencz & James McGuire, Mental Health Review Tribunals in the 
UK:  Applying a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, CT. REV. (Am. Judges Ass’n), 
Spring 2000, at 48, 51; Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., Forging Links and Renewing Ties:  
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between TJ and judging,54 and TJ and lawyering55 in these contexts.  But 
there has been very little written about the specific question of the role of TJ 
in veterans courts.56  The question to pose here is this:  Do such courts make 
it more likely that Professor Ronner’s vision—of voice, voluntariness, and 
validation—will be fulfilled? 
III. VETERANS COURTS 
Veterans courts have been established as part of an effort to seek “sys-
temic solutions that would allow the [judicial system] a greater range of tools 
to help struggling veterans than the traditional criminal justice alternatives of 
conviction and incarceration.”57  Explicitly, “‘[t]he rationale for veterans’ 
courts is based on the combat-related stress, financial instability, and other 
difficulties adjusting to life that confront many soldiers returning home from 
Iraq and Afghanistan.’”58  “The focus [of such courts] is on treatment, not 
  
Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice to Better Respond to Criminal 
Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 183–84 (2012). 
 53. See, e.g., Salmon A. Shomade, Case Disposition in the Drug Court:  Who Is the Most 
Central Actor?, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 74, 74–75, 78–79 (2010); Pamela L. Simmons, Comment, 
Solving the Nation’s Drug Problem:  Drug Courts Signal a Move Toward Therapeutic Juris-
prudence, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 258 (1999–2000).  The extent to which many drug courts 
actually do incorporate TJ principles is not at all clear.  See Michael S. King, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence’s Challenge to the Judiciary, 1 ALASKA J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
King, Therapeutic Jurisprudence’s Challenge to the Judiciary] (critiquing some drug courts as 
not fulfilling TJ values); PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra 
note 14, at 216–17. 
 54. See, e.g., King, Therapeutic Jurisprudence’s Challenge to the Judiciary, supra note 
53, at 3. 
 55. See, e.g., Paul Holland, Lawyering and Learning in Problem-Solving Courts, 34 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 185, 187 (2010); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743, 750 (2005). 
 56. But see Evan R. Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor:  Using Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence to Enhance Client Counseling for Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, 202 MIL. L. REV. 185, 188 (2009) [hereinafter Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as 
Counselor]; Samantha Walls, The Need for Special Veteran Courts, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 695, 716 (2011).  Professor David Wexler, one of the creators of TJ, has noted that TJ 
principles are now being employed in veterans courts.  See David B. Wexler, That’s What 
Friends Are For:  Mentors, LAP Lawyers, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Clients with Mental 
Illness 3 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Wexler, That’s What Friends Are 
For], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1962725. 
 57. Berenson, supra note 16, at 39. 
 58. Marta Hoes, Comment, Invisible Wounds:  What Texas Should Be Doing for the 
Mental Health of Its Veterans, 13 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 369, 378 (2012). 
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punishment, and on getting [to] the root cause of anti-social behavior.”59  
Importantly, the courts “are premised on the assumption that, when possible, 
veterans should receive treatment for PTSD.”60  Many of the veterans courts 
consciously “utilize the therapeutic jurisprudence ideology in creating the 
treatment-rehabilitate model.”61 
Although the first veterans court was started in Anchorage, Alaska, in 
2004,62 most commentators pinpoint the start of the veterans court movement 
to the creation of the Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court in 2008.63  As de-
scribed by that court’s founding judge: 
The mission driving the Veterans Treatment Court is to successful-
ly habilitate veterans by diverting them from the traditional crimi-
nal justice system and providing them with the tools they need in 
order to lead a productive and law-abiding lifestyle.  In hopes of 
achieving this goal, the program provides veterans suffering from 
substance abuse issues, alcoholism, mental health issues, and emo-
tional disabilities with treatment, academic and vocational training, 
job skills, and placement services.  The program provides further 
ancillary services to meet the distinctive needs of each individual 
participant, such as housing, transportation, medical, dental, and 
other supportive services.64 
At this point in time, there are at least eighty such courts,65 and hun-
dreds are in the planning process.66  Potential participants are screened to 
weed out any individual who does not “show a willingness to undergo treat-
  
 59. Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home:  Accommodating the Special Needs of Mili-
tary Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 570 (2010). 
 60. Adam Caine, Comment, Fallen from Grace:  Why Treatment Should Be Considered 
for Convicted Combat Veterans Suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 78 UMKC L. 
REV. 215, 239 (2009). 
 61. Walls, supra note 56, at 716. 
 62. Hawkins, supra note 59, at 565. 
 63. Berenson, supra note 16, at 39; Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court:  A 
Proactive Approach, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 364 (2009). 
 64. Russell, supra note 63, at 357 n.†, 364. 
 65. William H. McMichael, The Battle on the Home Front, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2011, at 42, 
44.  For descriptions of other courts, see Stuart Ditzen, Supreme Court, Veterans Administra-
tion Host First Veterans’ Task Force Mtg., LAW. J. (Allegheny Cnty. Bar Ass’n), Mar. 12, 
2010, at 5, 5; Hawkins, supra note 59, at 565; Art Heinz, Nation’s First Online Training for 
Veterans Courts Mentors Launched by Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, LAW. J. (Allegheny 
Cnty. Bar Ass’n), Dec. 16, 2011, at 5, 5; Judy L. Marchman, Veterans Courts in Texas, 75 
TEX. B.J. 616, 616 (2012); Smith, supra note 18, at 93. 
 66. The History, JUST. FOR VETS, http://www.justiceforvets.org/vtc-history (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2013). 
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ment for his PTSD.”67  Most such courts accept only defendants charged with 
misdemeanors or non-violent felonies,68 although some allow defendants 
charged with violent felonies to participate.69  While there has been pointed 
criticism at the inclusion of some offenses (specifically, domestic violence) 
in the eligibility column,70 others take the position that precluding violent 
offenders in these courts is like having “a Veterans Court without veter-
ans.”71  In some veterans courts, “violent cases are not precluded from diver-
sion [specifically] because ‘combat veterans’ PTSD issues often manifest in 
aggressive behavior.’”72  Often, however, “[w]hen [veterans courts] do enroll 
violent offenders, many programs can, and do, require victim input prior to 
the admittance decision.”73 
These courts are often staffed with “a Veterans Service Representative 
(VSR), a fellow veteran whose role is similar to that of a caseworker,” and 
who “works as a counselor, develop[ing] a treatment plan, and refer[ring] . . . 
defendant[s] to alcohol, drug dependency, or mental health treatment centers 
  
 67. Walls, supra note 56, at 718.  See infra Part III.A. for a discussion of the significance 
of PTSD diagnoses in the creation and implementation of these courts. 
 68. See Berenson, supra note 16, at 39. 
 69. Pamela Kravetz, Note, Way off Base:  An Argument Against Intimate Partner Vio-
lence Cases in Veterans Treatment Courts, 4 VETERANS L. REV. 162, 183 & n.109 (2012); 
Marcia G. Shein, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Criminal Justice System:  From Vi-
etnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, FED. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 42, 49. 
 70. See Kravetz, supra note 69, at 186; see also infra Part V.E. 
 71. John Baker, John Baker:  We Need Veterans Courts in Minnesota.  Here’s Why., 
TWINCITIES.COM (Aug. 29, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.twincities.com/ opin-
ion/ci_15916530 (observing that “domestic-abuse case[s], bar fights, assault and battery, hit 
and run cases that result in injury, and DWI cases that result in injury[]” are largely “the types 
of cases that bring veterans into the criminal justice system in the first place”); see also Dahlia 
Lithwick, Specialized Courts for War Veterans Work Wonders.  But Why Stop at Veterans?, 
SLATE (Feb. 11, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and 
_politics/jurisprudence/2010/02/a_separate_peace.html: 
Robert Alvarez, a psychotherapist with the Wounded Warrior program at Fort Carson, recently 
told a Denver newspaper that it’s a mistake to carve the most violent offenders out of the pro-
posed veterans court in Colorado:  “The violent offenders need help more than anybody. . . . 
[T]he very skills these people are taught to follow in combat are the skills that are a risk at 
home.  They’re trained to react instantly to a threat, because if not, people die.”  So as we con-
tinue to create specialized courts for our war veterans, one question worth probing is how it 
makes sense to give special services to those with the least to lose while withholding special 
services from those with the worst problems. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 72. Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice:  The Sus-
pended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI and 
Reduce Recidivism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 n.9 (2011) [hereinafter Seamone, Reclaiming the 
Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice]. 
 73. Id. at 8 n.9. 
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[where] necessary.”74  David Wexler has underscored that having such a 
mentor is an essential feature of such courts.75 
A. Issues Related to PTSD 
The story of General George Patton slapping a soldier in World War II 
is legendary. 
 During the action in Sicily, General Patton visited an evacua-
tion hospital.  He was conducted to the receiving tent, where [fif-
teen] casualties had just come in from the front. 
 “Where Were You Hurt?”  The General went down the line, 
asking each patient where he had been hurt.  On the edge of the 
fourth bed sat a soldier with no visible wounds.  He had been sent 
back by his divisional medical officer, tentatively diagnosed as a 
severe case of psychoneurosis.  He was still in battle dress. 
 The General asked him the routine question.  The soldier an-
swered:  “It’s my nerves.  I can hear the shells come over but I 
can’t hear them burst.” 
 Patton turned to the medical officer and asked, “What’s this 
man talking about?  What’s wrong with him--if anything?”  Patton 
began to shout at the man.  His high voice rose to a scream, in such 
language as:  “You dirty no-good------!  You cowardly--!  You’re a 
disgrace to the Army and you’re going right back to the front to 
fight, although that’s too good for you. . . .”  Patton reached for his 
white-handled single-action Colt. 
 The man sat quivering on his cot.  Patton slapped him sharply 
across the face, turned to the commanding medical officer who had 
come in when he heard Patton’s high-pitched imprecations.  “I 
want you to get that man out of here right away.  I won’t have the-
se other brave boys seeing such a bastard babied.”76 
  
 74. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 859; see also Hawkins, supra note 59, at 565. 
 75. Wexler, That’s What Friends Are For, supra note 56, at 3.  On the value of the use of 
psychological techniques in such court settings, see Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Coun-
selor, supra note 56, at 198. 
 76. Michael E. McCarthy, Essay, Diversionary Tactics:  Alternative Procedures for the 
Prosecution of Military Veterans, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 475, 477–78 (2012). 
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One of the first law review articles to discuss PTSD characterized this—“the 
slap heard round the world”77—as “[a]n extreme example of military intoler-
ance for warrior weakness.”78  There is little question that, “[b]efore Vi-
etnam, no single event contributed more to public awareness of PTSD”79 
than this incident. 
PTSD is “a condition under which a person ‘experienced, witnessed, or 
was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened 
death or serious injury, or that a threat to the physical integrity of self or oth-
ers’ and, ‘the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or hor-
ror.’”80  “Symptoms of PTSD may include recurrent nightmares, difficulty 
falling asleep, hyper-vigilance . . . outbursts of anger,” exaggerated startle 
response, and memory impairment.81  “Individuals who suffer from this syn-
drome often show increased irritability, impulsive behavior and unpredicta-
ble explosions of aggression with little or no provocation.”82  Persons with 
PTSD often also have “panic disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, 
social phobias, and major depressive disorders.”83  “Combat is one of the 
most severe [PTSD] stressors.”84  Although it has been suggested that PTSD 
symptoms are relatively easy to feign,85 the use of new neuroscience tech-
  
 77. Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations:  The Right of 
Access, Grenada, and “Off-the-Record Wars,” 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 972 n.284 (1985). 
 78. Michael J. Davidson, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder:  A Controversial De-
fense for Veterans of a Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 434 n.151 (1988). 
 79. John Lockman, The Thousand Yard Stare:  Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, the In-
visible Casualty of War, ERNESTBECKERFOUND. (Apr. 7, 2011, 6:59 PM), 
http://www.ernestbecker.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=452:the-
thousand-yard-stare-post-traumatic-stress-disorder-the-invisible-casualty-of-war-
&catid=7:news-archives&Itemid=33. 
 80. 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 9A-9.3b, at 
271 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL]; see 
also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
467 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]; Robert Kinscherff, Proposition:  A 
Personality Disorder May Nullify Responsibility for a Criminal Act, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
745, 746 (2010) (“[T]he recent movement to establish specialized ‘mental health courts’ for 
mentally ill defendants whose psychiatric conditions contributed in some measure to the con-
duct leading to arrest reflects the infusion of psychiatry into the criminal justice system.”). 
 81. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 464; Olympia Duhart, Soldier Suicides and OutCrit 
Jurisprudence:  An Anti-Subordination Analysis, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 883, 887 (2011) 
[hereinafter Duhart, Soldier Suicides]. 
 82. 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 80, § 9A-9.3b, 
at 272; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 464. 
 83. Duhart, Soldier Suicides, supra note 81, at 887. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Erin M. Gover, Comment, Iraq as a Psychological Quagmire:  The Impli-
cations of Using Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a Defense for Iraq War Veterans, 28 
PACE L. REV. 561, 581 (2008). 
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niques in the development of external measures of assessment should obviate 
most of these concerns.86 
Through the post-Vietnam era, fact finders were “generally reluctant to 
accept the validity” of PTSD both in insanity defense cases and in sentencing 
mitigation cases.87  Thus, while at least one court characterized the evidence 
of PTSD in the case of a Vietnam war veteran as highly persuasive,88 in the 
course of an opinion affirming a jury’s rejection of the defendant’s insanity 
defense based largely on the defendant’s own testimony,89 other courts have 
narrowly ruled on the scope of expert witnesses who may permissibly testify 
as to the syndrome’s effects.90  “Similarly, defendants [were] mostly . . . 
‘surprisingly unsuccessful’91 in their attempts to use Vietnam stress syn-
drome or PTSD as a ground for the granting of a new trial in cases where the 
original convictions predated the formal recognition of the existence of Vi-
etnam stress syndrome.”92  Some defendants have been successful in their 
  
 86. Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, PTSD, and Sentencing Mitigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
53, 104 (2012).  On the new uses of neuroscience in criminal law in general, see Michael L. 
Perlin, “And I See Through Your Brain”:  Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the 
Impact of Antipsychotic Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 
STAN. TECH. L. REV, (2009), http://stlr.standford.edu/pdf/perlin-and-i-see.pdf, and see also 
Perlin, “There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden,” supra note 14; Michael L. Perlin & 
Valerie R. McClain, Unasked (and Unanswered) Questions About the Role of Neuroimaging 
in the Criminal Trial Process, 28 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 4 (2010). 
 87. 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 80, § 9A-9.3b, 
at 273–74.  For a recent reconsideration, see Caine, supra note 60.  In one of the most poign-
ant examples, a jury explained to a trial judge why it rejected an insanity defense plea in the 
case of a Vietnam veteran charged with murder: 
We, the Jury, recognize the contribution of our Viet Nam [sic] veterans and those who lost 
their lives in Viet Nam [sic].  We feel that the trial of Wayne Felde has brought to the forefront 
those extreme stress disorders prevalent among thousands of our veterans. 
. . . . 
Through long and careful deliberation, through exposure to all the evidence, we felt that Mr. 
Felde was aware of right and wrong when Mr. Thompkins’ life was taken.  However, we 
pledge ourselves to contribute whatever we can to best meet the needs of our veterans. 
State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 380 n.9 (La. 1982). 
 88. Felde, 422 So. 2d at 380. 
 89. Id. at 380, 398; see also State v. Sharp, 418 So. 2d 1344, 1348 (La. 1982) (testimony 
admissible, but jury rejected insanity defense); State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tenn. 1984) 
(defendant’s pattern of conduct raised “serious doubts” about expert witness’ opinions), cert. 
granted sub nom., Bell v. Cone, 534 U.S. 1064 (2001), and rev’d, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1076–77 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 91. Elizabeth J. Delgado, Note, Vietnam Stress Syndrome and the Criminal Defendant, 
19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 495 (1985). 
 92. 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 80, § 9A–9.3b, 
at 273. 
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arguments that evidence of PTSD should be admissible at sentencing;93 how-
ever, a student author has concluded that the courts’ decisions in admitting 
the evidence appear “to be based on the nature of the crime and the defend-
ant’s success in rehabilitation,” rather than the underlying syndrome.94  Inter-
estingly, the Supreme Court of the United States has relatively recently ruled, 
in a death penalty case, that attorneys are required to present evidence of 
PTSD when it is available.95  There, although the defendant had been a deco-
rated Korean War veteran, his court-appointed counsel presented no evi-
dence whatsoever of his military service to the jury.96  The court noted that 
had such evidence been presented, “the jury might [have found] mitigating 
the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took on Por-
ter.”97  The Court added language especially relevant to the inquiry we are 
focusing upon today:  “Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency 
to veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those who fought on 
the front lines as Porter did.”98 
One of the clearly articulated reasons for the surge in popularity in vet-
erans courts has been the number of veterans diagnosed with PTSD who 
have become involved with the criminal justice system.99  A startling 30% of 
all male soldiers who served in Vietnam “experienced PTSD at some point in 
their lives,”100 and it is estimated that, already, between 10-20% of all veter-
ans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan exhibit characteristics of 
PTSD.101  Estimates of the percentage of those who have sought treatment for 
this condition range from 23-40%.102 
  
 93. E.g., State v. Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tenn. 1983); Geraldine L. Brotherton, 
Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder—Opening Pandora’s Box?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 91, 
91 n.1 (1981–1982) (listing early unreported cases in which PTSD was asserted as a sentence-
mitigation factor).  But see United States v. Krutschewski, 541 F. Supp. 142, 142–43 (D. 
Mass. 1982); State v. Pettit, 661 P.2d 767, 769 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983); State v. Watson, 316 
S.E.2d 293, 296 (N.C. 1984). 
 94. Delgado, supra note 91, at 500. 
 95. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43–44 (2009) (per curiam). 
 96. Id. at 40. 
 97. Id. at 43–44. 
 98. Id. at 43. 
 99. Grey, supra note 86, at 72. 
One final aspect of the increasing acceptance of mitigation for veterans who suffer from PTSD 
can be found in the recent popularity of veterans’ courts.  These courts are designed to keep 
veterans with mental health issues, including PTSD, who are charged with criminal behavior 
out of the traditional justice system and place them into treatment programs instead. 
Id. 
 100. F. Don Nidiffer & Spencer Leach, To Hell and Back:  Evolution of Combat-Related 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 29 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 11 (2010). 
 101. Id. at 12; see also Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 851; Charles W. Hoge et al., Combat 
Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care, 351 NEW ENG. 
 
36
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] JOHN BROWN WENT OFF TO WAR 463 
“Veterans who suffer from PTSD may face criminal charges because 
the symptoms that they suffer from can consequently lead them to commit 
criminal offenses.”103  “The relationship between PTSD and criminal offend-
ing is considered to be so significant that the president of the National Veter-
ans Federation . . . warns that the criminal justice system is facing an epi-
demic of veterans with PTSD being charged with crimes.”104  This relation-
ship is “well-recognized by researchers and psychologists,” and increasingly, 
by the courts.105  Of course, so many of the clients of veterans courts have 
been diagnosed with PTSD.106 
 
IV. SOCIETAL AMBIVALENCE 
The scar left on the national psyche by the war in Vietnam has never 
healed; it likely never will.107  We know that the societal ambivalence that 
followed the end of the war—ambivalence reflected in areas as disparate as 
decision-making with regard to returning all the American war dead to the 
U.S.,108 Supreme Court cases about draft card burning,109 the relationship 
  
J. MED. 13, 13 (2004), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa040603; 
McCarthy, supra note 76, at 479; One in Five Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Suffer from 
PTSD or Major Depression, RAND CORP. (Apr. 17, 2008), http://www.rand. 
org/news/press/2008/04/17.html. 
 102. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 851. 
 103. Jillian M. Cavanaugh, Note, Helping Those Who Serve:  Veterans Treatment Courts 
Foster Rehabilitation and Reduce Recidivism for Offending Combat Veterans, 45 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 463, 468 (2011). 
 104. Melissa Hamilton, Reinvigorating Actus Reus:  The Case for Involuntary Actions by 
Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 340, 341 (2011). 
 105. Walls, supra note 56, at 712. 
 106. Evan R. Seamone, Attorneys as First-Responders:  Recognizing the Destructive Na-
ture of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veteran’s Legal Decision-Making Pro-
cess, 202 MIL. L. REV. 144, 155 (2009); Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor, supra 
note 56, at 186; Wexler, That’s What Friends Are For, supra note 56, at 13. 
 107. For a comprehensive account, see MELVIN SMALL, AT THE WATER’S EDGE:  
AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE VIETNAM WAR (2005), and see id. at 217–24 for a comprehen-
sive bibliography of sources. 
 108. G. KURT PIEHLER, REMEMBERING WAR THE AMERICAN WAY 168 (1995); see also 
Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands off My (Dead) Body:  A Critique of the Ways in Which the 
State Disrupts the Personhood Interests of the Deceased and His or Her Kin in Disposing of 
the Dead and Assigning Identity in Death, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 58–59 (2005). 
 109. See Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-
Based and Content-Neutral:  The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 814 
(2004) (discussing how the Court’s decision in United States v. O’Brien “reveals an ambiva-
lence that may reflect the divisiveness of the Vietnam War”). 
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between American colleges and the military,110 the designs of war memori-
als,111 social attitudes toward “obedience to established authority, duty, sub-
ordination, and [drug-related] criminal activity,”112 and in the military’s pur-
suit of the war itself113—has played out in many ways, including, specifical-
ly, how we treat Vietnam veterans in the criminal justice system.  The am-
bivalence of the jurors in State v. Felde114 is a perfect reflection of the am-
bivalence of the general public,115 and it is a factor we cannot ignore in our 
analysis of the underlying issues being discussed.116 
  
 110. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Challenging the Wisdom of Solomon:  The 
First Amendment and Military Recruitment on Campus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 205, 
236–38 (2004). 
 111. See Robin Wagner-Pacifici & Barry Schwartz, The Vietnam Veterans Memorial:  
Commemorating a Difficult Past, 97 AM. J. SOC. 376, 377–78, 381 (1991). 
 112. See James B. Thwing, Service Connection:  A Bridge Over Troubled Waters (pt. 2), 
ARMY LAW., June 1986, at 26, 26. 
 113. See, e.g., Francis Dymond, Book Note, Choosing War:  The Lost Chance for Peace 
and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, 168 MIL. L. REV. 220, 220 (2001). 
 114. 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982); see also supra note 88. 
 115. Id. at 380 & n.9. 
 116. Such ambivalence on the part of general public is also clear regarding the legitimacy 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  See Olympia Duhart, PTSD and Women Warriors:  
Causes, Controls and a Congressional Cure, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 327, 336–37 
(2012).  On the ambivalence of the “United States and other occupying forces in Iraq ‘toward 
human rights and humanitarian law concerns,’” see Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human 
Rights Approach to Armed Conflict:  Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 171, 217–
18 (2004), and Joe Stork & Fred Abrahams, Sidelined:  Human Rights in Postwar Iraq, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004:  HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED CONFLICT 93, 93–
94 (2004). 
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V. CRITICISMS OF VETERANS COURTS117 
As noted earlier, there has been a series of criticisms leveled at the crea-
tion of veterans courts.118  In this section, I will discuss these criticisms and 
explain why I find them wanting. 
A. The “Free Pass” Argument 
“The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has opposed [v]eterans 
[c]ourts, arguing that veterans are provided ‘an automatic free pass based on 
military status to certain criminal-defense rights that others don’t have.’”119  
This argument tracks a statement attributed to “Judge Charles B. Kornmann 
of the U.S. District Court for South Dakota [who] ‘cautioned [a] jury that 
nobody got “a free pass to shoot somebody” because they “went to Iraq or 
Afghanistan or the moon.”’”120 
I believe this argument is misguided, for the reasons stated by Jillian 
Cavanaugh: 
[T]here is no “free pass” when it comes to admitting veterans into 
a veterans treatment court; their eligibility is based not upon their 
status as a military veteran, but rather upon the notion that their 
  
 117. There is some irony here that for years there have been veterans administrative courts 
to adjudicate questions of benefits payments, see, e.g., Steven Reiss & Matthew Tenner, Ef-
fects of Representation by Attorneys in Cases Before VA:  The “New Paternalism,” 1 
VETERANS L. REV. 2, 2 (2009), and that the existence of these courts has never, to the best of 
my knowledge, been raised in the debate about the courts under discussion here.  Such 
courts—the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims—are Article I courts; they 
may “(1) decide any relevant questions of law that arise in a benefits proceeding, (2) compel 
VA action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, (3) hold unlawful or set aside actions 
or regulations adopted by the VA, and (4) reverse the VA’s fact-finding if it is clearly errone-
ous.”  Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010:  A New Dialogue Between the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2011); see also 38 U.S.C. § 
7261(a)(1)–(4) (2006).  An interesting parallel can be made to the mental health courts debate.  
We discuss extensively the pros and cons of such courts, while ignoring the reality that there 
are other mental health courts in which individuals are regularly committed to psychiatric 
hospitals with virtually no due process protections.  See PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS 
INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra note 14, at 193–195, 212 (comparing problem-solving 
based mental health courts to “non-specialized [courts that] I have observed across the nation, 
in which persons with mental disabilities are regularly treated as third-class citizens by (at the 
best) bored or (at the worst) malevolent trial judges”). 
 118. See supra Parts I, III. 
 119. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860. 
 120. Anthony E. Giardino, Essay, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death 
Penalty:  Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain 
Injury, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2955, 2962 n.38 (2009). 
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criminal conduct was caused by an underlying physical or psycho-
logical injury that was incurred during military service in a combat 
zone.121 
B. The Disparity Argument 
“Other concerns are that [v]eterans [c]ourts exclude non-veterans who 
suffer from PTSD but are not eligible for special provisions through these 
problem-solving courts,”122 resulting in “disparity in treatment between,” for 
example, “non-violent drug offenders who are not veterans and those who 
are.”123  I am in partial agreement with Samantha Walls’s response to this—
that non-veteran drug offenders, in most jurisdictions, “can take advantage of 
. . . drug-court programs”124—but my concern about the quality of many drug 
programs125 makes me uneasy to endorse it without qualification.  My posi-
tion here is rather the same one that I have used in support of mental health 
courts when parallel arguments have been raised:  By increasing the likeli-
hood of a person with mental disability being diverted out of the criminal 
justice system—where he is likely to be treated as a third or fourth class citi-
zen if those terms have any meaningful content or context—such courts 
  
 121. Cavanaugh, supra note 103, at 479. 
It is important to understand that veterans in veterans treatment courts do not enjoy a privilege 
based upon their status as a military service member.  “The [veterans treatment court] won’t be 
a free pass for men and women accused of crimes just because they happen to have a military 
background.” 
Id. at 479–80 n.123 (quoting “Mitch Lyles, director of adult probation for Denton County”); 
see also B.J. Lewis, Denton Program Allows Alternate Court Sentencing for Veterans, 
DALLASNEWS.COM (Dec. 22, 2009, 2:36 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-
news/denton/headlines/20091222-Denton-program-allows-alternate-court-sentencing-
8915.ece. 
Consider one concern expressed by an American Civil Liberties Union spokesman comparing 
a proposed veterans treatment court in Nevada with the veterans treatment court established in 
Cook County, Illinois:  “The concern expressed in Nevada was that individuals who served in 
the military were sort of automatically transferred into this special court and were provided 
some options for lower-level sentences.  It was based on the [military] status rather than the 
crime.” 
Cavanaugh, supra note 103, at 480 n.123 (emphasis omitted). 
 122. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860. 
 123. Hawkins, supra note 59, at 571; see also Walls, supra note 56, at 721 (“The govern-
ment is arguably creating a first-class and second-class criminal-justice system, based upon 
determining who is more deserving of treatment:  [N]on-veterans who suffer from PTSD or 
veterans who suffer from PTSD.”). 
 124. Walls, supra note 56, at 721. 
 125. See PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra note 14, at 
207, 216; see also Holland, supra note 55, at 187 (discussing the position of the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as being “[r]elatively sanguine about mental health 
courts, [but] . . . thoroughly repudiat[ing] drug courts, calling for their abolition”). 
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make it less likely that the person with mental disabilities will suffer at the 
hands of others because of that status.126  As Steven Berenson noted, “veter-
ans receive not a ‘special treatment’ through veterans courts but the appro-
priate treatment that all defendants would receive through our criminal jus-
tice system in an ideal system.”127 
C. The Stereotype Perpetuation Argument 
“Critics also say that [v]eterans [c]ourts perpetuate the stereotype that 
veterans are returning ‘war-crazy.’”128  In responding to this argument, Pro-
fessor Steven Berenson concludes that “the burden should seem to be on 
veterans’ advocates better to publicize the successes of returning veterans 
than to deny necessary assistance to veterans who have not enjoyed any such 
successes.”129  While I agree that such publicity would be helpful, it seems to 
me that the issue here is much deeper, and reflects the malignancy of 
sanism—“an irrational prejudice . . . of the same quality and character of 
other [irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in] prevailing [social 
attitudes of] racism, sexism, [homophobia], and ethnic bigotry”130—and its 
impact on all of society.131  General Patton’s famous slap132 was a perfect 
exemplar of the ravages of sanism.133  If anything, the existence of veterans 
courts—premised on the acknowledged reality that persons with mental dis-
abilities are victimized by prejudice and discrimination—will serve as a way 
of, eventually, remediating some of the stereotypes that exist about crazy 
soldiers returning home from war.134  Almost thirty years ago, this issue was 
raised in the specific context of Vietnam veterans charged with crimes that 
appeared related to diagnoses of PTSD:  “[L]awyers on both sides do fear 
  
 126. See PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra note 14, at 
202–06.  On issues of fairness and procedural justice in hearings before such courts, see Terry 
Carney et al., Mental Health Tribunals:  “TJ” Implications of Weighing Fairness, Freedom, 
Protection and Treatment, 17 J. JUD. ADMIN. 46, 53–54 (2007); Risdon N. Slate, From the 
Jailhouse to Capitol Hill:  Impacting Mental Health Court Legislation and Defining What 
Constitutes a Mental Health Court, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 12, 15–16 (2003). 
 127. Berenson, supra note 16, at 40. 
 128. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860. 
 129. Berenson, supra note 16, at 41. 
 130. See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374 (1992). 
 131. See Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got,” 
supra note 32, at 750; Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/or Else Expecting Rain,” supra 
note 32, at 502; Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks,” supra note 32, at 688. 
 132. See McCarthy, supra note 76, at 477–78. 
 133. See id.; see also Peter Blanck, “The Right to Live in the World”:  Disability Yester-
day, Today, and Tomorrow, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 367, 377 (2008). 
 134. See Blanck, supra note 133, at 377; Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860–61. 
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that P-TDS [sic] cases could become litmus tests of attitudes about the war 
and the warriors.  Veterans often assume civilians will not understand their 
experiences, and jurors may worry that a guilty verdict proves they are un-
grateful to the soldiers.”135  Professor Peter Blanck has noted that “veterans 
with [PTSD] and mental conditions are among those with the highest war-
related injuries and most stigmatized impairments.”136  Elsewhere, I have 
described the roots of stigma facing persons with mental disabilities as being 
based on sanism, through which “‘able-bodied society feels existential anxie-
ty towards people with [mental] disabilities, and that anxiety’s at the core of . 
. . irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social atti-
tudes.’”137  If anything, veterans courts will diminish the stigma faced by 
such veterans and will help reduce the sanism prevalent in our treatment of 
them. 
D. The Costs Argument 
“Veterans [c]ourts have been criticized for being more costly than tradi-
tional courts.”138  My response here is a demurrer.  So what?  Like all prob-
lem-solving courts, these “courts offer a much wider range of services than 
their traditional counterparts, [and thus] tend to be more expensive than tra-
ditional courts” in terms of court operations.139  “However, the financial cost 
of problem-solving courts is still [significantly] less than the financial costs 
of incarceration and recidivism.”140  I think that Cathy Ho Hartsfield is pre-
cisely right when she concludes, on this point, “[p]roblem-solving courts, 
such as [v]eterans [c]ourts, should be viewed as a long-term solution, and 
thus, the long-term cost-efficient benefits are well worth the initial invest-
ment.”141 
  
 135. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The “Vietnam Syndrome” Defense:  A “G.I. Bill of Criminal 
Rights?,” ARMY LAW., Feb. 1985, at 1, 26 & n.171. 
 136. Blanck, supra note 133, at 377. 
 137. Id. (alteration in original); see also Michael L. Perlin, “Through the Wild Cathedral 
Evening”:  Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory Democracy, Professor tenBroek, and the Rights 
of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 413, 416 (2008) (discussing Har-
lan Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability:  Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, INDEP. 
LIVING INST., para. 24 (1985), http://www.independentliving.org/docs4/hahn2.html); Michael 
Ashley Stein, Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55 STAN. L. REV. 607, 
631–32 (2002) (book review); Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans:  The Foun-
dation of a Political Agenda, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 181, 182 (Alan 
Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987). 
 138. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860. 
 139. Berenson, supra note 16, at 40. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 862. 
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E. The Domestic Violence Critique 
Advocates for victims of domestic violence have opposed including 
such offenses within the ambit of veterans courts at all, “noting the escalating 
nature of those offenses.”142  Pamela Kravetz has argued that all such cases 
should be excluded from the courts’ jurisdictional ambit, arguing that their 
inclusion “makes difficult and highly volatile situations even worse due to 
mixed messages about criminal responsibility, emphasis on treatment, and 
the risk of victim coercion.”143  Although this is an argument with surface 
appeal, I believe it fails as well.  In a discussion of problem-solving courts, 
Professor David Wexler and Judge Michael King have noted how, “for rea-
sons of political acceptability,” those charged with serious offenses are typi-
cally excluded from newly-created drug and mental health courts,144 but that, 
as time goes on, offenders charged with violent offenses are more likely to 
be accepted into these courts, and that offenders charged with domestic vio-
lence are now being included in some mental health courts, as long as the 
victim consents.145 
If the purpose of these courts is to “help struggling veterans [more] than 
the traditional criminal justice alternatives of conviction and incarcera-
tion,”146 then it makes no logical sense to exclude certain crimes from their 
jurisdictional ambit, especially crimes that, logically, may often be a mani-
festation of the PTSD with which eligible veterans have been diagnosed.147  
And of course, there are currently domestic violence problem-solving courts 
in many jurisdictions, many of which were begun in recognition of the reality 
that “traditional approaches have failed in addressing the underlying prob-
lems in areas such as . . . domestic violence.”148 
  
 142. Hawkins, supra note 59, at 570. 
 143. Kravetz, supra note 69, at 201. 
 144. David B. Wexler & Michael S. King, Promoting Societal and Juridical Receptivity to 
Rehabilitation:  The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COURT SUPERVISED TREATMENT 
ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION FOR DRUG-DEPENDENT OFFENDERS:  THE DRUG POLICY 
AGENDA (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722278.  I 
discuss this phenomenon in PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” 
supra note 14, at 206. 
 145. Wexler & King, supra note 144 (manuscript at 5 n.17). 
 146. Berenson, supra note 16, at 39. 
 147. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 72, 
at 6, 7 & n.9. 
 148. Erin McGrath, Note, Reentry Courts:  Providing a Second Chance for Incarcerated 
Mothers and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 113, 118 (2012). 
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F. The “Cherry Picking” Argument 
Other opponents accuse such courts of “cherry picking” low-risk candi-
dates, leaving potentially higher-risk offenders behind to be sentenced 
through the traditional criminal justice system.149  Other critics argue that the 
creation of such courts would disproportionately divert resources from other 
criminal courts “because judges already have the ability to take service-
connected disabilities like PTSD into consideration in all aspects of the crim-
inal justice system, including sentencing.”150 
The literature that raises these arguments, however, does not point out 
any evidence that this has actually happened.151  And while this certainly may 
happen in cases where courts have the discretion to accept violent offenders, 
it does not seem to be an appropriate concern with regard to the vast majority 
of courts that jurisdictionally only serve nonviolent offenders.  Also, in some 
jurisdictions, any individual charged with a statutorily-listed offense who is a 
veteran under federal law may opt in.152  And, I have an additional response 
here:  Our correctional system is broken, badly broken, and perhaps beyond 
repair, especially in cases of persons with serious mental disabilities who 
have been convicted of crime.153  Any alternative to the system that diverts 
anyone out (and into potentially redemptive treatment programs) is a good 
alternative.  This point has been made most effectively by legal journalist 
Dahlia Lithwick: 
But the fact that veterans courts seem to work as well as they do 
suggests a more fundamental lesson about correcting what’s bro-
ken in the criminal justice system.  Whether we really want to go 
down the road of creating first- and second-class criminal court 
systems and whether we can truly draw any principled line be-
tween special judicial treatment for nonviolent veterans but not the 
violent ones are not easy political questions.  They are thorny legal 
  
 149. Caine, supra note 60, at 235–36. 
 150. Hawkins, supra note 59, at 571. 
 151. See Caine, supra note 60, at 236; Hawkins, supra note 59, at 571. 
 152. Smith, supra note 18, at 99 & n.32 (discussing court in Anchorage, Alaska). 
 153. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HENRY A. DLUGACZ, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND 
PRISONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 3–4 (2008) [hereinafter PERLIN & DLUGACZ, MENTAL 
HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND PRISONS]; John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Con-
fronting Confinement:  A Report of The Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Pris-
ons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 402 (2006) (“[M]ost correctional systems are set up to 
fail.”).  John J. Gibbons is a retired Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge; . Nicholas de B. 
Katzenbach was the former Attorney General of the United States. 
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ones.  You don’t have to oppose veterans’ court to want that type 
of justice for all.154 
G. The “We Have Other Courts” Argument 
“Because drug and mental health treatment courts already exist in many 
jurisdictions, a common suggestion is to simply divert veterans into those 
programs rather than create a new category of treatment courts entirely.”155  
Tiffany Cartwright responds ably to this critique: 
[F]or combat veterans, their underlying problem is not their sub-
stance abuse, or even their PTSD—it is their combat trauma, and 
that is something that cannot be addressed as effectively in a tradi-
tional drug or mental health court.  Many veterans have experi-
enced things that are uncommon or unheard of among civilian de-
fendants.156 
H. The “Already Lenient” Argument 
Some “believe that veteran courts are unnecessary due to the already 
present leniency towards veterans in the court process.”157  There is little 
hard non-anecdotal evidence, however, that this actually happens, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court’s dicta in Porter v. McCollum,158 discussed ear-
lier in this paper.159  An amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has 
made federal sentencing more hospitable to PTSD claims by military veter-
ans, noting that military service may be an appropriate mitigating factor “in 
determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service, indi-
vidually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present to 
an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered 
by the guidelines,”160 yet a recent search has revealed that there are few re-
  
 154. Lithwick, supra note 71. 
 155. Tiffany Cartwright, “To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle”:  The Re-
cent Development of Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 
302–03 (2011). 
 156. Id. at 303 (footnotes omitted). 
 157. Walls, supra note 56, at 721. 
 158. 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam). 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 95–98.  “Our Nation has a long tradition of ac-
cording leniency to veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those who fought on 
the front lines as Porter did.”  Porter, 558 U.S. at 43. 
 160. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (2011); see also Grey, supra note 
86, at 70. 
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ported cases interpreting this provision.161  And, of course, not all states use 
guidelines modeled on the federal law.162 
Mental health defenses based upon PTSD are typically unsuccessful, 
and even where mitigation is deemed warranted, the veteran-defendant will 
still face incarceration—often lengthy incarceration.163  And, if incarcerated, 
it is likely that this cohort will not receive the necessary psychological treat-
ment.164  The leniency argument is not reality-based. 
In short, none of the arguments offered in opposition to the creation of 
these courts is persuasive. 
VI. COUNSEL AND JUDICIARY ISSUES 
There has been little commentary on the question of the quality of coun-
sel made available to defendants in veterans court proceedings.  I believe, 
though, that consideration of counsel effectiveness in other problem-solving 
court venues may be relevant to this discussion.  We know that the quality of 
counsel made available to criminal defendants with mental disabilities is 
often tragically substandard.165  At least one court has ruled, by way of ex-
ample, that failure of counsel to pursue a PTSD defense did not deny effec-
tive assistance of counsel, characterizing Vietnam stress syndrome as a novel 
defense which need not be explored by counsel.166  Others have rejected 
Strickland v. Washington167 based arguments168 where PTSD was not raised 
  
 161. Grey, supra note 86, at 70 & n.80. 
 162. See, e.g., Caine, supra note 60, at 230–31; see also Grey, supra note 86, at 69, 70. 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 87–98; see also Michael L. Perlin & Henry A. 
Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone That Counts”:  Can International Human Rights Law Be an Effec-
tive Source of Rights in Correctional Conditions Litigation?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675, 676, 
680–81 (2009) [hereinafter Perlin & Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone That Counts”]; PERLIN & 
DLUGACZ, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND PRISONS, supra note 153, at 3. 
 164. Perlin & Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone That Counts,” supra note 163, at 681. 
 165. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY:  RETHINKING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (2013); see also Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s 
Face Is Always Well-Hidden”:  The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who 
Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 202–05, 207 (1996-1997); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL 
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY:  THE SHAME OF THE STATES 126 (2013) [hereinafter 
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY]. 
 166. See Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 678 (S.D. 1983).  But see id. at 682 (Henderson, 
J., dissenting). 
 167. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 168. Id. at 686 (test for adequacy is “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
function[] of the adversarial process that the trial [court] cannot be relied on as having pro-
duced a just result”).  I discuss Strickland extensively in PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 165, at 129–31. 
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at the sentencing phase of death penalty trials.169  Although there is some 
evidence that, at the current time, more defendants have successfully used 
PTSD defenses in sentence mitigation efforts,170 there is no evidence that the 
criminal defense bar, in the aggregate, gets the full meaning and potential 
range of PTSD defenses.171  At the very least, such lawyers must begin to 
“apprise themselves of their clients’ military experience and mental health 
background so as to protect and best advocate for the best interests of their 
clients.”172 
How can we be confident that counsel will be adequate in cases involv-
ing similar issues before veterans courts when much less is at stake (than in 
the death penalty context)?  Dr. Steven Erickson and his colleagues have 
expressed “concern[] as to whether defendants in mental health courts re-
ceive adequate representation by their attorneys.”173  Terry Carney character-
izes the assumption that adequate counsel will be present at hearings to guar-
antee liberty values as a “false hope.”174 
Henry Dlugacz and Christopher Wimmer summarize the salient issues: 
 It is not reasonable to expect a client to repose trust in an 
attorney unless she is confident that he is acting in accordance with 
her wishes.  The client with mental illness may already doubt the 
  
 169. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Thaler, 389 F. App’x 419, 421, 425, 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2445 (2011) (holding that defense counsel’s failures to 
investigate and present evidence of petitioner’s PTSD, attention deficit disorder, drug addic-
tion, fetal alcohol syndrome, learning disabilities, and borderline I.Q. did not prejudice him); 
Jordan v. Epps, 740 F. Supp. 2d 802, 814, 853–56 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (finding that determina-
tion that petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to obtain mental health exam-
iner in capital murder prosecution was not contrary to, nor unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law; there was no connection between petitioner’s alleged PTSD from his 
military service and his criminal behavior that would have required evaluation by mental 
health examiner). 
 170. Nidiffer & Leach, supra note 100, at 16. 
 171. See Daniel Burgess et al., Reviving the “Vietnam Defense”:  Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and Criminal Responsibility in a Post-Iraq/Afghanistan World, DEV. MENTAL 
HEALTH L., Jan. 2010, at 59, 77–78 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Porter v. 
McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009) (per curiam), stating that “such a ruling places a burden on 
the defense bar to ascertain clients’ military background and subsequent related issues when 
defending them in capital cases.”). 
 172. Id. at 79. 
 173. Steven K. Erickson et al., Variations in Mental Health Courts:  Challenges, Oppor-
tunities, and a Call for Caution, 42 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 335, 340 (2006). 
 174. Terry Carney, The Mental Health Service Crisis of Neoliberalism—An Antipodean 
Perspective, 31 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 101, 105 (2008); see also Terry Carney, Best Inter-
ests or Legal Rectitude?:  Australian Mental Health Tribunal Stakeholder & Case-Flow Impli-
cations 33 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.mhcirl.ie/Training_ 
Development/Professor_Terry_Carney_Best_Interests_or_Legal_Rectitude_Paper.pdf (“The 
issue of legal advocacy before [mental health tribunals] . . . is a vexed one.”). 
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attorney’s loyalty.  This risk is exacerbated when the attorney is 
appointed by the court.  The client may wonder whether the attor-
ney has been assigned in order to zealously represent her, or in-
stead to facilitate her processing through the legal system. . . . 
There are . . . strong personal disincentives to thorough prepara-
tion, even for the committed attorney. . . . There are also institu-
tional pressures:  The attorney who depends on the goodwill of 
others in the system (e.g., judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) 
may pull his punches, even unwittingly, in order to retain credibil-
ity for future interactions (which he would put to use for his future 
clients).  Judges want cases resolved.175 
 
Some solutions—largely drawing upon TJ imperatives176—have been 
offered.  Bruce Winick has argued that “lawyers should adequately counsel 
their clients about the advantages and disadvantages of accepting diversion 
to mental health court.”177  “As a result, judges and defense counsel in mental 
health courts should ensure that defendants receive dignity and respect, [and] 
are given a sense of voice and validation.”178  Further, it is essential that 
counsel has “a background in mental health issues and in communicating 
with individuals who may be in crisis.”179  Tiffany Cartwright has even rec-
ommended that “the prosecutor and defense counsel should work together 
using a non-adversarial approach to protect both public safety and the veter-
an’s rights.”180 
  
 175. Henry Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with 
Limited Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 331, 
353–54 (2011).  On the need for lawyers taking a TJ approach to view their clients holistical-
ly, see Wexler & King, supra note 144. 
 176. See Deen Potter, Lawyer, Social Worker, Psychologist and More:  The Role of the 
Defence Lawyer in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, AM. U. SCH. PUB. AFF., 96–97 (Jan. 2005), 
www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/105/pdf. (on the challenges inherent in a therapeu-
tic jurisprudence practice).  On how the use of TJ can improve public defender practices in 
general, see Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 51, at 786–800, 803–04. 
 177. Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 507, 523 (2005). 
 178. Id. at 516. 
 179. Tammy Seltzer, Mental Health Courts:  A Misguided Attempt to Address the Crimi-
nal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment of People with Mental Illnesses, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 570, 576 (2005); see also M. Carmela Epright, Coercing Future Freedom:  Con-
sent and Capacities for Autonomous Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 799, 801 (2010) (“‘Ideal-
ly, in mental health courts all courtroom personnel—i.e., judge, prosecutor, defense counsel 
and other relevant professionals—have experience and training in mental health issues and 
available community resources.’”). 
 180. Cartwright, supra note 155, at 307.  Her suggestion appears to track, sub silentio, 
much of the restorative justice literature that urges solutions by which to “restore victims, 
restore offenders, and restore communities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just.”  
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What about the role of judges?  Judge Michael King has written elo-
quently about the need for judges to become experts in the interpersonal as-
pects of judging, noting that, depending on the circumstances, judging may 
require “particular listening and communication skills, the expression of em-
pathy, the use of techniques of persuasion or motivational interviewing, the 
use of techniques to settle child witnesses and collaborative problem-solving 
techniques.”181  Certainly, the need for these skills is intensified in problem-
solving courts, such as veterans courts.182 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I began by quoting Judge Ackerman’s decision in the Falter case that 
the litigation there was about how the plaintiffs—VA residents—“are treated 
as human beings.”183  Writing recently about the role of the judiciary in prob-
lem-solving courts in general, Australian Judge Michael S. King quoted a 
judge involved in the creation of the first drug court in Miami, Florida, as 
referring to his work as “a statement of our belief in the redemption of hu-
man beings.”184  I believe this is where we must start. 
David Wexler and Judge King set out an important list of key TJ strate-
gies that all problem-solving courts should incorporate:185 
  
Id.; John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized:  Realistic or Utopian?, 
46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION 11 (2002) (“‘Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties 
with a stake in [the] . . . offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future.’”). 
 181. Michael King, Realising the Potential of Judging, 37 MONASH U. L. REV. 171, 171–
72 (2011) [hereinafter King, Realising the Potential of Judging]. 
 182. See id. at 176; Michael S. King, New Directions in the Courts’ Response to Drug and 
Alcohol Related Legal Problems:  Interdisciplinary Collaboration 2 (2012) (unpublished man-
uscript) [hereinafter King, New Directions], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130343; 
see also Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, ‘Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and 
Forsaked’:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law as Applied to 
Prisoners and Detainees by Forensic Psychologists, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 
231, 234 (2008); Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Home in the Valley Meets 
the Damp Dirty Prison”:  A Human Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Role of Forensic Psychologists in Correctional Settings, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 
256, 257 (2009); Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror,” supra note 32, at 606; Perlin, 
“Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind,” supra note 29, at 1184; PERLIN, 
UNDERSTANDING THE INTERSECTION, supra note 29, at 200–02. 
 183. Falter I, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1980). 
 184. King, New Directions, supra note 182, at 17–18. 
 185. Wexler & King, supra note 144 (manuscript at 12–15).  Judge King prefers “solution-
focused courts” to “problem-solving courts” as the proper descriptor.  Id. at 12; see also King, 
New Directions, supra note 182, at 17. 
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Promoting participant choice wherever possible. 
Asking participants to formulate rehabilitation plans setting 
out their goals for their time in the program and beyond and the 
strategies they intend to pursue in order to achieve these goals. 
Including participants’ rehabilitation plans as part of behav-
ioral contracts. 
Having positive (but realistic) expectations concerning partic-
ipant achievement. 
Promoting self-efficacy.  Self-efficacy refers to a person’s be-
lief in his or her ability to function competently. 
As far as possible avoiding a coercive and/or paternalistic ap-
proach to addressing problems with participants’ performance 
while engaging in the DTC program. 
The use of non-confrontational methods of engagement with 
participants in order to promote behavioral change—such as moti-
vational interviewing techniques and persuasion.186 
These prescriptions strike me as a perfect starting place at which veter-
ans court judges should begin.  In a recent article on the potential of judging, 
Judge King concludes by noting: 
The interpersonal dimension of judging has received particular 
note through the exercise of facilitative, change-oriented and in-
clusive judging practices in problem-solving courts and in the use 
of therapeutic jurisprudence in other contexts.  It has also been ex-
emplified in the acknowledgment within the judiciary of the neces-
sity to be more aware of and sensitive to the needs of individuals 
from diverse backgrounds, who come before the court in various 
capacities.187 
This sort of awareness is absolutely crucial if veterans courts are, in fact, 
going to succeed and if they can ameliorate the transition of returning veter-
ans into civil society.188  And it is an awareness that needs to be undertaken, 
  
 186. Wexler & King, supra note 144 (manuscript at 12–15). 
 187. King, Realising the Potential of Judging, supra note 181, at 186. 
 188. See Hawkins, supra note 59, at 570–72. 
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] JOHN BROWN WENT OFF TO WAR 477 
in the words of Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, a Ninth Circuit federal judge, 
“with an understanding heart, a firm hand, and a watchful eye.”189 
In Dylan’s song John Brown, upon return from the war, the eponymous 
narrator tells his mother: 
“And I couldn’t help but think, through the thunder rolling and 
stink. That I was just a puppet in a play 
And through the roar and smoke, this string is finally broke 
And a cannonball blew my eyes away.”190 
The extent to which our returning servicemen and servicewomen have 
been puppets in a play is a question that will be debated for decades, at least.  
As Dahlia Lithwick has perceptively noted, “[v]eterans return from war hav-
ing seen and survived unspeakable things, then try to adjust to civilian life 
with inadequate resources and support.”191  The very least we can do is to 
acknowledge what they have faced, the impact that their experiences at war 
have had, and restructure the judicial system to provide at least some of the 
needed resources and support. 
  
 189. Id. at 563 n.*, 572. 
 190. DYLAN, supra note 23. 
 191. Lithwick, supra note 71. 
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EVAN R. SEAMONE† 
By separating combat veterans with uniquely military discharges that make 
many ineligible for effective PTSD treatment, the active duty armed forces 
are creating a class of future offenders, specially trained to be lethal, whose 
violent acts against themselves, their families, and the public collectively 
amass more casualties, incur more costs, and drain more resources in the 
homeland than the underlying traumatic episode in the war zone.  The obli-
gation to treat these offenders and help them successfully transition to civil-
ian society with preserved VA benefits before discharge is not merely a laud-
atory goal of therapeutic jurisprudence, but a mandate under the precau-
tionary principle which guides the laws of public health and safety.  To meet 
this obligation, the military must work collaboratively with civilian agencies 
while offenders are still under military control.  Mutual self-preservation 
demands this. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the heels of various publications observing the high number of 
American inmates with mental illness,1 advocates and academicians have 
spoken against the criminalization of mental illness.2  Many courts have re-
  
 † Major, U.S. Army. Prosecutor, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. This article is based 
upon the author’s presentation at the Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter’s symposium, Wounds of War: Meeting the Needs of Active-Duty Military Personnel and 
Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Feb. 1, 2013).  The per-
spectives in this article, like the perspectives at the presentation, are solely attributable to the 
author’s personal opinions and do not represent the official position of any government agen-
cy, to include the Department of Defense, the Marine Corps, the Army, or the Department of 
Veterans Affairs.  The author would like to thank Professor Kathy Cerminara, Dr. Jonathan 
Shay, and Captain Eric Trudell for their valuable insights.  The author may be contacted by e-
mail at evan.seamone@us.army.mil. 
 1. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED:  U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa 
1003.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., MARY BETH PFEIFFER, CRAZY IN AMERICA:  THE HIDDEN TRAGEDY OF OUR 
CRIMINALIZED MENTALLY ILL, at ix–x (2007); E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: 
HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE TO TREAT THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 
(2008). 
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sponded to this problem with a therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) model that 
seeks to improve the outcomes of the criminal justice process by enhancing 
the well-being of all parties and society in litigation.3  Specifically, with the 
implementation of diversionary programs at arrest, probationary programs at 
sentencing, and specialized courts that monitor treatment progress, lawmak-
ers and judges have modified the criminal justice system to target the under-
lying psychiatric causes of the misconduct rather than the criminal symptoms 
of their mental illness.4  Although critics may complain about the possibility 
of true criminals getting off easy, for the most part, these deviations in pun-
ishment exist in the recognition that the status quo results in a “‘revolving 
door’” of criminality, endangering society and creating a public health con-
cern of terrible magnitude.5  I fashion this policy as the therapeutic impera-
tive in cases involving mental illness, especially when the offender has not 
been properly diagnosed or treated prior to the criminal offense(s) and inter-
action with the justice system. 
After more than eleven years of sustained combat operations, civilian 
criminal justice systems have embraced veterans—especially combat veter-
ans, particularly those with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and mild 
traumatic brain injury6 sustained from their faithful service to the nation—as 
  
 3. Evan R. Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor:  Using Therapeutic Juris-
prudence to Enhance Client Counseling for Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Dis-
order, 202 MIL. L. REV. 185, 188–90 (2009) (applying the concept of TJ to combat veterans). 
 4. See, e.g., David Loveland & Michael Boyle, Intensive Case Management as a Jail 
Diversion Program for People with a Serious Mental Illness:  A Review of the Literature, 51 
INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 130, 132–33 (2007) (surveying five 
widely adopted methods of diverting offenders with mental illness from the criminal justice 
system and repeat offenses). 
 5. See Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice:  The 
Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI 
and Reduce Recidivism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2011) [hereinafter Seamone, Reclaiming 
the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice] (describing the historical evolution of mental 
health courts to effectively reduce recidivism under extremely complicated circumstances). 
 6. See BARRY R. SCHALLER, VETERANS ON TRIAL:  THE COMING COURT BATTLES OVER 
PTSD 9, 41, 205–09 (2012).  PTSD and traumatic brain injury (TBI) are two injuries that have 
separate diagnoses and symptoms.  See id. at 32–36, 41 (discussing the development of 
PTSD’s seventeen diagnostic criteria, as well as TBI); Jennifer J. Vasterling et al., Posttrau-
matic Stress Reactions over Time:  The Battlefield, Homecoming, and Long-Term Course, in 
CARING FOR VETERANS WITH DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS DISORDERS:  IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, 
AND BEYOND 35, 46–47 (Josef I. Ruzek et al. eds., 2011) (discussing causes of PTSD in the 
war zone that create overwhelming sensations of hopelessness and later symptoms that lead to 
difficulties in families and communities); Jozsef Meszaros, Achieving Peace of Mind:  The 
Benefits of Neurobiological Evidence for Battered Women Defendants, 23 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 117, 150–52 (2011) (discussing symptoms of TBI, which results from physical 
trauma to the brain and often influences judgment and decision-making).  Conservative esti-
mates project approximately 300,000 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan will sustain PTSD.  
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a population deserving of the therapeutic imperative.7  Because the worst 
symptoms of this disorder are often delayed until the veteran returns after 
combat when the body and mind have physically left the chaotic environment 
of the war zone,8 legislators, law enforcement officers, and court personnel 
have recognized that the civil violation often represents the first opportunity 
the offender has to address remnants of their overseas combat experience.9  
  
Summary of INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR:  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR 
CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY, at xx–xxi (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. 
Jaycox eds., 2008), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/mono 
graphs/2008/RAND_MG720.pdf (“[A]pproximately 300,000 individuals [returning from Iraq 
and Afghanistan] currently suffer from PTSD or major depression.”).  Additionally, estimates 
regarding TBI project that Iraq and Afghanistan veterans who have survived attacks by im-
provised explosive devices are at high risk of suffering both TBI and PTSD as co-occurring 
disorders.  David L. Butler et al., Assessment and Treatment in Polytrauma Contexts:  Trau-
matic Brain Injury and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in CARING FOR VETERANS WITH 
DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS DISORDERS:  IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND BEYOND 87, 88–90 
(Josef I. Ruzek et al. eds., 2011) (discussing instances of comorbid PTSD and TBI). 
 7. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
26–27 & nn.69–70 (surveying veteran-specific interventions, including drivers’ license nota-
tions in Georgia and Utah for those diagnosed with PTSD); see also Sean Clark et al., Practice 
Commentary, Development of Veterans Treatment Courts:  Local and Legislative Initiatives, 7 
DRUG CT. REV. 171, 189–94 tbl.2 (2010) (comparing national statutory frameworks tailored to 
veterans in the criminal justice system); Debra A. Pinals, Veterans and the Justice System:  
The Next Forensic Frontier, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 163, 164 (2010) (noting the 
“expanding national agenda” for veteran-specific diversionary programs). 
 8. See Bernice Andrews et al., Delayed-Onset Posttraumatic Stress Disorder:  A Sys-
tematic Review of the Evidence, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1319, 1319 (2007).  Delayed-onset 
PTSD is recognized as a manifestation of the disorder in which symptoms do not emerge for 
months or even years following a servicemember’s combat trauma.  Id. at 1319 (observing 
how this variation was developed as a diagnosis in recognition that “many soldiers do not 
develop symptoms [of PTSD] until they return home, as stress reactions are not adaptive in 
combat”).  As an example, see JOANNA BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING:  FACE-TO-
FACE KILLING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY WARFARE 212 (Basic Books 1999) [hereinafter 
BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING] (sharing the experience of John Garcia, a WWII 
combat veteran, who is haunted daily by combat experiences in which he “inadvertently killed 
a woman and her infant” 40 years after the event). 
 9. See, e.g., MARGARET E. NOONAN & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:  VETERANS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISON, 2004, at 4 (2007), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vsfp04.pdf (reporting that incarcerated 
veterans, as a whole, are more likely than nonveterans to be first-time offenders).  Attorneys 
in the criminal justice system, specifically defense attorneys, are often the “first responders” to 
untreated PTSD.  Evan R. Seamone, Attorneys as First Responders:  Recognizing the Destruc-
tive Nature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veteran’s Legal Decision-Making 
Process, 202 MIL. L. REV. 144, 145–46 (2009) [hereinafter Seamone, Attorneys as First-
Responders].  Further, veterans treatment courts, which feature treatment alternatives and 
diversionary programs for veteran offenders specifically operate on the “unspoken assump-
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In light of growing reports of active duty suicide,10 failures to diagnose 
servicemembers, inadequacy of PTSD screening, and some indication of 
incentives for mental health professionals to conserve budgets by labeling 
PTSD as something less serious,11 the civilian criminal justice system often 
functions as a surrogate for active duty mental health triage and treatment 
when it inherits a military offender.12  Arguably, this embrace of veterans 
represents a tacit agreement between civil society and the active armed forc-
es; the criminal justice system has begun to pick up the pieces for veterans 
who are in the greatest need—as evidenced by the sheer destructiveness of 
their offenses—in recognition that the primary mission of the armed forces is 
combat, that the services must always be ready to fight, and that rehabilita-
tion by the active armed forces may often serve to impair the military mis-
sion.13 
Veterans raise special public health concerns because of their training.  
Combat veterans who have perfected the art of using their hands and weap-
ons to take lives in the quickest and most devastating manner, and who have 
developed a mental mindset that has allowed them to rationalize this behav-
ior in practice over time,14 are as lethal to bystanders, law enforcement offic-
  
tion” that the military has failed to meet their treatment needs.  SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 
208, 211. 
 10. See, e.g., RAJEEV RAMCHAND ET AL., THE WAR WITHIN:  PREVENTING SUICIDE IN THE 
U.S. MILITARY, at iii (2011), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG953.pdf (discussing notable and recent trends). 
 11. See Keegan Hamilton, Mind Field:  PTSD & the Military, SEATTLE NEWS (Aug. 8, 
2012), http://www.seattleweekly.com/2012-08-08/news/mind-field-ptsd-the-military/ (report-
ing on internal memoranda at Madigan Army Medical Center in which administrators encour-
aged Army psychiatrists to downgrade PTSD to adjustment disorder because a diagnosis 
could “burden [taxpayers] as much as $1.5 million for a single soldier over the course of his or 
her lifetime”). 
 12. SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 208 (“The failure of current [military] support systems 
has left it to the states and cities to fill in the gaps . . . .”); see also Todd Brewster, Foreword 
to BARRY R. SCHALLER, VETERANS ON TRIAL:  THE COMING COURT BATTLES OVER PTSD, at 
ix, xiii (2012) (“Courts, after all, don’t see the evidence of such trauma until a crime is com-
mitted, when it may already be too late.”). 
 13. U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (“[I]t is the primary business of 
[all] armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.”); see also 
discussion infra Part II (describing rationales for this abdication of rehabilitative responsibil-
ity). 
 14. See Preface to RICHARD A. GABRIEL, NO MORE HEROES:  MADNESS & PSYCHIATRY IN 
WAR, at prefatory note (1987) (quoting WWII Marine Corps veteran William Manchester:  
“You’re dealing here with complicated psychological states.  No man in battle is really sane.  
The mind-set of the soldier on the battlefield is a highly disturbed mind, and this is an epidem-
ic of insanity which affects everybody there, and those not afflicted by it die very quickly.”); 
see also BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING, supra note 8, at 102 (describing the 
positions of military psychiatrists who banked on the effect of stress-induced madness, reason-
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ers, and victims as they are to foreign enemies when the symptoms of their 
mental illness result in or contribute to loss of impulse control or violence.15  
Yet, public safety, alone, is not the only motivator for the therapeutic impera-
tive.16  A review of the enabling legislation for the growing number of veter-
ans treatment courts throughout the nation—currently180,17  with many more 
in the planning stages, highlights the unifying determining factor; as it relates 
to the treatment of veterans in the civilian criminal justice system, the thera-
peutic imperative derives more than anything from a moral obligation to 
repay the country’s wounded warriors for their debts.18 
The pivotal question raised by civil society’s willingness (or de facto 
role) to catch the stray servicemembers who slip through the cracks is 
whether this tacit agreement acts as an incentive for the military to bypass the 
legitimate mental health care needs of servicemembers.19  With an eye to-
ward the prevention of PTSD and traumatic brain injury (TBI) related mis-
  
ing “that combat soldiers who began fearing that they would ‘crack’ under the strain would 
attempt to destroy the threat as [soon] as possible and, in a fit of ‘desperate aggression,’ often 
acted heroically.”). 
 15. See, e.g., JERRY LAVELY ET AL., COMBAT VETERAN DOMESTIC CRISIS RESPONSE: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT DE-ESCALATION OPTIONS 3 (McCormick Foundation 2009) (observing how 
symptomatic veterans present a “unique threat to law enforcement”); Christopher Weaver et 
al., Enhancing Services Response to Crisis Incidents Involving Veterans: A Role for Law 
Enforcement and Mental Health Collaboration, 10 Psychological Servs. 66, 68 (2013) (“Vet-
erans are often trained in combat, weapons, and policing tactics, and may have wartime prac-
tice using these skills.  In fact, veterans’ skills in these areas may be equal or superior to those 
of responding officers.”). See also discussion infra Part IV. 
 16. See discussion infra Part IV.; see also Viewpoints on Veterans Affairs and Related 
Issues:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs, 103d Cong. 15 (1994) (testimony of Jonathan Shay, M.D., Ph.D.) [hereinaf-
ter Shay Testimony]. 
 17. Comments of Hon. Eric Shinseki, Sec. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Keynote Address to 
the General Session of the 143rd Congress of Corrections, Am. Correctional Ass’n..  National 
Harbor, Md (Aug. 12, 2013).  See also The History, JUST. FOR VETS, http://www. 
justiceforvets.org/vtc-history (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 18. See, e.g., Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra 
note 5, at 18 n.41 (describing how the many veterans’ initiatives developed in state judicial 
systems “exist to address issues related exclusively to [wounds incurred during] the offender’s 
active duty military service”).  Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, a Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) expert in combat PTSD, explains that combat veterans “have an absolute moral claim” 
on society that “goes right back to the War of Independence” for the simple reason that they 
were wounded by the enemy in service of their nation.  Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 15. 
 19. In his recent book, retired Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Barry Schaller argues 
that responsibility for adequate treatment prior to discharge rests solely with the military and 
not the civilian courts, which have been transformed into responders of last-resort by the 
military’s hasty and inadequate efforts to discharge wounded warriors.  SCHALLER, supra note 
6, at 200, 263 (“The goal must be to prevent problems of readjustment rather than expect 
civilian society to deal with them after they occur.”). 
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conduct, this article answers the question in the affirmative; active duty of-
fenders with PTSD are routinely neglected for effective treatment with the 
expectation that civil society will address the problem following discharge 
and that discipline is the primary ideology to be served.20  This is troubling, 
foremost, because many of the underlying assumptions in the military disci-
plinary framework are terribly flawed and the end result is a soldier, sailor, 
airman, marine, or coastie (collectively “troop”) so crippled by the indelible 
brand of the military’s discharge process that even civil society may find it 
impossible to provide necessary help once his or her separation from the 
military is complete. 
This article applies the principles of TJ to the punishment of active duty 
military offenders with PTSD and TBI who exist in a disciplinary structure 
that is distinct from the civilian justice system and serves very different 
ends.21  I argue that TJ, in this atypical military realm, is mandated not simp-
ly by the ideological goal to treat rather than punish offenders with legitimate 
mental health care needs for the betterment of society at large, but more im-
portantly, that TJ embodies a precautionary principle in public health and 
public safety that overrides simply the moral imperative never to leave a 
fallen comrade behind.22  Through the recognition of why it is absolutely 
necessary for military commanders to adapt the disciplinary structure to in-
corporate TJ, civil society can properly distinguish its responsibilities from 
the military’s, with more optimal results for both entities and all concerned 
parties.  To better understand the nature of this important and obscured prob-
lem, Part II begins by identifying the crux of the active duty problem:  How 
discipline now trumps treatment and the various statutory and regulatory 
escape hatches that have allowed such prioritization, even when a military 
offender has a diagnosed service-connected mental health disorder.23  This is 
problematic because it not only delays the ability to effectively treat symp-
toms, but also aggravates existing ones in the process. 
Part III describes the crippling less-than-honorable military discharge 
characterizations linked to misconduct and their effect in terminating health 
care benefits and generating societal stigmas, as well as handicaps that are 
unique to ex-servicemembers, but universal in their devastation.24  This Mili-
tary Misconduct Catch-22 becomes an impetus for recidivism in civil socie-
ty, translating commanders’ well-meaning intentions to enforce good order 
  
 20. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 22. Important as it may be, the moral obligation alone may not be enough to motivate 
military action because it clashes with other conflicting obligations, explored below in Part V. 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.A–D. 
 24. See discussion infra Part III. 
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and discipline into the basis for undermining the safety of the very society 
they are sworn to protect.  Normally, deference to the military’s unique at-
tributes or the invocation of other competing interests might permit it to de-
flect concerns about compassion, sympathy, and mercy.25  Part IV, however, 
borrows a page from international law and homeland security to highlight 
why TJ is necessary under the precautionary principle in public health—
despite many questions that simply cannot be answered at the present time.26  
By highlighting the interrelationship between TJ and the precautionary prin-
ciple in a military disciplinary framework, this article further reveals the 
adaptability of TJ to other fields where it might, at first, seem facially in-
compatible, such as regulation of human behavior in the mitigation of infec-
tious disease transmission, transboundary disasters, counterterrorism, and 
other public health crises.27 
II. THE UNCOMPROMISING MANTRA OF “GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE” 
IN THE ARMED FORCES 
Ground forces have an objective to obliterate the enemy face-to-face 
and hand-to-hand when mortars, rifles, and bayonets fail, while advancing on 
enemy positions.28  In the profession of arms, dangerous duty requires a dif-
ferent, harsher type of leadership than civilian occupations, aptly defined by 
President Truman to the Cadet Corps of the United States Military Academy 
as “that quality which can make other men do what they do not want to do, 
and like it.”29  Similar to a basic training ideology, which uses coercion to 
break (mostly) teenagers out of an independent mindset and replace their 
prior values with a singular ideology of “unquestion[ed] obedience,” contin-
ued service in the ground forces necessarily involves threats and frequent 
public use of discipline to remind all team members that they must work to-
  
 25. See discussion infra Part III (describing common justifications for ambivalence to 
wounded warrior offenders, including lack of ability to prove causation between PTSD and 
criminal acts, assumption of risk for invisible wounds in a volunteer military, and the ease of 
malingering PTSD for secondary gain). 
 26. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 27. See discussion infra Part III. 
 28. See, e.g., BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING, supra note 8, at xiv. 
 29. President Harry S. Truman, Remarks to the Cadet Corps at West Point (Sept. 28, 
1946), http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1760&st=&st1=; see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 22-100, MILITARY LEADERSHIP 7 (1958), available 
at www.cgsc.edu/CARL/docrepository/FM22_100_1958.pdf (“Military leadership.  The art of 
influencing and directing men in such a way as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, 
respect, and loyal cooperation in order to accomplish the mission.”). 
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gether and obey orders.30  There is a reason why commanders often display 
the results of administrative punishment under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) within the hallways of their platoon and company orderly 
rooms:31  Discipline must happen harshly and swiftly because lives may be 
on the line if and when it is questioned.32  This is an outgrowth of the guiding 
historical military leadership principle that, to win wars, “men must fear their 
officers more than death from the enemy.”33 
 
A.   The Armed Forces Are More Likely to Criminalize Mental Illness With 
Uniquely-Military Offenses Tied to Work Performance 
 
Life in the military is dominated by an endless set of rules, schedules, 
and suspense dates, each of which is conveyed through verbal or written or-
ders from a superior of one type or another.  Violations of these orders, no 
matter how trivial they might seem, make any subordinate service-member 
liable for punishment, which can include a federal criminal conviction, time 
in jail, and a punitive discharge.  For example, if an officer directs a junior 
enlisted soldier to stand at the position of attention while being addressed, 
and she willingly fails to do so, her criminal act, “[w]illfully disobeying a . . . 
superior commissioned officer,” under Article 90 of the UCMJ, could tech-
nically earn her up to a “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and 
allowances, . . . confinement for [five] years,” and reduction to the lowest 
enlisted grade.34  Even more unforgiving, if a general officer has developed a 
policy that requires or prohibits certain behavior, the service-member can be 
convicted of violating a lawful general order, even if she had never had no-
  
 30. ANNI BAKER, LIFE IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES:  (NOT) JUST ANOTHER JOB 25 (2008); 
see generally Robert J. Stevenson, The Officer-Enlisted Distinction and Patterns of Organiza-
tional Reaction to Social Deviance in the U.S. Military, 68 SOC. FORCES 1191, 1191, 1193 
(1990) (examining trends in military discipline during WWII, the Korean War, and Vietnam, 
and concluding that military superiors exert control through punishment, which occurs at 
increasing frequencies the more the leadership is called into question). 
 31. This is based on personal experience of the author, who has served primarily as a 
military prosecutor over the last eleven years. 
 32. See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893) (“The power to com-
mand depends upon discipline, and discipline depends upon the power to punish . . . .”); Rich-
ard C. Harding, A Revival in Military Justice:  An Introduction by the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, REPORTER, Summer 2010, at 4, 5 (discussing the indispensability of “‘military disci-
pline’” and “‘good order and discipline’” in achieving the objectives of the profession of 
arms). 
 33. GABRIEL, supra note 14, at 103. 
 34. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, at IV-21, A2-17 (2012) [hereinafter 
MCM], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf; see 10 
U.S.C. § 890(2) (2006). 
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tice of its contents, thus exposing her to up to a “[d]ishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, . . . confinement for [two] years,” and 
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, pursuant to Article 92 of the UCMJ.35 
Commanders, of course, are not required to press charges and pursue 
the full extent of punishment for all offenses.36  Furthermore, one cannot 
receive a Bad-Conduct Discharge (BCD) unless the issue has been elevated 
through higher channels from the recommending commander to a military 
judge or panel.37  Problematically, because individual commanders have such 
wide discretion to initiate different levels of punishment, no one knows for 
sure what to expect.  Today might just happen to be the day when the com-
mander and the military panel desire to set an example for other impression-
able troops and obtain a necessary deterrent.  The fact that commanders and 
military panels have equally been criticized for being too lenient and too 
harsh on offenders reveals a lack of consistent standards in punishment and 
the possibility for abuse of discretion.38  Likewise, the lack of any known 
minimum punishments for all but a handful of egregious offenses often pres-
sures servicemembers to waive their rights to full-blown courts-martial in 
favor of lesser administrative action, including the ominous administrative 
  
 35. MCM, supra note 34, at IV-25; 10 U.S.C. § 892(1).  The Manual specifically states, 
“knowledge of a general order or regulation need not be alleged or proved, as knowledge is 
not an element of this offense and a lack of knowledge does not constitute a defense.”  MCM, 
supra note 34, at IV-24.  In the military case of United States v. Webster, the court observed 
that the effect of this punitive article was to “creat[e] . . . what amounts to ‘strict liability’ for 
the unwary.”  37 M.J. 670, 677 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993). 
 36. Marshall L. Wilde, Incomplete Justice:  Unintended Consequences of Military 
Nonjudicial Punishment, 60 A.F. L. REV. 115, 129 (2007).  While the military articulates 
maximum punishments, there are few minimums and commanders always have the option to 
pursue nonpunitive means, such as corrective training to address infractions.  See id. (describ-
ing broad commander discretion on punishment and few rules about how to exercise it).  Even 
at a court-martial, “there’s no minimum sentence.  So for example, if someone were convicted 
of rape, they could get a sentence from no punishment all the way up to life imprisonment.”  
United States v. Schlamer, 52 M.J. 80, 88 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting a military judge’s com-
ment to panel member).  For further discussion, see Megan N. Schmid, This Court-Martial 
Hereby (Arbitrarily) Sentences You:  Problems with Court Member Sentencing in the Military 
and Proposed Solutions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 245 (2011). 
 37. See MCM, supra note 34, at II-128. 
 38. See generally PATRICK CALLHAN, MILITARY INJUSTICE 97-109 (2013) (describing the 
prevailing biases that influence commanders to pursue overly-punitive consequences for mili-
tary offenders).  As just one example, military records demonstrate that African-Americans 
and servicemembers of other minority groups received disproportionately higher numbers of 
stigmatizing discharges during Vietnam than white offenders punished for the same offenses.  
LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE:  THE DRAFT, 
THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 139 (1978) (describing evidence of racial bias in 
the discharge system). 
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discharge under Other Than Honorable Conditions (OTH) (which existed 
before 1976 as the Undesirable Discharge (UD)).39 
 
B.  Disciplinary Standards Lack Consistency Based on Individual Com-
manders’ Preferences and Philosophies 
 
With this very brief snapshot of military justice in mind, commentators 
have rightfully raised concerns that the military is far more likely to crimi-
nalize mental illness than the civilian justice system.40  As one attorney who 
works with wounded warriors has cautioned:  “Consider all the hoopla about 
the [Department of Defense] increasing the disability rating for PTSD. . . . 
Odds are, if you have PTSD, they are probably going to kick you out for a 
pattern of misconduct so you won’t be getting paid disability anyway.”41  
Putting aside the common symptom of self-medication with controlled sub-
stances or alcohol, and related offenses,42 PTSD symptoms tied to irritability 
and hyper-alertness often result in decreased work performance (i.e., the ina-
bility to maintain concentration working on monotonous or complicated 
tasks, outbursts in frustration, lateness for assigned duties).43  Unlike the ci-
vilian environment, each of these manifestations is a crime in the military.44  
And, with the armed forces being the occupation with the greatest levels of 
  
 39. See, e.g., Vanessa Baehr-Jones, A “Catch-22” for Mentally-Ill Military Defendants:  
Plea-Bargaining Away Mental Health Benefits, 204 MIL. L. REV. 51, 51–52, 54 (2010) (de-
scribing incentives for offenders with PTSD to plea-bargain away their benefits in exchange 
for lesser administrative punishment once commanders have instituted court-martial charges). 
 40. See Amanda Carpenter, Navy Doctor Warns:  Misconduct May Be Symptom of Stress 
Disorder, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, at A1.  According to a senior ranking Navy psychia-
trist, “[t]he service may be discharging soldiers for misconduct when in fact they are merely 
displaying symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.”  Id. (citing a widely-distributed 2007 
memorandum). 
 41. Carissa Picard, Military Misconduct, MYSPACE (Jan. 18, 2009, 4:29 AM), 
http://www.myspace.com/looking4ladybugs/blog/464671591. 
 42. See, e.g., Pinals, supra note 7, at 164 (discussing common co-occurring conditions 
that accompany most PTSD diagnoses); Greg Barnes, When War Comes Home:  Crime Surge 
Among Veterans Suggest Some Didn’t Leave Horrors Behind, FAYOBSERVER.COM (Feb. 5, 
2012, 1:49 AM), http://www.fayobserver.com/articles/2012/02/05/1151825 (noting an Army 
statistic that “25 . . . to 35 percent of wounded soldiers are addicted to prescription or illegal 
drugs while they await medical discharge”). 
 43. Gregg Zoroya, Battle Stress May Lead to Misconduct, USA TODAY, July 2, 2007, at 
A5 [hereinafter Zoroya, Battle Stress] (citing Captain William Nash for the proposition that, 
due to PTSD, “[i]t can be very, very hard for [marines] to really care even about obeying the 
rules”); Picard, supra note 41 (“[S]ymptoms of PTSD . . . make it difficult for affected 
servicemembers to comply with and conform to the military’s strict code of conduct.”). 
 44. See Carpenter, supra note 40; Picard, supra note 41. 
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stress,45 and thus PTSD risk, the signature injuries of the Iraq and Afghani-
stan wars have unwittingly transformed many patients in need of legitimate 
medical care into offenders in need of discipline in the eyes of their military 
superiors.  Commonly, any of the following phenomenon related to Opera-
tional Stress Injuries (OSIs)46 can result in behavior that is simultaneously 
symptomatic and criminal: 
 
• “dissociative episode[s]”;  
• “shattered assumptions of moral order”; 
• “thrill or sensation-seeking behavior”; 
• “self-punishment”; 
• “moral injury”; 
• “violent behavior occurring in a sleep-state in response to vivid 
nightmares”; or 
• “adverse reactions to psychotropic medications during the course 
of treatment for mental conditions.”47 
 
While the military has officially recognized the connection between 
service-connected stress conditions and misconduct48—both on the battle-
  
 45. See Victoria Brienza, The 10 Most Stressful Jobs of 2012, CAREERCAST, 
http://www.careercast.com/jobs-rated/10-most-stressful-jobs-2012 (last visited April 21, 
2013) (identifying the “enlisted soldier” as the most stressful occupation above firefighters, 
police, and even airline pilots). 
 46. While PTSD garners the bulk of attention, it is not the only combat-related condition 
that results in criminal offending.  Often, those who do not qualify for a full-blown diagnosis 
of PTSD suffer symptoms more acutely than those with the PTSD diagnosis.  
ShirleyMcPherson-Sexton & Brandon Hostetler, How to Respond to the Crisis Victim with 
PTSD Symptoms: An Intervener’s Guide, 9 J. POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS 61, 62 (2009).  For 
this reason, the military and civilian criminal justice systems must be cognizant of the prob-
lems facingservicemembers and veterans with other disorders too.  This surely includes “acute 
anxiety disorders,” “adjustment disorders,” “family violence,” and even “hostility.”  Peter J. 
Cosgrove, Forward to MILITARY STRESS AND PERFORMANCE: THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE 
FORCE, at xv (George E. Kearney et al. eds., 2003).  It is important, therefore, to consider all 
Operational Stress Injuries, which are simply defined as “any persistent psychological diffi-
culty resulting from operational duties performed by a [military] member.”  Operational Stress 
Injury Social Support, The Invisible Wounds, The Official Definition of an OSI, 
http://www.osiss.ca/ engraph/def_e.asp?sidecat=1 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
47.  John W. Brooker et al., Beyond “T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former 
Servicemember’s Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the 
Armed Forces, 214 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 253-55 (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., Letter from Peter W. Chiarelli, General, United States Army, to Leaders, in 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY 2020:  GENERATING HEALTH & DISCIPLINE IN THE FORCE 
AHEAD OF THE STRATEGIC RESET (2012), available at http://www.armyg1.army. 
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field49 and in manifestations after troops have returned home50—and has 
urged commanders to at least consider mental conditions before taking disci-
plinary action,51 the need for deterrence, group examples, and unquestioned 
obedience still allows commanders to disregard the current and future treat-
  
mil/hr/suicide/docs/army_2020_generating_health_and_discipline_in_the_force_report_2012
_GOLD_BOOK.pdf. 
One of the most important lessons learned in recent years is that we cannot simply 
deal with health or discipline in isolation; these issues are interrelated and will re-
quire interdisciplinary solutions.  For example, a Soldier committing domestic vio-
lence may be suffering from undiagnosed post-traumatic stress.  He may also be 
abusing alcohol in an attempt to self medicate to relieve his symptoms.  The reality is 
there are a significant number of Soldiers with a foot in both camps—health and discipline—
who will require appropriate health referrals and disciplinary accountability. 
Id. 
 49. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 22-51, LEADERS’ MANUAL FOR 
COMBAT STRESS CONTROL, at 4-1 to 4-20 (1994) [hereinafter FM 22-51], available at 
http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fm-22-51-leaders-manual-for-combat-stress-
control.shtml.  The term most commonly used is “combat stress,” and an Army field manual 
devotes an entire chapter to it.  See id.  The chapter identifies a number of criminal behaviors 
linked to combat stress and the manual goes on to distinguish how the same forces might 
generate positive and misconduct stress: 
 Positive combat stress behaviors and misconduct stress behaviors are to some extent a 
double-edged sword or two sides of the same coin.  The same physiological and psychological 
processes that result in heroic bravery in one situation can produce criminal acts such as atroci-
ties against enemy prisoners and civilians in another.  Stress may drag the sword down in the 
direction of the misconduct edge, while sound, moral leadership and military training and dis-
cipline must direct it upward toward positive behaviors. 
Id. at 3-12 & fig.3-1. 
 50. See TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEP’T OF DEF., AN ACHIEVABLE VISION:  
REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH 22 (2007), availa-
ble at http://dtf.defense.gov/rwtf/dodtfmentalhealth2007.pdf.  A recent Task Force report 
observed various PTSD-linked “complex disinhibitory behaviors” likely to result in criminal 
offenses following the return from combat.  See id. (citing “[d]ifficulty controlling one’s emo-
tions, including irritability and anger . . ., [s]elf-medicat[ion] with . . . illicit drugs in an at-
tempt to return to ‘normalcy,’ [and] reckless/high risk behaviors” which might occur “months 
after the battlefield injury or trauma”). 
 51. See, e.g., ARMY BD. FOR CORR. OF MILITARY RECORDS, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 
AR20120022346 (2013), available at http://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/ 
CY2012/20120022346.txt (requiring the commanding general to “address whether the Sol-
dier’s medical condition is the direct or substantial contributing cause of the conduct that led 
to the recommendation for administrative separation, and/or whether other circumstances of 
the individual case warrant disability processing instead of further processing for administra-
tive separation” in all cases where a Medical Evaluation Board has determined that an official 
disability rating for medical conditions is warranted).  Sadly, the requirement neither explains 
how to determine the link between the misconduct and the medical condition and the miscon-
duct, nor requires the commander to take favorable action even when the link is present.  See 
id.  Additionally, the requirement only applies to those cases that have completed the initial 
Medical Evaluation Board process, which could take over a year, and only those cases that 
have been favorably recommended by the Board for further processing.  See id. 
65
: Nova Law Review 37, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
492 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
ment needs of their offending subordinates.  Not only has the military failed 
to institute recommendations that would assist them in providing treatment 
rather than punishment,52 various escape clauses provide commanders with 
ways to evade existing mandates designed to provide needed treatment.53 
Publicly, the premium on punishing offenders with known mental 
health conditions is the greatest proof that misconduct trumps care, even 
when that misconduct arose from “good, even heroic, soldiers.”54  Consider, 
for example, the representative response of the United States Army’s Special 
Operations Command when its commander was criticized for prosecuting a 
soldier with PTSD:  “Nowhere in our four major criteria for PTSD does it 
allow for breaking the law.”55  Ponder the Army and the Marine Corps cases 
in which an officer and an enlisted servicemember had charges brought 
against them—one case resulting in a punitive BCD and 180 days confine-
ment—for failed attempts at suicide while suffering from a diagnosed mental 
health condition.56  Although the military’s highest court ultimately invali-
  
 52. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 40 (reporting the Marine Corps’ rejection of the rec-
ommendation for all post-deployment offenders to be screened for PTSD prior to the determi-
nation to pursue adverse action). 
 53. Kelly Kennedy, PTSD Victim Booted for ‘Misconduct,’ ARMY TIMES, (Jan. 7, 2009, 
12:55 PM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/01/military_ptsd_discharge_010709w/ 
(copy on file with Nova Law Review) (statement of retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Mike 
Parker:  “‘Even though they have this new regulation saying they can’t kick [a troop] out for 
personality disorders, they can still kick [PTSD-afflicted servicemembers] out for misconduct’ 
. . . . ‘Everything they say, they have an escape clause.’”). 
 54. FM 22-51, supra note 49, at 2-9(c); see also id. at 2-10 (“Excellent combat soldiers 
may commit misconduct stress behaviors in reaction to the stressors of combat before, during, 
or after their otherwise exemplary performance.  Combat stress, even with good combat be-
havior, does not excuse criminal acts.”).  For example, a recent military report “considers the 
misconduct discharges ‘good news’ because they lead to better discipline within the ranks” 
but essentially ignores “what happens to those soldiers after they leave the Army, often with 
other-than-honorable discharges that bar them from receiving military benefits.”  Barnes, 
supra note 42. 
 55. Carpenter, supra note 40 (citing the comments of the United States Army’s Special 
Operations Command’s chief of media and community relations Carol Darby). 
 56. Marine Fights Military Conviction for Suicide Attempt, FOX NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/02/02/marine-fights-military-conviction-for-suicide-
attempt/; The Case of Lt. Whiteside:  When It Comes to the Psychological Wounds a War 
Inflicts, the Army Still Doesn’t Get It, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2007, at A28.  Former Marine 
Lazzaric T. Caldwell was convicted for his self-harm and sentenced to a BCD and 180 days 
confinement.  Marine Fights Military Conviction for Suicide Attempt, supra.  As he awaits the 
results of his appeal, he is not receiving mental health treatment for his diagnosed PTSD be-
cause of his discharge.  Id.  He reasons, “[s]eeing the kind of state I was in, there should have 
been a way of getting help instead of just punishment.”  Id.  Army Lieutenant Elizabeth 
Whiteside fared a bit better in her case.  See The Case of Lt. Whiteside, supra.  Whiteside’s 
command criminally charged her for shooting herself in the stomach after a series of stressful 
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dated this outcome, the practices that led to this initial punishment provide an 
important window into a larger disciplinary philosophy.57 
Society, legislators, military courts, and commanders have often ex-
plained these “absurd,”58 “unjust and irrational,”59 byproducts of the military 
justice system—replete with its purely military offenses—on four policy 
grounds.60 
  
events in Baghdad and “[d]espite the unequivocal judgment of psychiatrists that she suffers 
from significant mental illness.”  Id.  Although charges were eventually dropped after media 
publicity and she received a General Discharge, Whiteside again attempted suicide following 
her charges.  Events Surrounding the Case of 1st Lt. Elizabeth Whiteside, WASH. POST (Jan. 
30, 2008 2:19 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/ 
AR2008013002250_pf.html.  She provides a personal account of her psychotic break on The 
Washington Post’s website.  Id.  The offense supporting such charges is codified in Article 
134 of the UCMJ as “[s]elf-injury without intent to avoid service” and bears a punishment that 
includes up to five years confinement and a Dishonorable Discharge (DD).  10 U.S.C. § 934 
(2006); MCM, supra note 34, at IV-129.  Upon considering Private Caldwell’s appeal, a ma-
jority of the Navy and Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction, finding 
that bloodletting from his two slashed wrists caused a substantial mess and required a re-
sponse that was prejudicial to good order and discipline.  United States v. Caldwell, 70 M.J. 
630, 632 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2011), aff’d in part and reversed in part, 72 M.J. 137 
(C.A.A.F. 2013)..  They continued: 
 As to the public policy argument, we are not persuaded that criminal prosecu-
tion of genuine suicide attempts should be prohibited under military law. . . . If a 
[commander] feels it necessary to resort to court-martial to address this type of lead-
ership challenge, he or she should be allowed to do so . . . . 
Id. at 633. 
     57. United States v. Caldwell, 72 M.J. 137, 141-42 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (finding insufficient 
evidence to show that this particular Marine’s acts of cutting his wrists had a palpable nega-
tive effect on good order and discipline within the unit or was service-discrediting, but con-
firming the viability of the charge in other circumstances).  
 58. Kennedy, supra note 53. 
 59. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 117. 
I . . . find the situation of veterans with “bad paper”[—being denied mental health 
treatment—]to be as unjust and irrational as if they had been drummed out for fail-
ure to stand at attention after their feet had been blown off.  Most of these men 
committed offenses because of their combat PTSD. 
Id. 
 60. See infra Part II. 
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C.   The Four Bases for Ambivalence to the Mental Health Treatment 
Needs of Military Offenders 
1. There Is Not Enough Research to Demonstrate an Absolute Causal Link 
Between PTSD and Misconduct.  Hence, It Would Be Counterproductive to 
Assume the Connection in All Cases. 
Even the leading psychiatrists in the nation agree that knowledge about 
PTSD is still in its infantile stages.61  The recently-revised diagnostic criteria 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5), 
therefore provide poor guidance to the criminal courts and the legal profes-
sion, which require objective and reliable diagnostic standards.62  As the 
mental health profession learns more, standards necessarily change.  A con-
sequence of this is the lack of studies providing definitive answers, the need 
for more studies to eliminate inconsistencies and contradictions based on the 
populations studied, and an abundance of tentative and qualified suggestions 
about causation.63  It is no wonder that, in this environment of uncertainty 
and soft science, there are similar problems linking PTSD to misconduct.64 
  
 61. See, e.g., Josef I. Ruzek et al., Introduction:  Addressing the Mental Health Needs of 
Active-Duty Personnel and Veterans, in CARING FOR VETERANS WITH DEPLOYMENT-RELATED 
STRESS DISORDERS:  IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND BEYOND 3, 5 (Josef I. Ruzek et al. eds., 2011) 
(recognizing that the “accelerating rate of change in the mental health support mission, will 
challenge all of us to move toward continually learning better ways to serve those who return 
from these wars [with PTSD]”). 
 62. See SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 9 (“The [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual’s 
(“DSM”)] definition of PTSD remains a moving target, with the disorder undergoing changes 
in each revision of the manual.”).  Justice Schaller defines five common concerns with the 
present criterion in the 2000 Text Revision of the DSM:  “(1) trauma concept; (2) assumption 
of a specific trauma factor; (3) lack of specificity of the criteria, namely, that they overlap 
with too many other disorders; (4) criterion creep or spread into too many diverse situations; 
and (5) excessive malingering encouraged by the formulation, which corrupts legitimate use 
of the diagnosis.”  Id. at 201.  For the current edition of the DSM, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-5, 
at 271-80, Criterion 309.81 (5th ed. 2013). 
 63. In the Institute of Medicine’s analysis, a panel of subject matter experts in PTSD 
could, at best, only conclude that “there is limited but suggestive evidence of an association 
between deployment to a war zone and later incarceration.”  6 INST. OF MED., GULF WAR AND 
HEALTH:  PHYSIOLOGIC, PSYCHOLOGIC, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENT-
RELATED STRESS 306 (2008), available at http://www.iom.edu/reports/2007/gulf-war-health-
vol-6-physiologic-psychologic-psychosocial-effects-deployment-related-stress. 
 64. See John Hoellwarth, Linking Misconduct with PTSD, MARINE CORPS TIMES, July 2, 
2007, at 13 (reporting the conclusions of a senior psychiatrist researcher at the Marine “Corps’ 
first Combat Operational Stress Control Conference” in 2007 regarding the possible correla-
tion between PTSD and crime:  “‘[W]e do not yet have the good data to discern how big the 
problem is, what contributes to it and how we can deal with it’”).  As recently as 2012, a team 
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Even where a troop unquestionably suffers from PTSD, his or her of-
fense may not have a connection to the disorder.  Prosecutors scoff at the 
defendant who argues that PTSD caused him to “‘get in a boat, sail it across 
the [A]tlantic and then try to take back ten thousand poun[d]s of hashish,’” 
echoing scholars’ conclusions that the causation requirement is the biggest 
obstacle to succeeding on the PTSD defense.65  In a court of law, as well as 
the court of public opinion, the defense must demonstrate that the PTSD re-
action occurred at the time of the criminal behavior and was the motivating 
force responsible for it.66 
Inevitably, PTSD affects individuals differently, making general state-
ments about causation useless in a given case.67  The flip-side of this conclu-
sion is the fact that PTSD reactions can and certainly do occur in discernible 
patterns68 of “‘particularly uncharacteristic misconduct following deploy-
ment’”:69  “Typical offenses [which can often be traced] directly from com-
bat PTSD” among veterans of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars include 
“AWOL or desertion after return to [the] U.S., [u]se of illicit drugs to self-
medicate symptoms of PTSD, [and] [i]mpulsive assaults during explosive 
  
of international researchers highlighted continuing difficulties establishing the simplest con-
nections between mental illness and military members’ criminality James Taylor et al., Mili-
tary Veterans with Mental Health Problems: A Protocol for a Systematic Review to Identify 
Whether They Have an Additional Risk of Contact with the Criminal Justice Systems Com-
pared With Other Veteran Groups, 53 SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1 (2012). 
 65. See Michael D’Antonio, The War They Can’t Escape:  They Returned from the Un-
popular War in Vietnam to a Hostile Welcome; Often Very Young, Lacking Training in Jobs, 
and Haunted by the Traumas of Faraway War, Many Veterans Have Replaced the Jungles of 
Asia with New Ones⎯The Jungles of American Prisons, BOS. GLOBE, May 10, 1981, at 1. 
 66. See Daniel Burgess et al., Reviving the “Vietnam Defense”:  Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and Criminal Responsibility in a Post-Iraq/Afghanistan World, 29 DEV. MENTAL 
HEALTH L. 59, 79 (2010).  But see United States v. Perry, No. 4:CR94–3035, 1995 WL 
137294, at *8 (D. Neb. Mar. 27, 1995) (finding a causal relationship between PTSD and “dis-
tribution of cocaine to fund the purchase of cocaine so as to be able to continue to self-
medicate”). 
 67. See TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 50, at 22 (“The time 
of onset, severity and duration of [PTSD-related] behaviors vary significantly from patient to 
patient.”). 
 68. Carpenter, supra note 40.  Most recently, Dr. Eric Elbogen and his colleagues have 
concluded that “combat trauma in the form of PTSD, combined with the high irritability that 
PTSD can cause, does ‘significantly’ raise the risk of criminal arrest.”  David Wood, Combat 
Veterans with PTSD, Anger Issues More Likely to Commit Crimes:  New Report, HUFFPOST 
WORLD (Oct. 10, 2012 1:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/09/veterans-ptsd-
crim-report_n_1951338.html; see also Eric B. Elbogen et al., Criminal Justice Involvement, 
Trauma, and Negative Affect in Iraq and Afghanistan War Era Veterans, 80 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1097, 1099 (2012) (the link between combat exposure and arrest was 
mediated by PTSD with high irritability). 
 69. Zoroya, Battle Stress, supra note 43. 
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rages on officers or NCOs after return to the U.S.”70  Additionally, even 
where the offense was not directly caused by PTSD, the condition indirectly 
led to the offense; that is, had the disorder never been caused by combat 
trauma, the veteran would not find herself in the perfect storm of handicaps 
that preceded the offending behavior.71  This is why courts distinguish be-
tween PTSD on the merits as a substantive defense and PTSD as a mitigating 
or extenuating factor at sentencing, which might help to explain the miscon-
duct by putting it in the proper context.72  In addressing this justification for 
the Military Misconduct Catch-22, we must be careful not to rule out the 
value and propriety of treatment as a sentencing consideration in courts and 
boards, even where the misconduct is not directly attributable to the mental 
condition. 
2. In an All-Volunteer Military, the Servicemember Has Assumed the Risk 
That He or She May Be Traumatized by Combat.  Accordingly, He or She 
Should Ask for Help When Needed Rather than Acting Irresponsibly or En-
gaging in Behavior That Has Criminal Consequences. 
As Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) psychiatrist Jonathan Shay ob-
serves, “[t]he usual perception is that . . . these groups have only themselves 
to blame—it is their misconduct or criminal behavior that has deprived them 
of their benefits.”73  I have often heard this assumption of risk argument from 
  
 70. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 115. 
 71. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
21. 
 72. See, e.g., Burgess et al., supra note 66, at 79; Pinals, supra note 7, at 165 (noting 
psychiatrists’ position that “the impact of [PTSD] is sufficiently mitigating to avoid a potential 
death penalty sentence”); Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, 
supra note 5, at 144–47 (discussing courts’ consideration of PTSD symptoms as a mitigating 
factor at sentencing). 
 73. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 112.  Consider the prosecutor’s representative 
argument to the military panel in United States Air Force Court of Military Review v. Win-
chester: 
You should discharge the accused.  You can do that by sentencing him to a bad-conduct dis-
charge.  As to the accused’s statement that a bad-conduct discharge will mark him for life, 
well, if that’s true, he’s the one who set the stage to be so marked.  Furthermore, ask yourself, 
if he doesn’t get the bad-conduct discharge from you, does he deserve to get the same dis-
charge you will get after serving your country honorably?  No. 
U.S. Air Force Court of Military Review v. Winchester, No. ACM S28735, 1994 WL 481709, 
at *1 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 12, 1994) (emphasis omitted).  Military prosecutors have used similar 
arguments to target VA benefits, specifically during the punishment phase.  See, e.g., Supple-
ment to Petition for Grant of Review at 9, United States v. Connolly, No. 07-0184 (C.A.A.F. 
Jan. 26, 2007) (“How many soldiers deployed to Iraq, went to war, came back, and they didn’t 
drink and drive?  They didn’t run over two security guards.  These are the soldiers that de-
serve VA benefits, not the accused.”); Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Mili-
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fellow military attorneys.  However, the position fails to explain or account 
for all of the conscripted Vietnam veterans with PTSD who were punished 
instead of treated when the military was not an all-volunteer institution.74 
Likewise, it presumes that individuals who are prone to suffering from 
distorted and irrational thoughts are still able to determine what is in their 
best interests, despite the disorder.75  That is quite a tall order, considering 
how PTSD shatters the important assumption that “a moral order exists in the 
universe that discriminates right from wrong.”76  Senior Navy psychiatrist, 
Captain William Nash, for example, highlighted “combat stress’ potential to 
damage beliefs in right and wrong, self-identity and moral code.  Combat 
stress can damage brain centers that control emotions, impair rational 
thought circuits and inhibit a Marine’s ability to think before acting, putting 
leathernecks with combat experience at ‘increased risk’ of misconduct.”77  
Doctor Shay observes a related, widespread dubious belief among even psy-
chiatrists that good character, shaped over years of one’s upbringing, will 
endure through the worst trauma:  “[I]f bad experience leads someone who 
was good to do terrible things, it must be because he was secretly flawed 
from the beginning.  He deserves no respect for any previously honorable 
conduct—all possibility of respect or consideration has been obliterated by 
  
tary Justice, supra note 5, at 130–31 (discussing the prosecutor’s sentencing argument for a 
punitive discharge for Staff Sergeant Ryan Miller, who suffered from diagnosed service-
connected PTSD).  During Vietnam, the Army showed recruits a film titled The Smart Way 
Out, contrasting the military service and future experiences of “Good Joe” and “AWOL John-
ny.”  BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 121.  While Good Joe’s obedient service ended 
with “‘years of happiness’” based on his Honorable Discharge, Johnny’s future was filled with 
“‘bitterness, loneliness, and poverty’” as a result of Johnny’s absence from his unit.  Id.  The 
film concluded with Johnny’s arrest for vagrancy after he received an UD and turned to sub-
stance abuse.  Id.  The film, in addition to the prosecutors’ positions, reveals how the military 
has relished in the creation of future societal offenders for the sake of punishment and deter-
rence. 
 74. See RAYMOND MONSOUR SCURFIELD, A VIETNAM TRILOGY:  VETERANS AND POST 
TRAUMATIC STRESS:  1968, 1989, 2000, at 34 (2004) (observing how, during Vietnam, com-
manders deemed “almost all soldiers with emotional and psychiatric symptoms to be behav-
ioral problems” and subsequently responded with discipline). 
 75. Seamone, Attorneys as First-Responders, supra note 9, at 174 fig.2, 175 (identifying 
“eight forms of distorted thinking” that affect troops with PTSD). 
 76. William P. Nash, Combat/Operational Stress Adaptations and Injuries, in COMBAT 
STRESS INJURY:  THEORY, RESEARCH, AND MANAGEMENT 33, 53 (Charles R. Figley & William 
P. Nash eds., 2007).  Too often in combat, troops “are constantly confronted with stark evi-
dence that none of the basic assumptions upon which their mental stability is premised are 
valid.”  GABRIEL, supra note 14, at 83. 
 77. Hoellwarth, supra note 64. 
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his criminal act.”78  Shay argues that this notion of immutable character is 
flawed because “[p]rolonged combat can produce not only psychiatric symp-
toms, it can damage good character. . . . When bereavement, betrayal of 
what’s right, and horror have been sufficiently severe, even the noblest char-
acter may crack.”79 
In one respect, however, troops do have some control over their symp-
toms.80  Many servicemembers, due to stigmas against reporting mental 
health troubles,81 engage in the phenomenon of “reverse malingering” or 
“dissimulation,” in which they fake good, perhaps minimizing their respons-
es to routine post-deployment assessments in order to stay in service, thereby 
inviting aggravated conditions.82  With a steady campaign to make 
servicemembers aware of counseling options, and very public efforts to de-
stigmatize requests for help,83 some may claim that the servicemember is not 
totally absolved of the responsibility to seek treatment when she or he detects 
that something is just not right.  It still seems counterproductive, however, to 
deny them effective treatment on the basis of their symptoms, even in this 
instance. 
  
 78. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 113.  See also Jeremy Schwartz, ‘Bad Paper’ 
Discharges Can Stymie Veterans’ Health Care, STATESMAN.COM (Oct. 2, 2010, 10:48 PM), 
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/bad-paper-discharges-can-
stymie-veterans-health--1/nRyPr/ (citing veterans’ advocate and attorney Teresa Panepinto for 
the proposition that single incidents of misconduct by combat-traumatized servicemembers 
often lead to stigmatizing discharges under zero tolerance policies, as if “‘[a]ll of a sudden, all 
the prior honorable service is negated’”). 
 79. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 112–13. 
 80. See Stephanie Hodson et al., Postdeployment Predictors of Traumatic Stress:  Rwan-
da, a Case Study, in MILITARY STRESS AND PERFORMANCE:  THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE 
EXPERIENCE 151, 159 (George E. Kearney et al. eds., 2003) (“[M]ilitary personnel expect to 
be exposed to potentially traumatic events, making these experiences more predictable and 
potentially more manageable.”). 
 81. Tracy Stecker & John Fortney, Barriers to Mental Health Treatment Engagement 
Among Veterans, in CARING FOR VETERANS WITH DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS DISORDERS:  
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND BEYOND 243, 245–46 (Josef I. Ruzek et al. eds., 2011) (describing 
various “barriers to mental health treatment”). 
 82. See Frank C. Budd & Sally Harvey, Military Fitness-for-Duty Evaluations, in 
MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY:  CLINICAL AND OPERATIONAL APPLICATIONS 35, 49 (Carrie H. Ken-
nedy & Erica A. Zillmer eds., 2006).  The authors are keen to point out how, “[i]n such cases, 
the individual should not receive a diagnosis of malingering but instead should receive the 
appropriate diagnosis (e.g., depression or substance abuse).”  Id. 
 83. Stecker & Fortney, supra note 81, at 251–53. 
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3. The Diagnosis of PTSD Is the Easiest to Fake and There Is Really No 
Way to Tell Whether It Is Legitimate in a Given Case.  The Military Must 
Therefore Take a Hardline Approach to Misconduct Without Exception Be-
cause Alternatives to Punishment Would Reward Offenders Who Pretend to 
Be Afflicted by the Disorder for Secondary Gain. 
An experienced VA psychiatrist “almost always” encounters two posi-
tions most frequently when discussing veterans with mental health conditions 
who are barred from receiving benefits:  “‘The Biggest Liar I Ever Met’ sto-
ry or ‘Doc, you been had by a scammer.’”84  In both the civilian and military 
context, we can expect concern over a diagnosis that depends entirely on the 
self-reported symptoms of a patient.85  When anyone can read up on the In-
ternet and memorize a script to increase their chances of a PTSD diagnosis, 
and that diagnosis can maximize his or her potential for unique forms of sec-
ondary gain in the military—whether it is to evade deployment, combat, or a 
work detail in general—military psychiatrists agree that they must necessari-
ly be cautious in their evaluations.86 
Here too, however, generalization ignores the legitimate experiences of 
PTSD sufferers.  While healthy skepticism may help identify cases of falsifi-
cation, an accusing eye can exacerbate the symptoms and worsen the condi-
tion of those who legitimately suffer from the disorder.87  This lesson is most 
clear in facilitating the mental health treatment of alleged rape victims.  Alt-
hough it is quite possible that some rape accusers have motives to falsify 
their allegations,88 the criminal justice system rightfully rejects the antiquat-
ed, discriminatory model that would cast doubt on all accusers before treat-
  
 84. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 113. 
 85. See Robert H. Aronson et al., Attorney-Client Confidentiality and the Assessment of 
Claimants Who Allege Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 76 WASH. L. REV. 313, 335 (2001) 
(“Individuals can malinger PTSD symptoms on their own, with the assistance of relevant 
reading materials, or with the benefit of coaching by relatives, friends, or counsel.”). 
 86. See Budd & Harvey, supra note 82, at 35, 48–49. 
 87. See id. at 48–49. 
 88. See, e.g., Robert R. Hazelwood & Ann Wolbert Burgess, False Rape Allegations, in 
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE INVESTIGATION:  A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 181, 193–94 
(Robert R. Hazelwood & Ann Wolbert Burgess eds., 4th ed. 2009) (providing other specific 
examples of motive in falsely reported rapes); JOHN M. MACDONALD, RAPE:  CONTROVERSIAL 
ISSUES:  CRIMINAL PROFILES, DATE RAPE, FALSE REPORTS AND FALSE MEMORIES 87 (1995) 
(discussing “many motives for false reports of rape,” which usually fall within the distinct 
categories of alibi, revenge or payback, financial or other gain, and attention or sympathy); 
Aviva Orenstein, Presuming Guilt or Protecting Victims?:  Analyzing the Special Treatment 
of Those Accused of Rape, in RACE TO INJUSTICE:  LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE 
LACROSSE RAPE CASE 351, 351 (Michael L. Seigel ed., 2009) (“No one can or should claim 
that women never lie or are never mistaken about rape.”). 
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ing their complaints as legitimate.89  Even if there is potential that the allega-
tion is fabricated, it does too much damage to victims that have actually ex-
perienced sexual violation to support such a skeptical model; most rapes go 
unreported due to the stigma of skepticism.90  For public health reasons, the 
well-being of legitimate sexual assault victims rightfully requires suspension 
of such skepticism in favor of prompt intervention that maximizes the well-
being of society at large.91  The resulting investigatory and prosecutorial pol-
icies seeking restraint in the rush to invalidate represent a necessary “delicate 
balance” in which “[t]he rules and procedures must be formulated with both 
the sexually brutalized victim and the absolutely innocent accused in 
mind.”92 
We can learn much from the policy lessons surrounding allegations of 
sexual assault, which often result in PTSD.  Recognizing the fact that many 
civilian abuses of the PTSD diagnosis have unfairly caused critics to doubt 
the complaints of military members,93 the desire to eradicate common obsta-
cles to PTSD treatment counters this prevalent justification for the Military 
Misconduct Catch-22.94  No one who legitimately cares about the effective 
treatment of PTSD victims, whether they are criminals or the greatest of Sa-
  
 89. See MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA:  FEMINISM AND THE POLITICS 
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 58–59 fig.1.1, 100–01 (2000) (challenging well-worn “rape myths” that 
all complaining “[w]omen make false allegations of rape out of revenge or spite”).  The myth, 
which represents a “cognitive distortion[],” has actually dominated the criminal justice system 
until very recent times, when legislators began to develop evidentiary rules that would limit 
the humiliation suffered by rape victims.  JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE:  SEX, VIOLENCE, HISTORY 
23 (2007); Betsy Wright Kreisel, Police and Victims of Sexual Assault, in SEXUAL ASSAULT:  
THE VICTIMS, THE PERPETRATORS, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 337, 346, 376–78 
(Frances P. Reddington & Betsy Wright Kreisel eds., 2d ed. 2009); see also Hazelwood & 
Burgess, supra note 88, at 194.  In early days of the legal system, and whenever invoked by 
the defense in the current one, the myth has the effect of contributing to an attack on victims 
that can rightfully be labeled a “second rape.”  LEE MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE 
SECOND RAPE:  SOCIETY’S CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM 3 (1991); Jeffrey W. Spears, 
Prosecution of Sex Crimes, in SEXUAL ASSAULT:  THE VICTIMS, THE PERPETRATORS, AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 365, 376 (Frances P. Reddington & Betsy Wright Kreisel eds., 2d 
ed. 2009). 
 90. See MADIGAN & GAMBLE, supra note 86, at 3; Hazelwood & Burgess, supra note 85, 
at 181. 
 91. Kreisel, supra note 89, at 346 (“For the benefit of the victim’s emotional state and the 
betterment of case processing, law enforcement should be advised to approach every allega-
tion of sexual assault as truthful until there is solid evidence to prove otherwise.”) (emphasis 
added).  Some adopt an even stricter standard than solid evidence:  “‘Only when your doubts 
overwhelm the evidence supporting the complaint should you begin to consider the possibility 
of a false allegation.’”  Hazelwood & Burgess, supra note 89, at 193–94. 
 92. Orenstein, supra note 88, at 352. 
 93. SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 204. 
 94. See discussion infra Part III. 
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maritans, should automatically challenge the troops who seek PTSD treat-
ment following misconduct.  Just as it is possible to pursue a false accuser 
with perjury charges, the legal system has the ability to incorporate sanctions 
into treatment programs for offenders who do not comply with treatment 
plans in the criminal context, eliminating the idea that a malingerer might get 
off too easy if the system responded by according automatic legitimacy to 
reported symptoms.95  In any probationary/diversionary arrangement, the 
sentencing or prosecuting authority retains the ability to institute the sus-
pended punishment or institute the deferred charges based on material 
breaches of the underlying agreement.96 
4. The Military Simply is Not the Type of Organization That Can or Does 
Invest in the Intensive Rehabilitation of Offenders.  If It Did, This Might 
Prioritize Efforts to Assist Lawbreakers Who Have Dishonored Themselves 
Ahead, or in Lieu, of Those Combat-Traumatized Warriors who Served 
Honorably. 
I include this position because I have heard it so often from fellow at-
torneys.  Normally, it arises in the context of clemency when troops request 
that commanders depart from the sentence handed down by a military judge 
or military panel as an act of mercy.97  Based on reported figures, there is a 
perception that military commanders do not often exercise any type of clem-
ency, despite their practically unlimited discretion to disapprove or modify 
any aspect of an adjudged sentence.98  If, say the commentators, clemency 
was once exercised for the purpose of rehabilitating offenders, advances in 
modern warfare have made the individual less important to military success, 
and hence, less important to salvage for the service.99  As it relates to offend-
ers with mental illness, this position relies as much on the notion that rehabil-
itation is dead in the military as it does on the belief that rehabilitation is 
  
 95. See James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts:  Problem-Solving and the 
Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1555 (2003) (describing how noncompliance 
with treatment plans in a veterans or mental health treatment court “may result in more serious 
sanctions than would be experienced in a traditional . . . court”). 
 96. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
170 (“[T]he ability to vacate a suspension for failure to meet the terms of a suspended sen-
tence preserves the option of executing the adjudged punishment.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Michael J. Marinello, Convening Authority Clemency:  Is It Really an Ac-
cused’s Best Chance of Relief?, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 169, 169 (2007) (describing the command-
er’s discretion to modify a sentence to the accused’s benefit for nearly any reason). 
 98. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
14–15 n.35. 
 99. See id. at 14, 43 n.145. 
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valued only to the extent that it can repair the warrior for a return to the front 
lines, benefitting the institution over the individual.100 
While commanders and attorneys have the freedom to adopt these 
views, it is vital to recognize that they do not represent the actual state of 
rehabilitative efforts in the military justice system.  Not only do various pro-
visions of military law explicitly direct that military judges and juries con-
sider rehabilitative potential to a greater degree than civilian courts,101 but 
panel members, judges, and commanders often attempt to suspend sentences 
specifically when the offender suffers from a mental health condition.102  
Elsewhere, I have pointed to a line of historical and continued precedents, 
which collectively demonstrate a viable rehabilitative ethic imprinted “in the 
very DNA of the military justice system,” if only commanders and attorneys 
are willing to look for and appreciate proof of this ethic’s existence.103  
Throughout major wars, this ethic further offered second chances to offend-
ers,104 even when they were not capable of rejoining the force due to their 
condition.105  In such cases, the military recognized society’s need for a pro-
ductive citizen rather than a socially-stigmatized castaway with few opportu-
nities for social advancement.106 
Almost all of the above rationales for the Military Misconduct Catch-
22107 are tied in some way to the special mission of the military and the dan-
ger of losing the ability to react with superior force anywhere and anytime.108  
The unifying thread is clearly the need to protect society, which routinely 
justifies troops’ loss of privileges enjoyed by civilians who rely on the mili-
tary to protect their sacred way of life.109  However, the important and distin-
  
 100. See id. at 43 n.145; see also SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 47.  Justice Schaller suggests 
that military psychiatry is slanted to support this view:  “Preparing soldiers to return to the 
battlefield is one of the controversial purposes of military psychiatry in the case of traumatic 
stress disorders.”  SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 47. 
 101. MCM, supra note 34, at II-123. 
 102. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
125, 127, 131–32. 
 103. Id. at 15, 123, 184. 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 47, 59–61, 73. 
 105. Id. at 62. 
 106. See id. at 78 & n.284 (discussing principal objectives to avoid future damage to so-
ciety as a result of military discharges). 
 107. Picard, supra note 41. 
 108. See Marinello, supra note 97, at 171–73. 
 109. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“The fundamental necessity [of] obe-
dience and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible 
within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”); Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953) (“[T]he very essence of [military] service is the suborna-
tion of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service”); In re Grimley, 
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guishing question answered in this article is:  What happens when, by virtue 
of untreated mental conditions, the military’s disciplinary system is breeding 
recidivism and placing society at a far greater cumulative risk?  In other 
words, can the military’s insistence on just deserts punishments and willful 
ignorance of legitimate and continuing mental health care needs justify its 
creation of a class of future offenders who will return to their own communi-
ties—well within the boundaries of our cities, towns, and neighborhoods—
and wreak havoc on innocent bystanders and their own families, as they ad-
vance toward their demise?  No must be the only acceptable answer.110 
III. CONTOURS OF “THE MILITARY MISCONDUCT CATCH-22” 
Although the premium on military discipline creates many terrible iro-
nies,111 the Military Misconduct Catch-22 concerns a very specific dilem-
ma.112  Concisely stated by Attorney Carissa Picard: 
What’s the point of DoD recognizing that PTSD/TBI causes mis-
conduct when it doesn’t do anything to stop [the] “pattern of mis-
conduct” discharges for soldiers with PTSD/TBI?  How can it say 
[that] this is evidence of a service-related disability only to use this 
evidence to deny servicemembers access to benefits for that disa-
bility?113 
  
137 U.S. 147, 152 (1890) (“By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier.  His relations to the 
[s]tate and the public are changed.”); James Finn, The Two Societies, in CONSCIENCE AND 
COMMAND:  JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY 3, 5 (James Finn ed., 1979) (“Support 
for the military institution and its ability to defend society must take priority even if it requires 
some restrictions on those rights normally possessed by the citizens.”). 
 110. See SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 209 (“It is unconscionable when . . . military leaders 
fail to take measures that prevent veterans with PTSD from lapsing into criminal behavior in 
the first place.”). 
 111. Stopping Suicides:  Mental Health Challenges Within the U.S. Department of Veter-
ans Affairs:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 93, 96–98 
(2007) (statement of Joy J. Ilem, Assistant National Legislative Director, Disabled American 
Veterans) [hereinafter Ilem Testimony].  As only one example, individuals who have fought in 
distant lands “to restore the freedoms of the Iraqi and Afghani peoples” often return to lose 
not only their sanity, but also “their own personal freedom after returning home,” confined for 
the criminal symptoms of their mental conditions.  Id. at 97. 
 112. Picard, supra note 41. 
 113. Id.; see also Gregg Zoroya, Troubled Troops in No-Win Plight; Marines Kicked Out 
for Conduct Linked to Stress Disorder Are Often Denied Treatment by the V.A., USA TODAY, 
Nov. 2, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Zoroya, Troubled Troops] (discussing Marine Lieutenant 
Colonel Colby Vokey’s description of an identical Catch-22). 
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This dilemma deals not only with the military’s insulated activities in admin-
istering discipline, but, more importantly, the military’s act of passing on its 
discarded troops to civilian society with severe handicaps related to their 
discharge characterizations that prevent successful reintegration.114 
While military discharges come in many forms, four types often totally 
preclude the veteran from receiving practically all pension, health care, and 
other benefits from governmental organizations:  The UD, the OTH, the 
BCD, and the DD.115  This article is not concerned with the DD because it is 
reserved for the most egregious offenses and automatically precludes bene-
fits from the VA.116  Nor is this article concerned with the General Under 
Honorable Conditions Discharge.  While many consider a General Under 
Honorable Conditions Discharge to be stigmatizing because it is not fully 
Honorable, it precludes educational benefits under the GI Bill, and it sug-
gests substandard performance,117 this general characterization still permits a 
veteran to maintain veteran status and obtain the most vital benefits from the 
VA.118  Undoubtedly, the ability to retain VA health care benefits is critical 
to the PTSD- and OSI-afflicted combat veterans’ reintegration, because the 
VA is “[t]he only reservoir of combat PTSD expertise,” completely un-
matched by the “overburdened state mental hospitals and municipal general 
hospitals” to which most veterans with crippling discharges must turn.119 
  
 114. See, e.g., BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 160 (observing how “the [UD] has led 
many a veteran into a hopeless downward spiral”). 
 115. See VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY:  
VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 90–92 (2007), available at 
http://veterans.senate.gov/upload/VetDisBenefitComm9-27.pdf. 
 116. See id. at 90; see also 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006).  Not only does a DD bar benefits 
under 38 U.S.C. § 101(2), but any punitive discharge from a general court-martial, including a 
BCD, also bars benefits.  Id. § 5303(a). 
 117. See, e.g., Christopher H. Lunding, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Dis-
charges, 83 YALE L.J. 33, 34–35 (1973) (“Courts have found the General Discharge to consti-
tute ‘a stigma of tremendous impact which [has] a lifelong effect.’”) (alteration in original) 
(citing, as an example, Unglesby v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714, 717 (N.D. Cal. 1965)); Charles 
P. Sandel, Comment, Other-than-Honorable Military Administrative Discharges:  Time for 
Confrontation, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 849 (1984) (“[E]arly separation itself stigmatizes a 
servicemember.  Derogatory characterization is an added stigma.”). 
 118. Marshall L. Wilde, Incomplete Justice:  Unintended Consequences of Military 
Nonjudicial Punishment, 60 A.F. L. REV. 115, 139 (2007) (“A discharge with a general service 
characterization permits the servicemember to retain most of his VA benefits . . . .”); see 
Douglass L. Custis, Due Process and Military Discharges, 57 A.B.A. J. 875, 875 n.4 (1971) 
(finding “a distinction without a difference” between the Honorable Discharge and the Gen-
eral Under Honorable Conditions Discharge). 
 119. Health Care, Economic Opportunities and Social Services for Veterans and Their 
Dependents—A Community Perspective:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & In-
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Many servicemembers believe that they are automatically ineligible for 
VA benefits upon discharge with a BCD, OTH, or UD characterization.120  
While some may, in fact, be barred, VA adjudicators must make an inde-
pendent determination on a case-by-case basis regarding whether a particular 
troop’s service was honorable enough to receive benefits.121  The major prob-
lem with this character of service process is, as judges of the Court of Ap-
peals for Veterans’ Claims have recognized, the “murky statutory and regula-
tory framework” guiding these determinations.122  Within this framework, the 
VA uses its own definitions related to military misconduct rather than the 
military’s definitions.123  Hence, VA adjudicators use standards like crimes 
of “moral turpitude” and “willful and persistent misconduct” to determine 
whether a servicemember’s conduct was other than dishonorable.124 
Problematically, VA adjudicators have little guidance on the meanings 
of their own terms and consequently apply subjective determinations to justi-
fy their decisions.125  Simplification of these provisions is more difficult be-
  
vestigations of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 103d Cong. 105 (1993) (testimony of War-
ren Quinlan) [hereinafter Quinlan Testimony]. 
 120. See PAUL STARR WITH RAYMOND P. BONNER, THE DISCARDED ARMY:  VETERANS 
AFTER VIETNAM 179–80 (1974). 
 121. See To Amend Title 10, United States Code, to Limit the Separation of Members of 
the Armed Forces Under Conditions Other than Honorable, and for Other Purposes:  Hear-
ings on H.R. 523 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 92d Cong. 
6008 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 523] (observing that it would be “illegal” for the 
VA to grant benefits to the recipient of a UD, OTH, or BCD without conducting a case-by-
case analysis). 
 122. Trilles v. West, 13 Vet. App. 314, 330 (2000) (Kramer, J., & Steinberg, J., concur-
ring) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a)–(b) (2006); Butler v. West, 12 Vet. App. 7, 8 (1998) (per 
curiam) (Kramer, J., concurring); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(b)–(c) (2012)). 
 123. See, e.g., Samuel W. Morris, A Survey of Military Retirement Benefits, 177 MIL. L. 
REV. 133, 139–40 (2003) (“The term ‘under conditions other than dishonorable’ poses a prob-
lem for [military attorneys] because this statutory definition is different from the language the 
military uses to characterize its discharges.”). 
 124. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(3) (2012) (barring benefits for crimes of “moral turpitude,” 
which generally include felonies); id. § 3.12(d)(4) (barring benefits for “willful and persistent 
misconduct,” unless the offense was minor in nature and the offender’s “service was other-
wise honest, faithful, and meritorious”).  Even in the 1950s, attorneys who studied these terms 
found problems with their application by the VA that resulted in the inability “to lay down any 
hard and fast rules” about how the circumstances of a given discharge would be interpreted by 
adjudicators under these guidelines.  See W.C. Blake, Punishment Aspects of a Bad Conduct 
Discharge, JAG J., Dec. 1952, at 5, 22.  For an expansive discussion of these standards, see 
Brooker et al., supra note 47, at 160-201. 
 125. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 523, supra note 121, at 5862 (statement of Representative 
Richard C. White raising concerns that VA adjudicators could realistically label “persistent 
jaywalking” as a basis to deny benefits under the VA’s standard for willful and persistent 
misconduct); id. at 6009 (statement of Philip V. Warman, Associate General Counsel, VA 
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cause lawyers, military commanders, judges, and even policymakers at the 
highest levels of the discharge characterization process have little under-
standing of the administrative rules that guide the VA in conducting the case-
by-case analysis.126  These problems are quite significant because a 
servicemember is not considered a “veteran” under all of the benefits statutes 
if the VA determines that his or her UD, OTH, or BCD—crippling discharg-
es—was issued for service “under conditions other than dishonorable.”127  
The consequence of this threshold determination means that a veteran suffer-
ing from PTSD will have to wait until the VA adjudicator makes the charac-
ter of service determination, if that determination is favorable, before obtain-
ing VA benefits and comprehensive mental health treatment.128 
It is impossible to estimate how many veterans are denied benefits 
through the VA’s Character of Service process because even the VA does 
not track these figures.129  Notably, discarded veterans with crippling dis-
  
confirming the subjective and non-uniform analyses of VA adjudicators in different offices); 
Donald J. Brown, The Results of the Punitive Discharge, 15 JAG J. 13, 14 (1961) (“The phrase 
‘moral turpitude or willful and persistent misconduct’ is sufficiently indefinite that its applica-
tion may vary among the different [VA] field activities and adjudication units.”). 
 126. See, e.g., U.S. Air Force Court of Military Review v. Winchester, No. ACM 528735, 
1994 WL 481709, at *3 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 12, 1994) (finding that the trial court provided 
erroneous instructions about the VA’s standards for evaluating BCDs); United States v. Ball-
inger, 13 C.M.R. 465, 467 (A.B.R. 1953) (finding error in the trial judge’s misstatements to 
the panel members about the VA’s character of service determination process); Bradley K. 
Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges:  A Legal and Empirical Evaluation, 59 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 16 (1973) (“Much of the commentary regarding the effect of the administrative 
discharge is based on sheer speculation.”).  “The consequences of the general and undesirable 
discharges are . . . little understood by the JAG officers asked to ‘counsel’ the recipients.”  
Jones, supra, at 1.  At a congressional hearing in 1971, Major General Leo Benade, a senior 
policymaker charged with the establishment of adverse discharge procedures, explained he 
“couldn’t describe . . . what the internal procedures of the VA are,” and reasoned, “[h]opefully 
the [VA] would utilize the same standards in evaluating [different cases involving UDs] and 
reach the same decision if the pattern of conduct is the same.”  Hearings on H.R. 523, supra 
note 121, at 5861 (statement of Major General Leo E. Benade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man-
power and Reserve Affairs).  He explained that his lack of knowledge about their process 
resulted from the fact that “[t]he [DoD] is not consulted [by the VA] in these cases.”  Id. 
 127. See 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006). 
 128.   Brooker et al., supra note 47, at 40-41 (providing an example of how a former 
servicemember can be denied benefits pending review of his status at the moment he sought 
outpatient medical care from a VA facility). 
 129. Id. at 157-58; see also Hal Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without Health-Care 
Benefits, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012, 8:03PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/ 
localnews/2018894574_vets12m.html [hereinafter Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without 
Health-Care Benefits] (“[T]he [VA] has no way to track how many [Character of Service] 
reviews are conducted, how long they take, or their outcomes.”). 
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charges have many disincentives to even apply for benefits after the labeling 
experience following their other punishments.130  As one such two-time Iraq 
veteran with PTSD and an OTH separation for “‘pattern[s] of misconduct’” 
explained, “‘I have nothing . . . .  After all I did for the Army, they took my 
money and kicked me to the curb and said, “Don’t let the door hit you in the 
ass.”’”131  Months, often years, without care before a final decision is ren-
dered on a former troop’s status is the greatest of all impediments.132  All too 
often, this “lost legion of ‘bad-paper vet[erans]’” evaporates into an invisible 
status with no mandates for any agency to care for their existence and great 
shame whenever they reveal the manner in which they left the military.133 
Sadly, the greatest effort to assist ex-servicemembers in upgrading their 
discharges came—and went—in the early 1980s, as Vietnam veterans ap-
proached the delimiting date in which they would no longer be eligible for 
educational benefits unless they obtained fully honorable discharges.134  
Once that delimiting date passed, the impetus to assist bad paper veterans 
fizzled, replaced by a preference to prioritize services for honorably dis-
charged veterans who never committed misconduct in the first place.135  Of 
  
 130. See Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without Health-Care Benefits, supra note 129; 
Kennedy, supra note 53. 
 131. Kennedy, supra note 53. 
 132. See, e.g., Letter from Manuel Duran, Exec. Dir., & Sean W. Mullaney, President, 
Shelter Legal Servs. Found., Inc., to President William J. Clinton (Apr. 30, 1993), in Health 
Care, Economic Opportunities, and Social Services for Veterans and Their Dependents—A 
Community Perspective:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of 
the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 103d Cong. 106, 106 (1993) (observing how “[t]ime in 
effect discriminates” against the veteran who applies for benefits, especially when she or he is 
homeless and transient); see also STARR WITH BONNER, supra note 120, at 175 (“Men are 
discouraged from appealing because the process usually takes years and requires legal assis-
tance beyond their means.”). 
 133. Lee May, Finally Is Given Honorable Status but Can’t Collect Damages:  WWII GI 
Still Battling over ‘Bad’ Discharge, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1986, at 13 (describing the plight of 
a “lost legion of ‘bad-paper vets’”).  On the topic of shame, see, for example, Edgar May, 
Inmate Veterans:  Hidden Casualties of a Lost War, CORRECTIONS MAG., Mar. 1979, at 3, 4 
(“‘A guy who has got a ‘bad paper’ discharge is probably not going to volunteer that for you . 
. . .’”). 
 134. See Oversight on Issues Related to Incarcerated Veterans:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 96th Cong. 26 (1979) (testimony of James J. Cox, Director, 
Veterans Assistance Service, Veterans Administration) (“Each day, thousands of veterans 
reach their delimiting date . . . . [W]e are in a race against time, because . . . time is running 
out rapidly for Vietnam-era veterans to use their educational benefits.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Letter from Edward J. Derwinski, Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, to Honorable 
G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Chairman, Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, House of Representa-
tives (Apr. 27, 1990), in Incarcerated Veterans Rehabilitation and Readjustment Act of 1989:  
Hearing on H.R. 3453 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 88, 91 (1990), available at 
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course, the notion of these discarded troops’ invisibility is illusory, as their 
numbers are revealed daily in homeless shelters, prisons, jails, and—very 
sadly—morgues throughout the nation.136 
The veterans’ service organizations that represent the small portion of 
ex-troops who do apply for Character of Discharge determinations have es-
timated general rates of success for such claims.137  The National Veterans 
Legal Services Project reports the VA’s approval rate at ten percent.138  A 
former supervisory benefits adjudicator and subject matter expert who 
worked in the Los Angeles VA Regional Office from 2002 to 2008 provides 
a more generous approval estimate of slightly under half of the applica-
tions.139  Anecdotally, we can also turn to the observations of one of the 
VA’s foremost PTSD experts who shared his experience with Congress:  
“[a]s a VA physician, I have never treated a veteran with a Bad-Conduct, 
Undesirable, or Dishonorable Discharge, because they cannot get through the 
front door—they are ineligible for any VA services.”140 
No matter the precise disapproval rate, it is clear that a substantial popu-
lation of veterans with crippling discharges remain closed-off to meaningful 
care.141  These statistics are quite important because they translate to a grow-
ing population of tens of thousands of traumatized combat veterans whose 
symptoms contributed to their jettison from the military and their inability to 
obtain quality medical care in civilian society.  For an idea of the size of this 
  
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/153232NCJRS.pdf (explaining that providing 
services for veterans who commit misconduct “presents a question of priorities” for “diverting 
staff” from activities designated for veterans who need resources and did not commit miscon-
duct). 
 136. Consider that “38% of veterans in [s]tate prison” “failed to receive an honorable 
discharge.”  NOONAN & MUMOLA, supra note 9, at 6.  Additionally, studies in more recent 
times have found that approximately 20% of veterans in state prisons and local jails are dis-
qualified from receiving VA benefits based on the nature of their crippling discharges.  James 
McGuire, Closing a Front Door to Homelessness Among Veterans, 28 J. PRIMARY 
PREVENTION 389, 390 (2007).  Within one New England homeless shelter for veterans, the 
director found 50% of the inhabitants had crippling discharges—when he looked for this 
variable specifically.  Quinlan Testimony, supra note 119, at 104 (“[O]n any given day, an 
average of about 50% of the men coming through the [shelter] doors . . . have . . . ‘bad paper.’  
Half, or 25% of these are combat veterans.”). 
 137. See, e.g., MICHAEL ETTLINGER & DAVID F. ADDLESTONE, MILITARY DISCHARGE 
UPGRADING AND INTRODUCTION TO VETERANS ADMINISTRATION LAW 26/2, 26/9 (1990 Supp.). 
 138. Id. (“The VA favorably adjudicates only about ten percent of these cases.”). 
 139. Brooker et al., supra note 47, at 157. 
 140. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 116. 
 141. See STARR WITH BONNER, supra note 120, at 179–80.  It would be a valuable task for 
scholars and VA employees to determine a general rate of success for initial applications and 
appeals; any established success rate might motivate applications from those many veterans 
who believe they are automatically ineligible. 
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population, through Vietnam, the military discharged 224,000 
servicemembers with UD characterizations and 31,800 with BCDs.142  Be-
tween October 2000 and September 2005 alone, 55,111 active duty 
servicemembers were separated with OTH discharges and 8,190 were sepa-
rated with BCDs.143  An investigative reporter for the Seattle Times con-
firmed that the military discarded over 20,000 more troops with OTH dis-
charges between 2008 and 2012.144  The collective number is likely to in-
crease, given the military’s objective to draw-down the forces by many more 
tens of thousands using involuntary separation as a major vehicle.145 
A commander of a large unit once lectured on the topic of command 
discretion.  He explained that many commanders liken the process of receiv-
ing—and then eliminating—a soldier to playing a hand of poker.  If a soldier 
turns out to be a deuce, then the commander can merely discard him and pull 
another card from an endless supply of recruits.  With no accountability for 
their discards, the process can go on indefinitely, and even well-intentioned 
commanders can remain blissfully ignorant regarding the outcome of their 
disciplinary decisions.146  As Chuck Luther, an attorney for Military Spouses 
for Change, observes, “‘[t]he military is creating a societal issue’ . . . .  ‘The-
se guys come out with no resources, and they’re angry and feeling betrayed.  
But commanders are thinking, “Do I rehabilitate him or do I get rid of him 
expeditiously so I can replace him with someone who can deploy?”’”147 
  
 142. BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 155 fig.6 (Military Punishments between Au-
gust 4, 1964 and March 28, 1973). 
 143. VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, supra note 115, at 93 tbl.5.1. 
 144. Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without Health-Care Benefits, supra note 129; see 
also Carpenter, supra note 40 (reporting statistics that the Army discharged 27,973 soldiers 
with stigmatizing discharge characterizations between October 2002 and May 2009, with 
12,700 alone, discharged in fiscal year 2003). 
 145. DAVID F. BURRELLI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41874, FY2012 NATIONAL 
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT:  SELECTED MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY ISSUES 3, 7 (2012) 
(“[T]he Secretary of Defense announced on January 6, 2011 that the Active Army would 
begin a reduction in its end strength by 22,000 in 2012.  This reduction would be followed by 
an additional reduction of 27,000 to begin in FY2015 and be completed in FY2016.”). 
 146. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
33 (describing how the military is oblivious to the fact that it has inflicted a “double wound” 
on military offenders with punitive discharges by placing them in the combat conditions that 
caused their injuries and then shutting them out of future treatment). 
 147. Kennedy, supra note 53; see also Sandel, supra note 117, at 855 (noting how com-
manders face unintentional incentives to quickly eliminate offending subordinates as to appear 
devoted to accomplishing the military mission and as not to “discredit [the] command”); TASK 
FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 48, at 22 (describing “instances in 
which returning [wounded warrior] service members were pressured by commanders and 
peers to accept . . . administrative discharge so they could be expeditiously cleared from the 
unit and replaced with a fully functional person”). 
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Although, for more than a generation, military lawyers,148 veterans’ ad-
vocates,149 legislators,150 VA psychiatry experts in PTSD,151 and senior men-
tal health professionals within the military152 have consistently raised con-
cerns over the Military Misconduct Catch-22, there has been no successful 
corrective action.153  In fact, the Marine Corps recently learned that 326 of 
the 1,019 Marines it had dismissed with less-than-honorable characteriza-
tions (in the first four years following the war in Iraq) had legitimate mental 
health care needs.154  Despite this knowledge, the Marine Corps made no 
effort to determine whether that population eventually obtained benefits.155 
To put this issue in proper perspective, it is vital to remember that many 
of the recent “invisible injuries” among troops originated from insurgent 
attacks on U.S. forces serving overseas.  When the injuries continue to mani-
fest in later, unexpected, violent, and often deadly episodes, untreated PTSD 
spares recruits to al Qaeda’s cause; the violence, disruption, and dread that 
results from PTSD has created a growing sleeper cell of veterans with un-
precedented access to our homeland.156  Sadly, despite the military’s best 
  
 148. See, e.g., Zoroya, Battle Stress, supra note 43; Zoroya, Troubled Troops, supra note 
113 (discussing Marine Lieutenant Colonel Colby Vokey’s criticism of the “no-win situation” 
that results from the Military Misconduct Catch-22). 
 149. See, e.g., Ilem Testimony, supra note 111, at 93, 98 (discussing Joy J. Ilem’s con-
cerns). 
 150. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 523, supra note 121, at 5825 (statement of Rep. Charles 
E. Bennett) (questioning the accuracy, consistency, reliability, and fairness of the VA’s char-
acter of service process and recommending determinations of benefits prior to the 
servicemember’s discharge to avoid the Military Misconduct Catch-22 throughout the hear-
ings). 
 151. See, e.g., Maxine Waters & Jonathan Shay, Heal the “Bad Paper” Veterans, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 1–19 (“Whatever the circumstances surrounding combat veterans’ 
bad-paper discharges, it is self-defeating to deny them benefits.  We don’t save money by 
shutting them out; it costs . . . much more [in various social and law enforcement services later 
in time].”). 
 152. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 48, at 22 (rec-
ommending assessment of and treatment for PTSD prior to the discharge of servicemembers 
facing administrative discharge for misconduct).  In 2007, a Navy psychiatrist and combat 
stress expert warned, “[i]f a Marine who was previously a good, solid Marine—never got in 
trouble—commits misconduct after deployment and [it] turns out they have PTSD, and be-
cause of justice they lose their benefits, that may not be justice.”  Zoroya, Battle Stress, supra 
note 43 (citing Captain William Nash). 
 153. Zoroya, Troubled Troops, supra note 113. 
 154. Zoroya, Battle Stress, supra note 43. 
 155. Id. (“The Marine Corps had no information about whether the 326 Marines who 
received less-than-honorable discharges and suffered mental health [benefits] were denied VA 
health care services.”). 
 156. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, HOME FROM THE WAR:  LEARNING FROM VIETNAM VETERANS 
137–38, 156–57 (1992); Alyson Sincavage, Note, The War Comes Home:  How Congress’ 
 
84
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] AMERICA’S LARGEST SLEEPER CELL 511 
intentions, it empowers this sleeper cell and increases the chance of unex-
pected violent or costly behaviors within our own borders the more it pro-
motes the Military Misconduct Catch-22.157  This result is not only shame-
ful,158 but runs contrary to the major premise for justifying the military’s my-
opic focus on good order and discipline:  The very protection of our Ameri-
can society.159 
IV. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE THERAPEUTIC IMPERATIVE 
The discussion above highlighted how principles of morality and justice 
fail to address the Military Misconduct Catch-22, and oftentimes contribute 
to it by invoking competing concepts of obligation, such as conservation of 
scarce resources (e.g., waiting for statistical assurances before committing 
resources to hypotheses that do not apply uniformly to individuals).160  The 
interdisciplinary experts who have addressed this problem recognize that 
certain principles of self-interest necessitate policies of prompt and wide-
spread intervention, even when these policies fall short of the harshest jus-
tice.161  Self-interest here is the objective of limiting the known potential for 
a host of negative societal outcomes that assuredly harm public health and 
safety.162  The solution they propose is not necessarily to ignore or exculpate 
misconduct, but to ensure the effective treatment of a dangerous disorder163 
  
Failure to Address Veterans’ Mental Health Has Led to Violence in America, 33 NOVA L. 
REV. 481, 482, 484, 486–87, 507 (2009). 
 157. See LIFTON, supra note 156, at 157–58.  Psychiatrist Robert J. Lifton, who treated 
many Vietnam veterans with PTSD, observed that many are “inundated by imagery of vio-
lence,” and how their pent-up rage is often released unexpectedly through explosive episodes.  
Id. at 138–39, 151–57 (describing three manners in which PTSD-afflicted veterans direct such 
violence).  Reasoning that it is not the experience of rage but how one channels it, Lifton 
concluded that the only way to prevent vicious cycles of violence is by “examining, channel-
ing, and transmuting their rage” through intensive therapy.  Id. at 156. 
 158. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 15. 
 159. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 33 
(explaining that treatment, rather than punishment, of military offenders with PTSD is directly 
related to “the well-being of the Nation that all active duty military members are sworn to 
protect and defend”). 
 160. See discussion supra Part III. 
 161. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 15, 117 (“Pure self-interest should lead us to take 
this step [to ensure that combat veterans remain eligible for VA benefits despite misconduct], 
even if a sense of justice does not.”). 
 162. See Waters & Shay, supra note 151; see also Picard, supra note 41 (“[U]ndiagnosed 
or untreated PTSD and/or TBI puts veterans at an increased risk of suicide, unemployment, 
drug and alcohol abuse, partner violence, and homelessness.”). 
 163. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 113 (“I am [not] attempting to exculpate criminals 
who also happen to be combat veterans of their crimes.”). 
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that only grows worse the more combat veterans are shut out from the VA, 
which is the single best avenue of treatment that exists.  The treatment solu-
tion is therefore rooted in TJ, not just for the sake of the individual, but more 
for the sake of public health and public safety.164  As retired Connecticut 
Supreme Court Justice Barry Schaller observes: 
The psychiatric profession must promote consideration of PTSD as 
a public health issue rather than simply as an individual mental 
health problem.  The broad reach of combat PTSD within Ameri-
can society, in terms of the number of veterans who develop the 
disorder and the number of people whose lives are directly affect-
ed thereby, qualifies it as a public health issue, meaning one that 
involves the health of communities or populations.165 
Because this mandate for treatment is to prevent known but unquantifiable 
future harm, this therapeutic imperative rests in the related principle of pre-
caution. 
Elsewhere, I have explored the precautionary principle in domestic and 
international law,166 which derives from a government’s self-interest in pro-
tecting its populace and which mandates intervention and the devotion of 
resources to preventive and mitigating efforts, particularly for “‘low proba-
bility, high consequence’ events.”167  Classic examples of such events are 
  
 164. See id. at 115; see also Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military 
Justice, supra note 5, at 28–29. 
 165. SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 202–03; see also Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative 
Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 28–29 (describing how the lethality of the veteran’s 
training makes untreated PTSD a matter of public safety). 
 166. See, e.g., Evan R. Seamone, The Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary 
Defense:  Achieving the Mandate to Defend the Earth Against Asteroid and Comet Impacts 
While There is Still Time, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1–2, 22 (2004) [hereinafter 
Seamone, The Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary Defense]; Evan R. Seamone, 
The Duty to “Expect the Unexpected”:  Mitigating Extreme Natural Threats to the Global 
Commons Such as Asteroid and Comet Impacts with the Earth, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
735, 766–73 (2003) [hereinafter Seamone, The Duty to “Expect the Unexpected”]; see gener-
ally Evan R. Seamone, Note, When Wishing on a Star Just Won’t Do:  The Legal Basis for 
International Cooperation in the Mitigation of Asteroid Impacts and Similar Transboundary 
Disasters, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1091 (2002) [hereinafter Seamone, When Wishing on a Star Just 
Won’t Do]. 
 167. Seamone, When Wishing on a Star Just Won’t Do, supra note 166, at 1095.  This 
term means that “‘while there is only a small possibility that damage could occur, the damage 
that could occur is great.’”  Id. at 1095 n.17; see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS 
& OVERSIGHT OF THE H. COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., 98TH CONG., REP. ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 9 (Comm. Print. 1984).  In response, “[p]lanning for 
threats that have not yet occurred is one aspect of the duty of self-preservation.”  Seamone, 
The Duty to “Expect the Unexpected,” supra note 166, at 748. 
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natural disasters, communicable crises, and manmade terrorist attacks.168  In 
each instance, although it is difficult—sometimes impossible—to predict 
precisely when the harmful event will occur, when it does, if the government 
and the populace have not taken effective measures to mitigate it, the conse-
quences are most assuredly devastating.169  The vernacular of disease preven-
tion and the governments’ preemptive responsibilities that stem from it is 
particularly appropriate for combat PTSD:  Disaster psychologists, for ex-
ample, have analogized PTSD to a “pathogen,” in the respect that, if untreat-
ed, it will result in the “loss of life through suicide, substance abuse, and 
domestic violence.”170  The veteran sleeper cell analogy raises the related 
concerns of counterterrorism.171 
Continuing the application of the precautionary principle, we can right-
fully label service connected PTSD-based offending as a low probability 
event for three reasons.172  First, the probability is low because not all veter-
ans who experience combat sustain PTSD.173  Second, and relatedly, not all 
veterans who sustain PTSD act in violent or aggressive ways.174  Third, 
PTSD may not be a cause or contributing factor in all criminal offenses 
committed by veterans who have the diagnosis.175  Despite the defense bar’s 
common assertion that all crimes committed by veterans are caused by PTSD 
and that veterans who engage in violent behavior have done so only because 
  
 168. See Seamone, The Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary Defense, supra 
note 166, at 9 (addressing “the spread of infectious disease, trans-border forest fires, nuclear 
and radiological emergencies, and terrorist attacks.”). 
 169. Id. at 6–7. 
[G]overnments must be capable of responding to threats of the greatest magnitude at all times.  
Planning for a “worst case scenario” is common in disaster relief circles.  Whether the harm is 
an earthquake, flood, or other natural disaster, the government’s goal must be to withstand 
maximum harm; not only harm that is considered “normal.”  The logic underlying this practice 
recognizes that there may only be one chance to avert significant harm. 
Id. at 7. 
 170. George S. Everly, Jr. & Cherie Castellano, Fostering Resilience in the Military:  The 
Search for Psychological Body Armor, J. COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L, 
Winter 2009, at 12, 13. 
 171. See LIFTON, supra note 156, 156–57; see also supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Justin Holbrook & Sara Anderson, Veterans Courts:  Early Outcomes and Key 
Indicators for Success 9–10 (Widener Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 11-
25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912655. 
 173. See id. at 9. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. at 9–10.  Many argue that these generalizations are harmful to veterans be-
cause they promote a fear-mongering, untrue, “wacko-vet myth.”  Id. at 3, 6–7 (reviewing 
exaggerated concerns that too many veterans are presumed to be violent and dangerous). 
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they were trained to be destructive, this “brutalization” hypothesis176 is hard-
ly a universal truth.177  Neither possibility can be quantified with any preci-
sion and existing studies lead to confused and contradictory results based 
largely on research methodology, self-reports, and populations that cannot be 
generalized.178 
However, low probability in this case does not equate to no probabil-
ity.179  Untreated combat trauma is a low probability, high consequence event 
because, “[f]or a small number of veterans, these stressors are having devas-
tating consequences, including increased risk of suicide.  Taking action 
now—before their problems become more complicated and severe, is in their 
best interests and in the best interest of the [n]ation.”180  Consequences are 
high particularly because of the training that has rendered the veteran lethal 
in combat.181  Many of these war-traumatized troops “often become adamant 
. . . about having loaded guns ready at hand for the purposes of self-defense, 
though there is usually no plausible threat anywhere near their typically sub-
urban neighborhoods.”182  When PTSD is untreated it can be triggered by any 
number of events in a no-notice situation, much like a lone wolf terrorist 
attack.183  As long as combat PTSD and other OSIs result in violent and crim-
  
 176. See BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING, supra note 8, at 344–45.  This hy-
pothesis states that “th[e] process of emotional numbing lead[s] combatants to long-term 
brutalization.”  Id. at 344. 
 177. Id. at 345 (“Though statistical evidence neither proved nor disproved the brutalization 
thesis, the weight of the evidence found veterans ‘innocent.’”). 
 178. Id. 
    179. William B. Brown, War, Veterans, and Crime, in 1 TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY 
MANUAL 599, 601 (M. Herzog-Evans ed. 2010) (“[T]he reintegration process, for many veter-
ans, includes their entanglement in the criminal justice system.”). 
 180. Ilem Testimony, supra note 111, at 98. 
 181. See, e.g., BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING, supra note 8, at 341 (observing 
how lethal skills acquired in training and in combat “disequipped men for life outside war 
zones”) (emphasis added)).  In many cases, once they have returned to civilian society, com-
bat veterans with PTSD are “‘dominated by a fear of their own violence’” or potential for 
violence.  LIFTON, supra note 156, at 138.  One Vietnam veteran used the term “‘the beast in 
me’” to address his “inclination to attack other people suddenly while in a dreamlike state in 
which he was hardly aware of what he was doing.”  Id. at 139.  In 1971, Congressional Medal 
of Honor recipient Sergeant Dwight W. Johnson was killed by a grocery store manager at the 
age of twenty-four while attempting a robbery.  Id. at 39 n.*.  This Vietnam veteran and hero 
in the truest sense who suffered from depression and post-Vietnam syndrome (moniker at the 
time) had voiced the concern to his mental health providers, “‘What would happen if I lost 
control of myself in Detroit and behaved like I did in Vietnam?’”  Id. at 39 n.*, 420 n.*. 
 182. Laurie Calhoun, The Silencing of Soldiers, 16 INDEP. REV. 247, 247 (2011); see also 
THE GROUND TRUTH (Focus Features 2006) (depicting an actual example). 
 183. See, e.g., Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra 
note 5, at 7 n.8 (discussing triggers for PTSD-related stress reactions, including “being cut-off 
by a vehicle on the road, perceiving that someone is staring-down the veteran, or even seeing 
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inal acts, suicide, and other behavior which harms society and families for 
generations to come in some proportion of cases,184 the precautionary princi-
ple mandates that governments, elected officials, and bureaucracies take ef-
fective preventive action, rather than absolving themselves from responsibil-
ity on the basis that these offenders have somehow lost their rights to mental 
health care as a result of military misconduct.  In fact, by placing 
servicemember-specific risks of criminality into the standard hazard profile 
that disaster mitigation specialists commonly use to assess the need for pre-
ventive intervention, military offender risks score among the highest catego-
ries.185  
Evident in the response to Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS), infectious disease prevention in that unplanned scenario required a 
proactive approach that eschewed standard—researched and heavily support-
ed—crisis response scripts and demanded practical interventions coupled 
with observations that led to self-correction after observed results.186  A simi-
lar precautionary principle relating to combat veteran offenders is most evi-
  
a Middle-Eastern person”); LIFTON, supra note 156, at 138 (describing a particularly high risk 
of “random violence” from Vietnam veterans who suffered combat trauma); Burgess et al., 
supra note 66, at 66 (reporting the facts of People v. Wood, an Illinois case in which a Vi-
etnam combat veteran was found to be not guilty by reason of insanity for a killing that oc-
curred as a result of noise in a factory that triggered a stress reaction and accompanying disso-
ciative episode); D’Antonio, supra note 65 (citing the findings of the Forgotten Warrior Pro-
ject that “a new shock or stress such as divorce, . . . death in the family, or unemployment can 
trigger antisocial, even criminal, behavior” in combat-traumatized veterans). 
 184. SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 50 (“[S]tudies are not necessary to predict that some types 
of criminal problems will result from the disorder.”).  Consider the prominence of secondary 
trauma suffered by family members, especially children.  Hedley Peach, Australia’s Vietnam 
Veterans:  A Review, 35 AUSTRALIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 619, 620 (2006).  Studies in this phe-
nomenon have begun to show that the children of combat veterans with PTSD are several 
times more likely themselves to develop psychological maladjustments and even commit 
suicide.  Id. at 621 tbl.2.  Just as PTSD and TBI are the signature injuries of the Iraq and Af-
ghanistan wars, secondary trauma is the signature injury of PTSD veterans’ family members.  
Joseph R. Herzog & R. Blaine Everson, Secondary Traumatic Stress, Deployment Phase, and 
Military Families:  Systemic Approaches to Treatment, in FAMILIES UNDER FIRE:  SYSTEMIC 
THERAPY WITH MILITARY FAMILIES 191, 209 (R. Blaine Everson & Charles R. Figley eds., 
2011). 
   185. See, e.g., LUCIEN G. CATON, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE 
PROPGRAMS 141 fig.5.7 (2007) (discussing use of the Hazard Profile to rate potential threats to 
public safety and health). 
 186. Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard & Arnold M. Howitt, Against Desperate Peril:  High 
Performance in Emergency Preparation and Response, in COMMUNICABLE CRISES:  
PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 1, 7–8 (Deborah E. Gibbons 
ed., 2007) (distinguishing “crisis emergencies” from planned emergencies for which there is 
an “executable script or routine that is known or identifiable and that provides a comprehen-
sive, reliable, and fully adequate response”). 
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dent in a recent movement among correctional mental health professionals.187  
In 2009, a series of articles by prominent psychiatrists and psychologists 
urged the corrections community to take immediate action to prevent veteran 
suicide in America’s jails and prisons.188  Recognizing that there were scarce 
data on the prevalence of veterans with PTSD in confinement who later 
committed suicide, they rebuked the prevailing opinion that more research 
was necessary to justify remedial intervention.189  Instead, as reflected in 
Figure 1 below, they looked to the convergence of risk factors that exist 
within the separate populations of prisoners who are at an increased risk of 
suicide and veterans who are at an increased rate of suicide and reasoned that 
the cumulative effect of this mixture is reason enough to prompt action.190 
 
Fig. 1191 
Even without certainty in studies and the status of PTSD as a soft and devel-
oping science, reasonable inferences are justified and immediate preventive 
action is necessary because “[w]hat clearly emerges is that incarcerated vet-
erans are at the intersection between two populations with well-established 
elevations in suicide rate.”192  Alternatively stated, the emerging picture of 
the serious risk posed is sufficient to create a moral obligation to act even in 
  
 187. See Hal S. Wortzel et al., Suicide Among Incarcerated Veterans, 37 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 82, 82, 88–89 (2009). 
 188. See Linda K. Frisman & Felicia Griffin-Fennell, Commentary:  Suicide and Incar-
cerated Veterans—Don’t Wait for the Numbers, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 92, 92 
(2009); Wortzel et al., supra note 187, at 82. 
 189. Wortzel et al., supra note 187, at 87 (“[O]ffering a meaningful estimation of suicide 
rate for [incarcerated veterans] remains impossible, and the . . . hypothesis that incarcerated 
veterans face a high suicide risk can, at present, be neither confirmed nor safely rejected.”). 
 190. Id. & fig.1. 
 191. Id. at 87 fig.1. 
 192. Id. at 87. 
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the absence of many studies serious scientists might desire for comfort in 
policymaking.193 
Common sense dictates the application of the precautionary principle in 
that corrections context, as it does in addressing the Military Misconduct 
Catch-22.  Following identical logic, for example, Warren Quinlan of the 
New England Shelter for Homeless Veterans, urged Congress to create addi-
tional options for securing VA benefits by drawing the following distinction, 
represented in Figure 2, below:  “Separately, combat PTSD is a social and 
legal problem, and veterans with ‘bad paper’ are a social and legal problem.  
The two together produce a dangerous and intractable morass of criminal, 
civil, and domestic dreadfulness.”194 
 
Fig. 2195 
In the same manner as the correctional psychiatrists and psychologists, Quin-
lan’s rationale avoids the types of illogical and absurd justifications pro-
pounded by opponents of arguments rooted only in subjective notions of 
morality or justice.196  Similarly, an actuarial perspective that factors the 
known and certain costs of avoided harm supports intervention rooted in the 
precautionary principle.  This known harm, for which the threat is real, ex-
tends far beyond merely the annual costs of incarceration to “unemployment 
compensation, . . . homeless shelters, substance abuse treatment and emer-
gency health care programs.”197 
  
 193. Frisman & Griffin-Fennell, supra note 188, at 92. 
 194. Quinlan Testimony, supra note 119, at 104. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra discussion accompanying notes 55–56. 
 197. Waters & Shay, supra note 162. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Contemporary commentators, like Professor William Brown, who often 
testifies at criminal trials involving PTSD-afflicted veterans,198 are very con-
cerned that the military and society have failed to learn the lessons from Vi-
etnam, particularly regarding those forgotten warriors who subsequently 
committed crimes as a result of their untreated combat PTSD.199  The Mili-
tary Misconduct Catch-22 obviously engenders the same eventual incarcera-
tion, suicide, and societal maladaptation that occurred for far too many Vi-
etnam veterans.200  While the question of what precautions to take may seem 
perplexing, they really are not when we consider many of the historical and 
recurring proposals.201 
The chances of blanket discharge upgrades for all types of military of-
fenders—including sexual predators, child molesters, and murderers—seems 
unlikely and undeserved.  Congress has not changed the VA’s character of 
discharge standards since 1944, even though standards for discharge have 
monumentally changed since then.202  It further blunted President Carter’s 
efforts to upgrade discharges for combat veterans in the aftermath of Vi-
etnam,203 and other more recent requests such as Representative Maxine Wa-
  
 198. Criminal Justice Degree Programs:  William Brown, PhD, W. OR. U., 
https://www.wou.edu/provost/extprogram/cj_online/faculty/brown.php (last visited Apr. 21, 
2013). 
 199. William B. Brown, Another Emerging “Storm”:  Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans with 
PTSD in the Criminal Justice System, JUST. POL’Y J., Fall 2008, at 2, 5–6, 11, 
http://www.cjcj.org/files/another_emerging.pdf; see also, e.g., Marcia G. Shein, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Criminal Justice System:  From Vietnam to Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, FED. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 42, 46–47; A Groundbreaking Court Decision for Vets 
with PTSD, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2009, 9:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2009/10/28/idUS147712+28-Oct-2009+PRN20091028. 
 200. See LIFTON, supra note 156, at 157; RICHARD A. KULKA ET AL., TRAUMA AND THE 
VIETNAM WAR GENERATION:  REPORT OF FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS 
READJUSTMENT STUDY 187 (1990); INST. OF MED., supra note 63, at 304. 
 201. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 202. See Hearings on H.R. 523, supra note 121, at 6006–08 (statement of Hon. Philip V. 
Warman, Associate General Counsel of the Veterans’ Administration).  As VA policy analysts 
noted, “the discharge provision . . . and . . . implementing administrative regulations have 
been in effect for in excess of one-quarter of a century, with no indication on the part of . . . 
Congress [or anyone] of any difference of opinion as to the validity of the Veterans Admin-
istration’s interpretation.”  Id. at 6008. 
 203. See, e.g., Nelson v. Shinseki, No. 09-3266, 2011 WL 1897329, at *1 & n.1 (Vet. 
App. May 19, 2011) (discussing how Congress muted President Carter’s Defense Special 
Discharge Review Program, which “generally entitled” bad paper veterans to “an automatic 
upgrade [of their discharge] to either an honorable discharge or a discharge under honorable 
conditions”). 
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ters’ efforts in the early ‘90s to do the same.204  The legislative intent behind 
the statutes related to veterans’ benefits has been, and continues to be, that 
some veterans should be denied medical care and hospitalization based on 
the nature of their misconduct while in the service.205  The VA, on the other 
hand, could improve the quality of its character of service determinations 
through its own administrative regulatory process.  Yet, it too is unlikely to 
adopt a blanket approach.  Unlike the Social Security Administration’s aboli-
tion of a similar character of service process in 1956,206 the VA’s standards 
for willful and persistent misconduct and crimes of moral turpitude derive 
largely from Congress’s explicit concerns when it passed the Servicemens’ 
Readjustment Act of 1944.207 
The optimal choice is confronting the problem while the servicemember 
is still in the force, prior to the time he or she is discharged with bad paper.208  
This is naturally the best opportunity to mitigate societal harm because it 
prevents a waiting game in which time is the enemy of recovery as the veter-
an appeals his or her discharge through a military board, the VA, or both; 
when the need for treatment is unquestionable, it should no longer take half a 
year for an initial determination, and then years for appeals in the VA 
alone.209  Practically, the armed services can conduct more aggressive 
screening and search for opportunities to treat instead of punish in situations 
recommended by health professionals.210 
  
 204. Waters & Shay, supra note 162. 
 205. Hearings on H.R. 523, supra note 121, at 6004–05 (statement of Hon. Philip V. 
Warman, Associate General Counsel of the Veterans’ Administration, citing various state-
ments of legislative intent). 
 206. Id. at 6010–11 (letter of Hon. Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security, 
describing how the Social Security Administration used to conduct a nearly identical character 
of service determination until December of 1956, when benefits were “provided without re-
gard to the character of the discharge the serviceman received for service after that date”). 
 207. See id. at 6005 (discussion paper submitted for the record by Hon. Philip V. Warman, 
Associate General Counsel of the Veterans’ Administration). 
 208. See, e.g., SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 210 (“[A]ny suggestion that it is acceptable to 
wait until veterans have been charged with crimes before the executive and legislative branch-
es intervene to assist in making them whole is far off the mark.”); Ilem Testimony, supra note 
111, at 98 (“DoD and VA share a responsibility to ensure that war-traumatized service per-
sonnel . . . should not be criminalized before an effort is made to intervene with therapeutic 
remedies.”). 
 209. See, e.g., Hal Bernton, Bronze Star Vet Discharged Without Benefits Gets Good 
News, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 8, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://seattletimes. 
com/html/localnews/2019103510_starks09m.html (reporting “an average of five to six 
months” time to conduct an initial character of service determination for an OTH recipient at 
the Portland, Oregon, VA Regional Office). 
 210. Hoellwarth, supra note 64. 
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Additionally, commanders can borrow a page from civilian justice 
agencies and courts by implementing diversionary programs to preserve VA 
benefit eligibility if the veteran succeeds in a course of intensive and super-
vised treatment, whether implemented by military agencies or through civil-
ian problem-solving courts (e.g., drug, domestic violence, mental health 
treatment, or veterans treatment courts).211  Because the option still exists for 
commanders to suspend all forms of crippling administrative and punitive 
discharges based on successful treatment outcomes, military leaders must 
endorse this approach and make it known throughout military mental health 
and legal channels.212  This has been done to address concerns over discharg-
ing servicemembers for personality disorders, which would deprive them of 
benefits for PTSD.213  In such cases, the Army Surgeon General must review 
cases prior to the involuntary separation.214  The military can certainly devel-
op similar protocols for handling of its misconduct cases.215  In a court-
martial, a federal conviction, reduction in rank, and forfeitures in pay can 
surely still meet the goals of deterrence in a case involving PTSD without 
requiring a crippling discharge as well. 
Even in those cases where the offender or the offense is deplorable 
enough to warrant eventual denial of benefits that would potentially displace 
the interests of honorably discharged veterans, the military can liaise with the 
VA and veterans service organizations to provide immediate and transition 
counseling services and effectuate some type of treatment in the months prior 
to discharge after the offender has been designated for the crippling dis-
charge pathway.216  Such efforts can include a preliminary disability evalua-
tion, therapy involving evidence-based PTSD treatments (including family 
members), preparation of one’s own file for discharge upgrade, and occupa-
tional counseling with those few organizations that still render services to 
  
 211. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
28–34. 
 212. See id. at 13–14. 
 213. Kennedy, supra note 53 (describing the Surgeon General’s involvement reviewing 
personality disorder discharges in the Army). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. It takes months to prepare a case for trial or a separation board and even after the 
announcement of a punitive discharge at court-martial, the offender is not separated from the 
military until appellate review has been completed months later.  See MCM, supra note 34, at 
II-169 (requiring appellate review of all approved court-martial sentences that include “dis-
missal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct dis-
charge, or confinement for 1 year or longer”).  During all of this time, the servicemember is 
still in the active military and recent developments permit the VA to devote its treatment 
resources toward active military members.  See Seamone, Attorneys as First Responders, 
supra note 9, at 169, 178–80 (discussing new VA directives). 
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veterans despite the brand of a crippling discharge.  For those overburdened 
military installations located near functioning problem-solving mental health 
or veterans’ treatment courts, program administrators and private clinicians 
can and should conduct outreach efforts and develop memoranda of under-
standing to expand the options available to commanders contemplating dis-
charge for misconduct.217  One notable example is the network of volunteer 
mental health providers assembled by Ray Parrish and Social Worker Johan-
na (Hans) Buwalda, which offers free mental health evaluations to former 
servicemembers across the nation who desire to apply for “Character of Ser-
vice” determinations by the VA.218 
On a final note, rather than abandoning over sixty years of regulatory 
standards within the VA, interdisciplinary experts can and should recom-
mend significant improvements to standardize the vague and undefined con-
cepts like “willful and persistent misconduct” and “moral turpitude” with 
objectively defined and methodological steps using the notice and comment 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.219  Such reform does not 
require protracted congressional action and can be completed in far less time 
with lasting modifications to the Code of Federal Regulations, while preserv-
ing Congress’s original intent in the statutes.220  A recent testament to such 
revision is the Department of Justice’s monumental shift in 2008 away from 
nearly a century’s worth of precedent221 in redefining the standards for evalu-
  
 217. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
13–14, 34. 
 218. Johanna (Hans) Buwalda, Spreading the Wealth:  Training Mental Health Providers 
Nationwide to Work with Veterans, VETERAN (Vietnam Veterans Against the War), Spring 
2012, at 8, 8 (describing the efforts of Vietnam Veterans Against the War to “develop[] a 
network of providers across the country that is willing to provide free, quality mental health 
services”).  Disabled American Veterans is another organization that provides services to 
PTSD-afflicted veterans and has attempted to address this concern with Congress.  See Ilem 
Testimony, supra note 111, at 93–94, 96. 
 219. See, e.g., William A. Moorman & William F. Russo, Serving Our Veterans Through 
Clearer Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 207, 208–11, 213, 217 (2004) (describing how the adminis-
trative rulemaking process could more quickly and effectively eliminate ambiguity in VA 
regulations than the legislative process). 
 220. Administrative agencies often fill in the gaps where statutes may be ambiguous and 
courts accord great deference when they do so.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 322–23 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the Supreme 
Court’s longstanding deferential position on agency rulemaking and related interpretations). 
 221. Cate McGuire, Note, An Unrealistic Burden:  Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude and 
Silva-Trevino’s Realistic Probability Test, 30 REV. LITIG. 607, 615 (2011) (describing how the 
Attorney General “upset almost 100 years of jurisprudence” within the Board of Immigration 
Appeals in creating a new method to define moral turpitude offenses). 
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ating whether an alien has been convicted of a crime of “moral turpitude” 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act.222 
While none of the above recommendations will end all veteran crimi-
nality, catch all cases of PTSD, or guarantee the success of all treatment 
plans or collaborative efforts between the military and society, no single in-
tervention could ever realistically accomplish all of these goals.  Instead, the 
efforts would reach a population that is treated as invisible for generations.  
By addressing the Military Misconduct Catch-22 head on, we might finally 
“bring home” these lost divisions of combat-traumatized veterans who con-
tinue to wage wars in our neighborhoods, our hospitals, our psychiatric 
wards, and our prisons and jails each day.  Recognizing society’s dire inter-
est in the servicemember’s un-crippled transition, the precautionary principle 
demands no less than TJ in action.  Otherwise, through the failure to treat 
this particularly devastating and lethal form of mental illness in the most 
dangerous offenders, the military and society will only contribute to the 
ranks of America’s largest sleeper cell, defeating itself from the inside out 
with each discarded troop’s preventable clash with the law. 
 
  
 222. See Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688, 691 (2008) (address-
ing the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When young Americans volunteer their lives to go and serve in the 
armed services, they often fail to realize that they are making a commitment 
that will last for the rest of their lives.  Rarely do they consider that it may 
even shorten their lives.  Inadequate treatment for veterans who have post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) leads to the symptoms progressing, and for 
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some, consequently results in suicide.1  Today, “more active duty soldiers 
commit suicide than are killed in combat,” which reflects negatively on the 
United States Military.2  The lack of proper care and attention awarded to 
veterans and military personnel is apparent in Specialist Kirkland’s story.3  
Kirkland, a soldier who had been deployed to Iraq twice, was sent home be-
cause the symptoms of PTSD were hindering his ability to live.4  When he 
returned to the barracks, he was publicly ridiculed for having PTSD and as-
signed to a room by himself.5  Forty-eight hours later he was found dead.6  
While it may have been his hands that physically took his life, “Kirkland did 
not kill himself.  He was killed by the Army” as a result of the inadequate 
treatment.7 
PTSD, which occurs in a high number of veterans, when left untreated, 
often leads to suicide.8  Preventing suicide among veterans with PTSD is 
directly linked to the legal system, because the law determines whether a 
veteran can qualify for disability benefits to receive treatment for disabilities 
incurred during service.9  Providing adequate care to veterans is dependent 
on specific laws set forth by the United States, which enable the Department 
of Veteran Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide 
adequate and efficient services to veterans.10  Additionally, the actions taken 
by the United States in decreasing the stigma attached with mental illnesses 
will help reduce suicide rates among veterans.11 
PTSD has been linked to a heightened risk of suicide among veterans, 
due to untreated symptoms of PTSD, which include:  “[D]epression, anxiety, 
sleep deprivation, substance abuse, and difficulties with anger manage-
ment.”12  Unfortunately, suicide rates in the military are at an all-time high, 
  
 1. See Seth Manzel, Let’s Not Forget PTSD and Suicide This Veterans Day, RSN (Nov. 
11, 2010), http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/266-32/3911-lets-not-forget-ptsd-and-
suicide-this-veterans-day. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Manzel, supra note 1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304, 3.12, 4.125 (2012). 
 10. See Exec. Order No. 13,625, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,783, 54,784–85 (Aug. 31, 2012). 
 11. See id. at 54,786. 
 12. MARGARET C. HARRELL & NANCY BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., LOSING THE 
BATTLE:  THE CHALLENGE OF MILITARY SUICIDE 2 (2011), http://www.cnas.org/files/ docu-
ments/publications/CNAS_LosingTheBattle_HarrellBerglass_0.pdf. 
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and the number of psychiatric illnesses, namely PTSD, are on the rise.13  
“PTSD is the only [mental] illness [that has] a clear etiologic[al] relationship 
to military service . . .” and it has been demonstrated that being exposed to 
war-zone stress can lead to life-lasting impairment.14  In 2012, a study re-
vealed that veterans who attempted suicide did not do so because they want-
ed to harm themselves; rather, they did so because they wanted the pain they 
were experiencing to end.15  Despite the prevalence of PTSD among veter-
ans,16 few studies have been conducted and little is known about how to help 
them.  The issue of rendering aid to returning veterans and preventing them 
from committing suicide has been placed under a spotlight of national scruti-
ny, which is evidenced by recent actions by President Barack Obama and the 
members of the Congress.17 
As veterans return and are not properly cared for, the reputation of the 
military as well as individuals’ desires to volunteer for the military will de-
crease, which is manifested in George Washington’s declaration, “‘[t]he will-
ingness with which our young people are likely to serve in any war, no mat-
ter how justified, shall be directly proportional to how they perceive the 
[v]eterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their nation.’”18  It 
is crucial that this topic be addressed with urgency because in the next five 
years a million soldiers are expected to return from combat,19 and in order to 
prevent suicide, it is integral that equal importance is given to mental wounds 
as is to physical wounds.20  Part two of this article defines PTSD and suicide 
both generally and in the military.21  Then, part three discusses the problem 
of the increasing rates of suicide amongst veterans with PTSD.22  Specifical-
ly, after explaining the general issues, the article discusses the legal obstacles 
that arise among veterans with PTSD.23  Part four illustrates the current ef-
  
 13. Deborah Brauser, Military Suicide:  US Takes Aim at Its ‘Toughest Enemy,’ 
MEDSCAPE NEWS (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/771603. 
 14. Robert Rosenheck & Alan Fontana, Changing Patterns of Care for War-Related 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder at Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Centers:  The Use 
of Performance Data to Guide Program Development, 164 MILITARY MED. 795, 795 (1999). 
 15. Gregg Zoroya, Study Reveals Top Reason Behind Soldiers’ Suicides, USA TODAY, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-07-10/army-study-soldiers-
suicides/56136192/1 (last updated July 11, 2012). 
 16. See Rosenheck & Fontana, supra note 14, at 795–96. 
 17. See Brauser, supra note 13. 
 18. HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 10. 
 19. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 20. See HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 5−6. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
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forts that are being taken to address the problem.24  Next, part five makes 
suggestions of what should be done to curtail the detrimental effects that 
PTSD has on veterans to prevent suicide.25  Finally, part six concludes that 
there is an increasing rate of suicide among returning veterans with PTSD 
and that rectifying the issue of suicide by veterans with PTSD is necessary.26 
II. DEFINING PTSD AND SUICIDE 
A history of PTSD has been linked to an increased risk of suicide at-
tempts among veterans.27  Individuals with PTSD are at a higher risk for sui-
cidal behavior, which has been illustrated by two studies.28  In the first study, 
a community sample showed that a veteran with PTSD was “14.9 times more 
likely to attempt suicide than [a veteran] without PTSD.”29  In the second 
study, an Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) 
screened sample demonstrated that a veteran with PTSD is “over four times 
more likely to endorse suicidal ideation than [a veteran] without PTSD.”30  
Veterans with PTSD possess an increased desire to engage in self-harm as a 
means of dealing with their overwhelming internal experiences, often be-
cause they have survivor guilt, have taken lives before, and have sustained 
combat injuries.31 
A. PTSD Generally and in the Military 
PTSD is a “trauma-related emotional disturbance” that has been a chal-
lenge for the mental health community “since its inception in 1980.”32  PTSD 
has been defined as “‘[a]n anxiety disorder resulting from exposure to an 
  
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. See infra Part V. 
 26. See infra Part VI. 
 27. Bridget E. Bulman, PTSD and Suicide in Veterans and Military Personnel, 
Powerpoint Presentation at Suicide Prevention Week, slide 22 (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.mirecc.va.gov/visn19/presentations/docs/bulman_ptsd_suicide_northern_ca_spw_
9-6-11.pdf. 
 28. Id.; see also Jonathan R. T. Davidson et al., Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in the 
Community:  An Epidemiological Study, 21 PSYCHOL. MED. 713, 713 (1991); Matthew 
Jakupcak et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder as a Risk Factor for Suicidal Ideation in Iraq 
and Afghanistan War Veterans, 22 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 303, 305 (2009). 
 29. Bulman, supra note 27, at slide 22; see also Davidson et al., supra note 28, at 718. 
 30. Jakupcak et al., supra note 28, at 305; see also Bulman, supra note 27, at slide 22. 
 31. Bulman, supra note 27, at slide 22–24. 
 32. E. B. Foa & E. A. Meadows, Psychosocial Treatments for Posttraumatic Stress Dis-
order:  A Critical Review, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 449, 449–50 (1997). 
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experience involving direct or indirect threat of serious harm or death.’”33  
The term PTSD “was first introduced [by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion] in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III).”34  Currently, the text revision of the fourth edition 
(DSM-IV-TR), which was published in 2000, is followed, and is limited to 
mostly descriptive changes to the DSM-IV.35  The fifth revision of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is expected to be released 
in 2013.36 
Pursuant to title 38, section 4.125 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
the VA has adopted the DSM-IV for rating psychiatric conditions.37  The 
DSM-IV explicitly lists military combat as a type of traumatic event which 
gives rise to PTSD.38  According to the DSM-IV, an individual must satisfy 
six criteria in order to be diagnosed with PTSD.39  First, there must have 
been a stressor, which means that the individual must have been introduced 
to a traumatic event “that involved actual or threatened death or serious inju-
ry, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others,” and the response to 
that threat must have “involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.”40  Once 
the first factor is satisfied, the second through fourth criteria explain that the 
symptoms include:  Persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event (Crite-
rion B), “[p]ersistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and 
numbing of general responsiveness” (Criterion C), and “[p]ersistent symp-
toms of increased arousal” (Criterion D).41  The fifth criterion mandates that 
the duration of the symptoms experienced must be present for more than one 
month.42  The sixth factor assesses functional significance of the individual 
and further requires a physician to specify whether the PTSD is acute—
symptoms last less than three months—or chronic—symptoms last three or 
more months.43  The second requirement of persistent reexperiencing consists 
of: 
  
 33. Bulman, supra note 27, at slide 6. 
 34. Foa & Meadows, supra note 32, at 450. 
 35. See DSM-IV-TR, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm 
/dsm-iv-tr (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (2012). 
 38. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 463 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
 39. See id. at 467−68. 
 40. Id. at 467. 
 41. Id. at 468. 
 42. Id. 
 43. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 468. 
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(1) [R]ecurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, 
. . . (2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event, . . . (3) acting or 
feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring, . . . (4) intense 
psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that 
symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event, [or] (5) 
physiological reactivity [up]on exposure to internal or external 
cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.44 
The avoidant/numbing factor includes: 
(1) [E]fforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associat-
ed with the trauma; (2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people 
that arouse recollections of the trauma; (3) inability to recall an 
important aspect of the trauma; (4) markedly diminished interest or 
participation in significant activities; (5) feeling of detachment or 
estrangement from others; (6) restricted range of affect; [and] (7) 
[a] sense of . . . foreshortened future.45 
The element of hyper-arousal involves “(1) difficulty falling or staying 
asleep, (2) irritability or outbursts of anger, (3) difficulty concentrating, (4) 
hypervigilance, [and an] (5) exaggerated startle response.”46 
PTSD is caused by stress factors and it has been found that when the 
stress is caused by human design, PTSD “is more severe and lasts longer.”47  
Individuals experiencing PTSD exhibit self-destructive and dangerous be-
havior, including “[s]ubstance use, [s]uicidal attempts, [r]isky sexual behav-
ior, [r]eckless driving, [and] [s]elf-injury.”48  Treatment for PTSD includes 
hypnotherapy; psychodynamic treatments; cognitive-behavioral treatments 
such as exposure procedures, systematic desensitization, prolonged imaginal 
and in vivo exposure; anxiety management programs; and combined treat-
ment programs.49 
PTSD has been utilized in courts as a basis for the insanity defense, as 
well as a mitigating factor at sentencing for veterans who were involved in 
combat.50  Approximately “30% of combat veterans experience PTSD,”51 
  
 44. Id. (stating that the traumatic event is reexperienced, persistently, in at least one of 
the ways mentioned). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Bulman, supra note 27, at slide 15. 
 48. Id. at slide 16. 
 49. Foa & Meadows, supra note 32, at 457–58, 461–62, 470, 472. 
 50. Jim McGuire & Sean Clark, PTSD and the Law:  An Update, PTSD RES. Q., Apr. 21, 
2011, at 1, 1, available at http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/newsletters/research-
quarterly/v22n1.pdf. 
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which has been associated with being deployed multiple times, and a lack of 
time available to spend at home to lead a normal, healthy life, inevitably re-
sulting in emotional problems and then the commission of suicide.52  The 
most common reason why army personnel are being hospitalized is due to 
psychiatric illnesses such as PTSD.53 
While PTSD is often not given as much importance because it is per-
ceived as a mental illness, a recent study showed that individuals experienc-
ing PTSD do exhibit physical alterations in their brain.54  In November 2012, 
a study indicated that combat veterans with PTSD had a smaller volume in 
the amygdala, the primary area of the brain that regulates responses to stress, 
fear, and anxiety, which is significant because it indicated that a physical 
alteration is associated with PTSD, “regardless of the severity of trauma.”55  
The study analyzed magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans of “200 com-
bat veterans who served in Iraq and Afghanistan,” half who had PTSD, and 
the other half who had not been diagnosed with PTSD.56 
B. Suicide Generally and in the Military 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “[s]uicide 
was the tenth leading cause of death [in the United States] in 2010.”57  “Sui-
cide is the third leading cause of death” for youth between the ages of fifteen 
and twenty-four years old,58 which is problematic because many of the sol-
diers serving the country fall within this age range.59  Challenges at work, 
financial and legal troubles, physical or medical illnesses, struggles in social 
life, substance abuse, psychological injury, emotional distress, and mental 
disorders including depression, schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, and PTSD, 
  
 51. Bulman, supra note 27, at slide 7. 
 52. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 53. See id. 
 54. PTSD Linked to Smaller Brain Area Regulating Fear Response, SCI. DAILY (Nov. 5, 
2012), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/11/121105161355.htm. 
 55. Id.  However, this study fails to indicate whether a smaller amygdala volume is a 
result of trauma, or whether the smaller amygdala volume is what makes soldiers more vul-
nerable to developing PTSD.  Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. CDC, SUICIDE:  FACTS AT A GLANCE (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/Violence Preven-
tion/pdf/Suicide_DataSheet-a.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
 59. David R. Segal & Mady Wechsler Segal, America’s Military Population, 
POPULATION BULL., Dec. 2004, at 1, 23, 24 fig.9, available at http://www.prb.org/Source/ 
ACF1396.pdf. 
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are all correlated with suicide attempts, suicide ideation, and deaths by sui-
cide,60 and occur among all age groups and demographic variables.61 
General Lloyd J. Austin stated, “‘[s]uicide is the toughest enemy I have 
faced in my 37 years in the Army.  That said, I do believe suicide is prevent-
able,’”62 representing a belief that if proper precautions are taken, the number 
of deaths caused by suicide may decrease.63  Making suicide prevention a 
priority is necessary because a policy brief indicated that approximately 
eighteen veterans take their own lives daily, and between the years of 2005 
and 2010, at a rate of about one every thirty-six hours.64 
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has been working to ensure 
access to mental health services and has created programs tailored to prevent 
suicides.65  The suicide of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jeremy 
Boorda, served as a “wakeup call” for the military, leading to widespread 
media attention.66  This began the development of formal suicide prevention 
programs in the military.67  Suicide prevention programs in the Army focus 
on:  “Developing life-coping skills, [e]ncouraging help-seeking behaviors, 
[r]aising awareness and vigilance to suicide prevention, [i]ntegrating suicide 
prevention programs, [and] [c]onducting suicide surveillance and analysis.”68  
In 2007, the VA implemented a suicide prevention program at the order of 
the Congress.69  While the problem is identified, it is hard to prevent because 
it is difficult to predict which individuals are actually thinking about commit-
ting suicide due to the low base rate of suicide.70  Additionally, the low num-
ber of comprehensive assessments of suicide mortality among veterans 
  
 60. DEP’T OF DEF. TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS OF THE 
ARMED FORCES, THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE:  STRENGTHENING THE FORCE, PREVENTING 
SUICIDE AND SAVING LIVES, 7, 8 diagram 2-1 (2010), available at 
http://www.health.mil/dhb/downloads/suicide prevention task force report 08-21-
10_v4_rln.pdf. 
 61. See CDC, supra note 57. 
 62. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. John F. McCarthy et al., Suicide Mortality Among Patients Receiving Care in the 
Veterans Health Administration Health System, 169 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1033, 1033–34 
(2009). 
 66. DEP’T OF DEF. TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS OF THE 
ARMED FORCES, supra note 60, at 11. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 16. 
 69. McCarthy et al., supra note 65, at 1033. 
 70. Ella C. Nye et al., Specific Symptoms Predict Suicidal Ideation in Vietnam Combat 
Veterans with Chronic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 172 MILITARY MED. 1144, 1144 
(2007). 
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makes it harder to solve the problem.71  There has also been no assessment of 
suicide rates among veterans who are receiving aid from the VHA health 
system.72 
III. THE PROBLEM 
A. Generally 
During the month of July 2012, “26 active-duty soldiers and 12 reserve 
soldiers [committed suicide], which is the highest number ever recorded in 1 
month.”73  The United States Army confirmed an overall rise in the number 
of suicides, evidenced by 116 active-duty suicides and 71 reservist suicides 
in just the first seven months of 2012, as compared to 165 active duty and 
118 reservist suicides in all of 2011.74  One of the greatest challenges that 
both the mental health community and the VHA healthcare system face is 
that of veterans with PTSD experiencing suicidal ideation.75  Veterans with 
PTSD who chronically exhibit suicidal ideation consume a disproportionate 
amount of the limited resources available at hospitals or clinics, which in 
turn “introduce[s] resource allocation stress into [the] system[], [inevitably 
leading] to wide-ranging consequences for the entire . . . veteran population” 
that is seeking treatment.76 
There are only two medications, sertraline and paroxetine, approved by 
the Food and Drug Administration for treating PTSD.77  It has been indicated 
that even the two medications are only effective in a limited capacity.78  Of-
ten times, in addition to the medicine, the individual seeking recovery might 
also need psychotherapy, which makes it even harder for an individual to 
overcome the hurdle.79  As a result, many veterans do not attend therapy reg-
ularly, and between 20% and 50% of soldiers walk away from PTSD treat-
ment before it is completed.80  This has led scientists to look for other medi-
cations such as D-cycloserine and ketamine, as well as other promising ther-
  
 71. McCarthy et al., supra note 65, at 1033. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Nye et al., supra note 70, at 1144. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Michael Dieperink et al., Comparison of Treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der Among Three Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Centers, 170 MILITARY MED. 305, 
305 (2005). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Brauser, supra note 13. 
 80. Id. 
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apies such as “‘eye movement desensitization, hypnosis, and other talking 
therapies.’”81 
Instead of praising veterans with PTSD for living through traumatic ex-
periences that were experienced during combat, society, including military 
personnel, looks down upon individuals with PTSD, perceiving them as 
weak and pitying them.82  The stigma associated with having a mental disor-
der is the greatest challenge preventing soldiers from seeking help.83  Com-
batting the stigma will be close to impossible because many people do not 
regard PTSD as a real injury.84  A study conducted in 2008 revealed that the 
reported rates of PTSD and suicidal thoughts were “two to four times higher” 
in anonymous surveys as compared to those in post-deployment health as-
sessment (PDHA) surveys.85  Returning soldiers fabricate their answers at-
tempting to conceal any PTSD related symptoms since their unit leaders ad-
vise them to.86  Soldiers have been told by their unit leaders, “‘[i]f you an-
swer yes to any of those questions, you are not going home to your family 
tomorrow,’” resulting in soldiers falsifying responses.87  As an effort to rem-
edy this problem and encourage honesty, the 2010 National Defense Author-
ization Act (NDAA) necessitates that “PDHA evaluations [be conducted] 
individually and face-to-face” by “trained medical or behavioral . . . profes-
sionals.”88 
Additionally, a major problem is the lack of healthcare providers to help 
veterans who are seeking treatment for PTSD.89  The national shortage of 
mental health and behavioral healthcare providers has been linked to an in-
crease in suicide rates.90  Even when military hospital commanders have the 
authority to hire healthcare personnel on an as-needed basis, they cannot do 
so due to a national shortage of care providers.91  It was found that where the 
healthcare professionals increased to the number recommended in the Veter-
ans Health Administration Handbook, suicide rates decreased by 3.6 deaths 
per one hundred thousand.92 
  
 81. Id. 
 82. See HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 5. 
 83. Id.  “[Forty-three] percent of soldiers . . . who took their own lives in 2010 did not 
seek help from military treatment facilities in the month before their deaths.”  Id. 
 84. Id. at 5–6. 
 85. Id. at 5. 
 86. See HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 5. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 6. 
 90. Id. 
 91. HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 6. 
 92. Id. 
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Another factor that adds to the problem of veterans not getting adequate 
treatment is the time delay between the onset of PTSD and the treatment for 
it.93  Approximately one million veterans are currently waiting on claims for 
disability from the VA, a number which is only expected to rise in the next 
several months by 1.2 million.94  It takes the VA, on average, just over eight 
months to respond to a disability claim, and in the case that a veteran desires 
to appeal a denied claim, it takes an average of three and a half years.95  The 
time delay poses a problem because if a veteran with PTSD commits suicide 
while he or she is not receiving treatment, it is impossible to say that the 
death could not have been prevented.96 
B. Obstacles Presented by the Legal System 
The four main legal issues addressed in this article associated with 
PTSD and suicide among veterans are:  (1) The United States judicial sys-
tem’s ability to take action on the VA’s treatment of veterans;97 (2) the law 
regarding veterans’ ability to establish a service connection;98 (3) untreated 
PTSD causing veteran dismissal without disability benefits;99 and (4) laws 
regarding certain personnel from inquiring when a soldier or veteran owns a 
personal firearm.100 
1. Limited Authority of Federal Courts over the VA 
The VA adjudicates the majority of the claims involving veterans be-
cause the United States federal courts have limited authority to render deci-
sions over an agency.101  While the Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims has 
final jurisdiction to review the decisions of the VA, pursuant to section 
706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, federal courts can only com-
mand an agency to act if the agency failed to act in a way it was required to 
  
 93. See Leila Levinson, Time to Pay the Price of War, HUFFPOST (Sept. 21, 2012, 5:51 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leila-levinson/veterans-mental-health_b_1898771.html. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Ruben Rosario, We’re Quick to Send Them off to War, but Slow to Help, TWIN 
CITIES.COM (Sept. 22, 2012, 10:27 PM), http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci 
_21603734/ruben-rosario-were-quick-sand-them-off-war. 
 96. See Levinson, supra note 93; Rosario, supra note 95. 
 97. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 98. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 99. See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
 100. See discussion infra Part III.B.4. 
 101. See Case Law Developments, Expert Evidence and Testimony, 35 MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 547, 567 (2011). 
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do so.102  The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988 (VJRA) dictates which 
federal courts do and do not have jurisdiction in cases involving veteran ben-
efits.103  The VJRA confers exclusive jurisdiction upon veteran courts to re-
view ‘“all questions involving benefits under laws administered by the VA . . 
. includ[ing] factual, legal, and constitutional questions.”’104  By codifying 
section 511, Congress intended to permanently “broaden the scope of section 
211105 and limit outside court intervention in the VA decisionmaking pro-
cess.”106  As a result, federal courts are disqualified from hearing cases re-
garding veterans’ benefits.107  For instance, because sections 1705 and 1710 
of the United States Code delegate the “[m]anagement of health care [con-
sisting of the] patient enrollment system” and “[e]ligibility for hospital, nurs-
ing home, and domiciliary care” to the Secretary of the VA, federal courts 
lack jurisdiction to judge the agency’s exercise of judgment.108  This means 
that federal courts have no say in, or control over, whether the VA is provid-
ing timely or effective mental healthcare to veterans.109  This is extremely 
problematic because if the VA does not provide timely care, or if it renders 
ineffective treatment, the federal courts lack the authority to improve the 
procedure or guidelines utilized by the VA.110 
2. Service Connections 
The VA has a compensation system for veterans with PTSD, allowing 
veterans to file claims in order to receive disability compensation benefits.111  
Even though the VA was not created until 1930, the custom of providing 
  
 102. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006); 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). 
 103. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 840 (2013).  For a detailed explanation of the history of 
judicial review, and the VJRA, see id. at 1020–23. 
 104. Id. at 1021 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, pt. 1, at 5 (1988)). 
 105. 38 U.S.C. § 511.  Section 211 (involving the preclusion of judicial review by other 
courts), originally appeared in the Department of Veterans Affairs Codification Act, Pub. L. 
No. 102-83, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 388 (1991), but is now covered by 38 U.S.C. § 511.  38 U.S.C. § 
511. 
 106. Shinseki, 678 F.3d at 1022 (quotations omitted); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, pt. 
1, at 27.  Title 38 of the United States Code Annotated section 511 is subject to four excep-
tions, one of which allows “[t]he Veterans Court and . . . Federal Circuit [to] review the Secre-
tary’s decisions regarding veterans’ benefits.”  Shinseki, 678 F.3d at 1022. 
 107. Id. at 1022–23. 
 108. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1705, 1710. 
 109. See Case Law Developments, supra note 101, at 567. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Nathaniel J. Doan & Barbara C. Morton, Comment, A New Era for Establishing 
Service Connection for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD):  A Proposed Amendment to 
the Stressor Verification Requirement, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 249, 249–50 (2010). 
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disability benefits for individuals who served for the United States has been 
evident since the Revolutionary War.112  A veteran looking to receive a cer-
tain amount of disability benefits due to an injury caused by a service in-
curred condition must show that the injury caused by the condition was relat-
ed to service to the country.113  A “[s]ervice connection connotes . . . that the 
facts . . . establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability 
was incurred coincident with service in the [a]rmed [f]orces, or if preexisting 
such service, was aggravated therein.”114  The United States Code mandates 
that when adjudicating a claim for service connection for PTSD, “the places, 
types, and circumstances of” service are considered by examining service 
records, the official history of any organization in which the veteran served, 
military records, as well as any other pertinent evidence.115 
In order to receive a service connection for PTSD, the claimant must 
show that a claim is well grounded116 through:  (1) Medical evidence estab-
lishing a clear diagnosis of the condition; (2) “credible supporting evidence 
that the claimed in-service stressor [actually] occurred;” and (3) “a link, es-
tablished by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service 
stressor.”117 
Pursuant to an amendment by President Obama in July 2010, when 
there is no evidence to corroborate that an alleged injury occurred during 
combat, the Secretary of Veteran Affairs may accept satisfactory lay evi-
dence as long as it is consistent with the conditions of the service.118  Before 
the amendment in 2010, a soldier serving as a physician for wounded sol-
diers would not be able to receive disability benefits even if he witnessed his 
fellow soldiers in an explosion, and as a result, during the explosion, utilized 
a firearm to protect himself.119  Because the soldier was acting as a physician, 
it would be close to impossible for the soldier to prove that the in-service 
stressor actually occurred.120  However, as a result of the 2010 amendment, 
the sole lay testimony of a veteran may be sufficient to establish the exist-
ence of an in-service stressor where evidence indicates that PTSD was diag-
  
 112. Katherine Dubyak, Close, but No Cigar:  Recent Changes to the Stressor Verification 
Process for Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Why the System Remains In-
sufficient, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 655, 665 (2012). 
 113. Doan & Morton, supra note 111, at 250. 
 114. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2012). 
 115. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1) (2006). 
 116. See id. § 5107(a). 
 117. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f).  The second requirement has commonly been known as the 
“documentation requirement.”  Dubyak, supra note 112, at 656. 
 118. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1)–(4); Dubyak, supra note 112, at 656. 
 119. Dubyak, supra note 112, at 655–56. 
 120. See id. at 655. 
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nosed during service in the armed forces and that the claimed stressor was 
associated to the service as long as there is no clear and convincing evidence 
to the contrary.121  The lay testimony may also be sufficient to show the ex-
istence of an in-service stressor where it is shown that the veteran was in-
volved with combat and that the claimed stressor was associated with the 
combat.122 
However, it has been held that the mere presence in a combat zone does 
not constitute a valid stressor to support a PTSD diagnosis; instead, a show-
ing of an event “such as experiencing an immediate threat to one’s life or 
[observing] another person being . . . killed” is necessary.123  This is evi-
denced in Gray v. West,124 where a veteran, with the military occupational 
specialty of general warehouseman, was diagnosed with PTSD yet denied 
entitlement to service connection because he was not able “‘to verify [the] 
alleged stressors.’”125  The court held that it was not enough that the medical 
diagnosis stated, “‘this man had stressors when he went out on patrol and 
faced death for the first time,’” and that corroboration of the stressor by 
“specific dates, places, or names of people killed” was necessary in order to 
establish a sufficient service connection.126  However, a court held that pain 
or suffering is relevant for a showing of a disability for which service con-
nection can be granted as it is considered in assessing the extent of a condi-
tion.127  Additionally, there is a presumption of soundness stating that a vet-
eran is presumed to be in “sound condition when examined” for obtaining 
benefits with the exception of the conditions noted during initial examina-
tion.128 
Moreover, a service connection can be granted if it is shown that symp-
toms of a condition were chronic or continuous.129  Showing that the symp-
toms qualify under “service connection” requires the veteran to be diagnosed 
with the condition during service and at the time of the claim for the service 
connection.130 
While the law regarding service connection was recently amended in 
2010, the language of the law is narrowly worded, making it difficult for 
  
 121. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1); Dubyak, supra note 112, at 656. 
 122. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2); Dubyak, supra note 112, at 656. 
 123. Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 99 (1993). 
 124. No. 97-752, 1998 WL 551797 (Vet. App. Aug. 19, 1998). 
 125. Id. at *1. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi, 259 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 128. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) (2012). 
 129. Id. § 3.303(b). 
 130. Id. 
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many veterans to obtain disability benefits.131  With regard to establishing 
service connection, the requirement of “‘credible supporting evidence that 
the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred’” should be eliminated, and, 
instead, lay testimony coupled with confirmations by two or more mental 
health experts should be sufficient for establishing an in-service stressor.132  
Although this would increase the cost for mental healthcare professionals, a 
change in this direction would be ultimately beneficial by evading both the 
pecuniary and societal costs of PTSD left untreated.133  Making it easier for 
returning veterans with PTSD to establish service connection is a necessary 
step to reduce suicide rates because establishing service connection will re-
sult in access to treatment for PTSD. 
3. The Plight of a Military Defendant Who Is Not Declared Incompetent 
Another major legal obstacle that stands in the way of a veteran with 
PTSD is if the veteran received an Other Than Honorable (OTH) dis-
charge.134  Pursuant to Title 38 of the United States Code section 1131, the 
United States will compensate a veteran who incurred a disability during 
duty, so long as the veteran was “discharged or released under conditions 
other than dishonorable;” however, if a veteran incurred the disability due to 
the “veteran’s own willful misconduct or [by substance] abuse,” no compen-
sation will be made.135  The adjudication regulations followed by the VA are 
detailed in the Code of Federal Regulations section 3.12, titled “[c]haracter 
of discharge.”136  Veterans who receive OTH discharges are generally not 
eligible to receive disability benefits from the VA, “unless it is found that the 
person was insane at the time of committing the offense causing such dis-
charge.”137 
In cases where the defense counsel suspects that the defendant is suffer-
ing from PTSD, a sanity board is requested.138  When the sanity board does 
not find the defendant insane at the time of the offense, the defendant is 
faced with an option.139  The defendant can request a discharge instead of 
court-martial, which will likely result in an OTH discharge, barring qualifi-
  
 131. See Dubyak, supra note 112, at 656, 675. 
 132. Id. at 655–56, 678. 
 133. Id. at 678. 
 134. See 38 U.S.C. § 1131 (2006). 
 135. Id. 
 136. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2012). 
 137. Id.; see also Vanessa Baehr-Jones, A “Catch-22” for Mentally-Ill Military Defend-
ants:  Plea-Bargaining Away Mental Health Benefits, 204 MIL. L. REV. 51, 51–52 (2010). 
 138. Baehr-Jones, supra note 137, at 53. 
 139. Id. at 53–54. 
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cation for disability benefits.140  The only exception listed in the Veteran’s 
Benefit Code (VBC) that permits treatment for veterans with an OTH dis-
charge is when the veteran is declared incompetent.141  A veteran will hardly 
ever fall under the exception because the whole reason the defendant was 
even faced with the option to receive an OTH discharge was because the 
sanity board did not declare the defendant incompetent in the first place.142  
Unfortunately, the language of the VBC forces military defendants to face 
this Catch-22:  A veteran who is not declared incompetent can opt for an 
OTH discharge instead of a court-martial, barring disability benefits; but if a 
veteran has an OTH discharge, he or she can only obtain benefits if declared 
incompetent.143  If veterans do not get disability benefits, PTSD symptoms 
often go untreated, which also often ultimately results in an increase in sui-
cides.144 
This poses a problem because in the last five years, more than twenty 
thousand soldiers left the Army with OTH discharges, restricting their access 
to healthcare and disability benefits.145  Where a veteran produced medical 
records detailing PTSD among other injuries, the VA did not qualify him for 
healthcare because he left the military with an OTH discharge.146  Unfortu-
nately, so many soldiers are forced to leave the military with OTH discharges 
because their PTSD is not adequately treated; and when PTSD is left untreat-
ed, it leads to the soldiers misbehaving, ultimately and inevitably resulting in 
an OTH discharge.147  This is evidenced by a survey conducted in 2010, 
which indicated that soldiers who served in combat zones and were suffering 
from PTSD “were more than [eleven] times [as] likely to receive a miscon-
duct discharge” than soldiers without PTSD.148 
The VBC should be amended to include a provision allowing benefits 
for disability for veterans regardless of the fact that they have an OTH dis-
charge if the disability is service-connected.149  Additionally, the standards 
utilized by the sanity board should be broader, including a full evaluation as 
  
 140. Id. at 54. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Baehr-Jones, supra note 137, at 53–54. 
 144. See Hal Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without Health-Care Benefits, 
SEATTLETIMES, Aug. 13, 2012, 
www.seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2018894574_vets12m.html. 
 145. See id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Baehr-Jones, supra note 137, at 60. 
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well as treatment options for the judge to consider when sentencing.150  
Moreover, the VBC should also be amended to explicitly include PTSD 
within the insanity exception as a basis for being declared incompetent.151 
4. Laws Preventing Inquiry of the Possession of Firearms 
On January 2, 2013, the United States Congress passed the National De-
fense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013, amending section 
1062(c) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011.152  Before this amendment, it 
was extremely difficult for military personnel to take preventative measures 
in terms of high-risk individuals that might possess firearms.153  The legal 
restrictions set forth in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 forbade anyone in 
the DoD from collecting any information regarding the legal possession of 
any firearms.154  The only exceptions permitted were 1) records of the use or 
possession of firearms “by a member of the Armed Forces or civilian em-
ployee of the [DoD]” engaged in official DoD duties or wearing an Armed 
Forces uniform; or 2) records of an alleged violation, including whether a 
member of the Armed Forces poses a threat to others.155  Military leaders 
were permitted to discuss personal firearms with soldiers who appeared to 
have the potential to hurt themselves.156  The provisions of the NDAA for 
fiscal year 2011 were problematic because “forty-eight percent of the mili-
tary suicides in 2010 [were committed] with privately-owned [firearms].”157  
However, the amendment in the NDAA for fiscal year 2013 
authorize[s] a health professional that is a member of the Armed 
Forces or a civilian employee of the [DoD] or a commanding of-
ficer to inquire if a member of the Armed Forces plans to acquire, 
or already possesses or owns, a privately-owned firearm, ammuni-
tion, or other weapon, if such health professional or such com-
  
 150. Id. at 63. 
 151. See id. at 60. 
 152. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, sec. 
1057, § 1057, 126 Stat. 1938, 1938; see also Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, sec. 1062, § 1062(c), 124 Stat. 4363, 4363. 
 153. Compare § 1057, 126 Stat. at 1938, with § 1062, 124 Stat. at 4363. 
 154. HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 6. 
 155. § 1062, 124 Stat. at 4363; HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra 
note 12, at 6–7. 
 156. HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 6–7; see also § 
1062, 124 Stat. at 4363. 
 157. HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 6. 
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manding officer has reasonable grounds to believe such member is 
at risk for suicide or causing harm to others.158 
Inhibiting access to weapons has been indicated to serve as a successful 
means to prevent suicide;159 however, the 2013 provision only allows inquiry 
regarding whether the veteran owns or plans on purchasing a firearm where 
the healthcare professional has reasonable grounds to believe that the indi-
vidual is suicidal.160  The 2013 provision still poses problems because:  (1) 
healthcare professionals often do not know that an individual is suicidal; (2) 
even where a healthcare professional has a hunch that an individual is suicid-
al, it might be hard for a healthcare professional to prove that hunch based on 
reasonable grounds; and (3) the potentially suicidal veteran could commit 
suicide in the time it takes a healthcare professional to properly follow the 
procedural guidelines to prove reasonable grounds.  To fully combat the 
problem of veterans committing suicide by privately-owned firearms, all 
military personnel and veterans should be required to report to the DoD and 
VA whether personal firearms are owned and whether they plan on purchas-
ing any firearms.  Implementing such a policy would allow healthcare pro-
fessionals to monitor veterans with PTSD who own or plan on owning a fire-
arm to be monitored more closely. 
IV. CURRENT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS SUICIDE AMONG VETERANS WITH 
PTSD 
A. Government Action to Reduce Suicide Among Veterans Resulting from 
PTSD 
1. Executive Order 
On August 31, 2012, President Obama signed an executive order in-
structing the VA to “hire 1600 new mental health professionals and 800 
peer-support counselors” to ensure that an individual in crisis can be helped 
within twenty-four hours.161  As an effort to prevent suicide, any veteran who 
calls the Veterans Crisis Line in crisis will be ensured that he or she will be 
connected with a mental healthcare professional within twenty-four hours.162  
The executive order mandates a 50% expansion of the Veterans Crisis Line, 
  
 158. § 1057, 126 Stat. at 1938. 
 159. HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 6. 
 160. See § 1057, 126 Stat. at 1938. 
 161. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 162. Exec. Order No. 13,625, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,783, 54,783 (Aug. 31, 2012). 
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as well as the expansion of the number of mental health professionals availa-
ble beyond the traditional business hours.163  To better understand the under-
lying mechanisms of PTSD and to better the coordination between the DoD, 
VA, and the Health and Human Services (HHS), the executive order required 
the establishment of a National Research Action Plan within eight months of 
the execution of the order.164  Additionally, President Obama established an 
interagency task force, “co-chaired by the Secretaries” of the DoD, VA, and 
HHS,165 to formulate policies to improve diagnosis and treatment for 
PTSD.166  To further offer support to veterans in crisis, the DoD created a 
“Real Warriors” campaign and website.167 
2. Veteran Treatment Courts 
Generally, veterans who have PTSD have the tendency to exhibit be-
havior leading to their involvement in the criminal justice system.168  Since 
2008, veterans treatment courts (VTCs)—an alternative “justice system [that] 
incorporates advanced ‘problem-solving’ strategies in its sentencing practic-
es,” allowing veterans to escape a conviction by giving them a second 
chance—are being formed to deal with veterans’ mental health issues.169  The 
number of problem-solving courts has been increasing rapidly; “[a]s of 2012, 
there are over 3648 problem-solving courts in the United States.”170  Current-
ly, 104 VTCs exist in the United States,171 which were modeled after the first 
one formed in New York.172  States, such as Alaska and California, have cre-
ated their own courts just for veterans, with the purpose of providing veter-
ans proper healthcare treatment instead of just incarcerating them.173  VTCs 
are created because it has been found that “there is a direct link between 
PTSD and the commission of crimes” due to the symptoms of PTSD leading 
  
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 54,784–85. 
 165. Id. at 54,785. 
 166. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 167. Id. 
 168. What Is a Veterans Treatment Court?, JUST. FOR VETS, 
http://www.justiceforvets.org/what-is-a-veterans-treatment-court (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 169. McGuire & Clark, supra note 50, at 2; Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilita-
tive Ethic in Military Justice:  The Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Mili-
tary Offenders with PTSD and TBI and Reduce Recidivism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011). 
 170. Seamone, supra note 169, at 34–35. 
 171. The History, JUST. FOR VETS, http://www.justiceforvets.org/vtc-history (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2013). 
 172. McGuire & Clark, supra note 50, at 2. 
 173. Marcia G. Shein, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Criminal Justice System:  
From Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, FED. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 42, 49. 
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to violent or criminal behavior,174 and formation is motivated by the occur-
rence of PTSD among veterans seeking justice.175  Problem-solving courts, 
such as VTCs, are extremely beneficial for veterans, as they shift the focus 
from the victim’s interest to the defendant’s interest, allowing for therapeutic 
justice instead of retributive justice.176  Additionally, a VTC judge, who only 
hears cases involving veterans, is in a better position to exercise discretion 
and provide more effective relief than a normal judge who adjudicates a case 
involving a veteran only periodically.177  A VTC judge may also better un-
derstand the effect of PTSD on veterans.178  The creation of VTCs are likely 
to reduce the negative effects of PTSD, such as suicide rates, by ensuring 
that veterans are placed in programs where they can receive treatment for 
PTSD, ultimately preventing veterans from committing suicide.179  A treat-
ment program through the VTC includes a bi-weekly appearance in court at a 
minimum during the early phases of a treatment program, required attend-
ance at treatment sessions, and frequent testing for substance use.180 
B. Public Awareness Campaigns & Efforts to Reduce Stigma 
Veterans are put in a very difficult situation when they return home and 
realize that they may need help.  Veterans likely shy away from mental 
healthcare options due to the stigmas associated with having PTSD, often in 
the form of negative reactions and criticism from potential employers, and 
frequently exacerbated when the veteran is located in geographical areas 
with sparse resources.181  As an effort to reduce the stigma, briefings for leg-
islative staff in Washington D.C. were hosted during mental health aware-
ness month.182  The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program was also created 
“to reduce PTSD . . . by promoting mental resilience.”183 
The Re-Engineering Systems of Primary Care Treatment in the Military 
(“RESPECT-Mil”), a program that screens and treats members with PTSD, 
  
 174. PTSD, Criminal Defendants, and Veteran’s Courts in Wisconsin, GRIESSMEYER L., 
http://www.griessmeyerlaw.com/Legal-Articles/PTSD%20and%20Veteran’s%20Courts%20 
in%20Wisconsin.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 175. McGuire & Clark, supra note 50, at 2. 
 176. Id. 
 177. What Is a Veterans Treatment Court?, supra note 168. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Brauser, supra note 13; What Is a Veterans Treatment Court?, supra note 168. 
 180. What Is a Veterans Treatment Court?, supra note 168. 
 181. See Brauser, supra note 13.  Veterans “living in rural communities had significantly 
fewer visits [to physicians] than those living in urban areas. . . .”  Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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has been instituted into approximately ninety clinics worldwide.184  
RESPECT-Mil allows for veterans to receive treatment and be screened for 
mental illnesses in a primary care setting.185  Enabling veterans to receive 
such treatment in a primary care setting helps reduce stigmas by “‘[m]aking 
behavioral health screening as standard as a blood pressure check.’”186  Fur-
thermore, RESPECT-Mil has an automatic web-based setting that will flag 
patients who have not shown any improvement in eight weeks, which in turn 
signals the physician to change the course of treatment to one that might 
prove more effective.187 
Additionally, as an effort to end stigmatization, President Obama 
changed a firmly-rooted policy by announcing that condolence letters would 
be sent to the families of the veterans who committed suicide during service 
to the United States.188 
C. Intervention 
Another service designed to assist soldiers and veterans is the National 
Suicide Prevention Lifeline (NSPL).189  The NSPL provides twenty-four hour 
emotional support to veterans in crisis.190  Additionally, chat services such as 
the Veterans Crisis Line connect veterans in crisis or their family members 
with responders who are both caring and qualified to help; aid is available 
via text message, online chat, or a confidential hotline.191  Veterans and their 
loved ones can receive free support, resources, referrals, assessments, infor-
mation, and, if necessary, rescue services can be implemented to prevent an 
individual from committing suicide.192  Furthermore, suicide hotlines set up 
by the federal government have designated a special extension number for 
veterans.193 
  
 184. Id. 
 185. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. Lucy Madison, Obama:  PTSD Stigmatization Must End, CBSNEWS (Aug. 30, 2011, 
2:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20099337-503544.html. 
 189. Lifeline Overview, NAT’L SUICIDE PREVENTION LIFELINE, http://www.suicide 
preventionlifeline.org/About/Overview (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Veterans Crisis Line, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.mental 
health.va.gov/suicide_prevention/ (last updated Mar. 5, 2013). 
 192. See id. 
 193. Susan Blumenthal, Stopping the Surge of Military Suicides:  How to Win This Pre-
ventable War, HUFFPOST (Sept. 14, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-
blumenthal/military-suicide_b_1884083.html?view=screen. 
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Additionally, as an effort to treat suicidal ideation, the Army granted 
three million dollars to Michael J. Kubek, Ph.D, a research expert on 
thyrotropin-releasing hormone (TRH), to research the effects of a nasal spray 
containing TRH.194  Once the spray is sprayed into the nasal cavity, it is dis-
persed into the brain where it can control suicidal ideation. 195 
V. OPINION 
In order to actually understand and address the issue of suicide among 
veterans that have PTSD, cooperation across many jurisdictions and organi-
zations is integral.196  The United States DoD, VA, HHS, and Congress must 
coordinate with one another to share data and find a way to promote uni-
formity in terms of healthcare administration and recording data for veter-
ans.197  While President Obama is taking steps to make such unity possible, it 
must be done promptly.198 
Access to adequate mental healthcare should be a guaranteed right for 
veterans because of the job they are made to do.199  To ensure that returning 
veterans have access to the proper healthcare they need, proper measures 
must be taken to increase resources and healthcare providers.200 
Since many veterans will not seek specialized care for mental needs, 
more systems like RESPECT-Mil that “‘frontload[] the healthcare system 
and enable[] [primary care doctors] to identify the people who are in the 
greatest need’” should be implemented.201  This will also help alleviate issues 
associated with the lack of resources and healthcare providers, since more 
responsibility is placed on primary care physicians.202  Furthermore, empha-
sis should be placed on rendering outpatient services and behavioral thera-
py.203  Additionally, attempting to retain the veterans who are receiving 
treatment should be prioritized in order to learn how to improve outcomes.204  
Preventing veterans from discontinuing treatment for PTSD can start with 
  
 194. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 195. Id. 
 196. HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 9. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Exec. Order No. 13,625, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,783, 54,783 (Aug. 31, 2012) (delegat-
ing tasks in order to improve access to health care for returning veterans). 
 199. Manzel, supra note 1. 
 200. HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 6. 
 201. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. Id. 
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the elimination of the negative stigma associated with PTSD.205  Outcomes 
and management of veterans can improve by obtaining “[s]pecific 
knowledge of the best predictors of suicidal ideation,”206 which will be facili-
tated if veterans continue to attend treatment.207  Moreover, suicide amongst 
veterans with PTSD can be reduced if more focus is placed on research on 
PTSD and suicide.208 
To better help a veteran with PTSD treat symptoms, the approach taken 
by mental healthcare professionals should be specifically altered for veterans 
with PTSD, distinct from the treatment taken for a civilian with PTSD.209  
One of the main differences between veterans and other trauma survivors is 
the victimization exhibited by the individual.210  For example, while a rape 
victim might feel like they could have done more to prevent their rape, veter-
ans often feel guilty and shameful about more rational things that are harder 
to justify, such as killing an innocent person.211  Therefore, the methods uti-
lized to aid a civilian through victimization might not be appropriate for a 
veteran.212  Because challenging the feelings of shame and guilt a veteran 
feels are rightly resisted, justifying those feelings might not be the most ef-
fective way to treat a veteran.213  Instead, the root of the problem that the 
veteran is facing, such as the trigger for guilt, should be identified, and ways 
to make reparations for that guilt should be recommended.214 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, PTSD is a real illness affecting returning veterans and is 
connected to an increase in suicide rates.215  This problem cannot be rectified 
without public awareness campaigns, reducing stigma for those going into 
the armed services and returning home with PTSD, more education and 
training for all levels of command in the military as well as mental healthcare 
professionals, and research leading to more treatment options as well as de-
  
 205. See HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 5; see also 
Blumenthal, supra note 193. 
 206. Nye et al., supra note 70, at 1144. 
 207. See Brauser, supra note 13. 
 208. See Blumenthal, supra note 193. 
 209. See Foa & Meadows, supra note 32, at 475–76. 
 210. Id. at 475. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Foa & Meadows, supra note 32, at 453–54, 475. 
 215. See Madison, supra note 188. 
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tecting the problem earlier.216  Representative Grace Napolitano summed it 
up best:  “‘We put these people in harm’s way . . . [s]o I think it’s up to us in 
this country to at least ensure that they get all the assistance needed to bring 
them back to society in a workable fashion.’”217  It is the duty of the United 
States Government to take care of the individuals that volunteered their lives 
to serve the country; failure to do so will turn young Americans away from 
voluntarily enlisting.218  If we were as quick to help veterans as we are to 
send them off to war, suicide rates among veterans with PTSD would not be 
as high. 
 
  
 216. See HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 8–9; see also 
Brauser, supra note 13. 
 217. Brauser, supra note 13. 
 218. See HARRELL & BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., supra note 12, at 10. 
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E. ANN JESCHKE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States military1 has been in a state of sustained conflict for 
over a decade.  More than 2.6 million American warriors2 have been de-
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ployed to Afghanistan or Iraq at least once.3  Both military medicine, as a 
function of the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Department of Veter-
an’s Affairs (VA) are charged with the complex duty of providing for the 
physical and psychological health of our warriors.4  Medical experts from 
both communities have begun to realize that, in addition to physical and psy-
chological symptoms, combat injuries have a social and spiritual compo-
nent.5  As such, practitioners and researchers have been encouraged to ex-
plore more holistic and interdisciplinary treatment methods to accommodate 
a new vision of health care for warriors returning from combat.6 
One of the signature injuries of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).7  Nearly 20% of returning warriors 
have been diagnosed with combat-related PTSD,8 while approximately 40% 
  
 1. Hereafter, the term “military” will be used to refer specifically to the United States 
military. 
 2. Hereafter, the term “warrior” refers equally to men and women who have served or 
are currently serving in the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, or Coast Guard.  I have specifi-
cally chosen the term warrior because it is common military parlance for anyone who has 
served in the United States Armed Forces and is not gender specific.  Additionally, this paper 
will use the masculine form throughout to refer to either a male or female warrior. 
 3. COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ONGOING EFFORTS IN THE TREATMENT OF 
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, INST. OF MED., TREATMENT FOR POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER IN MILITARY AND VETERAN POPULATIONS:  INITIAL ASSESSMENT, at xiii (2012) 
[hereinafter COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.nap.edu/ cata-
log.php?record_id=13364. 
 4. Id.  The treatment for any injury determined to be combat related begins in the DoD 
system of military medical care and is eventually transferred, either in part or in full, to the 
VA.  See id. at 111.  Military medicine and the VA work together to provide a continuum of 
care.  See id.  For this reason, not only is there enormous overlap in the patient population, but 
also in research and treatment methodologies employed by the two systems of care.  See id.  
Furthermore, both systems maintain a common appreciation of the military culture from 
which a warrior derives his identity.  See COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 111.  
In this paper, I will be exploring combat PTSD as a common challenge for both systems as a 
complete entity.  Unless otherwise noted, when referencing to either DoD or VA research and 
treatment methodologies, the reader can assume that the information equally applies to both 
systems. 
 5. See Wayne B. Jonas et al., Why Total Force Fitness?, 175 MILITARY MED. 6, 6 (Aug. 
Supp. 2010); Nina A. Sayer et al., Reintegration Problems and Treatment Interests Among 
Iraq and Afghanistan Combat Veterans Receiving VA Medical Care, 61 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 589, 589, 591 (2010). 
 6. See Jonas et al., supra note 5, at 6; Terence M. Keane, Guest Editorial, Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder:  Future Directions in Science and Practice, 45 J. REHABILITATION RES. & 
DEV., at vii, vii (2008), available at http://www.research.va.gov/programs 
/JRRD/45_3/keane.pdf. 
 7. See Jonas et al., supra note 5, at 6. 
 8. While individuals in the military may be experiencing PTSD for other traumatic life 
events, the reader should assume that I am specifically addressing PTSD as a combat injury. 
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have reported stress-related symptoms that impede reintegration into daily 
life.9  The challenges of accurately assessing, diagnosing, and treating com-
bat related PTSD amongst the warrior population are unquestionably im-
mense.10 
In this paper, I intend to explore issues relevant to the proper treatment 
of PTSD within the VA and DoD health care systems.11  Since the warrior’s 
medical community has asserted a need for holistic and interdisciplinary 
treatment methods in effectively treating combat injuries, I am going to ar-
gue that PTSD must be treated as a bio-psycho-social-spiritual12 phenomenon 
in order to properly address the moral injuries brought about by combat 
trauma.  My analysis will develop two main themes:  1) The spiritual aspects 
of combat dismantle a warrior’s moral identity and must be addressed in 
order for holistic healing of the warrior to occur; and 2) treatment methods 
common to VA/DoD fail to address the spiritual component of combat trau-
ma and, therefore, cannot fully heal a warrior’s PTSD.  Consequently, a two-
fold response is required:  1) Clinicians must creatively explore alternative 
methods for sanctifying13 moral trauma when treating warriors with PTSD; 
and 2) research must explore the spiritual elements of a warrior’s combat 
  
 9. Id. 
 10. See id.  In Why Total Force Fitness?, the authors argue that the current military para-
digm of fitness does not adequately address the returning warrior’s full spectrum of needs.  Id.  
Current military health care predominantly focuses on “prevention of disease through physical 
examinations, vaccinations, health risk screening, enhanced exercise, and the reduction of 
unhealthy habits.”  Id.  While this model supports the health of the fighting force pre-
deployment by enabling warriors to be fit and ready to fight, it does little to mitigate the 
overwhelming burdens of post-deployment health care.  See Jonas et al., supra note 5, at 6.  
The authors contend that if a new model of military medicine does not equally focus on resili-
ence enhancement the entire system will collapse due to the psychological strains placed on 
warriors and their families amidst the current military operations tempo.  See id. 
 11. An important issue to treating PTSD in military communities is the stigma of seeking 
mental health care.  Robert H. Pietrzak et al., Perceived Stigma and Barriers to Mental Health 
Care Utilization Among OEF-OIF Veterans, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1118, 1118, 1121 
(2009); Nina A. Sayer et al., A Qualitative Study of Determinants of PTSD Treatment Initia-
tion in Veterans, 72 PSYCHIATRY 238, 239, 245 (2009); see also Karen H. Seal et al., Bringing 
the War Back Home, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 476, 476 (2007).  While this is a critical 
aspect of proper diagnosis and treatment, this paper will not address this as a part of my cen-
tral thesis or inquiry. 
 12. By spiritual experience I do not mean religious experience.  I have no wish to import 
a meaning particular to any religion or practice of faith tradition.  This will be further de-
scribed in the first section of my paper.  See infra Part II.  See note 24 for further clarification. 
 13. I have chosen the word sanctification because it is a more fulsome synonym for heal-
ing to include:  Absolution, cleansing, and consecrated.  All warriors take an oath of office 
and as such are consecrated to the mission of the United States Armed Forces.  10 U.S.C. § 
502(a) (2006).  I do not intend to use this word in an exclusively religious sense. 
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experience in order to promote effective evidence-based treatment methods 
that address the moral trauma of our returning warriors. 
In developing the first theme I must answer the following three inter-
connected questions:  1) How is war a spiritual experience?; 2) Why does the 
spiritual quality of warfare make combat trauma unique?; and 3) What is 
needed to properly treat the spiritual dimension of combat trauma?  A de-
scriptive analysis using combat narratives14 will illustrate that the spirituality 
of war is defined by the legitimate participation in destruction, which initi-
ates a disintegration of the warrior’s moral identity.15  In turn, the warrior’s 
moral identity requires sanctification.16  I will proceed to develop the second 
theme by answering the following three questions:  1) How is PTSD current-
ly diagnosed and treated within the VA/DoD systems?; 2) Why is treating 
PTSD as a bio-psycho-social phenomenon insufficient?; and 3) What is re-
quired to address this challenge?  A descriptive analysis of current treatment 
for PTSD will reveal that there is little, if any, emphasis on the moral conse-
quences of actions performed during combat.17  As such, the bio-psycho-
social model of treatment cannot properly address the moral guilt associated 
with combat trauma.  My final section will briefly explore alternative meth-
ods that could potentially address the spiritual aspect of the moral trauma of 
war when attempting to develop a holistic model of care for PTSD.18 
  
 14. I do not intend to use narrative solely from GWOT, but from various different wars to 
show that combat trauma involves a moral dimension.  Likewise, these narratives are not 
limited to those officially diagnosed with PTSD, as the diagnosis did not become a medical 
reality until 1980.  COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 25–26.  Furthermore, the 
implications of combat trauma having a moral dimension are not limited to those with PTSD 
diagnosis.  See id. at 44.  However, for the purposes of this paper I am focusing solely on the 
implications for PTSD and its concomitant treatment. 
 15. See KARL MARLANTES, WHAT IT IS LIKE TO GO TO WAR, at xi (2011). 
 16. See id. at 8–9. 
 17. See id. at 7. 
 18. PTSD was not officially recognized as a medical disorder until 1980 with the intro-
duction of the DSM-III.  CHRIS R. BREWIN, POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER:  MALADY OR 
MYTH? 44 (2003); KIRTLAND C. PETERSON ET AL., POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER:  A 
CLINICIAN’S GUIDE 3–4 (1991).  Reasons for development of a diagnostic category were de-
pendent on both cultural and political issues surrounding the Vietnam War, which I cannot 
fully address in this paper; however, the emotional-moral trauma of war has been recorded 
throughout history, and while one cannot say that historical modes of managing the emotion-
al-moral trauma of warfare were dealing specifically with the diagnosis of PTSD, they proffer 
rich insight into some of the challenges to a warrior’s reintegration into society after combat.  
See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 5; see also BREWIN, supra note 18, at 45–50.  My 
claim will be that some of these experiences are being overlooked in our current medical 
standards of PTSD.  I do not wish to put the two concepts in competition, but to show how 
forfeiting the spiritual aspect of trauma is deficient for treating PTSD and the need to augment 
current treatment modes with alternative methods.  For further reading, see BREWIN, supra 
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II. THE SPIRITUAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF WAR19 
A. Question One:  How Is War Spiritual? 
To readers unfamiliar with war, at first blush, it may seem odd to sug-
gest that war takes place in a spiritual domain.  However, war is not simply a 
participation in material destruction.  The all-consuming power and violence 
of combat leaves many warriors with the sense that they have participated in 
something godlike; namely, that they have been given total authority to in-
flict death upon others—a role normally assigned to deities.20  The art of war-
riors is the art of killing, which approaches “the sacred in its terror and con-
tact with the infinite.”21  Dr. Edward Tick, a clinical psychologist specializ-
ing in warriors with PTSD, explains that “war is an archetypal force that 
creates a larger-than-life arena . . . . In war we embody and wrestle with god 
powers.”22  Karl Marlantes, writing about his experiences as a marine in Vi-
etnam, refers to combat as a spiritual initiation that occurs in the “[T]emple 
of Mars.”23 
Marlantes argues that there are four components of spiritual24 experi-
ences, which are:  “[T]otal focus on the present moment,” “constant aware-
  
note 18; ERIN P. FINLEY, FIELDS OF COMBAT:  UNDERSTANDING PTSD AMONG VETERANS OF 
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2011); PETERSON ET AL., supra note 18. 
 19. Throughout this paper, I will use the terms war and combat interchangeably.  While 
different levels of combat do exist amidst war, in order to receive a diagnosis of PTSD the 
warrior must have had a traumatic combat experience, whether it was in the rear or forward 
areas.  See Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Treatment and Research:  Moving Ahead Toward 
Recovery:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 
110th Cong. 7 (2008) (statement of Colonel Charles W. Hoge, M.D., U.S.A., Dir., Div. of 
Psychiatry & Neuroscience, Walter Reed Army Inst. of Research, Dep’t of the Army, U.S. 
Dep’t of Def.).  Without proof that an injury occurred in combat, the warrior is unable to 
receive the status of service related injury.  See id. at 3–4 (statement of Hon. Phil Hare).  So 
for the purposes of this paper, the distinction between war and combat is not critical to my 
argument as anyone, regardless of where he is stationed, can experience a traumatic event 
while deployed to a warzone. 
 20. See MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 1. 
 21. Id. at 7. 
 22. EDWARD TICK, WAR AND THE SOUL:  HEALING OUR NATION’S VETERANS FROM POST-
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 1–3, 41 (First Quest ed. 2005). 
 23. MARLANTES, supra note 15, at xi–xii, 3. 
 24. Marlantes uses the word spiritual and mystical interchangeably in his book What It Is 
Like to Go to War.  See id. 7–8.  However, he is not pointing to a particular experience em-
bedded in a religious or cultural tradition, but a quality of experience.  See id. at xi.  In this 
paper, I will use the word mystic to describe the spiritual experience of a person engaging in a 
religious or faith-based quest for communion with the transcendent.  I will use spiritual to 
refer to an overarching phenomenon of mystical experiences, which are not particular to any 
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ness of one’s own . . . death,” placing “other[s’] . . . lives above one’s own,” 
and participation in a larger community.25  These same conditions hold true 
in combat; however, upon entering the Temple of Mars, transcendent brutali-
ty and sacrifice “assaults psyches, confuses ethics, and tests souls.”26  Alt-
hough the spiritual mystic and the spiritual warrior enter their journey in 
different ways, they are both sacred—set apart for a particular mission.27  In 
contrast to a mystic who embraces nothingness through the annihilation of 
the rational will in the practice of meditation, the warrior embraces nothing-
ness through an attempt to annihilate physical life by killing the enemy.28  
Marlantes suggests that combat may, in fact, be the dark side of the mystical 
vision of heaven.29 
If combat only parallels the dark side of a spiritual experience, what is 
the attraction of entering the Temple of Mars?  Is there something more to 
combat than soul-shattering death and darkness?  Dr. Tick claims humanity 
is aroused by and in love with war because its godlike character allows the 
warrior to reach an altered level of consciousness.30  Looking at Marlantes’s 
conditions for a spiritual experience in the context of war narratives will il-
luminate how combat is not only the dark side of spiritual experience, but 
war also enables warriors to reach an addictive state of consciousness.  Un-
fortunately, these encounters have an altogether different outcome for the 
warrior than for the mystic.31  First, let us turn to a number of warrior’s nar-
  
specific religion.  What I take as common to all spiritual experiences is the phenomenon of 
being united with a source of transcendental consciousness. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. Id. at xi, 7–8. 
 27. See MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 7–9.  As an all-volunteer force, we can say that 
warriors in the military have chosen to set themselves apart from the normal duties of an 
American civilian in order to serve their country.  Therefore, the warrior is similar to the mys-
tic in that he has chosen a specific path in life that will demand he serve something beyond the 
self. 
 28. Compare ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN:  THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE 
WORLD 72–73 (1985), with EVELYN UNDERHILL, MYSTICISM:  A STUDY IN THE NATURE AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF MAN’S SPIRITUAL CONSCIOUSNESS 23–24 (1974).  Evelyn Underhill’s gen-
eral book on mysticism explains the process by which mystics evacuate the will to reach the 
truth of existence.  UNDERHILL, supra note 28, at 23–24.  In contrast, Elaine Scarry articulate-
ly argues that the goal in war is to empty the body of its very contents.  SCARRY, supra note 
28, at 72–73.  Placing the arguments of these two texts together, I must concur with 
Marlantes’s astute observation that the combat experience in many ways harkens to the dark 
side of mysticism.  See MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See TICK, supra note 22, at 41. 
 31. MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 7–8.  As Underhill explains, the mystic must undergo 
a purification experience that could be metaphorically described as hell; the final union with 
transcendence is described as supreme peace.  See UNDERHILL, supra note 28, at 199–201.  In 
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ratives to see if Marlantes’s conditions for a spiritual experience hold true to 
combat. 
We can examine the first condition for a spiritual experience—total fo-
cus on the present moment—by turning to Homer’s character, Achilles.32  In 
Achilles’s exultant campaign against the Trojans after the death of his friend 
Patroclus, he was singularly focused on the present moment of killing.33  
Achilles “fell in among the Trojans, his heart clothed with strength, crying 
his terrible cry . . . [Iphition,] fell with a crash, and goodly Achilles exulted 
over him . . . Achilles went on godlike” relentlessly slaying.34  Even after 
destroying Hector and defiling the dead body, Achilles’s implacable thirst for 
killing could be quashed only by the interference of the gods.35  Although 
mythic in its origins, Achilles has been heralded as the prototypical example 
of a warrior consumed by his own boundless strength, ability, and fervor for 
battle.36  He has been claimed as both the sine qua non of military competi-
tive virtue and history’s greatest warrior,37 but Achilles also illustrates the 
additive quality of battle.38  J. Glenn Gray, writing a philosophical reflection 
on his experiences from World War II, calls this obsession common to all 
men in battle “‘the tyranny of the present.’”39  Everything in combat happens 
in the intensity of a split-second where the human senses become a vehicle 
for heightened awareness.40 
The second condition for a spiritual experience—constant awareness of 
one’s own death—is well illustrated in Philip Caputo’s personal Vietnam 
War narrative.41  Caputo offers his readers an earnest confession concerning 
the delights of combat.42  For Caputo, combat affords a singular type of 
  
the next section, I will argue that engaging in the transcendent aspect of war creates the exam-
ple opposite outcome; namely, emotional, physical, and moral dissonance. 
 32. See generally HOMER, THE ILIAD (George Chapman trans., Wordsworth Classics 
2003). 
 33. Id. at 277, 301 
 34. Id. at 334. 
 35. See id. at 371, 393. 
 36. See T.S. Westhusing, The Competitive and Cooperative Aretai Within the American 
Warfighting Ethos 124–26 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (on file 
with Nova Law Review). 
 37. See id. at 124.  In the second section of Colonel Westhusing’s dissertation, he claims 
Achilles as the apogee of the competitive virtues required for a warrior to thrive.  Id. at 124–
25.  He, however, notes that the bloodlust of this character also runs contra to the cooperative 
virtues of the consummate honorable warrior.  Id. at 126. 
 38. Id. at 124. 
 39. J. GLENN GRAY, THE WARRIORS:  REFLECTIONS ON MEN IN BATTLE, at xv, 28 (1970). 
 40. PHILIP CAPUTO, A RUMOR OF WAR, at xvii (First Owl Books 1996) (1977). 
 41. See generally id. at xvi–xvii. 
 42. See id. at xvii. 
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pleasure that mixes utter euphoria with extreme pain brought about when one 
realizes that death is present at any moment.43  As he explains: 
Under fire, a man’s powers of life heightened in proportion to the 
proximity of death, so that he felt an elation as extreme as his 
dread.  His senses quickened, he attained an acuity of conscious-
ness at once pleasurable and excruciating.  It was something like 
the elevated state of awareness induced by drugs.  And it could be 
just as addictive, for it made whatever else life offered in the way 
of delights or torments seem pedestrian.44 
The ability to be hyper-stimulated in combat is not only a survival skill, but 
also allows warriors to experience richness in life that is not present in daily 
civilian life.45  Often warriors are shy to admit to this particular attribute of 
their combat experience because it courses against the common understand-
ing of warfare as simply extreme brutality.46  Nonetheless, Caputo claims 
that all warriors, if honest, must admit they not only enjoy combat, but are 
also compelled by its unique attractiveness.47 
The third condition for a spiritual experience—putting others’ lives 
above one’s own—is powerfully demonstrated by the bravery of combat 
medics.48  Sebastian Junger describes the absolute commitment Juan 
Restrepo, a combat medic serving the second platoon in the Korengal Valley, 
had to his men.49  Restrepo’s dedication enabled him to run through a heavy 
firefight in order to treat his wounded men, while everyone else was taking 
cover.50  The impetus to perform acts of sublime bravery without concern for 
self was Restrepo’s unwavering need to save the lives of his injured com-
rades.51 
The final condition for a spiritual experience—participation in a larger 
community—is eloquently depicted in Tim O’Brien’s reminiscences on Vi-
etnam.52  He details a wistful longing to return to the adventure of combat 
because the intensity of combat has a way of making life vivid53 and forging 
  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvii. 
 46. See id. at xvi–xvii. 
 47. Id. at xvi–xvii. 
 48. SEBASTIAN JUNGER, WAR 58 (2010); see, e.g., CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvii. 
 49. JUNGER, supra note 48, at 58–59. 
 50. Id. at 58. 
 51. See id. at 58–59. 
 52. See generally TIM O’BRIEN, THE THINGS THEY CARRIED (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 
Publ’g Co. 2011) (1987). 
 53. See id. at 77–78. 
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a community of love that is unlike any other.54  As he says, “[y]ou make 
close friends.  You become part of a tribe and you share the same blood—
you give it together, you take it together.”55  Such affection, tenderness, and 
intense bonds of loyalty, as O’Brien explains, are impossible to understand 
when someone has not felt the exhaustive and solidifying force of combat, 
which calls such love into being.56 
Clearly, Marlantes’s conditions for spiritual experience are undoubtedly 
present in the preceding combat narratives.57  We can therefore say that com-
bat is a spiritual experience that opens the warrior to a superhuman state of 
consciousness and physical ability.  The common idiom that war is hell has 
different implications if warriors, who are asked to violate commonly held 
religious and moral norms for the good of the country, actually admit to tak-
ing any pleasure from the benefits of participating in the act of killing.  When 
“euphoric expectancy” brought on by combat increases “to the point of om-
nipotence,” it can have seriously negative consequences for the warrior who 
is asked to participate in the power of hell instead of heaven.58  Not only does 
the reality of combat lust59 run contrary to commonly held impressions that 
war is infinitely abhorrent, but it also makes a claim on the identity of warri-
ors.60  Such spiritual awakenings run contrary to the idealized courageous 
warrior who engages the horror of war for a higher good.61  Next, I will ad-
dress some of the implications of spiritual consciousness and combat trauma. 
  
 54. CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvi. 
 55. O’BRIEN, supra note 52, at 178. 
 56. CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvi–xvii. 
 57. I cannot argue that every warrior will have a spiritual encounter that traces the same 
pattern as the one outlined by Marlantes.  However, these conditions are coursed through the 
narratives I read.  In illustrating the point that war is a spiritual experience, these for examples 
should be sufficient. 
 58. See JUNGER, supra note 48, at 34−35. 
 59. By combat lust I am not intending to imply that everyone in war takes pleasure in 
killing for the sake of killing alone.  I am trying to forward the point that combat ignites cer-
tain unspeakable experiences that do not have to do with destruction, but with a pleasure ac-
quired from the experience of transcendent power with which warriors are allowed to partici-
pate when charged with the duty to kill the enemy.  This spiritual experience is a taboo sub-
ject, but has profound implications for those warriors who must wrestle with its effects. 
 60. See CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvi. 
 61. I am not attempting to make any claims about just war, the politics of war, or why a 
nation might go to war.  I am merely concerned with how the phenomenon of war can poten-
tially affect warriors. 
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B. Question Two:  Why Does the Spiritual Quality of War Make Combat 
Trauma Unique? 
If war is a spiritual experience that engages the moral identity of a war-
rior, as I have shown it is, how are we to understand combat trauma as a re-
sult of this unique experience?62  Samuel Hynes explains that the trauma il-
lustrated in war narratives has two particular themes—namely, what warriors 
do in war and what war does to warriors.63  My previous section was con-
cerned with the former concept.64  We will now move on to discuss the latter.  
Jonathan Shay, also a clinical psychiatrist, wrote a landmark book analyzing 
PTSD in Vietnam veterans seeking care in the Boston VA hospital.65  In his 
book, Achilles in Vietnam:  Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, 
Shay contends that combat trauma is unique—and in turn PTSD is difficult 
to treat—because at its core it is a moral trauma.66  While I agree with Shay’s 
general thesis that combat trauma is deeply embedded in moral trauma, con-
trary to Shay, I intend to argue that the moral trauma of combat is bound to 
experiencing the spiritual consciousness of war, not the betrayal of loyal-
ties.67  As such, a warrior’s moral trauma needs to be sanctified in order for a 
restoration of his moral identity to occur. 
  
 62. Typical combat stresses are not common and rarely amalgamated in civilian life.  See 
William P. Nash, The Stressors of War, in COMBAT STRESS INJURY:  THEORY, RESEARCH, AND 
MANAGEMENT 11, 11–12, 15, 18 (Charles R. Figley & William P. Nash eds., 2007).  These 
stresses make combat, by its very nature, a traumatic experience, but these stresses are not 
sufficient to qualify as a traumatic event that lead to a diagnosis of PTSD.  See id. at 18.  I will 
be narrowing in on a more specific quality of combat trauma that I believe is intimately relat-
ed to the bio-psycho-social-spiritual nature of PTSD.  However, these traumatic-qualifying 
events occur amidst modern military operations that include constant exposure to the follow-
ing physical conditions:  Extreme temperatures, lack of hygiene, sleep deprivation, constant 
exposure to malevolent noises and blasts from explosions nearby, fumes and noxious smells, 
blinding light or darkness, malnutrition, and the constant threat of injury, illness, or death.  Id. 
at 19–21.  Additionally, mental conditions include:  Lack or abundance of information, am-
biguous and changing rules of engagement, loyalty conflicts, experiences that do not make 
sense, isolation, loss of friends to injury or death, fear, shame and guilt, helplessness as well as 
the horror of carnage.  Id. at 22–27.  For further information, see id. at 19–27. 
 63. SAMUEL HYNES, THE SOLDIERS’ TALE:  BEARING WITNESS TO MODERN WAR 3 (1997). 
 64. See supra Part II.A. 
 65. David Berreby, Exploring Combat and the Psyche, Beginning with Homer, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at F4; see also JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM:  COMBAT 
TRAUMA AND THE UNDOING OF CHARACTER 4 (1994). 
 66. SHAY, supra note 65, at 5–6, 184–86. 
 67. I disagree with where Shay locates the moral breakdown.  Shay sees the moral dam-
age occurring due to the breakdown of a warrior’s concept of what is right in terms of his 
relationship to his peers and his superiors.  Id. at 3, 6, 15, 17.  In other words, it is a break-
down of loyalty, and thus the warrior can no longer cement a sense of trust in his circumstanc-
es.  As a result, Shay suggests that the path to treating PTSD must include both a communaliz-
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Again, warriors’ narratives will explain the aftermath of experiencing 
the four conditions of a spiritual experience in combat.68  My central claim is 
that actions, such as killing, may be licit in combat, but are incompatible 
with commonly held notions of morality.  Being ensconced in the transcend-
ent spirituality of combat has the potential not only to allow a warrior to 
touch brief moments of the glory, but also to leave his moral identity sullied 
by the horror of carnage in which he has participated.  The schismatic expe-
rience of combat runs deeper than mere emotional thoughts and physical 
reactions.  It destroys a warrior’s ability to locate his place in the moral order 
of humanity after participating in mass destruction. 
What does an assaulted psyche, confused ethics, and a tested soul look 
like after experiencing even moments of godlike bliss in combat?  To further 
explore this question, let us turn to the first condition:  Total focus on the 
present moment.  Dr. Tick states that the raw brutal sensuality of war causes 
the warrior to be completely absorbed in combat’s brutality, such that it 
overwhelms the imagination causing the survivor to see little other than de-
struction in all his thoughts.69  After many exhilarating moments in combat, 
O’Brien describes the constant image of faceless dead bodies with which he 
was left after Vietnam: 
I watched a man die on a trail near . . . My Khe.  I did not kill him.  
But I was present, you see, and my presence was guilt enough.  I 
remember his face . . . and I remember feeling the burden of re-
sponsibility and grief.  I blamed myself . . . I was once a soldier.  
There were many bodies, real bodies with real faces, but I was 
young then and I was afraid to look.  And now, twenty years later, 
I’m left with faceless responsibility and faceless grief.70 
  
ing and re-narrating of the warrior’s story of what is possible in the present and the future.  Id. 
at 187–88.  I do not disagree with the importance of what Shay has proposed both in terms of 
the nature of combat trauma or integrating new means of treating PTSD.  See id.  However, 
Shay has failed to recognize the moral effects of experiencing war’s spiritual consciousness.  
In fact, he at one point misunderstands Christian theology and maligns it as part of the moral 
trauma warriors incur, when they think that playing a savior role will redeem a comrade.  The 
outcome is that he fails to address a deeper moral tension that I see present in warriors’ com-
bat narratives—namely, how the warrior should understand his moral identity when he has 
participated in legal forms of killing and has been consumed by that process.  Although Shay 
is unique in calling combat trauma moral, he, like many others, fails to address the fact that 
killing in war may be licit, but is always a rupture with deeply-ingrained human morality.  See 
id. at 3, 5–6. 
 68. MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 69. TICK, supra note 22, at 21. 
 70. O’BRIEN, supra note 52, at 166. 
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When asked by his daughter if he had ever killed someone, O’Brien could 
not explain the truth.71  All that could be said was, “[i]t’s a mystery, I guess.  
I don’t know.”72  Years after leaving Vietnam, O’Brien was still haunted by 
irremediable guilt with no means through which to integrate his paradoxical 
experience.73 
The second condition:  Constant awareness of one’s own death also 
menaces the minds and spirits of returning warriors.74  Erin Finley, a medical 
anthropologist working for the VA, interviewed warriors who had been diag-
nosed with PTSD after returning home from Iraq and Afghanistan.75  One 
warrior had the following to say about constantly realizing he could die: 
“Afghanistan [was a] mind-fuck . . . . Being deployed is easy.  You 
just have to stay alive. 
. . . . 
. . . ‘[T]he thing you have to realize is that you’re already dead.  
Once you realize that, then you can function as a soldier.’ . . . Once 
you grasp the fact that you’re already dead . . . [i]t makes the job 
easier over there.  It makes [life] a real bitch coming home.  Be-
cause you’re used to being dead and now you got to be alive again. 
. . . Whenever I look at people, I know what they’re going to look 
like dead.  I know what they look like with their brains blown out 
or jaws blown off or eyes pulled out.  When I look at somebody I 
see that, to this day.”76 
This warrior goes on to describe an interior rage that can be sparked at the 
slightest provocation.77  Knowing what human beings can do to each other, 
left him with a malignant private grief.78  Feelings of disappointment in him-
self and the world could not be shared without moral reproof or misunder-
standing from friends.79 
The third condition—dedication to others’ well-being above one’s 
own—is unquestionably manifested in the story of Colonel Theodore Scott 
  
 71. See id. at 167. 
 72. See id. at 169. 
 73. See id. at 166–67. 
 74. See CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvi. 
 75. FINLEY, supra note 18, at 22–23. 
 76. Id. at 51–52, 54. 
 77. See id. at 56. 
 78. See id. at 57. 
 79. See id. 
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Westhusing.80  Colonel Westhusing graduated third in his class from West 
Point, trained as an elite Army Ranger, and wrote his doctoral dissertation at 
Emory on virtues necessary for excellence in the American war-fighting 
ethos.81  A man of total commitment to others, he was also known to be un-
waveringly committed to excellence, virtue, and honor in war, especially 
during his deployment in Iraq.82  After receiving an anonymous letter alleg-
ing he had become too close to contractors who were involved in egregious 
corruption and human rights violations—to include the killing of two inno-
cent Iraqi civilians—Colonel Westhusing proclaimed himself a failure.83  His 
moral identity torn asunder caused Colonel Westhusing to take his life on 
June 4, 2005.84  The suicide note read:  “I cannot support a msn [mission] 
that leads to corruption, human rights abuse, and liars.  I am sullied. . . . I 
came to serve honorably and [I] feel dishonored. . . . Death before being dis-
honored anymore.”85  A man praised by his superiors, beloved by his family, 
and revered by students and friends alike was struggling with an internal war 
as set in motion by the collective evil that he felt polluted his attempts to be a 
man of duty, service, courage, loyalty, and mostly honor.86 
Finally, what happens to a warrior when he is no longer able to partici-
pate in the larger community that had constructed an entirely new family 
structure?  A story told by a Navy chaplain about a gung-ho marine sergeant 
brings into stark relief the horror of being disowned by the warrior communi-
ty when aspects of war cause a warrior to lose his sense of fight.87  While on 
patrol, a marine spotted a suspicious woman.88  Shouting for her to stop, the 
woman paid no attention.89  The sergeant decided she was an enemy and took 
two shots causing his fellow marines to open fire.90  When the shooting sub-
sided the woman was “‘nearly cut in half.’”91  When the marine approached 
the dead body he found a white flag and screamed, “‘What the fuck did I just 
do?  I killed an innocent person.’”92  A few days later, “the sergeant [said] . . 
  
 80. See NANCY SHERMAN, THE UNTOLD WAR:  INSIDE THE HEARTS, MINDS, AND SOULS OF 
OUR SOLDIERS 39–41, 237 (2010). 
 81. Id. at 6, 67, 237. 
 82. Id. at 237. 
 83. See id. at 238–39. 
 84. Id. at 239. 
 85. SHERMAN, supra note 80, at 240 (alterations in original). 
 86. See id. at 237–40. 
 87. PETER A. FRENCH, WAR AND MORAL DISSONANCE 34–35 (2011). 
 88. Id. at 34. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. FRENCH, supra note 87, at 34. 
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. he could [not] . . . fight and refused to go on another mission.”93  The chap-
lain tried to assuage the marine’s conscience by stating that such events were 
part of war and that the marine had not violated any military rules of en-
gagement.94  Next, “[t]he chaplain reminded the [marine] that refusing to 
fight was . . . [an] offense” that could end in a court-martial.95  The sergeant 
was recalcitrant in his stance that he could not fight.96  The platoon ostracized 
this marine for being a coward.97  After returning to the United States with a 
diagnosis of PTSD, he was denied reenlistment in the Marines on the 
grounds that he was weak and refused to prove he was fit for combat.98  The 
death of an Iraqi woman was the first act in the moral disintegration of this 
marine’s identity, and at best, he was offered the consolation that what he 
had done was ethical according to the laws of war.99 
Let me briefly synthesize how the spirituality of war leads to a disinte-
gration of the warrior’s moral identity.100  First, total focus on the present 
moment not only enables a warrior to identify with, and at times relish, the 
immense destructive power of combat, but it can also cause disruptive hyper-
vigilant memories.101  Moreover, as Marlantes honestly admits, “[k]nowing I 
loved it and hated it, I concluded I was mildly psychotic, just another little 
something to hide from everyone, sort of like shell shock.”102  The paradox of 
war’s spirituality caused a sense of shame that could not readily be shared.103  
Second, the constant awareness of one’s own death can quicken the senses to 
a state of euphoria, but it can also turn the warrior into a dead man walk-
ing.104  As Hynes declares, “[s]trangest of all is the presence of death, and the 
ways it is present.”105  Warriors “go to war, where death is the whole point, 
the truest truth, the realest reality.”106  “[A]stonishing[ly], death [becomes a 
  
 93. Id. at 35. 
 94. Id. at 34–35. 
 95. Id. at 35. 
 96. Id. 
 97. FRENCH, supra note 87, at 35. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 34–35. 
 100. My purpose in this section is not to cast moral judgment on the warrior or the cultural 
dynamics that occur in times of war.  My point is to understand, not to shame, because with-
out understanding there can be no true healing. 
 101. See, e.g., ROGER BENIMOFF WITH EVE CONANT, FAITH UNDER FIRE:  AN ARMY 
CHAPLAIN’S MEMOIR 161 (2009); CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvi. 
 102. MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 68 (emphasis omitted). 
 103. See id. at 68–69. 
 104. See CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xv–xviii. 
 105. HYNES, supra note 63, at 19. 
 106. Id. 
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warrior’s recurrent] tale.”107  Left to identify more with the dead than the 
living, the warrior finds himself a complete stranger once he is home, having 
little in common with civilian life.108  Third, placing others’ lives above one’s 
own inspires acts of superhuman bravery in combat, but when the bonds of 
sacrifice are betrayed the warrior is left with a sense that his valor is purpose-
less.109  Roger Benimoff, an Army chaplain who endured everything for his 
troops, noted the following after coming home:  “I am not motivated to work, 
I am not doing my readings and I don’t care. . . . I[’ve] lost [my] sense of . . . 
perfectionism in the process.  I’ve been ruined. . . . Nothing else seems to 
measure up to what we were able to accomplish in Iraq.”110  Thus, a warrior 
is left believing both his moral quest and his life are failures because his abil-
ity to give of himself has ultimately been thwarted outside of combat.111  
Finally, participation in the larger community of a combat unit or platoon 
bonds men in unimaginable ways, but it also leaves a warrior emptied of self 
when he is no longer identified with his comrades in arms.112  Caputo ele-
gantly describes the intimacy of combat as more profound than the intimacy 
between any two lovers.113  It was “the sentiment of belonging to each oth-
er.”114  Failing to show courage is a violation of the love that binds comrades 
in arms.  If branded a coward by fellow warriors, banishment from the com-
munity is a coup de grace to a warrior’s identity.  As such, the warrior now 
belongs to no one, as even his warrior identity is stripped from him.115  Hav-
ing discussed what combat does to warriors, we begin to see why combat 
trauma is unique. 
C. Question Three:  What is Needed to Properly Treat the Spiritual Di-
mension of Combat Trauma? 
Understanding how combat opens the door to a particular spiritual expe-
rience allows us to understand what participation in that experience means 
for the warrior’s moral identity.  In turn, appreciation of the spiritual quality 
of war has serious implications for how we effectively heal the moral disin-
tegration of a warrior’s character.  Any treatment method used for warriors 
struggling with the effects of combat trauma must appreciate that war de-
  
 107. Id. 
 108. CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvi. 
 109. See SHAY, supra note 65, at 6. 
 110. BENIMOFF WITH CONANT, supra note 101, at 161. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See CAPUTO, supra note 40, at xvi. 
 113. Id. at xvii. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See HYNES, supra note 63, at 21–22. 
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stroys character and strips human dignity.  What was once understood as 
decent human goodness has been replaced with a sense of profound guilt and 
identification with evil.  The following warrior well describes how combat 
annihilated his soul: 
 I was eighteen years old. . . . A virgin.  I had strong religious 
beliefs.  For the longest time I wanted to be a priest . . . . [E]vil 
didn’t enter [my world] ‘till Vietnam. 
 I mean real evil. . . . 
 Why I became like that? . . . All evil.  Where before, I wasn’t. 
. . . 
 War . . . strips you of all your beliefs, your religion, takes your 
dignity away, you become an animal. . . . 
. . . . 
 I carried this home with me.  I lost all my friends, beat up my 
sister, went after my father. . . . So it wasn’t just over there.116 
Not only was this warrior’s moral identity radically altered by the experience 
of combat, but so too was his human identity.117  In helping warriors heal 
from the serious wounds of combat trauma, treatment methods must address 
more than sadness, psychological scars, and broken communities.  They must 
also alleviate profound guilt, re-humanize the warrior, and help him reclaim 
his dignity as well as sanctify and reintegrate his moral character. 
If Marlantes is correct in thinking that “combat is the dark side of the 
[mystic’s] vision [of heaven and] equivalent in intensity,”118 then perhaps a 
good place to look for ways to heal wounds to the soul would be the mystical 
tradition.  St. Ignatius of Loyola, affectionately known within Roman Catho-
lic circles as the soldier saint, was both a soldier and a mystic.119  After being 
severely wounded in combat he began a process of profound conversion, 
such that he would eventually become the founder of the Jesuit religious 
  
 116. SHAY, supra note 65, at 32–33. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 8. 
 119. See Avery Dulles, Preface to the Vintage Spiritual Classics Edition of IGNATIUS OF 
LOYOLA, THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF ST. IGNATIUS, at xiii, xiii–xv (John F. Thornton & 
Susan B. Varenne eds., Louis J. Puhl trans., Random House, Inc. 2000) (1951). 
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order.120  Having spent the first thirty years of his life as a warrior, the image-
ry, structure, and tenor of St. Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises reflect his mili-
tary formation and identity.121  St. Ignatius serves as a good starting point for 
inquiry concerning ways to heal warriors’ moral identity because he has ex-
perienced both combat and mystic visions of God. 
In many ways St. Ignatius of Loyola is akin to Achilles.122  He had 
“[s]tubbornly resist[ed] the assault against Pamplona in the face of hopeless 
odds . . . was struck by enemy fire,” and won honor for his valor.123  Like-
wise, once home from combat he described his former actions as going from 
one evil to another.124  My point is not to recommend that all warriors partic-
ipate in the Spiritual Exercises.  In fact, I want to attempt to avoid all doctri-
naire impositions of religion.  As we have already noted warriors’ god-
concepts can be profoundly distorted in the aftermath of combat.  Many war-
riors express the idea that God is punishing them for their indecent behavior 
in combat or that they are not worthy of being identified with holiness, sanc-
tity, or goodness.125  Others warriors have been known to hate all things reli-
gious or faith based because combat has swallowed their entire appreciation 
of goodness in humanity.126  In contrast, Daryl Paulson and Stanley Krippner, 
also clinical psychologists specializing in warriors with PTSD, encourage a 
wide range of treatment methods drawn from cross-cultural literature that 
pay close attention to a warrior’s spiritual emergencies and dark night of the 
soul experiences.127  As such, St. Ignatius provides an excellent resource and 
will reveal that there is a way to have the spiritual experience of war, sanctify 
a mortally wounded moral identity, and go on to have a spiritual experience 
opposite that of war.128  Turning now to the Spiritual Exercises will reveal 
how St. Ignatius journeyed from a vision of hell to a vision of heaven. 
  
 120. See id. at xiv–xvi. 
 121. See Chronology of the Life of St. Ignatius of Loyola, in THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF 
ST. IGNATIUS, at xxv, xxx (John F. Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds., Louis J. Puhl trans., 
Random House, Inc. 2000) (1951); see generally IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, THE SPIRITUAL 
EXERCISES OF ST. IGNATIUS (John F. Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds., Louis J. Puhl trans., 
Random House, Inc. 2000) (1951). 
 122. See Dulles, supra note 119, at xiv; HOMER, supra note 32, at xi; SHAY, supra note 65, 
at 6. 
 123. Dulles, supra note 119, at xiv. 
 124. See id. at xiv–xv. 
 125. See DARYL S. PAULSON & STANLEY KRIPPNER, HAUNTED BY COMBAT:  
UNDERSTANDING PTSD IN WAR VETERANS INCLUDING WOMEN, RESERVISTS, AND THOSE 
COMING BACK FROM IRAQ 81 (2007). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See generally id. 
 128. See IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, supra note 121, at 5. 
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The first phase of the Spiritual Exercises requires the participant to 
spend a week in silence purifying the soul through the purgation of sins in 
order to turn away from evil and advance towards holiness.129  During this 
week an individual must spend time in meditation examining his conscience 
by asking the following questions:  “‘What have I done . . . ?  What am I 
doing . . . ?  What ought I . . . do . . . ?’”130  Before entering into meditation 
the participant asks God for what he needs and desires, then commences a set 
of meditations that allows the participant to recollect all his thoughts, words, 
and deeds that were contrary to holiness, no matter how small.131  After these 
meditations have been completed, the participant makes a general confession 
of all his sins and is given a set of penitential acts that will atone for the vio-
lations against God’s goodness.132  During the first week, the participant 
meditates on all the good God has done for the world and expresses gratitude 
for the benefits bestowed upon him.133  The second phase allows the partici-
pant to decide what type of man he would like to be in the service of holi-
ness.134  There are three forms of service:  To serve oneself, to serve the 
Lord, or to serve the enemy of human nature.135  Once a participant has dedi-
cated himself to the service of the Lord, the third phase allows him to medi-
tate on the community of the Lord he serves and ways to eliminate inordinate 
desires.136  The final phase is a week of meditations requesting for the grace 
to experience the love of God, which allows the participant to embody the 
way God cares for him in his personal life.137 
In evaluating the Spiritual Exercises, we notice four important elements 
that allow a warrior to acknowledge, accept, repair, and let go of self-blame 
fomenting in his moral consciousness.138  Those elements are:  Purification 
through purgation139—which allows the warrior to focus on the death of his 
soul, admit his participation in evil, confess his actions to another human 
being, and experience the gift of forgiveness; gratitude for blessings be-
stowed140—which allows the warrior to focus his thoughts on the abundance 
of goodness in the world and the benefits he presently possesses; atonement 
  
 129. Id. at 5–6, 17. 
 130. Id. at 23. 
 131. Id. at 15, 17–20. 
 132. Id. at 20–21. 
 133. See IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, supra note 121, at 41–42. 
 134. See id. at 50–51. 
 135. See id. at 17, 47–51. 
 136. See id. at 68–70. 
 137. See id. at 80. 
 138. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, supra note 121, at 17, 20–21, 24–26, 80. 
 139. See id. at 17. 
 140. See id. at 80. 
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for malevolent conduct141—which allows the warrior to put others before 
himself by making up for malignant actions through beneficent actions; and 
choosing to be a person of holiness in a community of love142—which allows 
the warrior to personally redefine his identity and be accepted for who he is 
without denying his past or forfeiting his future.  Noticeably, these four ele-
ments well correspond to Marlantes’s conditions for a spiritual experience.143 
Since the mystic and the warrior are both sacred vocations, following 
the mystic’s journey should allow the warrior to experience the heavenly side 
of the spiritual vision and receive the concomitant benefits of sanctification; 
namely, acceptance of past sins, redemption from the false self, a trans-
formed moral identity, and acceptance in a community.144  In the next section 
of my paper, I am going to argue effective treatment methods for PTSD must 
include the four elements of purgation, gratitude, atonement, and communal-
ization that have been drawn from the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises.  Any 
treatment method that forfeits these four elements will be unable to fully 
restore a warrior’s broken humanity, dignity, moral identity, and community 
because it does not fully appreciate the spiritual aspect of combat trauma. 
III. VA/DOD BIO-PSYCHO-SOCIAL APPROACH TO PTSD:  LIMITATIONS 
AND WAYS FORWARD 
A. Question One:  How Is PTSD Diagnosed and Treated? 
Now that we understand the unique effects that combat trauma has on 
the warrior’s moral identity and have established a framework for under-
standing what is needed to heal this particular wound, let us look at how 
PTSD is diagnosed and treated within the VA/DoD.  The diagnostic criteria 
for PTSD given in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
IV Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) as appropriate by the VA/DoD guidelines145 
requires the following: 
  
 141. See id. at 20–21, 24–26. 
 142. See id. at 55. 
 143. MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 7. 
 144. Id. at 7–9. 
 145. Hereafter, I will refer to VA/DoD guidelines simply as “guidelines.”  The guidelines 
are “‘[r]ecommendations for the performance or exclusion of specific procedures or services 
derived through a rigorous methodological approach that includes:  Determination of appro-
priate criteria, such as effectiveness, efficacy, population benefit, or patient satisfaction and a 
literature review to determine the strength of the evidence in relation to these criteria.’”  THE 
MGMT. OF POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS WORKING GRP., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS & DEP’T OF 
DEF., VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR MANAGEMENT OF POST-TRAUMATIC 
STRESS 3 (2010) [hereinafter VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES], available at 
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A. [That] [a] person has been exposed to a traumatic event in 
which both of the following were present:146 
 1. The person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with 
an event or events that involved actual or threatened death 
or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self 
or others 
 2. The person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, 
or horror. . . . 
B. The traumatic event [be] persistently re-experienced in one (or 
more) of the following ways: 
 1. Recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the 
event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions. . . . 
  2. Recurrent distressing dreams of the event. . . . 
  3. Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring . . 
. 
 4. Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or ex-
ternal cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the 
traumatic event 
 5. Physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external 
cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic 
event 
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and 
numbing of general responsiveness . . . as indicated by three 
(or more) of the following: 
 1. Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associ-
ated with the trauma 
 2. Efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse rec-
ollections of the trauma 
  3. Inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma 
  4. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant 
activities 
  5. Feeling of detachment or estrangement from others 
  6. Restricted range of affect. . . . 
  7. Sense of a foreshortened future. . . . 
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before . 
. . trauma), as indicated by two (or more) of the following: 
  1. Difficulty falling or staying asleep 
  
http://www.healthquality.va.gov/PTSD-FULL-2010c.pdf (emphasis omitted).  As such they 
cull evidence-based information so that a care provider can draw concrete conclusions about 
therapeutic methods when making specific recommendations concerning the treatment of 
PTSD.  Id.  The strength of an intervention is rated from A through I, with A being the strong-
est rating and I the weakest.  Id. at 7 tbl.Evidence Rating System. 
 146. The traumatic experience that undergirds a diagnosis of PTSD might not be a morally 
traumatic event.  The indications of moral trauma are more likely to occur in criteria 2, 3, or 4. 
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  2. Irritability or outbursts of anger 
  3. Difficulty concentrating 
  4. Hypervigilance 
  5. Exaggerated startle response 
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and 
D) is more than 1 month 
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or im-
pairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning.147 
 
The most crucial aspect of diagnosing PTSD is establishing that a severe 
traumatic stressor has occurred.148  In order to qualify as a triggering traumat-
ic event, the stressor must be:  Psychologically distressing to the individual 
who experienced the event, something that would distress almost anyone, 
and “outside the range of ‘usual human experience.’”149 
The guidelines state that when a warrior presents with qualifying symp-
toms of PTSD he should be given a screening to include:  A medical and 
psychiatric history, physical examination, mental health status check, and a 
psychosocial, functional assessment.150  If it is determined that the warrior 
has experienced a qualifying traumatic event and meets the DSM-IV-TR 
criteria for PTSD, then the severity of his PTSD is subsequently deter-
mined.151  Upon completion of the screening and diagnostic assessment, the 
warrior is educated about:  The diagnosis of PTSD, treatment options, and 
resources for care.152  Working collaboratively with a treatment team, the 
  
 147. Id. at 79 tbl.B. 
 148. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 15; see also N. Breslau et al., The Uniqueness of 
the DSM Definition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder:  Implications for Research, 32 
PSYCHOL. MED. 573, 573–75 (2002).  One of the challenges of treating PTSD is that the clini-
cal diagnosis must be in reference to a specific event.  See id. at 573.  Researchers have criti-
cized this model since many people possess symptoms related to the other criteria without 
reference to a specific determining stress event.  Id. at 574.  This is a particularly large strug-
gle for the VA/DoD system of determining PTSD in warriors because often combat stressors 
that induce trauma are left undocumented because of the nature of tracking information in a 
warzone.  If there is no written evidence corroborating a traumatic event, it becomes difficult 
to receive a diagnosis and care for PTSD.  Although the topic of my paper does not pertain to 
this specific difficulty in treating PTSD, it is of particular importance to returning warriors.  
For further information see the following:  Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Treatment and 
Research, supra note 19. 
 149. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 15. 
 150. VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 65–68. 
 151. Id. at 56 fig.B-1. 
 152. Id. 
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warrior develops goals and expectations concerning a treatment plan and 
determines an optimal setting for care.153 
Realizing that PTSD often requires complex and intensive intervention, 
the guidelines stress the benefits of using an interdisciplinary biopsycho-
social mode of treating the warrior’s symptoms.154  Trauma-focused psycho-
therapy combined with pharmacological interventions are considered most 
effective.155  Therapeutic techniques receiving the highest evidence rating are 
strongly recommended by the guidelines.156  Those three treatment options 
are:  Cognitive processing (CPT), prolonged exposure (ET), and eye move-
ment desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR).157  Consequently, it is these 
three modes of therapy that I will evaluate for their ability to effectively ad-
dress a warrior’s moral trauma.158  Before moving on, we must first under-
stand how the VA/DoD defines these three therapeutic techniques.  Thus, my 
description of each therapy will be drawn from the most recent research 
commission by the VA/DoD and contained in the Institute for Medicine’s 
(IOM) report on PTSD in the warrior population. 
CPT protocols help a warrior “to identify and modify . . . negative 
thoughts and beliefs . . . considered” to be the emotional and behavioral trig-
gers of the traumatic event underlying his PTSD.159  The goal is for the war-
rior to recognize negative thinking and learn to exchange destructive 
thoughts with constructive thoughts in order to reduce PTSD.160  CPT con-
sists of:  Education about specific symptoms and how treatment can help 
reduce these symptoms; increasing the warrior’s awareness of his own 
thoughts and feelings; teaching new skills that enable the warrior question 
  
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. at 51–52; Elaine S. LeVine & Elaine Orabona Mantell, The Integration of 
Psychopharmacology and Psychotherapy in PTSD Treatment:  A Biopsychosocial Model of 
Care, in 1 TRAUMA PSYCHOLOGY:  ISSUES IN VIOLENCE, DISASTER, HEALTH, AND ILLNESS 283, 
283 (Elizabeth K. Carll ed., 2007). 
 155. LeVine & Mantell, supra note 154, at 283–84. 
 156. VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 7. 
 157. See id. at 116–17. 
 158. Much research is being done concerning the neurobiological aspects of PTSD and 
concomitant ways of treating the symptoms with various pharmacological treatment methods.  
COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 59–60.  In a similar way, the guidelines based 
their recommendations on randomly controlled clinical trials that produce evidence of their 
effectiveness in helping to reduce a warrior’s symptoms.  VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE 
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 116.  For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that phar-
macological treatments relate to the biological aspect in the bio-psycho-social method of 
treatment.  As such, I will set aside further discussion on this topic so as to focus on the effec-
tiveness of psychological treatment methods in connection with moral trauma. 
 159. COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 237. 
 160. Id. 
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his maladaptive thoughts; and instilling the notion that it is normal for trau-
ma to change the way a person understands the world and other people.161  
Modification of negative thoughts surrounding the trauma event and its con-
sequences reduces dysfunctional behaviors sparked by re-experiencing the 
event.162  Ultimately, CPT is aimed at helping warriors integrate “the beliefs 
they had before and after their trauma.”163  The therapeutic process occurs in 
twelve hour-long sessions over a six-week period.164 
ET protocols are aimed at helping the warrior confront his “trauma-
related [event], memories, and feelings” through repeatedly revisiting the 
traumatic memory.165  ET uses in vivo exposure and imaginal exposure, 
which allows the warrior to embody his traumatic memory in a controlled 
and objectively safe environment.166  “In vivo exposure consists of having 
the [warrior] gradually and systematically approach situations, places, and 
people that” trigger a dysfunctional response.167  After repeated exposure to 
triggering stimuli proves to be harmless, the warrior’s unrealistic expecta-
tions are disconfirmed.168  In contrast to in vivo, imaginal exposure uses the 
imagination to set up an environment in which a warrior revisits his trauma 
setting.169  Thereafter, psychoeducation teaches a warrior to understand what 
causes PTSD and attempts to normalize his previous response by imparting 
awareness that certain reactions are common after a traumatic event.170  In 
attempting to reduce anxiety brought on by disruptive memories, ET also 
teaches controlled-breathing techniques.171  Such processing allows the war-
rior to experience his trauma from a new perspective, reorganize his thoughts 
concerning traumatic memories, and learn to redirect his physical responses 
to anxiety triggering events.172  The therapeutic process for ET typically 
“consists of [eight] to [twelve] sessions of [sixty to ninety] minutes each.”173 
EMDR protocols ask a warrior to take account of disturbing images 
connected with his traumatic event.174  A record of these images is taken.175  
  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 237. 
 165. Id. at 233. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 233–34. 
 168. Id. at 234. 
 169. COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 233–34. 
 170. Id. at 234. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 238. 
 175. Id. 
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Thereafter, in a safe place, the warrior is asked to bring to mind one of the 
disturbing images while allowing physical sensations associated with the 
image to enter his body.176  At this point, the warrior attempts to identify “a 
negative self-referring belief” connecting him to the image and sensations.177  
Once the negative belief is located, the warrior attempts to replace it with a 
positive thought while tracking a clinician’s finger movement for twenty 
seconds.178  The process is repeated for each negative association related to a 
particular image until all beliefs associated with the image have been re-
moved.179  The same process occurs for each item in the catalogued list of 
images.180  The goal of EMDR is to isolate dysfunctional memories and cre-
ate a new memory route in the brain in order to reduce the influence of nox-
ious memories and develop better coping mechanisms to intrusive stimuli 
related to the traumatic event.181  Now that we understand how the VA/DoD 
diagnoses PTSD as well as its preferred treatment methods, we can progress 
to an evaluation of the VA/DoD’s ability to effectively acknowledge the war-
rior’s spiritual experience in combat and address his corresponding moral 
trauma. 
B. Question Two:  Why Is Treating PTSD as a Bio-psycho-social Phenom-
enon Insufficient? 
As previously determined, to properly heal a warrior’s moral trauma, ef-
fective treatment methods must include the four elements of purgation, grati-
tude, atonement, and communalization.182  Purgation should provide an ave-
nue for the warrior to embrace the consequences of his actions in combat, 
have them acknowledged by a fellow human being as immoral, but replace 
moral condemnation with forgiveness.  Gratitude should provide an avenue 
for the warrior to replace old negative thoughts with new positive thoughts 
about the goodness that still exists, the safety in which he now resides, and 
hope for the future.  Atonement should provide an avenue for the warrior to 
replace actions, for which he feels most grievous guilt or fault, with acts of 
charity that can redress past offenses.183  Communalization should provide a 
  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 238. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 183. Many of the experiences of moral guilt and trauma are related to people who have 
been killed.  I am not proposing an exact correlate action.  The goal is to behaviorally make 
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safe space in which the warrior can honestly discuss and grieve the trauma of 
war, both from the perspective of what war has done to him and what he had 
done in war.184 
Now I will explore how each method encouraged by the VA/DoD com-
pares to the task at hand starting with CPT.  The primary thrust of this treat-
ment modality is rearranging the warrior’s thought process—the main goal 
being to replace destructive thoughts with constructive thoughts.185  As such, 
it succeeds at achieving the second element of gratitude.  In some respects it 
might also be possible to achieve a portion of the first element of purgation 
in that it attempts to provide skills that would allow the warrior to rid himself 
of maladaptive thinking.  However, this ultimately falls short because sug-
gesting that a warrior’s recurring thoughts of guilt surrounding combat trau-
ma are maladaptive inherently negates the moral valence of the thought.  The 
purgative element should allow a warrior to first acknowledge his responsi-
bility, embrace it, and then let it go.  CPT also fails to provide an avenue 
through which the warrior can experience an act of forgiveness once his cul-
pability has been accepted and confessed.  Finally, CPT fails to achieve any 
aspect of the elements of atonement or communalizing. 
Next let us turn to ET.  The central defining feature of ET is the attempt 
to recreate the trauma situation underpinning a warrior’s PTSD so that he can 
approach his feelings, memories, fear, anxiety, and distrust in a safe situa-
tion.186  The goal is that after multiple exposures the warrior will learn that he 
is no longer exposed to harm and that the anxiety, harmful elaboration on 
  
amends so that the warrior can experience the reality that kindness, compassion, and generosi-
ty are still a part of his human identity. 
 184. Shay provides an excellent description of the importance of communalizing grief in 
the warrior community and the necessity to include this function as part of treating PTSD.  
Shay argues that a warrior’s grief often goes unattended.  SHAY, supra note 65, at 55.  I am 
also proposing that guilt be addressed and acknowledged to the fullest extent.  The idea is not 
to shame the warrior, but instead to provide a space where the truth can emerge and the warri-
or is allowed to integrate the dark side of war into his identity without it completely defining 
his self-concept.  Warrior narratives describe the exploits of combat with a sense of fear and 
urgency—fear of being socially shamed as an untenable human being, and urgency that be-
trays a need not to ignore the brutal truth of war.  See id. at 188–89, 192–93.  In order for the 
warrior to be truly accepted into society, he has to be provided a place where his whole identi-
ty can be revealed and be understood without moral judgments.  See id. at 188–189.  Silencing 
or ignoring the extent to which guilt can pervade a warrior’s identity is only to the detriment 
of his holistic health.  See id. at 194.  Marlantes confirms this by sharing that he was dogged 
by a feeling of being “unclean, insecure, strange, and awkward.  I didn’t feel right—with 
anyone. . . . [W]e came home alone . . . . [and] I needed desperately to be accepted back in.”  
MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 182, 184. 
 185. See COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 237; see also VA/DOD CLINICAL 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 117. 
 186. See VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 116. 
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memories, and concomitant responses will subside.187  ET accomplishes 
some of the purgative element in that it brings the warrior back to the state of 
his combat trauma and allows him to address the surrounding issues.  A war-
rior can accept and confront the experiences giving rise to his malevolent 
feelings of guilt and responsibility.  Clinicians can readily provide an appro-
priate forum for the warrior to confess his true feelings, have the feelings be 
acknowledged by an authority figure who can, in turn, express an under-
standing that though these actions are reprehensible, they are also an element 
of war and that the warrior has the right to be forgiven.  Though in a less 
explicit way, ET also upholds the element of gratitude by creating a safe 
space and teaching controlled breathing techniques that allow a warrior to 
slowly replace old negative thoughts with new positive ones about life and 
his future.  By allowing the warrior to recreate and reenter the traumatizing 
events of combat, ET could potentially also achieve the element of commu-
nalizing if performed in a safe group therapy setting.188  However, ET fails to 
provide any means to fulfill the element of atonement. 
Finally, let us turn to EMDR.  Similar to CPT, EMDR has the potential 
to fulfill the purgative element.  Unfortunately, the therapy brings the warrior 
to disturbing images in order to rid him of dysfunctional thoughts and memo-
ries.189  As such, it cannot pass the test on the purgative element because it 
does not properly address the warrior’s guilt and free him of the negative 
sense of being responsible for committing grave atrocities.  EMDR does suc-
cessfully achieve the element of gratitude by attempting to use focus tech-
niques to replace old negative thoughts with new positive ones.190  However, 
it also fails on the elements of atonement and communalizing. 
Having now compared all three VA/DoD recommended treatment 
methods against the four necessary elements to heal a warrior’s moral trau-
ma, we clearly see that all three methods fail to properly address a warrior’s 
moral trauma.  ET has the most potential to holistically heal the warrior of 
his PTSD since it has the ability to achieve three out of the four elements 
required to heal moral trauma.  However, CPT and EMDR fare poorly in 
achieving only one of the four required elements.  The primary focus of all 
three of these methods is changing the warrior’s thoughts, not accepting 
deeds, and integrating them into his identity.191  While redirecting a warrior’s 
thoughts is essential to treating PTSD and can help a warrior more meaning-
  
 187. See id. at 124. 
 188. Unfortunately, the guidelines rank group therapy as having a fair-poor strength rating.  
Id. at 139.  As such, it is not recommended for treating PTSD.  See id. at 139 tbl.Evidence. 
 189. COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 238. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. at 233, 237–38. 
146
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] MORAL TRAUMA OF AMERICA'S WARRIORS 573 
fully respond to harmful stimuli, it is not sufficient to holistically heal the 
wounds of combat trauma that course deeper than thoughts.  All three 
VA/DoD methods ignore the profound emotions and memories related to the 
guilt a warrior incurs when he is initiated into the Temple of Mars and how 
that guilt rips his moral identity asunder.  Ironically, these three methods also 
do little to explicitly help with the social aspect of the bio-psycho-social 
model.  While the goal of all three methods is to make the warrior more com-
fortable in responding to normal social settings and relationships, we must 
note that all three methods are highly individualized therapeutic models.192  
The sole focus is on the warrior, not his community, family, or friends.193 
Since the current guidelines fail to properly address the spiritual aspect 
of a warrior’s trauma, clinicians must willingly engage in non-traditional 
methods of treating a warrior’s PTSD and research must explore potential 
strategies to effectively integrate the “spiritual” into current modes of treat-
ment. 
C. Question Three:  What Is Required to Address this Challenge? 
In order for VA/DoD to adequately address the challenge of sanctifying 
the moral wounds of combat trauma a twofold approach is needed.  This 
twofold approach is crucial because the guidelines promote the use of evi-
dence-based medicine.194  While they do not exclude alternative therapies, 
they strongly encourage those modalities that have been proven successful 
through random control trials.195  Consequently, clinicians in the VA/DoD 
systems are in a good position to explore new concepts and ideas because 
they are not bound to standard treatment methods.196  However, other meth-
ods are only briefly mentioned and receive low, fair, or poor strength rat-
ings.197  Thus, the guidelines leave an impression that treatments beyond 
  
 192. See id. at 233–34, 237–38. 
 193. See id. at 233–34, 237–39. 
 194. See VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 4. 
 195. See id. at 3. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See, e.g., id. at 7 tbl.Evidence Rating System, 113 tbl.I–3.  Ironically, the guidelines 
make a passing reference to spiritual support as an option for aiding acute stress disorder.  Id. 
at 51–52, 172–73.  It is suggested that religious warriors might benefit from seeking advice 
from a spiritual leader.  VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 172.  
However, during the first month after exposure, spiritual support is given the lowest strength 
of recommendation, has unknown benefit, and is rated lower than pharmacological interven-
tions.  See id. at 46 tbl.A-4.  Furthermore, there is no reference to spiritual support in the 
guideline goals for PTSD, and the notion of spiritual support is directly linked to a warrior’s 
potential religion of faith.  Id. at 6, 172.  It is not in reference to the spirituality of war that I 
have tried to develop in this paper. 
147
: Nova Law Review 37, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
574 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
CPT, ET, and EMDR are ineffective at treating PTSD, when in fact, the 
listed options may simply have not been widely tested forms of treatment.198  
Even though the front page of the guidelines says, “[t]hey are not intended to 
define a standard of care and should not be construed as one,” the implica-
tion of their ranking system and structure predisposes clinicians to be biased 
toward the strongly recommended methods of treatment.199 
More importantly, nowhere in the guidelines is there an appreciation for 
the concept of a warrior’s moral trauma.  The challenge then is not that the 
VA/DoD is totally dismissive of using non-traditional treatments for PTSD, 
but that they have not yet fully appreciated the importance of treating moral 
trauma as ancillary to the psychological trauma of PTSD.  For those clini-
cians who have discovered effective alternative modes for addressing moral 
trauma, such methods will not be captured and successfully implemented if 
they remain untested in random control trials.  Therefore, clinicians need to 
be strongly encouraged to look to alternative methods for treating PTSD and 
researchers need to take seriously the importance of investigating new ave-
nues for treating a warrior’s moral trauma that work in conjunction with 
CPT, ET, and EMDR. 
I will now briefly investigate potential avenues for thinking about how 
to develop treatments that address a warrior’s moral trauma without resorting 
to a particular faith tradition.  In contrast to other employers, the military 
encourages religious practice and spiritual belief.200  In fact, it has recently 
been suggested that maintaining military readiness includes commanders 
developing “policies that will promote a coherent and effective approach to 
the spiritual needs of service members.”201  The difficulty in stressing the 
importance of spirituality is finding a way to avoid the reduction of all spirit-
uality to one particular faith based system.202  As an equal opportunity em-
ployer, “[m]ilitary commanders are responsible to provide for the free exer-
cise of religion of those under their authority.”203  Consequently, addressing 
the moral trauma of war must always bear in mind that the VA/DoD promote 
and espouse religious diversity. 
  
 198. See id. at 109, 116–17. 
 199. Id. at Qualifying Statements. 
 200. Compare David J. Hufford et al., Spiritual Fitness, 175 MILITARY MED. 73, 73 (Aug. 
Supp. 2010), with Louise Fenner, Religion in the Workplace Is Diversity Issue for U.S. Com-
panies, AMERICA.GOV ARCHIVE (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.america.gov/st/diversity-english 
/2007/November/20071128173019xlrennef0.1781427.html?cp.rss=true. 
 201. Hufford et al., supra note 200, at 73. 
 202. See id. at 75. 
 203. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-05, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN JOINT OPERATIONS, at 
viii (2009). 
148
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] MORAL TRAUMA OF AMERICA'S WARRIORS 575 
It is not the goal of this paper to fully develop proper treatment options; 
however, it is important to point out potential avenues for further research.  
Since much research is needed to provide consistent evidence of proper 
methods, my remarks will remain preliminary.  In discussing treatment alter-
natives to the guidelines, it will be helpful to keep in mind the definition of 
spiritual given in Total Force Fitness:  “‘Of, pertaining to or affecting the 
spirit or soul, esp[ecially] from a religious aspect.’”204  In turn, psycho-
spiritual aspects of the warrior’s health relate to the realm of spirituality that 
intersects with other domains and increase his mindfulness and mental resili-
ence.205  The religiously neutral aspects of a warrior’s psycho-spiritual health 
are:  Purpose and meaning; reflection and introspection; relationships beyond 
the self; and exceptional spiritual experiences.206 
The IOM committee’s initial assessment provides an excellent resource 
in a section concerning emerging therapies.207  The report encourages 
VA/DoD clinicians and researchers to take their lead from integrative-
collaborative approaches to treating PTSD that have been shown successful 
in civilian trauma care.208  Such approaches dismantle elements of estab-
lished evidence based medicine—CPT, ET, and EMDR—and combine them 
with other options such as:  Yoga, couples therapy, family therapy, transcen-
dental meditation, acupuncture, t’ai chi, animal assisted therapy, and art ther-
apy.209  Combining different elements from various traditions, both medical 
and non-medical, allows a treatment modality to remain religion neutral, yet 
address all four aspects of a warrior’s psycho-spiritual health.  In order to 
integrate various treatment methods, a clinician would need to either become 
interdisciplinary in approach—use other experts from each corresponding 
tradition to care for various portions of the warrior’s treatment plan—or, 
research in each separate area would need to prove the effectiveness at treat-
ing the moral trauma of PTSD. 
An interdisciplinary orientation allows clinicians and various healers to 
tailor their treatment method to specific needs of a warrior.210  Moreover, it 
  
 204. Hufford et al., supra note 200, at 74 tbl.I. 
 205. Id. at 75. 
 206. Id. at 76–77.  These four aspects correspond nicely to those aforementioned catego-
ries presented both by Marlantes and St. Ignatius.  See supra Parts II.A, II.C.  Without re-
explicating the previous section, I take this parallel to further affirm what has already been 
proven about the spiritual nature of war and what is needed to heal moral trauma.  At this 
juncture it is important to maintain religiously neutral appreciation for spirituality in discuss-
ing VA/DoD options for future research and implementation. 
 207. See COMM. INITIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 255–64. 
 208. Id. at 254. 
 209. Id. at 254–61. 
 210. See id. at 233–34, 254. 
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extends the therapy beyond the individual warrior to his community.211  
Marlantes suggests that one of the grievous mistakes in attempting to sancti-
fy a warrior’s soul is eliminating his extended family and community.212  As 
such, Marlantes and Tick both encourage elaborate processes of ritual heal-
ing akin to the Native American sweat lodges.213  While these methods are 
likely to be effective modes of purification and sanctification, the remaining 
challenge is to effectively standardize such processes in random control trial 
so that they can be made available for general use and appropriation into the 
guidelines. 
In order to present one potential for random control trial, I will return to 
the medieval warrior.214  Verkamp provides a historical analysis of medieval 
penitential rites of warriors returning from battle.215  The elements of these 
penitential rites could be more easily isolated for future random control trials 
and could easily be used in combination with current methods of treating 
PTSD.  The central aspect of medieval penitential rites is that they allowed a 
returning warrior to accept that his “‘sacred moral norms’ and ‘deeply held 
convictions’” had been violated through his participation in the violence of 
combat and perform a heartfelt contrition.216 
Verkamp argues that modern therapeutic approaches attempting to 
simply eliminate “self-criticism” deny the returning warrior’s personal self-
accusation.217  Moreover, these methods tend to curb a warrior’s remorse 
leaving him enslaved to the feeling that his moral identity was lost on the 
battlefield as a result of his own wartime behavior.218  Similar to the Spiritual 
Exercises,219 Verkamp suggests that medieval penitential rites provide the 
  
 211. See id. at 233–34. 
 212. See MARLANTES, supra note 15, at 179. 
 213. See id. at 8; TICK, supra note 22, at 211, 214. 
 214. In attempting to look beyond a Judeo-Christian model for moral healing, I explored 
the Code of the Samurai.  However, I found little information concerning the warrior returning 
from battle.  The focus was more on how to prepare for death.  Corresponding avenues for 
meditation were located in the monk-warrior, which is a separate class of citizen that practices 
Zen meditation so the spiritual-combat connection was not readily apparent.  For that reason, I 
will limit my focus to Western rituals that provide a framework for warriors returning from 
combat to address their moral identity.  For further information concerning the samurai code 
see Y ZAN DAID JI, CODE OF SAMURAI:  A MODERN TRANSLATION OF THE BUSHIDO 
SHOSHINSU OF THE TAIRA SHIGESUKE (Thomas Cleary trans., 1999). 
 215. See BERNARD J. VERKAMP, THE MORAL TREATMENT OF RETURNING WARRIORS IN 
EARLY MEDIEVAL AND MODERN TIMES 17–23 (1993). 
 216. Id. at 104–05. 
 217. Id. at 105. 
 218. See id. 
 219. The use of the Spiritual Exercises, as discussed previously, was to point out the 
common links between the mystic and the warrior’s spirituality. See supra Part II.C.  
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crucial elements of:  “[E]xamination of conscience,” a confession of sin, and 
contrite reparation, all of which restore the breach with community and 
God.220  The importance of these penitential rites need not be understood in 
their religious context.  However, they acknowledge a warrior’s deeper al-
ienation from his own moral identity, correspond to the aspects of psycho-
spiritual health previously mentioned, and could easily be researched. 
While these ideas are inchoate, they provide general ways of thinking 
more broadly about PTSD treatment methods and a warrior’s psycho-
spiritual health.  If clinicians and researchers can move forward in proving 
and implementing any of these methods, we will be one step closer to ad-
dressing the moral trauma of war and holistically healing our returning war-
riors. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have argued that combat often, if not always, includes 
traumatic experiences that have serious consequences for a warrior’s moral 
identity if left untreated.  In order to treat the entire person, treatment meth-
ods must address the moral injuries of war as a spiritual phenomenon.  Cur-
rent VA/DoD guidelines that omit the spiritual aspect of combat trauma can-
not fully heal a warrior’s PTSD because they cannot sanctify his moral iden-
tity.  In contrast to a bio-psycho-social model of treating PTSD, I suggested 
that a twofold response is needed to integrate the spiritual into treatment 
methods within the VA/DoD health care systems.221  First, clinicians need to 
creatively explore non-traditional forms of sanctifying moral trauma that are 
tailored to a warrior’s spiritual needs when treating PTSD.  Second, research 
must explore the spiritual aspects of a warrior’s combat experience in order 
to promote effective evidence-based treatment methods that understand mor-
al trauma as an inherent element of PTSD.  Finally, I suggested potential 
avenues for integrating alternative therapies into the current bio-psycho-
social model of treating PTSD so that the guidelines can develop into a more 
holistic, interdisciplinary, bio-psycho-social-spiritual model.222 
  
Verkamp’s book is helpful because it develops a common pattern of wounds between medie-
val warriors and modern warriors.  His suggestion that prior modes of dealing with war moral 
trauma should be brought forward into our modern treatment methods not only underscores 
the point that combat trauma is of deeper moral nature, but also provides a more streamlined 
means of integrating penitential rites into modern therapy for returning warriors. 
 220. VERKAMP, supra note 215, at 104–05. 
 221. See supra Part III.C. 
 222. See id. 
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All pain reveals deep anxieties about life, but war has the ability to rav-
ish the mind, body, and soul.  Sometimes such pain leaves no visible sign on 
the body.  If silence stifles the spiritual pain of our warriors it will, at best, 
turn into terrible despair.  Our warriors deserve more than despair.  They 
deserve to be sanctified in order to restore a sense of personal dignity, but 
more importantly, to be cherished as a blessing and national treasure in the 
hearts of the American people.  We ought not appreciate and laud our warri-
ors in ignorance of their combat mission, or in spite of it, but because of their 
physical, mental, and spiritual display of:  Loyalty, duty, courage, respect, 
selfless honor, integrity, and personal courage. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most fiscally and politically complex challenge facing our 
nation is the state of our economy.  The problem of unemployment has been 
of particular concern to our nation’s leaders and to families from every cor-
ner of the country.  The long-term unemployed, in particular, have faced the 
question of how they are supposed to move forward when finding gainful 
employment seems so daunting.  This problem is particularly acute among 
the men and women who have served our country in the various branches of 
the armed services.  Those servicemembers who have been disabled as a 
result of their time in the military face additional hurdles that may seem in-
surmountable.  Disabilities extend far beyond the physical wounds of war.  A 
trend towards wider recognition of the disabling psychological effects of war 
and military service has developed.  Outreach efforts concerning Posttrau-
matic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in particular have encouraged those dealing 
with the illness to get help and have provided education for the public at 
large about the condition.  While the problems facing our economy, and vet-
erans in particular, are significant, a great deal of effort and ingenuity has 
been expended towards developing innovative solutions.  Much is known 
about the benefits available to veterans in terms of health care, pensions, etc.  
However, benefits available to veterans who undertake entrepreneurial en-
deavors are lesser known.  Those very benefits allow veteran-owned small 
  
 * Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, J.D., magna cum laude, 
2012; University of Phoenix, B.S., magna cum laude, 2009.  This article is dedicated to the 
soldiers of the United States Armed Forces and their supporting friends and families.  Their 
spirit is as strong as the love, support, and faith observed by their families both in times of 
war, and in peace.  Let us never forget just how much it means to serve this country, the duties 
we owe to those that rise to the challenge, and the honor displayed by the men and women 
who defend freedom with their lives. 
 ** Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, J.D. Candidate, 2014; 
Florida International University, M.S., 2005; Florida International University, B.S., 2003.  
This article is dedicated to my mother, Pura, for her love and patience and for teaching me the 
importance of never giving up; to my father, Angel, for his selflessness and valuable advice; 
and to Raul, for his unconditional love and support and for reminding me to laugh a little bit 
every day and to always keep fighting. 
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businesses (VOSB) and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses 
(SDVOSB) to offer yet another contribution to the country they have long 
served.  Now out of uniform, and in the role of entrepreneurs, veterans can 
become job creators and improve their circumstances, that of others, and 
their communities.  The federal government and the State of Florida have 
offered assistance to small businesses which qualify as VOSB and 
SDVOSB.1 
On October 20, 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Or-
der 13,360.2  The Order was entitled “Providing Opportunities for Service-
Disabled Veteran Businesses To Increase Their Federal Contracting and 
Subcontracting.”3  A clear policy statement and directive were contained in 
the order: 
America honors the extraordinary service rendered to the United 
States by veterans with disabilities incurred or aggravated in the 
line of duty during active service with the armed forces.  Heads of 
agencies shall provide the opportunity for service-disabled veteran 
businesses to significantly increase the Federal contracting and 
subcontracting of such businesses.4 
The Order charges agency heads with developing strategic plans which 
include, among other things, “encouraging and facilitating participation by 
service-disabled veteran businesses in competitions for award of agency con-
tracts.”5 
President Obama and his Administration have continued the work of 
aiding veterans and linking that assistance with entrepreneurial efforts that 
benefit local communities and the economy as a whole.6  The Administration 
notes that they “have been committed to upholding [the] sacred trust with 
America’s veterans and wounded warriors.  Putting Americans, especially 
our veterans, back to work is job one.”7  President Obama has integrated 
entrepreneurship training and established the “National Veterans Entrepre-
  
 1. See infra Part III for a discussion of VOSB and SDVOSB. 
 2. Exec. Order No. 13,360, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,549, 62,549, 62,551 (Oct. 26, 2004). 
 3. Id. at 62,549. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. THE WHITE HOUSE, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION RECORD FOR VETERANS AND WOUNDED 
WARRIORS, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/veterans_and_wounded_ war-
riors_record_0.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
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neurship Training program within the Small Business Administration 
[(SBA)].”8  The SBA has highlighted that: 
In Fiscal Year 2011, over 190,000 veterans received small busi-
ness counseling or training through SBA and its resource partners.  
In addition, since 2009, SBA has doubled the number of SBA Vet-
eran Business Outreach Centers nationwide.  Over the past three 
years, SBA has also expanded the Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for 
Veterans with Disabilities to eight top U.S. business schools na-
tionwide.9 
Additionally, President Obama has increased veterans’ “access to capital and 
government contracts.”10  Of particular significance is that fact that 
“[b]etween 2009 and 2011, over $3 billion through over 12,000 [SBA] loans 
went to small businesses owned by veterans and service-disabled veterans.”11  
The SBA has “worked with both contracting officers and veteran-owned 
businesses to deliver the highest-ever percentage of federal contracts to ser-
vice-disabled veteran-owned . . . businesses in 2010, totaling $10.4 billion.”12 
In 2008, the Florida Legislature passed House Bill 687, entitled the 
“Florida Service-Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise Opportunity Act.”13  
Similar to President Bush’s Executive order, the Act was intended to provide 
a “selection preference in state contracting for certified service-disabled vet-
eran business enterprises.”14  The Legislature made it clear that their intent 
was to 
rectify the economic disadvantage of service-disabled veterans, 
who are statistically the least likely to be self-employed when 
compared to the veteran population as a whole and who have made 
extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of the nation, the state, and the 
  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 6. 
 12. Marie Johns, More Resources for America’s Veteran-Entrepreneurs and Small Busi-
ness Owners, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:29 AM), http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/blog/2011/11/08/more-resources-america-s-veteran-entrepreneurs-and-small-business-
owners-0. 
 13. Florida Service-Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise Opportunity Act, Ch. 2008-
155, § 1, 2008 Fla. Laws 1932, 1933 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 295.187 (2008)). 
 14. Compare id., with Exec. Order No. 13,360, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,549, 62,549 (Oct. 26, 
2004). 
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public, by providing opportunities for service-disabled veteran 
business enterprises.15 
The federal government and the State of Florida are both making strides 
at encouraging our veterans to transition to the role of entrepreneur and it is 
not surprising to see why.  The numbers are staggering.  President Obama’s 
Interagency Task Force on Veterans Small Business Development explained 
that  
over one million service men and women are returning over the 
next five years . . . . Providing this growing number of veterans 
with the tools to transition back to civilian life—including assis-
tance to start and grow a small business—is a moral responsibility. 
. . . [Additionally,] unemployment rates are as high as 11.1% for 
returning male veterans and 14.7% for returning women veter-
ans.16 
The Task Force succinctly and insightfully makes the connection between 
honoring the service of veterans and working towards addressing our eco-
nomic woes.17  The report notes “veterans own about 2.4 million businesses 
or 9% of all of America’s businesses.  These businesses generate about $1.2 
trillion in receipts and employ nearly 6 million Americans.”18  Additionally, 
Ret. Army Colonel Jill Chambers who is the chairman and CEO of This Able 
Vet, notes that “[v]eteran-owned business[es] are twice as likely to succeed 
as businesses owned by non-veterans, according to studies . . . . ‘It’s indica-
tive of solid military training that can transition into the civilian workforce 
and be successful and productive.’”19 
The goal of this article is to explore the benefits available to veterans in 
support of their entrepreneurial efforts.  In order to provide veterans with 
enough information to get them started on the road to classification as a 
VOSB or SDVOSB with the goal of preference in government contracting in 
mind, we will begin with a discussion of the definition of disability and the 
  
 15. Ch. 2008-155, § 1, 2008 Fla. Laws at 1933. 
 16. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON VETERANS SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT:  EMPOWERING VETERANS THROUGH ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1 (2011), available 
at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FY2012-Final Veterans TF Report to President.pdf. 
 17. See id.  “America has both an unquestioned responsibility and a compelling incentive 
to empower veterans through entrepreneurship, enabling them to become successful small 
business owners.”  Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Michelle Lodge, SBA Helps Veteran-Owned Businesses, CNBC (Nov. 11, 2010, 
12:17 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40131100?SBA_Helps_VeteranOwned_Businesses. 
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role of PTSD.20  Then, we will discuss the requirements for classification as a 
VOSB or SDVOSB and the benefits available for each.21  We then explore 
the verification process and the potential pitfalls throughout that very critical 
phase.22  Next, we discuss the benefits that the State of Florida offers to vet-
erans and the requirements for creating a business entity in Florida.23  Addi-
tionally, we address the definition of a “small business concern” and engage 
in an analysis of the critical components of that definition.24  Lastly, another 
issue for veterans to consider is the voluntary and involuntary transfer of 
shares once their enterprise is up and running, and how those transfers can 
impact their status as a VOSB or SDVOSB.25 
II. DEFINING DISABILITY AND THE POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
CONNECTION 
The focus of this article is on the benefits available to VOSB and 
SDVOSB in support of their entrepreneurial efforts.  A logical starting point 
is a discussion of the myriad of ways that disability is defined.  Additionally, 
the link between disability and PTSD merits exploration. 
Title 38, section 101 of the United States Code defines “veteran” as “a 
person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was 
discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonora-
ble.”26  A “disabled veteran” is defined as “a veteran who is entitled to com-
pensation (or who but for the receipt of military retired pay would be entitled 
to compensation) . . . or . . . a person who was discharged or released from 
active duty because of a service-connected disability.”27  A “special disabled 
veteran” is defined as: 
(A) a veteran who is entitled to compensation (or who but for the 
receipt of military retired pay would be entitled to compensation) . 
. . for a disability (i) rated at 30% or more, or (ii) rated at 10 or 
20% in the case of a veteran who has been determined under sec-
tion 3106 of this title to have a serious employment handicap; or 
  
 20. See discussion infra Part II. 
 21. See discussion infra Part III. 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 23. See discussion infra Parts V.–VI. 
 24. See discussion infra Part VII. 
 25. See discussion infra Part VIII. 
 26. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006). 
 27. Id. § 4211(3). 
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(B) a person who was discharged or released from active duty be-
cause of service-connected disability.28 
Another important distinction is between what is service-connected and what 
is non-service-connected.  “‘[S]ervice-connected’ means, with respect to 
disability or death, that such disability was incurred or aggravated . . . in line 
of duty in the active military, naval, or air service.”29  “‘[N]on-service-
connected’ means . . . that such disability was not incurred or aggravated . . . 
in line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service.”30 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders explains 
that: 
 [t]he essential feature of [PTSD] is the development of charac-
teristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic 
stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that in-
volves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat 
to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves 
death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; 
or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or 
threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other 
close associate.31 
Additionally, “[t]he person’s response . . . must involve intense fear, help-
lessness, or horror.”32  Also, “[t]he full symptom picture . . . must cause clin-
ically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other im-
portant areas of functioning.”33  It does not require a stretch of the imagina-
tion to arrive at the conclusion that many of our men and women in uniform 
are engaged in yet another battle with PTSD on the home front.  The Nation-
al Center for PTSD is under the auspices of the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs (VA).34  The Center offers the following statistics regarding the preva-
lence of PTSD in the military: 
Experts think PTSD occurs: 
  
 28. Id. § 4211(1).  An explanation of disability ratings is a complex endeavor and outside 
the scope of this article. 
 29. Id. § 101(16). 
 30. Id. § 101(17) (emphasis added). 
 31. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 463 (4th ed., text rev. 2000). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See How Common Is PTSD?, U.S. DEPARTMENT VETERANS AFFS. (July 5, 2007), 
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/how-common-is-ptsd.asp. 
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• In about 11–20% of Veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars . . . or in 11–20 Veterans out of 100. 
• In as many as 10% of Gulf War (Desert Storm) Veterans, or 
in 10 Veterans out of 100. 
• In about 30% of Vietnam Veterans, or about 30 out of 100 
Vietnam Veterans.35 
The way in which the VA is addressing the epidemic of returning veter-
ans with PTSD was illustrated in a recent case decided by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.36  In National Organization of Vet-
erans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,37 the issue involved 
an amendment to the rule governing “claims for service-connected disability 
benefits for [PTSD].”38  The Secretary proposed a rule, which the court up-
held, that “creat[ed] an additional situation where a veteran could establish 
PTSD service-connection without supporting evidence regarding the claimed 
in-service stressor.”39  Prior to this rule being proposed, “a finding of PTSD 
service-connection require[d] three components:  ‘medical evidence diagnos-
ing the condition in accordance with [38 U.S.C. § 501(a)]; a link, established 
by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; 
and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor oc-
curred.’”40  The proposed rule that was codified and upheld by this court 
states: 
If a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to the veteran’s fear of 
hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psy-
chologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has 
contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to sup-
port a diagnosis of [PTSD] and that the veteran’s symptoms are re-
lated to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convinc-
ing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is 
consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veter-
  
 35. Id. 
 36. Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 669 F.3d 1341, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 37. 669 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 38. Id. at 1343. 
 39. Id. at 1343–44. 
 40. Id. at 1343 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2012)). 
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an’s service, the veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the 
occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor.41 
III. BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO VETERAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESSES AND 
SERVICE-DISABLED VETERAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESSES 
In addition to the benefits that most people are aware of, such as health 
care, veterans who decide to venture out as entrepreneurs may do so with the 
help of the VA.  “Public Law (P.L.) 109-461 entitled ‘Veterans Benefits, 
Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006’ provides VA with 
unique authority for contracting with SDVOSB and VOSB.”42  The goal of 
the legislation was to increase the contracting opportunities for VOSBs and 
SDVOSBs.43  Title 38, Section 8127 of the United States Code states that a 
“small business concern may be awarded a contract . . . only if the small 
business concern and the veteran owner . . . are listed in the database of vet-
eran-owned businesses maintained by the Secretary.”44  Additionally, “[i]n 
maintaining the database, the Secretary shall . . . [verify] that each small 
business concern listed in the database is owned and controlled by veterans 
[and] [i]n the case of a veteran who indicates a service-connected disability, 
verifi[y] . . . the service-disabled status of [each] veteran.”45  Now that we 
know that VOSBs and SDVOSBs have increased contracting opportunities 
with the federal government, it is important to define exactly what consti-
tutes a VOSB and SDVOSB.  Making sure that a business qualifies under 
either definition is the first step in a long road to benefiting from the assis-
tance. 
The first key definition is that of a veteran-owned small business con-
cern.  A VOSB concern is 
  
 41. Id. at 1344 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3)).  The National Organization of Veter-
ans’ Advocates asserted that 
the new VA rule:  (1) conflicts with statutes and regulations that require the VA to consider all 
medical evidence on a case-by-case basis, including evidence from private physicians, and that 
require the VA to give the veteran the benefit of the doubt when considering all evidence in the 
record; (2) improperly includes language that is not required in the DSM-IV; and (3) should be 
set aside as arbitrary and capricious on grounds that none of the VA’s proffered explanations 
provides a rational basis for excluding private doctors’ opinions. 
Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc., 669 F.3d at 1345. 
 42. Veteran-Owned Small Business Verification Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/osdbu/veteran/verification.asp (last updated Dec. 19, 
2012); see Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-461, §1, 120 Stat. 3403, 3403. 
 43. 38 U.S.C. § 8127(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV). 
 44. Id. § 8127(e). 
 45. Id. § 8127(f)(4). 
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a small business concern that is not less than 51% owned by one or 
more veterans, or in the case of any publicly owned business, not 
less than 51% of the stock of which is owned by one or more vet-
erans; the management and daily business operations of which are 
controlled by one or more veterans and qualifies as “small” for 
Federal business size standard purposes.46 
The second key definition is that of a service-disabled veteran-owned small 
business concern.  A SDVOSB concern is 
a business not less than 51% of which is owned by one or more 
service-disabled veterans, or in the case of any publicly owned 
business, not less than 51% of the stock of which is owned by one 
or more service-disabled veterans; the management and daily 
business operations of which are controlled by one or more ser-
vice-disabled veterans, or in the case of a veteran with a permanent 
and severe disability, a spouse or permanent caregiver of such vet-
eran.  In addition, some businesses may be owned and operated by 
an eligible surviving spouse.  Reservists or members of the Na-
tional Guard disabled from a disease or injury incurred or aggra-
vated in line of duty or while in training status also qualify.47 
It is interesting to note the role of surviving spouses in this context.  A sur-
viving spouse is 
any individual identified as such by VA’s Veterans Benefits Ad-
ministration and listed in its database of veterans and family mem-
bers. . . . [T]he following conditions must apply:  (1) If the death 
of the veteran causes the small business concern to be less than 
51% owned by one or more veterans, the surviving spouse of such 
veteran who acquires ownership rights in such small business shall 
. . . be treated as if the surviving spouse were that veteran for the 
purpose of maintaining the status of the small business concern as 
a service-disabled veteran-owned small business.48 
In essence, the surviving spouse steps into the shoes of the service-disabled 
veteran.49  Now that we have set out the definitions of VOSB and SDVOSB, 
  
 46. 38 C.F.R. § 74.1 (2012). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See 48 C.F.R. § 802.101(1).  But in order to qualify as an eligible surviving spouse, 
the veteran to whom the spouse is married must meet certain conditions.  See id. § 802.101(3).  
“The veteran must have had a 100% service-connected disability rating or the veteran died as 
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the next step is to explore the complex verification process required in order 
for the business to be listed in the database maintained by the VA. 
IV. THE VERIFICATION PROCESS 
Before any contracts may be awarded, the VOSB or SDVOSB must 
complete the verification process.50  The first step is that “[r]egistered busi-
nesses, or businesses wishing to register in the Vendor Information Pages 
(VIP) database for the purpose of securing opportunities in the Veterans First 
Contracting Program, must fill out an electronic Verification application . . . 
.”
51
  There are several core requirements in order for a VOSB or SDVOSB to 
become verified.52  The requirements are: 
(1) The Veteran owner(s) have direct and unconditional owner-
ship of at least 51% of the small business (38 C.F.R. § 74.3) and 
have total unconditional control (full decision making authority) 
(38 C.F.R. § 74.4(g)); 
(2) The Veteran manages the company on both a strategic policy 
and a day-to-day basis (38 C.F.R. § 74.4); 
(3) The Veteran holds the highest officer position (38 C.F.R. § 
74.4(c)(2)); 
(4) The Veteran should be the highest compensated employee un-
less there is a logical explanation otherwise, submitted by the Vet-
eran as to how taking a lower salary than other employee(s) helps 
the business (38 C.F.R. § 74.4(g)(3)); and 
(5) The Veteran has the managerial experience of the extent and 
complexity needed to manage the company.53 
Veterans are not alone in this process.  Help is available in the form of 
the “Verification Counseling Program,” which “was developed to provide 
  
a direct result of a service-connected disability.”  Id.  Without these requirements, the spouse 
does not qualify and cannot step into the shoes of her decedent spouse.  See id. 
 50. Veteran-Owned Small Business Verification Program, supra note 42. 
 51. Veteran Business Status Verification Instructions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
AFF., http://www.va.gov/osdbu/veteran/verificationInstructions.asp (last updated Dec. 19, 
2012). 
 52. See Verification Self Assessment Tool, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF., 
https://www.research.net/s/Verification_Assessment_Tool (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 53. Id. 
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training and assistance to Verification Assistance partners, who in turn pro-
vide Verification counseling to applicants.”54  Among the services provided 
by the Verification Counseling Program are:  One-on-one verification assis-
tance to the applicant in helping to understand regulation 38 C.F.R. § 74, 
“[r]eview of a firm’s business model,” providing insight “to applicants re-
garding the interpretation of [the] regulation,” and helping and “[a]ssist[ing] 
the [v]eteran with questions on how to use the Self Assessment Tool.”55 
The VA notes that the “[a]pplicant bears the burden of proof of ade-
quately establishing its claimed status.”56  There are several steps in the veri-
fication process.57  The most essential are as follows: 
(1) The Veteran applies to have a company verified by entering 
ownership information into VIP and sign[ing] VA Form 0877 elec-
tronically in the VIP registration section. . . . (2) Once all the own-
ers have completed their electronic signatures, VA confirms the 
Veteran status of each Veteran owner . . . . (3) After an Applicant’s 
Veteran status is confirmed, the documents that were submitted are 
reviewed to ascertain if they are correct and viable for examina-
tion.  When that has been determined, the examination begins and 
the 90 day clock for Verification begins. . . . (4) The Evaluation 
stage is completed by a Federal employee. . . . (5) The final stage 
of the process is the Determination stage.  In this stage, the Federal 
employee determines if the application is approved or denied and 
the appropriate letter is issued.  This letter is scanned and sent via 
VIP profile . . . . If the application is approved, the logo is turned 
on and the company will then appear in VIP.58 
The VA has also identified common pitfalls during the verification pro-
cess in an effort to help future applicants avoid the same issues.59  Among 
those pitfalls are that “100% of [o]wners have not completed the VA Form 
0877 electronic signature.”60  Also, applicants sometimes fail to “upload all 
required documents to their VIP profile” and do not provide all the necessary 
  
 54. Verification Assistance Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF., http://www. 
va.gov/osdbu/veteran/vap.asp (last updated Mar. 8, 2013). 
 55. Verification Counseling Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF., http://www 
.va.govosdbu/veteran/vapVCP.asp (last updated Mar. 26, 2013). 
 56. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA VETERAN-OWNED VERIFICATION PROGRAM—
INITIAL APPLICATION GUIDE 1 (2012), available at www.va.gov.osdbu/docs/ 
vapInitialVerificationApplicationGuide.pdf. 
 57. Id. at 2. 
 58. Id. at 2–3. 
 59. Id. at 7. 
 60. Id. 
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documentation.61  Additionally, it is sometimes determined that “[n]on-
[v]eterans appear to control the company.”62  Problems involving “unusual 
ownership or management structure” and “affiliation issues” may also be 
present.63  As described, despite the complex nature of the process, the VA 
has several mechanisms in place to assist veterans in navigating the process 
and reaching a successful outcome.64  It appears clear that those veterans who 
choose to avail themselves of the assistance are far more likely to be success-
ful than those who might elect not to do so. 
V. HOW DOES FLORIDA HELP VETERANS WITH THEIR ENTREPRENEURIAL 
EFFORTS? 
Florida provides benefits to VOSBs and SDVOSBs.65  Former Governor 
Charlie Crist signed the Florida Service-Disabled Veteran Business Enter-
prise Opportunity Act into law in June 2008.66  The Act created “a preference 
in state contracting for businesses owned by service-disabled veterans.  [The 
Department of Management Services Office of Supplier Diversity] provides 
business development and certification for minority- and women-owned 
businesses.”67  The first service-disabled veteran-owned business was certi-
fied the same week the legislation was signed.68  American Building Inspec-
tors Corporation is owned by a veteran of Operation Desert Storm/Desert 
Shield and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.69  The program has been a great 
success and Florida now ranks third for greatest number of veteran-owned 
businesses.70  Additionally, the “[United States Small Business Administra-
tion] Office of Advocacy report[s] that Florida has 176,727 veteran-owned 
businesses which produce revenue of $61.9 billion.  These veteran-owned 
employers provide jobs for 310,154 people with an annual payroll of $10.6 
  
 61. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at 7. 
 62. Id. at 8. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Florida Service-Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise Opportunity Act, Ch. 
2008-155, § 1, 2008 Fla. Laws 1932, 1933, 1935 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 295.187 (2008)). 
 66. Id. at 1936. 
 67. Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs. Office of Supplier Diversity, First Certified 
Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Business (Nov. 17, 2008) (on file with Nova Law Review). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, Florida Ranks Third for Greatest 
Number of Veteran-Owned Businesses (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.floridajobs.org/news-
center/news-feed/2012/11/12/florida-ranks-third-for-greatest-number-of-veteran-owned-
businesses. 
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billion.”71  While the first Florida business to be certified was a building in-
spection company, a recent service-disabled veteran-owned small business to 
be certified in Florida is CLI Solutions which is a “national defense intelli-
gence company” that plans to create “up to 40 jobs and $3.4 million in capi-
tal investment” in Florida.72  CLI Solutions “specializ[es] in linguistic ser-
vices, human terrain analysis, cultural awareness and language training, stra-
tegic communications, intelligence analytical support, operations, and pro-
gram management.”73 
With the passage of the Florida Veteran Business Enterprise Opportuni-
ty Act, the Florida Legislature set out 
to rectify the economic disadvantage of service-disabled veterans, 
who are statistically the least likely to be self-employed when 
compared to the veteran population as a whole and who have made 
extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of the nation, the state, and the 
public, by providing opportunities for service-disabled veteran 
business enterprises.74 
Section 295.187 of the Florida Statutes defines a “‘[v]eteran business enter-
prise’” as an enterprise that: 
1. Employs 200 or fewer permanent full-time employees; 2. 
[t]ogether with its affiliates has a net worth of $5 million or less or, 
if a sole proprietorship, has a net worth of $5 million or less in-
cluding both personal and business investments; 3. [i]s organized 
to engage in commercial transactions; 4. [i]s domiciled in this 
state; 5. [i]s at least 51% owned by one or more wartime veterans 
or service-disabled veterans; and 6. [t]he management and daily 
business operations of which are controlled by one or more war-
time veterans or service-disabled veterans or, for a service-
disabled veteran having a permanent and total disability, by the 
spouse or permanent caregiver of the veteran.75 
  
 71. Id. 
 72. Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs. Office of Supplier Diversity, supra note 
67; Press Release, Governor of Fla., Gov. Scott Announces CLI Solutions to Expand Opera-
tions at Tampa Headquarters (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.flgov.com/2012/12/14/gov-scott-
announces-cli-solutions-to-expand-operations-at-tampa-headquarters/. 
 73. Press Release, Governor of Fla., supra note 72. 
 74. FLA. STAT. § 295.187(2) (2012). 
 75. Id. § 295.187(3)(c). 
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Although there are differences between the federal and state definitions, they 
are largely the same.76  However, the requirements for certification are dif-
ferent.77  The state statute requires that the application for certification, 
at a minimum, include:  1. The name of the business enterprise ap-
plying for certification and the name of the veteran submitting the 
application on behalf of the business enterprise.  2. The names of 
all owners of the business enterprise, including owners who are 
wartime veterans, service-disabled veterans, and owners who are 
not a wartime veteran or a service-disabled veteran, and the per-
centage of ownership interest held by each owner.  3. The names 
of all persons involved in both the management and daily opera-
tions of the business, including the spouse or permanent caregiver 
of a veteran who has a permanent and total disability.  4. The ser-
vice-connected disability rating of all persons listed [above] . . . 
with supporting documentation from the [VA] or the . . . Depart-
ment of Defense.  5. Documentation of the wartime service of all 
persons listed [above] . . . . 6. The number of permanent full-time 
employees.  7. The location of the business headquarters.  8. The 
total net worth of the business enterprise and its affiliates.  In the 
case of a sole proprietorship, the net worth includes personal and 
business investments.78 
VI. THE BASICS OF STARTING A BUSINESS IN FLORIDA 
Starting a business typically begins with a good idea and a plan.  Once 
that stage in the process is over, the hard work begins and several complex 
legal issues may present themselves.  While all of the legal complexities in-
volved in the formation of a business entity are outside the scope of this arti-
cle, a brief discussion of the various forms of business entities available in 
Florida, and the basic requirements for each, is important for veterans who 
are considering starting a business and are hoping to avail themselves of the 
assistance that is offered by both the federal government and the State of 
Florida. 
  
 76. Compare 38 C.F.R. § 74.1 (2012), with FLA. STAT. § 295.187(3)(c). 
 77. Compare FLA. STAT. § 295.187(5)(a), with Veteran Business Status Verification 
Instructions, supra note 51. 
 78. FLA. STAT. § 295.187(5)(a). 
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A. Corporations 
Chapter 607 of the Florida Statutes governs corporations.79  It is im-
portant to set out a few definitions before delving into the requirements for 
incorporation and similar concepts.  Section 607.01401 of the Florida Stat-
utes defines numerous terms that are involved in the formation of a corpora-
tion.80  A corporation is defined as “a corporation for profit, which is not a 
foreign corporation, incorporated under or subject to the provisions of this 
act.”81  An employee “includes an officer but not a director.  A director may 
accept duties that make him or her also an employee.”82  Principal office 
“means the office (in or out of this state) where the principal executive offic-
es of a domestic or foreign corporation are located as designated in the arti-
cles of incorporation or other initial filing until an annual report has been 
filed, and thereafter as designated in the annual report.”83  Secretary is de-
fined as “the corporate officer to whom the board of directors has delegated 
responsibility under [section] 607.08401 for custody of the minutes of the 
meetings of the board of directors and of the shareholders and for authenti-
cating records of the corporation.”84  A shareholder or stockholder “means 
one who is a holder of record of shares in a corporation or the beneficial 
owner of shares to the extent of the rights granted by a nominee certificate on 
file with a corporation.”85  Shares are defined as “the units into which the 
proprietary interests in a corporation are divided.”86  Finally, a voting group 
means all shares of one or more classes or series that under the ar-
ticles of incorporation or this act are entitled to vote and be count-
ed together collectively on a matter at the meeting of shareholders.  
All shares entitled by the articles of incorporation or this act to 
vote generally on the matter are for that purpose a single voting 
group.87 
A corporation is born “when the articles of incorporation are filed or on 
a date specified in the articles of incorporation, if such date is within 5 busi-
  
 79. See generally id. ch. 607. 
 80. See id. § 607.01401. 
 81. Id. § 607.01401(5). 
 82. Id. § 607.01401(10) (emphasis added). 
 83. FLA. STAT. § 607.01401(20). 
 84. Id. § 607.01401(23). 
 85. Id. § 607.01401(24). 
 86. Id. § 607.01401(25). 
 87. Id. § 607.01401(31). 
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ness days prior to the date of filing.”88  Additionally, “[t]he Department of 
State’s filing of the articles of incorporation is conclusive proof that the in-
corporators satisfied all conditions precedent to incorporation.”89  The arti-
cles of incorporation must include certain basic information such as: 
(a) A corporate name for the corporation . . . ; (b) [t]he street ad-
dress of the initial principal office and, if different, the mailing ad-
dress of the corporation; (c) [t]he number of shares the corporation 
is authorized to issue; (d) [i]f any preemptive rights are to be 
granted to shareholders, the provision therefor; (e) [t]he street ad-
dress of the corporation’s initial registered office and the name of 
its initial registered agent at that office together with a written ac-
ceptance . . . ; and (f) [t]he name and address of each incorpora-
tor.90 
In addition to articles of incorporation, the other fundamental document 
required for a corporation is the bylaws.  Section 607.0206 of the Florida 
Statutes addresses bylaws and states that “[t]he incorporators or board of 
directors of a corporation shall adopt initial bylaws for the corporation unless 
that power is reserved to the shareholders by the articles of incorporation.”91  
Additionally, “[t]he bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision for 
managing the business and regulating the affairs of the corporation that is not 
inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation.”92  The fundamentals 
that no corporation in Florida can do without are articles of incorporation and 
bylaws.  Another form of business entity that a veteran may wish to consider 
is the limited liability company (LLC). 
B. Limited Liability Companies 
The terminology used in, and requirements of, an LLC are slightly dif-
ferent.93  Definitions are also important in the context of LLCs.  An author-
ized representative 
means one or more persons acting to form a limited liability com-
pany by executing and filing the articles of organization of such 
limited liability company . . . and authorized by a member of such 
  
 88. FLA. STAT. § 607.0203(1). 
 89. Id. § 607.0203(2). 
 90. Id. § 607.0202(1). 
 91. Id. § 607.0206(1). 
 92. Id. § 607.0206(2). 
 93. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.01401(10), (23)–(24), (31), with id. § 608.402(3), (18). 
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limited liability company, which authorized representative may, 
but need not be, a member of the limited liability company that the 
authorized representative forms.94 
A manager is defined as “a person who is appointed or elected to manage a 
manager-managed company and, unless otherwise provided in the articles of 
organization or operating agreement, a manager may be, but need not be, a 
member of the limited liability company.”95  There are two types of LLCs.96  
Some LLCs are manager-managed.97  Others are member-managed.98  A 
manager-managed LLC is “a limited liability company that is designated to 
be managed by one or more managers.”99  A member-managed LLC is an 
LLC that is managed by members.100  The operating agreement is one of the 
fundamental documents for an LLC.101  An operating agreement is defined 
as “written or oral provisions that are adopted for the management and regu-
lation of the affairs of the [LLC] and that set forth the relationships of the 
members, managers, or managing members and the [LLC].  The term in-
cludes amendments to the operating agreement.”102  Finally, a membership 
interest is defined as “a member’s share of the profits and the losses of the 
[LLC], the right to receive distributions of the [LLC’s] assets, voting rights, 
management rights, or any other rights under this chapter or the articles of 
organization.”103 
Akin to the articles of incorporation in the LLC context are the articles 
of organization.104  Section 608.407 of the Florida Statutes requires that the 
articles of organization include: 
(a) The name of the [LLC] . . . . (b) The mailing address and the 
street address of the principal office of the [LLC].  (c) The name 
and street address of its initial registered agent for service of pro-
cess in the state. . . . (d) Any other matters that the members elect 
to include in the articles of organization.105 
  
 94. FLA. STAT. § 608.402(3). 
 95. Id. § 608.402(18). 
 96. See id. § 608.402(19), (22). 
 97. Id. § 608.402(19). 
 98. Id. § 608.402(22). 
 99. FLA. STAT. § 608.402(19). 
 100. See id. § 608.402(22). 
 101. See id. § 608.402(24). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. § 608.402(23). 
 104. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.01401(1), with id. § 608.402(2). 
 105. FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1). 
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Finally, “[t]he articles of organization may also, but need not, identify 
one or more persons authorized to serve as a manager or managing member 
and may describe any limitations upon the authority of a manager or manag-
ing member.”106  Next, a veteran may wish to form a general partnership or a 
limited partnership. 
C. Limited Partnerships and General Partnerships 
Chapter 620 of the Florida Statutes governs partnerships in Florida.107  
The decision to organize as a general partnership or a limited partnership 
involves many complex considerations that are unique to each business enti-
ty.  Limited partnerships are comprised of general partners and limited part-
ners.108  Section 620.1104 of the Florida Statutes describes the “[n]ature, 
purpose, and duration” of a limited partnership.109  Specifically, “[a] limited 
partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.”110  This fact is one of the 
reasons that a business owner may find the partnership form to be appealing. 
Section 620.8202 of the Florida Statutes addresses the formation of a 
partnership.111  A partnership is formed by the “association of two or more 
persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit . . . whether or not the 
persons intend to form a partnership.”112  Deciding whether a partnership is 
formed is often a source of debate.113  Among the factors to be considered 
are: 
(a) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, 
joint property, common property, or part ownership does not, by 
itself, establish a partnership, even if the coowners share profits 
made by the use of the property.  (b) The sharing of gross returns 
does not, by itself, establish a partnership, even if the persons shar-
ing them have a joint or common right or interest in property from 
which the returns are derived.  (c) A person who receives a share 
of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner in the busi-
ness, unless the profits were received in payment:  1. Of a debt by 
installments or otherwise; 2. [f]or services as an independent con-
tractor or of wages or other compensation to an employee; 3. [o]f 
  
 106. Id. § 608.407(6). 
 107. Id. ch. 620. 
 108. Id. § 620.1102(12). 
 109. Id. § 620.1104. 
 110. FLA. STAT. § 620.1104(1). 
 111. Id. § 620.8202. 
 112. Id. § 620.8202(1). 
 113. See Elizabeth R. Darby, Relations Between Attorneys:  When Does a Partnership 
Exist?, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 319, 319 (1993). 
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rent; 4. [o]f an annuity or other retirement benefit to a beneficiary, 
representative, or designee of a deceased or retired partner; 5. [o]f 
interest or other charge on a loan, even if the amount of payment 
varies with the profits of the business, including a direct or indirect 
present or future ownership of the collateral, or rights to income, 
proceeds, or increase in value derived from the collateral; or 6. 
[f]or the sale of the goodwill of a business or other property by in-
stallments or otherwise.114 
The partnership agreement is the central document in this form of busi-
ness entity and “governs relations among the partners and between the part-
ners and the partnership.”115  Interestingly, “[t]o the extent the partnership 
agreement does not otherwise provide, this act governs relations among the 
partners and between the partners and the partnership.”116  There are limits 
upon a partnership agreement.117 
A partnership agreement may not:  (a) Vary a limited partnership’s 
power . . . to sue, be sued, and defend in its own name; (b) Vary 
the law applicable to a limited partnership . . . ; (e) Eliminate the 
duty of loyalty of a general partner . . . ; (f) Unreasonably reduce 
the duty of care of a general partner . . . ; (g) Eliminate the obliga-
tion of good faith and fair dealing . . . .118 
As mentioned previously, the decision to organize as a particular form 
of business entity is a very complex decision that involves considerations of 
day-to-day operations, management, control, taxation, etc.119 
VII. DEFINING SMALL BUSINESS CONCERN 
According to 48 C.F.R. § 2.101, a “[s]mall business concern means a 
concern . . . that is independently owned and operated, not dominant in the 
field of operation in which it is bidding on Government contracts, and quali-
fied as a small business under the criteria and size standards in 13 C.F.R. part 
121.”120  In order to help understand what this means, we will break the sen-
tence down into four parts.  The first portion will deal with defining small 
  
 114. FLA. STAT. § 620.8202(3)(a)–(c). 
 115. Id. § 620.1110(1). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. § 620.1110(2). 
 118. Id. § 620.1110(2)(a), (b), (e), (f), (g). 
 119. A veteran may be well-advised to seek the assistance of counsel when deciding how 
to organize their business in Florida. 
 120. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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business concern.  The second portion will explain what it means to be inde-
pendently owned and operated.  The third portion will explain the concept of 
dominance.  And lastly, we will explain the size qualifications for a small 
business. 
A. Defining “Concern” 
Title 48 offers very little insight as to what is meant by a small business 
concern.121  Although defining small business concern as a “concern,” the 
VA does offer some guidance by cross referencing 13 C.F.R. § 121 to help 
us in gaining an understanding of what is meant by “concern.”122  There, the 
SBA defines a concern as “a business entity organized for profit, with a place 
of business located in the United States, and which operates primarily within 
the United States or which makes a significant contribution to the U.S. econ-
omy through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials or 
labor.”123  Additionally, the SBA explains that “[a] business concern may be 
in the legal form of an individual proprietorship, partnership, limited liability 
company, corporation, joint venture, association, trust, or cooperative.”124  
Special rules apply to joint ventures, limiting participation by foreign busi-
ness entities to a maximum interest of 49%.125 
Although each state has its own rules and regulations for creating the 
entities described above, for this article, we are only discussing those busi-
ness concerns as they are defined by Florida law.  Business entity is a term of 
art that is used in Florida law.126 
B. Defining “Independently Owned and Operated” 
As noted earlier, a veteran or service-disabled veteran must own 51% of 
the small business concern in order for the business entity to be considered a 
VOSB or SDVOSB.127  If at any time after being verified, a transfer of an 
interest results in the majority ownership becoming anything less than 51%, 
then the business loses its veteran-owned status.128  For corporations, veter-
ans must independently own 51% of all issued stocks in order to qualify for 
  
 121. See id. 
 122. See id.; see also 13 C.F.R. § 121.105(a)(1) (2013). 
 123. 13 C.F.R. § 121.105(a)(1) (2013). 
 124. Id. § 121.105(b). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1108(1) (2012). 
 127. 38 C.F.R. § 74.1 (2012); see supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 128. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(e)(1), (4). 
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the benefits extended to a VOSB.129  A complete listing of issued stocks of 
Florida corporations can be found on either the articles of incorporation or 
the latest annual report, made available as a public record by the State of 
Florida.130 
The Center for Veterans Enterprise (CVE) has incorporated the 51% 
ownership requirements and included it as part of the meaning of inde-
pendently owned and operated.131  As mentioned earlier, the CVE requires 
veterans to “have direct and unconditional ownership of at least 51% of the 
small business” concern.132  The veteran must manage the company, having 
sole control of its decision-making, “hold[ing] the highest officer position,” 
and, with but a few exceptions, have the highest compensation.133  Lastly, the 
manager must have the “managerial experience [to] the extent . . . [neces-
sary] to manage the company.”134 
“Ownership must be direct.”135  In other words, the veteran must own 
the share, not a business entity that is a VOSB or a SDVOSB.136  Nor can a 
trust own the share, generally speaking.137 
[O]wnership by a trust, such as a living trust, may be treated as the 
functional equivalent of ownership by a veteran or service-
disabled veteran where the trust is revocable, and the veteran or 
service-disabled veteran is the grantor, a trustee, and the sole cur-
rent beneficiary of the trust. 
. . . . 
. . . Ownership by one or more veterans or service-disabled veter-
ans must be unconditional ownership.  Ownership must not be 
subject to conditions precedent, conditions subsequent, executory 
agreements, voting trusts, restrictions on assignments of voting 
rights, or other arrangements causing or potentially causing owner-
  
 129. See id. §§ 74.1, 74.3(b)(3).  The same applies to SDVOSB concerns.  See id. § 74.1 
(defining SDVOSB). 
 130. FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., http://www.sunbiz.org (last visited Apr. 21, 
2013). 
 131. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2012); Verification Self Assessment Tool, supra note 52. 
 132. Verification Self Assessment Tool, supra note 52. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(a) (2012). 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
174
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] APPLAUDING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT 601 
ship benefits to go to another—other than after death or incapaci-
ty.138 
Therefore any “arrangements causing or potentially causing ownership bene-
fits to go to another—other than after death or incapacity” may disqualify the 
share.139  The CVE has made it clear that the benefit of the share should go to 
the veteran or service-disabled veteran.140  Restrictions on alienation may 
harm the price of the share, but a stock option or agreement between veteran 
and/or service-disabled veteran shareholders may protect the VOSB and 
SDVOSB.141  But, any unexercised stock options or agreements held by non-
veteran shareholders shall be considered as having already been exercised.142 
Dividend distribution requires very strict guidelines such that 51% of 
the benefit belongs to the veteran or service-disabled veteran shareholders.143 
One or more veterans or service-disabled veterans must be entitled 
to receive: 
(1) At least 51% of the annual distribution of profits paid 
to the owners of a corporate, partnership, or LLC appli-
cant or participant; 
(2) At least 51% of the net profits earned by a joint ven-
ture in which the applicant or participant is the lead con-
cern; 
(3) 100% of the value of each share of stock owned by 
them in the event that the stock is sold; and 
(4) At least 51% of the retained earnings of the concern 
and 100% of the unencumbered value of each share of 
stock owned in the event of dissolution of the corporation, 
partnership, or LLC. 
  
 138. Id. § 74.3(a)–(b) (emphasis added). 
 139. Id. § 74.3(b). 
 140. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(b). 
 141. See id. § 74.3(c). 
 142. Id.  “[A]ny unexercised stock options or similar agreements—including rights to 
convert non-voting stock or debentures into voting stock—held by non-veterans will be treat-
ed as exercised.”  Id. 
 143. Id. § 74.3(d). 
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(5) An eligible individual’s ability to share in the profits 
of the concern should be commensurate with the extent of 
his/her ownership interest in that concern.144 
The CVE has indicated that change of ownership restrictions exist in all 
cases except death or incapacity agreement options.145  Every time a change 
of ownership in any of the existing shares occurs, a new application must be 
submitted to the CVE to determine if the VOSB or SDVOSB retains its sta-
tus.146  If a shareholder agreement, marital agreement—premarital, divorce 
decree, or postnuptial agreements included—or other contract such as a buy-
sell agreement is created such that the contract “substitute[s] one veteran 
owner for another [such veterans] shall submit a proposed novation agree-
ment and supporting documentation . . . to the contracting officer147 prior to 
the substitution or change of ownership for approval” is permitted.148  In the 
event of a “death or incapacity due to a serious, long-term illness or injury of 
an eligible [shareholder], prior approval is not required, but the concern must 
file a new application with contracting officer and CVE within 60 days of the 
change.”149  CVE verification is required each and every time a concern’s 
shareholder transfers ownership to a new owner and before the award of any 
new contracts.150 
Mere ownership is not enough.151  Control must be retained by the own-
er of the share.152  Such control does not simply mean the right to legally own 
or take profits derived from dividends of a stock.153 
 (a) Control means both the day-to-day management and long-
term decision-making authority for the VOSB.  Many persons 
share control of a concern, including each of those occupying the 
following positions:  Officer, director, general partner, managing 
partner, managing member, and manager.  In addition, key em-
  
 144. 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(d). 
 145. Id. § 74.3(e)(1)–(3). 
 146. Id. § 74.3(e)(1). 
 147. Contracting officer is the person responsible for determining which business entity is 
to be awarded a government contract.  See id. § 74.3(e).  Because verification is required 
before each time a contract is applied for by a VOSB and/or SDVOSB, the contracting officer 
needs to be aware of the “[c]ontinued eligibility” of the VOSB and/or SDVOSB.  See id. § 
74.3(e)(4). 
 148. 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(e)(2). 
 149. Id. § 74.3(e)(3). 
 150. Id. § 74.3(e)(4). 
 151. See id. § 74.4(b). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.4(b). 
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ployees who possess expertise or responsibilities related to the 
concern’s primary economic activity may share significant control 
of the concern.  CVE will consider the control potential of such 
key employees on a case-by-case basis. 
 (b) Control is not the same as ownership, although both may 
reside in the same person.  CVE regards control as including both 
the strategic policy setting exercised by boards of directors and the 
day-to-day management and administration of business operations.  
An applicant or participant’s management and daily business oper-
ations must be conducted by one or more veterans or service-
disabled veterans.  Individuals managing the concern must have 
managerial experience of the extent and complexity needed to run 
the concern.  A veteran need not have the technical expertise or 
possess a required license to be found to control an applicant or 
participant if he or she can demonstrate that he or she has ultimate 
managerial and supervisory control over those who possess the re-
quired licenses or technical expertise.  However, where a critical 
license is held by a non-veteran having an equity interest in the 
applicant or participant firm, the non-veteran may be found to con-
trol the firm.154 
C. Understanding the Concept of “Dominance” and “Qualified Small 
Business” 
Eligibility is limited to “small businesses” and the VA has defined the 
test for determining if a business concern is a small business based on its 
dominance over the marketplace.155  The VA explains that 
[s]uch a concern is “not dominant in its field of operation” when it 
does not exercise a controlling or major influence on a national ba-
sis in a kind of business activity in which a number of business 
concerns are primarily engaged.  In determining whether domi-
nance exists, consideration must be given to all appropriate factors, 
including volume of business, number of employees, financial re-
sources, competitive status or position, ownership or control of 
materials, processes, patents, license agreements, facilities, sales 
territory, and nature of business activity.156 
  
 154. Id. § 74.4(a)–(b). 
 155. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101. 
 156. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 632 (2006 & Supp. IV); 48 C.F.R. § 19.102. 
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And although the VA provides this definition, it cross references 15 U.S.C. § 
632 for purposes of defining dominance, allowing the SBA to determine 
what constitutes a small business concern based on each industry.157  Once 
the SBA does this, it qualifies those small business concerns once it has 
cross-referenced the business’s application with the standards it has created 
for each industry.158 
But the SBA cannot arbitrarily or capriciously assign numbers and fig-
ures to decide what constitutes a small business concern; it must carefully 
consider all the appropriate factors including those enumerated.159  This is 
especially true if what might constitute as small in one region is not neces-
sarily small in another due to both geographical and financial considera-
tions.160  The esteemed Judge Gesell explains: 
 The Act does not specify that dominance is to be measured on 
a national scale and SBA may not limit its inquiry to promulgation 
of uniform national standards merely for convenience or because 
this approach may appear appropriate in the vast majority of cases.  
When most of the firms in an industry are regarded as being con-
fined to a regional market by geographical and financial considera-
tions, the small-business size standard cannot be one that gives a 
dominant firm in a regional market the preferred status of a small 
business.161 
Even though the SBA may be required to evaluate a rational argument 
for a regional variation on its size standard when qualifying a business on a 
case-by-case basis, it still provides standards that essentially create a pre-
sumption of a small business.162  Appealing an SBA determination of one’s 
business as not being a small business concern in reliance on the “alternative 
  
 157. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101; see 15 U.S.C. § 632. 
 158. See 15 U.S.C. § 632; 48 C.F.R. § 2.101. 
 159. See Cal. Dredging Co. v. Sanders, 657 F. Supp. 38, 41 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. (holding that a “size standard on a regional basis” should be considered as a “via-
ble alternative to a nationwide size standard” and that “failure to do so . . . without rational 
explanation is arbitrary and an error of law”). 
 162. See 13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (2013).  The SBA appears unfazed by California Dredging 
Co., describing its size standards by industry in absolute terms.  Compare Cal. Dredging Co., 
657 F. Supp. at 41, with 13 C.F.R. § 121.201. 
 The size standards described in this section apply to all SBA programs unless otherwise 
specified in this part.  The size standards themselves are expressed either in number of em-
ployees or annual receipts in millions of dollars, unless otherwise specified.  The number of 
employees or annual receipts indicates the maximum allowed for a concern and its affiliates to 
be considered small. 
13 C.F.R. § 121.201. 
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to . . . nationwide size standard” defined in California Dredging Co. v. Sand-
ers,163 should not be taken to the administrative courts.164  There, the adminis-
trative court made it clear that it lacks jurisdiction to determine the constitu-
tionality of SBA standards as the proper venue for such a case is the federal 
district courts.165  Therefore, if a VOSB or a SDVOSB wishes to show that it 
should be qualified as a small business concern when the applicant con-
cern/business entity is larger than the SBA allows, then the burden falls on 
them to disprove the SBA in federal district court by applying either the re-
gional standard test or providing other factors that may persuade the federal 
district court judge of its small business concern status.166 
VIII. VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF SHARES 
In the event that a veteran shareholder voluntarily transfers stocks by 
any means to a non-veteran, the business may lose its VOSB status unless 
after the transfer, veteran shareholders still own 51% of the issued stocks and 
the transfer of ownership was done in accordance to CVE and contract of-
ficer requirements.167  Any number of veterans may own these shares, so 
long as at least 51% is owned by veterans or service-disabled veterans.168  
The right of a voluntary transfer of shares may be limited by a contract such 
as a shareholder agreement, a premarital agreement, or a postnuptial agree-
ment, but it may not affect the veteran’s or service-disabled veteran’s bene-
fits of owning shares.169 
Involuntary transfers become slightly more complicated.  Involuntary 
transfers occur when a shareholder must relinquish control of the shares in a 
corporation due to certain events.170  Events such as death or divorce may 
require that the shareholder relinquish control, even if he or she does not 
want to.171  The intestate death of a veteran shareholder—which means with-
  
 163. 657 F. Supp 38, 41 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 164. Terra Excavating, Inc., SBA No. SIZ-4785, 2006 WL 1668353, at *3 (May 19, 
2006). 
 165. Id. (noting that although the federal district courts hold jurisdiction, a proper showing 
of facts must be demonstrated as to why an alternative to the SBA’s guidelines must properly 
demonstrate a dilemma not dissimilar to that in California Dredging Co.). 
 166. See id. at *3–4. 
 167. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.1(3) (2012). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. § 74.3(b). 
 170. See, e.g., id. § 74.3(e)(3). 
 171. Id. 
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out a valid and enforceable will—may result in such a transfer.172  Also, the 
divorce of a veteran shareholder, where the divorce decree requires transfer 
of the shares to a non-veteran divorcee spouse, can also cause potential con-
flicts.173  Both of these scenarios are the most likely to lead to litigation.  To 
properly protect the VOSB and SDVOSB, agreements that limit transfers of 
shares should strongly be considered when forming the business entity. 
 
A. Documents Limiting Transfers of Shares 
There are several documents that can limit the transfer of shares.  For 
the purposes of this article, we shall only discuss three.  The shareholder 
agreement, the premarital and postnuptial agreements, and lastly, the will, 
are documents that will likely be used commonly among veterans that own 
shares in a VOSB or SDVOSB.  The importance of 51% ownership cannot 
be stressed enough.  Less than 51% ownership is always fatal to the VOSB 
and SDVOSB, and may terminate any and all chances of gaining the contrac-
tual benefit.174  Therefore, each shall be discussed in detail for the purpose of 
clarifying issues that may arise either in business formation or in the every-
day lives of veteran shareholders. 
1. Shareholder Agreements Between Shareholders of Corporations 
Florida law specifically recognizes a shareholder’s right to enter into a 
shareholders agreement with any other shareholder(s) of the same corpora-
tion.175 
A shareholders agreement typically grants rights to those share-
holders who are party to the agreement that are above and beyond 
the rights that are inherent in the shares that they own, and is in-
tended to ensure that those shareholders obtain the benefits of the 
  
 172. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Deco Purchasing & Distrib. Co., 448 So. 2d 1197, 1199–1201 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (showing how the absence of a will can result in a personal 
representative filing suit against a surviving spouse over ownership of shares, even if the 
shares were given as a gift inter vivos or delivered as part of a joint account). 
 173. See, e.g., Steritech Grp., Inc., v. MacKenzie, 970 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007) (showing how a divorce can result in an involuntary transfer of shares and how a 
shareholder agreement that is referenced on the face of a stock so transferred can bind both 
spouses to the shareholder agreement). 
 174. 38 C.F.R. § 74.3. 
 175. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0731(1), .0732(1) (2012). 
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additional rights that they bargained for when making their in-
vestments.176 
And although the language of one of the two Florida statutes that refer-
ence a shareholders agreement says “[t]wo or more shareholders may pro-
vide for the manner in which they will vote their shares by signing an agree-
ment for that purpose,” the use of the word “may” indicates that the agree-
ment can, and often does, include specifically enforceable additional 
terms.177  Such additional terms can restrict alienation,178 putting subsequent 
purchasers on notice if the stock certificates indicate conspicuously either on 
their face or on the back of the certificate that the stockholder is bound to an 
existing shareholder agreement.179  Customarily, such stocks merely mention 
that the bearer is bound by a shareholder agreement with the actual agree-
ment being recorded in the corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws 
by the secretary.180 
For these reasons, it is strongly recommended that the incorporators or 
subscribers for shares,181 or all of the shareholders of a VOSB or SDVOSB, 
come together and create, approve, and record in the bylaws or articles of 
incorporation a binding shareholder agreement offering the right of first re-
fusal182 to other qualified veterans.  Several measures can be taken.  For ex-
  
 176. Corp. Law Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Enforceability and 
Effectiveness of Typical Shareholders Agreement Provisions, 65 BUS. LAW. 1153, 1155 
(2009). 
 177. FLA. STAT. § 607.0731(1)–(2); see id. § 607.0732(1). 
 178. See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0731(3), .0732(1)(h) (“An agreement among the shareholders 
of a corporation . . . is effective among the shareholders and the corporation . . . if it . . . 
[o]therwise governs . . . the relationship between the shareholders . . . and is not contrary to 
public policy.”).  Like New York and Delaware, general restrictions against alienation will 
likely be seen by Florida’s courts as contrary to public policy.  Corp. Law Comm. of the Ass’n 
of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 176, at 1174. 
 179. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0731(3), .0732(1)(h). 
 180. See id. §§ 607.01401(23), .0732(2)(a)1; see also id. § 607.0732(2)(a)1 (“An agree-
ment [set forth] by this section shall be . . . approved by all persons who are shareholders at 
the time [of] the agreement . . . .”).  It is important to note that if more than 100 shareholders 
exist at the time the shareholder agreement is made, the agreement cannot restrict anything 
besides voting rights.  See id. §§ 607.0731(1), .0732(1).  Compare id. § 607.0732 (applying 
restrictions only to “this section”), with FLA. STAT. § 607.0731 (applying no such restriction).  
Also, if the “shares of the corporation are listed on a national securities exchange or regularly 
quoted in a market maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities 
association,” then the “agreement [shall] cease[] to be effective” and the “board of directors 
may . . . adopt an amendment to the articles of incorporation or bylaws, without shareholder 
action, to delete the agreement and any references to it.”  Id. § 607.0732(4). 
 181. Id. § 607.0732(7). 
 182. See id. § 607.0732(2)(a)1.  The right of first refusal is often used in property law to 
indicate the right of a named person to purchase property before it is offered for sale by its 
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ample, a right of first refusal where the corporation has the right to acquire 
the shares based on whatever good faith offer is presented to the veteran 
would allow the corporation to buy back its interests.183  Another way, a bet-
ter way, is for a current shareholder to offer a right of first refusal to all exist-
ing qualifying veteran shareholders of the corporation, thereby allowing the 
corporation to retain its VOSB or SDVOSB status.184  Remember, a re-
striction on alienation requiring the selling shareholder to sell or transfer the 
share only to a known and verified qualified veteran shareholder will not be 
  
current owner to a willing buyer.  See Corp. Law Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of 
N.Y., supra note 176, at 1178.  For securities law, the New York Bar provides us with a clear 
definition.  See id. 
A right of first refusal (a “ROFR”) requires a shareholder that desires to sell its shares to pre-
sent an offer made by a potential purchaser that it proposes to accept to the other shareholders 
and/or the corporation, who then have an opportunity to purchase the shares at the same price 
and terms.  In contrast, a right of first offer (a “ROFO”) requires the selling shareholder to first 
solicit offers from the other shareholders and/or the corporation, and if the selling shareholder 
prefers to seek higher offers from third parties, it may do so, but it may not sell the shares to a 
third party at a lower price or on other terms that are less favorable to the selling shareholder 
than those offered by the other shareholders and/or the corporation. 
Id.  A ROFR is more likely to be allowed by the CVE when getting verified because it is 
beneficial to the veteran as it puts the onus of pricing on the third party purchaser. 
 183. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Sachs, 837 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“[A] 
right of first refusal is a right to elect to take specified property at the same price and on the 
same terms and conditions as those continued in good faith offer by a third person if the owner 
manifests a willingness to accept the offer.” (quoting Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v. Holbein, 
231 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970))). 
That right is clearly an executory right.  By its very nature then, a right of first refusal would 
never contain specific terms such as price because the terms are always dictated by the third 
party whose offer the holder of the right of first refusal is bound to match in all essential de-
tails. 
Id. (citing Holbein, 231 So. 2d at 857).  But beware the percentage.  If a corporation buys back 
its shares, existing shareholders run the risk of losing their VOSB and SDVOSB status if the 
final percentage of veteran or service-disabled veteran ownership falls below 51% of the out-
standing shares.  38 C.F.R. § 74.1 (2012). 
 184. See id. (defining ownership interest in a SDVOSB as “a business not less than 51% of 
which is owned by one or more service-disabled veterans” and the ownership interest in a 
VOSB as “a small business concern that is not less than 51% owned by one or more veter-
ans.”).  It is strongly urged that when drafting the shareholder agreement, all interested parties 
consult an attorney as failure to properly word a shareholder agreement can lead to the unen-
forceability of notice requirements and possibly a flawed right of first refusal.  See Burns v. 
Barfield, 732 So. 2d 1202, 1204–05 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).  Also, keep in mind that 
stock options held by another veteran or service-disabled veteran are protected so long as they 
are agreements between qualifying shareholders.  “In determining unconditional ownership, 
CVE will disregard any unexercised stock options or similar agreements held by veterans or 
service-disabled veterans.”  38 C.F.R. § 74.3(c). 
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allowed.185  The veteran and service-disabled veteran should feel comfortable 
in knowing that he or she has the right to sell her shares too.186 
If a corporation would like to buy back its shares under a right of first 
refusal, Florida law does allow the intended and named VOSB or SDVOSB 
third-party beneficiary the right to file a claim for breach of contract against 
the selling shareholder, the buying shareholder, or both.187  The fact that the 
buyer takes the stock certificate subject to the agreement puts the buyer on 
notice of the specifically enforceable agreement.188  And because preparing 
such an agreement in this way would designate the VOSB or SDVOSB as a 
named and intended third party beneficiary, both the contract breaching buy-
er and the noticed seller may be required to either rescind or pay damages as 
defined in the shareholder agreement.189  Inconsistencies between the share-
holder agreement and the bargained for exchange between the seller and the 
buyer will likely be controlled by the shareholder agreement because the 
buyer takes in the stock’s purchase agreement subject to the noticed share-
holder agreement.190 
  
 185. See Corp. Law Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 176, at 
1176; see also 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(b). 
 186. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(b). 
 187. See Harrington v. Batchelor, 781 So. 2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that where no shareholder agreement exists, a shareholder lacks standing and damag-
es sustained may only be claimed by the corporation, but where there is “a contractual duty, 
between the wrongdoer and the shareholder,” a “party to a contract may sue for its breach”).  
When we combine the idea that a contractual duty allows one shareholder to sue another 
shareholder where both are bound by an existing shareholder agreement, id., with the principle 
that a named intended third party beneficiary may file a claim to specifically enforce the terms 
of an agreement, Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Road Rock, Inc., 920 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006), both a named and intended third party beneficiary corporation and a 
shareholder baring a stock certificate which conspicuously display the existence of a share-
holder agreement, may specifically enforce that shareholder agreement against the bearer of 
any other stock certificate which also conspicuously displays the existence of the same share-
holder agreement, as long as the shareholder agreement itself meets the requirements of sec-
tions 607.0731 and .0732 of the Florida Statutes. 
“A third party is an intended beneficiary, and thus able to sue on a contract, only if the parties 
to the contract intended to primarily and directly benefit the third party.”  “[I]n order to find 
the requisite intent, it must be shown that both contracting parties intended to benefit the third 
party.  It is insufficient to show that only one party unilaterally intended to benefit the third 
party.”  “Florida law looks to the ‘nature or terms of the contract’ to find the parties’ clear or 
manifest intent that it ‘be for the benefit of a third party.’”  Furthermore, Florida law holds that 
“the language used in a contract is the best evidence of the intent and meaning of the parties.” 
Road Rock, Inc., 920 So. 2d at 203 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 188. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0731(2)–(3), .0732(3) (2012). 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. § 607.0731(3); Baker v. Maytag, 207 So. 2d 300, 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
1968). 
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2. Premarital and Postmarital Agreements 
Marriage and the dissolution of the marriage may cause a conflict with 
the VOSB and SDVOSB status of a small business concern.191  Therefore, in 
order to protect the contractual rights of these entities, a brief discussion on 
pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements is in order.  After all, the last thing a 
shareholder wants is to have his or her shares devalued because the small 
business concern no longer qualifies to receive a preference on government 
contracts due to the termination of its VOSB and SDVOSB status.  Addition-
ally, because Florida is an equitable distribution state, absent an agreement, 
the courts may decide to divide shares in the corporation, transferring shares 
owned by a qualifying veteran or service-disabled veteran to a non-
qualifying veteran or non-veteran spouse in the event of a marital dissolu-
tion.  Prudence dictates that the right to contract be executed by a veteran or 
service-disabled veteran spouse upon the creation, or the receipt of, shares in 
a VOSB or SDVOSB. 
Although Florida now recognizes the right of a wife to enter into a bind-
ing contract with her husband, this was not always the case.192  In 1903, Jus-
tice Hocker explained, “[a]t the common law a man and wife could make no 
contract with each other, and their contracts are nullities.”193  Post-nuptial 
agreements were recognized only in rare circumstances, and only to the ex-
tent that equity demanded.194  But Florida’s legislature grew to understand 
the importance of a woman’s right to contract with her husband and, as of 
1970, a wife has every enforceable right to contract with her husband as a 
husband has to enter into a binding contract with his wife.195 
In order for a post-nuptial agreement to be enforceable, “there must be 
an agreement that shows there was a meeting of the minds that is supported 
  
“When an agreement is evidenced by two or more writings, the writings must be construed to-
gether.  This rule is not necessarily confined to instruments executed at the same time by the 
same parties for the same purpose; instruments entered into on different days, but concerning 
the same subject matter, may under some circumstances be regarded as one contract and inter-
preted together.  Where a contract is embodied in several instruments, its true meaning is to be 
ascertained from a consideration of all the instruments and their effect upon each other.  But 
where a variety of instruments form one transaction, the law will not give effect to any one in-
strument unless the whole transaction is completed.” 
Baker, 207 So. 2d at 303 (quoting 7 FLA. JUR. Contracts § 78, at 144–45 (1956)). 
 191. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.1. 
 192. Compare Fritz v. Fernandez, 34 So. 315, 319 (Fla. 1903), with FLA. STAT. § 708.09. 
 193. Fritz, 34 So. at 319. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See FLA. STAT. § 708.09; Act effective Oct. 1, 1970, ch. 70-4, § 3, 1970 Fla. Laws 66, 
68 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 708.09 (1970)). 
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by consideration.”196  And unless the agreement is read into the record offi-
cially before the court, the agreement should be evidenced by a writing or it 
may run afoul of the writing requirements created at common law.197  Also, 
“a spouse may set aside or modify an agreement by establishing that it was 
reached under fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or over-
reaching.”198  Florida’s courts further explain that 
agreements entered into between the parties, acting without coun-
sel and without full and fair disclosure of the parties’ assets, 
should be viewed with skepticism.  This is all the more true when 
the parties enter[ed] into an oral settlement agreement years before 
the divorce, and later reconcile[d] after agreeing to its terms.199 
Therefore, if any of these mental states exist by the challenging spouse, a 
presumption exists that the agreement was not entered into voluntarily and is 
therefore voidable by the challenging spouse.200  In order to defeat this pre-
sumption, a showing of “either (a) a full, frank disclosure to the challenging 
spouse by the defending spouse before the signing of the agreement . . . or 
(b) a general and approximate knowledge by the challenging spouse of the 
character and [the] extent of the marital property sufficient to obtain a value 
by reasonable means.”201 
Many of these same terms and conditions are thoroughly detailed and 
codified for premarital agreements.202  “A premarital agreement must be in 
  
 196. 25A FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 612, at 148 (2010) (citing Morange v. Morange, 722 
So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Loss v. Loss, 608 So. 2d 39, 41–42 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam); Hieber v. Hieber, 151 So. 2d 646, 649 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1963)); see also Morange, 722 So. 2d at 920 (“[T]o be judicially enforceable, a [post-
nuptial] settlement agreement must be sufficiently specific and mutually agreeable regarding 
every essential element.  The party seeking enforcement of the settlement has the burden of 
establishing a meeting of the minds or mutual reciprocal assent to a certain proposition by 
competent substantial evidence.”). 
 197. See Morange, 722 So. 2d at 920 (citing Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing 
Care Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997)); see also Loss, 608 So. 2d 
at 41–42. 
 198. Matos v. Matos, 932 So. 2d 316, 320 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Casto v. 
Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1987)) (“[T]he challenging spouse may have the agreement 
set aside by establishing ‘that the agreement makes an unfair or unreasonable provision for 
that spouse, given the circumstances of the parties.’”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707, 710–11 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Casto, 508 So. 2d 
at 333). 
 201. Id. at 711 (quoting Casto, 508 So. 2d at 333). 
 202. Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7)(a)2 (2012), with Matos, 932 So. 2d at 320 
(citing Casto, 508 So. 2d at 333). 
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writing and signed by both parties.  It is enforceable without consideration 
other than the marriage itself.”203 
(a) Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to:  
1. The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the 
property of either or both of them whenever and wherever ac-
quired or located; 2. The right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, 
. . . assign . . . property; [and] 3. The disposition of property upon 
separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoc-
currence of any other event . . . .204 
Additional consideration beyond the marriage itself is not necessary and “[a] 
premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage of the parties.”205  
Lastly, 
[a] premarital agreement is not enforceable . . . if the party against 
whom enforcement is sought proves that:  1.  The party did not ex-
ecute the agreement voluntarily; 2.  The agreement was the prod-
uct of fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; or 3.  The agree-
ment was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execu-
tion of the agreement, that party:  a.  Was not provided a fair and 
reasonable disclosure of the property . . . of the other party; b.  Did 
not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclo-
sure of the property . . . of the other party beyond the disclosure 
provided; and c.  Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, 
an adequate knowledge of the property . . . of the other party.206 
For the above reasons, a spousal agreement—whether signed before or 
during the marriage—should be drafted by attorneys representing both par-
ties after all parties offer full and fair disclosure regarding not only the 
VOSB and the SDVOSB share value, but all other assets held at the time by 
both spouses.  A full and accurate statement on the financial health of the 
VOSB/SDVOSB as of the date of the agreement should be provided to both 
parties, and, in the event that either spouse does not understand the financial 
statements, their attorneys should take the time to explain these statements to 
their respective spousal clients.  Each spouse should sign the document in the 
presence of their respective attorneys, and not in the presence of the other, to 
avoid even the appearance of fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresenta-
  
 203. FLA. STAT. § 61.079(3). 
 204. Id. § 61.079(4)(a)1–3. 
 205. Id. § 61.079(5). 
 206. Id. § 61.079(7)(a). 
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tion, or overreaching.  Both parties should also agree upon a right of first 
refusal being offered to existing veteran or service-disabled shareholders in 
order to protect the VOSB and SDVOSB status of the business.  Normally, 
valuation of the shares is important and should be as close to fair market 
value at the time of the transfer of the shares as possible, thereby avoiding 
the appearance of unconscionability.  Failure to have a valuation agreement 
that both spouses can agree to at the time of the marital agreement, where the 
purchaser is the veteran spouse and/or existing veteran/service-disabled vet-
eran, may lead to further litigation during a divorce.  The goal should be to 
keep the veteran’s benefits as protected as possible.  The benefits of the 
VOSB and SDVOSB are intended for the veteran, not the divorced spouse.207 
An important note, although Florida has not directly decided this issue:  
If the shareholder agreement and a premarital/postnuptial agreement are to 
be drafted together as one in the same—an idea the authors strongly discour-
age—the parties should take great care to ensure that all the elements of both 
(a) the premarital/postnuptial agreement, and (b) the shareholder agreement 
are met as defined at common law and in sections 61.079 and 607.0732 of 
the Florida Statutes respectively.208 
  
 207. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.1 (2012) (including the definition of surviving spouse but not 
including the definition of divorced spouse); 48 C.F.R. § 802.101 (including the definition of 
surviving spouse but not including the definition of divorced spouse). 
 208. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.079, 607.0732; Morange v. Morange, 722 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 
2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997)); see, e.g., Darr v. Marine Elecs. Solutions, Inc., 96 
So. 3d 527, 533–34 (La. Ct. App.), cert denied, 98 So. 3d 860 (La. 2012) (holding by a Loui-
siana appellate court with roots in civilian law interpreting a matter of Florida law by claim-
ants within Louisiana’s jurisdiction); see also supra Parts III, IV, and accompanying text. 
 Under Florida law, a shareholders’ agreement is “a written agreement that is signed by all 
persons who are shareholders at the time of the agreement and such written agreement is made 
known to the corporation.”  Implicit in this statute is the requirement that the persons signing 
the agreement are signing the agreement “as shareholders” of the corporation. . . . [P]laintiff 
[has the] burden of proving that plaintiff and [the defendant spouse] signed the [marriage set-
tlement agreement (MSA)] “as shareholders” of the corporations. . . . [If] they signed the MSA 
in their individual capacities as part of settling various matters involved in their divorce pro-
ceeding, . . . mere knowledge of the existence of the MSA by plaintiff and [the defendant 
spouse], without more, does not transform the MSA into a shareholders’ agreement. 
Darr, 96 So. 3d at 533–34 (citation omitted).  Although two separate agreements should be 
drafted in order to ensure that each element is met, the agreements should reference the other 
and incorporate the content of the other in order to protect the integrity of both agreements.  
Great care should be taken to ensure that neither agreement contradicts the other and that the 
language is clear and unambiguous. 
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3. Wills, Intestacy, and Share Transfers upon Death 
Both VOSB and SDVOSB security interests may be transferred upon 
death to either named beneficiaries in a will—known as devisees—or heirs to 
inherit through Florida’s intestacy laws if the estate is resolved in Florida.209  
If the decedent veteran owned a security interest in a VOSB, then the qualifi-
cation of the VOSB may terminate if a subsequent titleholder is not a quali-
fying veteran.210  This includes unqualified non-veteran personal representa-
tives, devisees, and/or any heirs at law, including some spouses.211 
In Florida, as with many states, when a person dies intestate—that is 
without a valid will—their property is delivered to the decedent’s heirs by 
the personal representative as required by state law.212  A personal repre-
sentative is a middle man who administers the estate of the decedent.213  In 
essence, he or she takes possession in trust of the decedent’s real or personal 
property only to transfer legal title of the decedent’s property to the heirs of 
the deceased.214  Intestate personal property to be so distributed includes any 
security ownership interest of business entities registered in Florida.215  When 
a person dies testate, that is, with a valid will, the personal representative 
must deliver the ownership interest to the named beneficiary, or, if no bene-
ficiary is named, to the testator’s heirs, unless a beneficiary of the residuary 
is named in the will.216 
We choose to reference the personal representative because when he or 
she takes possession of the stock from the decedent, he or she becomes the 
legal owner of the stock until it is delivered to the beneficiary heir or devi-
see.217  When this happens, ownership may fall beneath 51%, and therefore, 
result in the failure of the business entity to qualify as a VOSB.218  One way 
to avoid this problem is to have the personal representative be a qualifying 
  
 209. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(11), (20); id. §§ 732.101, .605. 
 210. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(e)(1), (4). 
 211. See id. § 74.1. 
 212. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.201(28), 732.101–.103, 733.602. 
 213. Id. § 731.201(28) (referring to personal representatives as having alternative names in 
case law such as “an administrator, administrator cum testamento annexo, administrator de 
bonis non, ancillary administrator, ancillary executor, or executor”); see also id. § 733.301. 
 214. Campbell v. Owen, 132 So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (quoting Whit-
field v. Whitfield, 172 So. 711, 712 (Fla. 1937) (per curiam)); see also FLA. STAT. § 
731.201(28). 
 215. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.201(32), 732.605(1). 
 216. See id. §§ 731.201(2), (11), (28), 732.101(1). 
 217. Campbell, 132 So. 2d at 215 (quoting Whitfield, 172 So. at 712) (“[A]n administrator 
stands in the position of a trustee holding the estate in trust for the heirs, distributees and cred-
itors . . . .”). 
 218. See 38 C.F.R. § 74.3(b)(1)–(3) (2012). 
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veteran by either expressly naming a personal representative that qualifies or 
by directing the court, through the will, to appoint a qualifying veteran as the 
personal representative.219  And although “the probate court has the inherent 
authority to consider a person’s character, ability, and experience to serve as 
personal representative,”220 naming a qualified veteran or directing the court 
to choose a qualified veteran may be the best and most prudent advice we 
can give. 
In Florida, a validly executed will requires a testator—the person whose 
property is being devised in the will—or a person directed by the testator in 
the presence of the testator, to sign at the end of the writing—Florida inter-
prets this to mean the logical end, not necessarily the bottom of the docu-
ment—before two witnesses who must sign in the presence of the testator 
and the presence of each other.221  For a will to be valid, the testator must be 
of sound mind and must be either 18 years old or an emancipated minor.222 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In closing, becoming a VOSB or SDVOSB can become rather compli-
cated.  To ensure that your business is protected, it is strongly advised that 
those interested in creating a business concern with these benefits seek out 
the assistance of counsel to aid in the formation of their business and the 
verification process of the VOSB and SDVOSB.  After honorably serving 
our country, our nation owes veterans and their families a great deal.  Con-
gress has decided to create laws that give preference in contracts to veter-
ans.223  These contractual benefits can make for excellent business opportuni-
ties for shareholders.  Our hope is that veterans will avail themselves of these 
benefits in Florida, as there can be few things more appealing to Floridians 
than welcoming veterans with an entrepreneurial spirit. 
 
 
  
 219. See id. § 74.3(e)(1). 
 220. DeVaughn v. DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d 1128, 1133 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 221. FLA. STAT. § 732.502; Bradley ex rel. Bradley v. Bradley, 371 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). 
 222. FLA. STAT. § 732.501. 
 223. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 8127 (2006 & Supp. IV). 
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ABSTRACT 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have posed unique challenges to U.S. 
military personnel and their families.  Among them are concerns about the 
adverse psychological effects of combat and military-related trauma on our 
returning service men and women, their families, and their communities.  In 
this article, we provide an overview of combat-related posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD).  The learning objectives are to:  1) Gain an understanding 
of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD; 2) gain knowledge regarding the preva-
lence of war trauma and combat-related PTSD; and 3) increase awareness of 
co-morbid psychiatric disorders and common impairments in functioning and 
quality of life among active duty military personnel and veterans with PTSD.  
The discussion will also focus on increasing knowledge about the risk and 
resilience factors associated with the development and course of PTSD, fac-
tors that promote recovery from PTSD, and available treatment options. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) was the umbrella term used by the 
U.S. government for counterterrorism military actions that began on or after 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.1  The official name for 
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the war in Afghanistan is Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the war 
in Iraq is officially termed Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).2  These terms also 
included a number of smaller military conflicts, including supportive coun-
terterrorism operations in other areas of the world.3  On September 1, 2010, 
the war in Iraq acquired a new moniker, Operation New Dawn (OND), de-
signed to coincide with the change of mission in Iraq from an active counter-
insurgency role to one of active support of the Iraqi military.4  On December 
15, 2011, the Iraq War was officially declared over by U.S. Defense Secre-
tary Leon Panetta.5  The war in Afghanistan continues to the present day.  In 
January 2013, “President Barack Obama, after meeting with President Hamid 
Karzai of Afghanistan, [released a joint statement] that the [U.S.] would be 
able to accelerate the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in [the] coming 
months because of gains made by Afghan security forces.”6 
For many returning service members and their families, surviving war 
represents but one of the myriad of challenges associated with deployment.  
Military personnel involved in operations associated with the GWOT may 
have confronted difficulties associated with the current structure of U.S. 
military forces and defense needs of the country.  Recent changes include the 
decreasing size of the U.S. Armed Forces.7  For example, “[d]uring the pe-
riod of Operation Desert Storm . . . approximately 750,000 [active] service 
members” comprised the U.S. Army.8  “This number decreased to its current 
number of just fewer than 500,000 [active] personnel by the mid 1990s, its 
  
 1. See Rod Powers, Global War on Terrorism Medals, ABOUT.COM, 
http://www.usmilitary.about.com/od/medalsanddecs/l/blwotmedals.htm?p=1 (last visited Apr. 
21, 2013). 
 2. See Jarod Perkioniemi, Army NCO History (Part 9):  OEF, OIF and the Future of the 
NCO, WWW.ARMY.MIL (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.army.mil/article/18051/army-nco-history-
part-9-oef-oif-and-the-future-of-the-nco/. 
 3. See id. 
 4. New Name for Iraq War:  Operation New Dawn, ARMYTIMES (Feb. 19, 2010, 7:19 
PM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/02/military_new_dawn_gates_021810w (copy 
on file with Nova Law Review). 
 5. Thom Shanker et al., In Baghdad, Panetta Leads Uneasy Moment of Closure to a 
Long Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A19; Tom Vanden Brook, U.S. Formally De-
clares End of Iraq War, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/ 
world/iraq/story/2011-12-15/Iraq-war/51945028/1 (last updated Dec. 15, 2011). 
 6. Mark Landler, Obama:  Troops’ Exit Can Rev Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 12, 
2013, 9:33 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national_world/2013/01/12/obama-
troops-exit-can-rev-up.html. 
 7. NAT’L CTR. FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
IRAQ WAR CLINICIAN GUIDE 4–5 (2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.ptsd.va.gov/ profes-
sional/manuals/manual-pdf/iwcg/iraq_clinician_guide_v2.pdf. 
 8. Id. 
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smallest size since the beginning of World War II.”9  With the number of 
military personnel significantly reduced, “the tempo of operations 
(OPTEMPO)” or frequency and intensity of assigned missions—both war 
and operations other than war—has increased, leading many service mem-
bers to “deploy to unaccompanied overseas assignments repeatedly during 
their careers.”10 
The challenges inherent in repeated deployments may be exacerbated 
by the large Guard and Reservists composition of the U.S. Armed Forces.11  
Whereas active duty personnel generally “deploy with the units with whom 
they train and . . . [their] families . . . [reside in] established military commu-
nities (bases and posts),” Guard and Reserve members may be assigned to 
unfamiliar units and leave their families behind without the resources and 
support afforded by a military base.12  Compounding these challenges, Guard 
and Reserve members may face “loss of civilian employment” and financial 
repercussions as a result of multiple deployments.13 
For all military personnel, deployment may be associated with “differ-
ent forms or expressions of stress” depending on how well they adjust to the 
various stressors that occur during the different phases of deployment (i.e., 
prior, during, and after) and the types of conflict encountered overseas.14  For 
example, prior to deployment, military personnel may face worry concerning 
planning for a prolonged absence and uncertainty concerning their departure 
date as deployment orders often change.15  During this phase of pre-
deployment, the reality of having to leave family and transition to a combat 
environment may set in, and mental health practitioners may have difficulty 
differentiating a normal stress reaction from “the development or recurrence 
of [a] psychiatric” disorder.16  During the deployment phase, the stressors 
associated with pre-deployment can be compounded by the types of conflict 
encountered during deployment.17  Types of conflict can range from low in-
tensity combat, in which combat occurs intermittently—as in peace keeping 
missions—to high intensity combat, where other strains are more pervasive 
such as extremes of “family separation, . . . harsh living conditions, ex-
  
 9. Id. at 5. 
 10. Id. at 7. 
 11. See id. at 6. 
 12. NAT’L CTR. FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
supra note 7, at 7. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 7–8. 
 15. Id. at 7. 
 16. Id. at 7–8. 
 17. See NAT’L CTR. FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 8. 
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tremely long duty hours with little [opportunity for rest, . . . reduced] com-
munication with the outside world, and boredom.”18  Moreover, many of the 
challenges encountered in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been un-
precedented.19 
Unlike previous conflicts where [noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs)] were leading [individuals] against another nation’s Army, 
they now found themselves fighting against individuals, who were 
not wearing a distinctive uniform, but blended themselves into the 
crowd, making it harder to distinguish who was a threat.  Urban 
guerilla warfare also became a prominent means of combat as 
raids and attacks were carried out placing NCOs in the midst of 
heavily populated areas, surrounded by noncombatants. 20 
The uncertainty of distinguishing enemy forces from companions and 
civilians may exacerbate the inherent fear and intensity of warfare and is 
highly conducive to the development of acute stress reactions and the devel-
opment of PTSD.21  Whereas experiencing a stress response in combat is 
adaptive in that it prepares the individual to face threat,22 the development of 
a psychiatric disorder ensues, in part, when the body’s stress response per-
sists long after the stressor or life threatening situation has ended.23 
The stress response is a coordinated set of interactions among multiple 
organ systems in the body—including the brain, gut, heart, liver, immune 
system, thyroid, adrenals, pituitary, gonads, bone, and skin—that prepares 
the body for action, i.e., “fight or flight” in response to an acute stressor.24  
Typically, the acute stress response subsides after the stressor has ended and 
the body returns to its normal state.25  However, a chronic stress response can 
develop, as in the diagnosis of PTSD, in which the individual lives in a 
chronic state of heightened arousal that can result in subjective feelings of 
anxiety and diminished control.26  Research supports that “PTSD may be 
associated with stable neurobiological alterations in both the central and au-
  
 18. Id. 
 19. See Perkioniemi, supra note 2. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See NAT’L CTR. FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 8. 
 22. See id. at 23. 
 23. Id. at 11–12. 
 24. See id.; Terry Hurley, Physiological Responses to Stress, LOVE TO KNOW, 
http://stress.lovetoknow.com/physiological_responses_to_stress (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 25. NAT’L CTR. FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
supra note 7, at 23. 
 26. See id. at 12. 
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tonomic nervous systems” including most brain mechanisms related to the 
survival response.27 
II. DIAGNOSIS OF PTSD 
PTSD first appeared in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Third Edition (DSM-III) in 1980.28  However, observations con-
cerning chronic stress reactions in response to war have occurred early in the 
history of human conflict.  For example, in Achilles in Vietnam, author Jona-
thon Shay, M.D., examines the psychological effects of war by comparing 
the experiences of Vietnam veterans diagnosed with PTSD to Homer’s ac-
count of Achilles’ experiences in the Iliad, a literary work “composed . . . 
twenty-seven centuries ago.”29  More recent descriptions of PTSD reactions 
were also noted during the Civil War (Soldier’s Heart) and described by the 
event that caused them, such as World Wars I and II (e.g., Railroad Syn-
drome, Shell Shock and Traumatic Neurosis, Survivor Syndrome).30  In the 
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, 
PTSD is diagnosed based on several criteria.31  Unlike other psychiatric dis-
orders that appear in the DSM-5, PTSD is unique—with the exception of 
Acute Stress Disorder32—in that a severe and identifiable environmental 
stressor must precipitate the onset of symptoms.33  Criterion A stipulates the 
following: Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual 
violence” through direct experience, witnessing in-person, learning of the 
violent or accidental death of family or a close friend, or experiencing re-
peated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic events.34 
The second criterion, B, concerns the experience of reliving the trau-
matic event.35  The DSM-IV-TR stipulates the presence of one (or more) of 
the following intrusion symptoms: 
  
 27. PTSD Frequently Asked Questions, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com 
/benefits/veterans-health-care/ptsd-frequently-asked-questions.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2013). 
 28. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 236–39 (3d ed. 1980). 
 29. JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM:  COMBAT TRAUMA AND THE UNDOING OF 
CHARACTER, at xiii (1994). 
 30. See I.S. PARRISH, MILITARY VETERANS PTSD REFERENCE MANUAL § II (rev. ed. 
2008), http://www.ptsdmanual.com/chap1.htm. 
 31. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 143–49 (5th ed.) [hereinafter DSM-V]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 143. 
 35. Id. at 144. 
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1)Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the 
traumatic event(s); 2) recurrent distressing dreams in which the 
content and/or after affect of the dream are related to the traumatic 
event(s); 3) Dissociative reactions (e.g., flashbacks) in which the 
individual feels or acts as if the traumatic event(s) were recurring; 
4) Intense prolonged psychological distress at exposure to internal 
or external cues that symbolize or resemble aspects of the trau-
matic event(s); marked physiological reactions to internal or exter-
nal cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic 
event(s).36 
Individuals with PTSD often experience multiple manifestations of the 
symptoms described in Criterion B.37  These symptoms depict the experience 
of being tormented by vivid and unwelcome internal experiences surround-
ing the traumatic event with the concomitant physiological (e.g., racing 
heart) and psychological distress (e.g., feelings of horror, or guilt) aroused by 
traumatic cues.38 For some individuals with PTSD, intrusion symptoms can 
extend to psychotic episodes (flashbacks) in which the person loses grip on 
current reality and misperceives and acts as if he/she is literally re-living the 
traumatic experience.39 
The third criterion, C—persistent avoidance—concerns the pervasive 
efforts that people with PTSD engage in to cope with the significant distress 
and disruption caused by re-experiencing symptoms.40  To be diagnosed with 
PTSD, the individual must endorse one or both of the symptoms of 
“[p]ersistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event(s), 
beginning after the traumatic event(s) occurred” as indicated by: 
1) Avoidance of or efforts to avoid distressing memories, thoughts, 
or feelings about or closely associated with the traumatic event(s); 
2) Avoidance of or external reminders (people, places, conversa-
tions, activities, objects, situations) that arouse distressing memo-
ries, thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with the 
traumatatic event(s). 41 
  
 36. DSM-V, supra note 31, at 144. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 143–149. 
 39. See id. at 144.  For example, the individual is no longer at a family picnic, but sud-
denly finds himself thrust back to the battlefield in Afghanistan.  Family members may ob-
serve him acting out past combat experiences at the picnic. 
 40. Id. 
 41. DSM-V supra note 31, at 144. 
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Whereas the strategy of avoiding traumatic cues may seem like a viable 
way for an individual with PTSD to reduce their exposure to painful internal 
experiences (e.g., thoughts, emotions, memories), avoidance as a general 
coping strategy is ineffective because cognitive suppression has the opposite 
of the intended effect.42  A large body of research demonstrates that the more 
one tries to stop thinking (or feeling) something, the more it occurs.43  More-
over, persistent avoidance inhibits the process of integrating the traumatic 
experience into the person’s life narrative in a way that would enable the 
individual to move on from the psychological crisis.44  Avoidance of people, 
places, conversations, and activities that arouse recollections of the trauma 
can also interfere with engaging in routine activities of daily living that can 
promote healing (e.g., career, recreation, family life), including accessing the 
person’s own natural supports through meaningful relationships (e.g., family, 
clergy, friends). 
 
Criterion D stipulates that the person experiences “negative alterations 
in cognitions and mood associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning or 
worsening after the traumatic event(s) occurred, as evidenced by two (or 
more) of the following”: 
 
1) Inability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic event(s) 
(typically due to dissociative amnesia and not to other factors such 
as head injury, alcohol, or drugs) 2) Persistent and exaggerated neg-
ative beliefs or expectations about oneself, others, or the world 
(e.g., “I am bad,” “No one can be trusted,” The world is completely 
dangerous, “My whole nervous system is completely ruined”; 3) 
Persistent, distorted cognitions about the cause or consequences of 
the traumatic event(s) that lead the individual to blame him-
self/herself or others. 4) Persistent negative emotional state (e.g., 
fear, horror, anger, guilt, or shame); 5) Markedly diminished inter-
est or participation in significant activities; 6) Feelings of detach-
ment or estrangement from others; and 7) Persistent inability to ex-
perience positive emotions (e.g., inability to experience happiness, 
satisfaction, or loving feelings). 45 
 
  
 42. See Richard M. Wenzlaff & Daniel M. Wegner, Thought Suppression, 51 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL., 59, 64, 83 (2000). 
 43. See id. at 83. 
 44. See id. at 59, 64, 83. 
 45. DSM-V, supra note 31, at 145. 
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Whereas the symptoms in this criterion are no longer included in the 
avoidance cluster of symptoms as in previous editions of the DSM, persistent 
changes in thoughts and mood can represent a form of psychological avoid-
ance in which the person becomes unable to experience their emotions, par-
ticularly emotional connection in human relationships. For example, a com-
bat veteran with PTSD might relay that he or she does not feel anything an-
ymore.  He or she may perceive a sense of estrangement from others, even 
when in the presence of individuals with whom he or she was emotionally 
close before the traumatic event, such as family and friends.46  Whereas psy-
chological avoidance may at times successfully distract the individual from 
unwelcome painful thoughts and emotions, such as thoughts about personal 
culpability and feelings of guilt, when implemented as a pervasive coping 
strategy, psychic avoidance also has the unintended effect of inhibiting the 
experience of positive emotions, such as joy and love.  The individual may 
be able to cognitively discern that a strong emotional response is in order 
(e.g., sadness at a funeral; joy when playing with children), but has difficulty 
overcoming his or her own emotional numbing.  Also included in this crite-
rion is the experience of psychogenic amnesia, or an inability to remember 
significant aspects of the traumatic event, which is another form of emotional 
disconnection that is a less commonly observed PTSD symptom.47 
 
The fourth PTSD criterion, E, is as follows:  “Marked alterations in 
arousal and reactivity associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning or 
worsening after the traumatic events(s) occurred, as evidenced by two (or 
more) of the following:  1) Irritable behavior and angry outbursts (with little 
or no provocation) typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression to-
ward people or objects; 2)  Reckless or self-destructive behavior; 3) Hyper-
vigilance; and 4) Exaggerated startle response; 5) Problems with concentra-
tion; and 6) Sleep disturbance (e.g., difficulty falling or staying asleep or 
restless sleep).”48  As in other anxiety disorders, insomnia, irritability, and 
concentration difficulty are symptomatic of PTSD.49  In contrast, hypervigi-
lance and startle are more pathognomonic of PTSD, with the “startle re-
sponse ha[ving] a unique neurobiological substrate.”50  Hypervigilance and 
startle can resemble frank paranoia, as individuals tend to misinterpret their 
  
 46. See id. at 144–45. 
 47. See id. at 145. 
 48. Id. at 145. 
 49. Id. at 464; Matthew J. Friedman, PTSD History and Overview, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
VETERANS AFF. (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/ptsd-
overview.asp. 
 50. Friedman, supra note 49. 
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environment and perceive danger where it does not exist.51  For example, an 
individual with combat PTSD may repeatedly patrol the perimeter of his or 
her home armed with a weapon to ensure that the family remains secure even 
though no credible threat is present.52 
The duration criterion, F, specifies that the symptoms delineated in cri-
teria B through E must last at least one month.53  Finally, as in all psychiatric 
disorders, the functional significance criterion specifies that the symptoms 
“must cause clinically significant . . . impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning.”54 
III. PREVALENCE AND COMORBIDITIES OF PTSD 
Much of what is currently known about the prevalence of PTSD is de-
rived from two large population-based epidemiological studies that represent 
benchmark studies for all psychiatric disorders:  The U.S. National Comor-
bidity Survey (NCS), conducted between 1990 and 1992, and The U.S. Na-
tional Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R), conducted between 2001 
and 2003.55  The prevalence of PTSD was similar across both samples,56 so 
only prevalence in the more recent NCS-R is presented here.  Information on 
the original NCS is discussed at length elsewhere.57  The NCS-R assessed the 
prevalence rates of PTSD in a nationally representative subsample of 5,692 
adult Americans using DSM-IV criteria.58  “[E]stimated . . . lifetime preva-
lence of PTSD among adult Americans [was] 6.8%.”59  “The lifetime preva-
lence of PTSD among men was 3.6% and among women was [over twice 
  
 51. Id. 
 52. John Zemler, What Is PTSD Hypervigilance or Hyper Alertness?, HUBPAGES, 
http://drzemler.hubpages.com/hub/What-is-PTSD-Hypervigilance-or-Hyper-Alertness (last 
updated Feb. 20, 2010). 
 53. DSM-V, supra note 31, at 143–49; see also Friedman, supra note 49. 
 54. DSM-V, supra note 31, at 143–49. 
 55. See Ronald C. Kessler et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the National Comor-
bidity Survey, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1048, 1049 (1995) [hereinafter Kessler et al., 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey]; Ronald C. Kessler et al., 
Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of 12-Month DSM-IV Disorders in the National Co-
morbidity Survey Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617, 618, 624 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity]. 
 56. Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity, supra note 55, at 624. 
 57. See Kessler et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey, 
supra note 55, at 1051–57. 
 58. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset Distributions of 
DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 593, 593–94 (2005). 
 59. Jamie L. Gradus, Epidemiology of PTSD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF. (Jan. 
31, 2007), http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/epidemiological-facts-ptsd.asp. 
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that at] 9.7%.”60  The twelve-month prevalence was estimated at 3.5%61—
1.8% among men and 5.2% among women.62  Currently, research has not 
determined what accounts for the higher prevalence rates of PTSD among 
women, but increased likelihood of exposure (more trauma) and type of 
traumatic exposure (the kind of event) do not appear to explain these differ-
ences.63  The differences may be attributable to severity of the trauma, gender 
differences in appraisal of threats, other physiological sex-linked differences, 
or due to other factors yet to be uncovered.64 
Whereas the lifetime prevalence rate of PTSD in the general population 
is fairly low, at about 7.8%, the NCS-R study found estimated lifetime preva-
lence of PTSD among combat veterans to be significantly higher, at about 
38.8%.65  Similarly, The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study 
(NVVRS) is a large-scale study of about 3,000 individuals, including veter-
ans that served in the military during the Vietnam era.66  Researchers re-
ported high estimated lifetime prevalence of PTSD in active duty Vietnam 
veterans for both men (30.9%) and women (26.9%).67  When the data was 
examined according to percentage of active duty Vietnam veterans diagnosed 
with PTSD at the time of the survey, 15.2% of males and 8.5% of females 
were diagnosed with PTSD.68  Taken together, these data demonstrate that 
exposure to combat is a particularly brutal stressor that appears to impact 
both men and women similarly in terms of the development of PTSD:69  
“Exposure to combat has been described as one of the most intense stressors 
that a person can experience, and for many people . . . combat . . . is the most 
  
 60. Id. 
 61. Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity, supra note 55, at 620 tbl.1. 
 62. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, NATIONAL COMORBIDITY SURVEY:  12-MONTH 
PREVALENCE OF DSM-IV/WMH-CIDI DISORDERS BY SEX AND COHORT, at tbl.2 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/ncs/ftpdir/NCS-R_12-month_Prevalence_Estimates 
.pdf. 
 63. See David F. Tolin & Edna B. Foa, Sex Differences in Trauma and Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder:  A Quantitative Review of 25 Years of Research, 132 PSYCHOL. BULL. 959, 
977 (2006). 
 64. Id. at 978–79. 
 65. Kessler et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey, 
supra note 55, at 1052–53. 
 66. RICHARD A. KULKA ET AL., TRAUMA AND THE VIETNAM WAR GENERATION:  REPORT 
OF FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS READJUSTMENT STUDY 13 (1990). 
 67. Id. at 53. 
 68. Id. at 52. 
 69. Id. at 52–53. 
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traumatic [event] of their life.”70  In fact, some research has shown a dose-
response relationship between combat and PTSD; the prevalence of PTSD in 
veterans increases as combat exposure increases.71 
PTSD is also comorbid (occurs together) with other psychiatric disor-
ders and psychosocial problems.72  Common psychiatric comorbidities in-
clude major depression, general anxiety, and substance-use disorders.73  Vet-
erans with PTSD have clinically significant impairment in other important 
areas of functioning.74  Research indicates that veterans with PTSD experi-
ence significantly higher rates of unemployment and of being fired from em-
ployment, marital distress—both divorce and separation—or spousal abuse, 
poorer health and increased limitations to physical functioning, and increased 
likelihood of perpetuating violence.75 
IV. RISK & RESILIENCE FACTORS 
PTSD can have devastating impacts on individuals, families, and com-
munities.76  At the same time, surviving war can be transformative in ways 
that stimulate growth, maturation, and renewal.  Many combat personnel 
acquire an enhanced sense of purpose, camaraderie, pride, and meaning.  For 
others, the transformative effects stimulate a crisis that can manifest at any 
point across the lifespan.  A number of pre-deployment, deployment (war-
zone), and post-deployment factors have been identified as directly or indi-
rectly increasing one’s risk for developing PTSD—risk factors—or offering 
protection against it—resilience factors—following exposure to combat 
trauma.77  Evidence points to deployment (warzone) factors as most signifi-
cantly related to whether an individual will develop PTSD, followed by post-
deployment and pre-deployment factors, respectfully.78 
  
 70. 6 COMM. ON GULF WAR & HEALTH, INST. OF MED., PHYSIOLOGIC, PSYCHOLOGIC, AND 
PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS 32 (2008), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11922.html (citations omitted). 
 71. Barbara A. Hermann et al., Epidemiology and Prevention of Combat-Related Post-
Traumatic Stress in OEF/OIF/OND Service Members, MILITARY MED., Aug. Supp. 2012, at 1, 
3. 
 72. Kessler et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey, 
supra note 55, at 1051, 1054–55. 
 73. Id. at 1055, 1056 tbl.7. 
 74. See id. 
 75. KULKA ET AL., supra note 66, at 141–42, 247–48. 
 76. See Hermann et al., supra note 72, at 1–3. 
 77. Id. at 1–4; Dawne S. Vogt & Lynlee R. Tanner, Risk and Resilience Factors for Post-
traumatic Stress Symptomatology in Gulf War I Veterans, 20 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 27, 28–29 
(2007). 
 78. Vogt & Tanner, supra note 77, at 27, 34. 
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At pre-deployment, risk of developing PTSD is greater if the individual 
is female, if the individual had experienced significant stressors—such as 
“divorce, . . . family psychiatric illness, domestic violence, abuse, or vio-
lence”—or had mental or physical health problems prior to entering com-
bat.79  At deployment, risk of developing PTSD is heightened if the individ-
ual experienced greater severity of combat exposure, greater frequency or 
duration of deployments, “or perceived threat of personal [harm]” or death, 
as well as if the individual had relationship or family concerns, sustained a 
physical injury during deployment, reacted to combat exposure with high 
levels of arousal, or experienced peritraumatic dissociation.80  Post-
deployment risk factors include experiencing additional life stressors (e.g., 
unemployment, familial discord, financial difficulty) and having poor social 
support.81 
A pre-deployment protective factor also includes growing up in “posi-
tive childhood family environments.”82  Individuals reared in such environ-
ments experience fewer stressors later in life and have easier access to post-
deployment supportive relationships.83  Believing that one is prepared for 
combat and having supportive relationships, particularly in the form of unit 
member cohesion during deployment and greater social support at post-
deployment, also protects against the development of PTSD.84 
V. TREATMENT 
A range of treatments is available to treat PTSD, although they have not 
all received the same amount of research attention.85  Among the pharmacol-
ogical treatments, paroxetine, sertraline, and venlafaxine show the most 
promise.86  Psychological treatments have been shown to be more effective 
than pharmacotherapies, with cognitive-behavioral therapies combined with 
  
 79. Hermann et al., supra note 71, at 2. 
 80. Id. at 3; Dawne Vogt et al., Predeployment, Deployment, and Postdeployment Risk 
Factors for Posttraumatic Stress Symptomatology in Female and Male OEF/OIF Veterans, 
120 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 819, 828 (2011). 
 81. Hermann et al., supra note 71, at 3; Vogt & Tanner, supra note 76, at 29. 
 82. Vogt & Tanner, supra note 77, at 28. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Hermann et al., supra note 71, at 3; see Faith Ozbay et al., Social Support and Resil-
ience to Stress:  From Neurobiology to Clinical Practice, PSYCHIATRY, May 2007, at 35, 37–
38; Vogt & Tanner, supra note 77, at 28–31. 
 85. Alan L. Peterson et al., Assessment and Treatment of Combat-Related PTSD in Re-
turning War Veterans, 18 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. MED. SETTINGS, 164, 168 (2011). 
 86. Brian A. Sharpless & Jacques P. Barber, A Clinician’s Guide to PTSD Treatments for 
Returning Veterans, 3 PMC (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC3070301/pdf/nihms278539.pdf. 
202
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] OVERVIEW OF COMBAT-RELATED PTSD 629 
 
pharmacological treatment having the best empirical support.87  These inter-
ventions incorporate some degree of 1) processing and restructuring mal-
adaptive beliefs and assumptions related to the trauma; 2) direct exposure—
either through the imagination or in vivo—to traumatic memories or feared 
situations associated with the trauma; or 3) the teaching of skills to help indi-
viduals cope with or manage their PTSD symptoms and co-morbid problems 
such as substance addiction.88  While treatments with an exposure-based 
component (i.e., Prolonged Exposure and Cognitive Processing Therapy) 
have the greatest empirical support, certain individuals may not be able to 
tolerate these types of treatments because of the difficulty of discussing the 
traumatic stressors and tolerating traumatic cues, and for them, alternatives 
may need to be considered.89 
VI. CONCLUSION 
During the past decade, the frequency of deployment of military service 
personnel has increased.90  More frequent deployments are related to “in-
creased involvement in [o]perations [o]ther than [w]ar, as well as actual 
combat scenarios.”91  “Servicemen and women may be deployed from active 
duty, as well as the large Reserve or National Guard positions” that represent 
a large portion of the modern U.S. Armed Services.92  The challenges inher-
ent to the deployment of servicemen and women differ across individuals 
and families.93  “In families [with preexisting] medical or emo-
tional/behavioral problems . . . the deployment of a military [spouse or] par-
ent can destabilize [an already] tenuous situation, creating significant” diffi-
culties for both the individual and his or her family.94 
The development of PTSD is impacted by individual factors as well as 
pre-deployment, peritraumatic, and post-deployment risk and protective fac-
tors.95  Whereas some individual and war-zone stressors are inevitable, one 
  
 87. See id. at 1. 
 88. See Lisa M. Najavits, Seeking Safety:  An Evidence-Based Model for Substance 
Abuse and Trauma/PTSD, in THERAPIST’S GUIDE TO EVIDENCE-BASED RELAPSE PREVENTION 
141, 145, 147, 151–53 (Katie Witkiewitz & G. Alan Marlatt eds., 2007); Sharpless & Barber, 
supra note 86, at 4–5. 
 89. See Peterson et al., supra note 85, at 168–69. 
 90. NAT’L CTR. FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
supra note 7, at 83. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Hermann et al., supra note 71, at 2–3; Vogt et al., supra note 80, at 820. 
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of the most modifiable and important risk/protective factors relates to the 
support afforded to military personnel during the various phases of deploy-
ment and re-integration into their community.96  A range of treatments are 
available to assist with PTSD symptoms and a large body of evidence indi-
cates their effectiveness. 
Combat is a particularly severe form of trauma that can give rise to 
PTSD.97  At the same time, PTSD is a preventable and treatable mental 
health condition.  A wealth of information concerning resources for the 
treatment of PTSD can be found on the National Center for PTSD website.98 
 
  
 96. NAT’L CTR. FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
supra note 7, at 83–84. 
 97. Id. at 11–12. 
 98. National Center for PTSD, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.ptsd.va.gov 
(last updated Apr. 21, 2013). 
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LINDA J. FRESNEDA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“‘If you don’t hear from me in the next 24 hours, call the police,’” 
whispered Kristi to Stacy—veterans’ wives—when she called her at 2:12 
A.M. and then hung up.1  They had become friends while their husbands 
were deployed overseas in 2004.2  Kristi’s husband had served in three de-
ployments and had recently come back from the last one.3  The day after the 
call, Kristi said to Stacy, “‘Mark tried to strangle me last night.’”4  “Kristi’s 
husband adored her.  He had no history of domestic violence, no pattern of 
abuse.  He had made no attempts to isolate her from friends, family, or fi-
nances.”5  Kristi sought help, but to no avail.6 
As if the experiences acquired during deployments were not enough, 
veterans often return home to struggle with family issues caused by the 
trauma suffered during combat.7  The impact of military service can manifest 
itself in “the lives of veterans and their families in [various] ways.”8  
“[F]amily functioning is [unavoidably] affected” after a deployment.9  Upon 
  
 * The author will receive her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad 
Law Center, in May 2014.  Linda received a Bachelor of Arts from Florida International Uni-
versity with a major in Psychology and a minor in Criminal Justice.  Linda would like to thank 
her friends, her family, and her fiancé, Ernesto, for their unconditional support during the law 
school journey.  In addition, she would like to thank her mother, Lucia, and her father, Wil-
liam, for teaching her the value of hard work and bringing her to the land of the free.  She 
would like to dedicate this article to the men and women who make that freedom possible:  
The United States Armed Forces. 
 1. Stacy Bannerman, Husbands Who Bring the War Home, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 25, 
2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/09/25/ptsd-and-domestic-abuse-husbands-
who-bring-the-war-home.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Bannerman, supra note 1. 
 7. Press Release, Witness Justice, Family Safety:  A Significant Concern for Returning 
Veterans and Their Families (Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://www. witnessjus-
tice.org/news/natlsurveyresults.pdf. 
 8. Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court:  A Proactive Approach, 35 NEW ENG. 
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 357 (2009) [hereinafter Russell, A Proactive Ap-
proach]. 
 9. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS OF U.S. MILITARY SERVICE 
MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES:  A PRELIMINARY REPORT 9 (2007). 
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return, service members find themselves battling another war at home.10  
Significant rates of domestic violence in returning war veterans have caused 
a rising concern.11  Most of them feel terrible that they cause all this trouble 
and do not want to hurt anyone.12  Now more than ever, it is crucial that we 
recognize the effects that trauma is having on the relationships of military 
veterans, because compared to military conflicts of the past, the majority of 
currently returning veterans are married or are in a committed intimate rela-
tionship.13 
This increase in crimes committed by veterans gave rise to veterans 
treatment courts.14  Judges across the country started to notice that veterans 
who came back from deployments and appeared in court, brought back simi-
lar personal issues.15  They began to suspect that these issues might have 
been related to their military service.16  Veterans treatment courts are mod-
eled after other types of special courts that have proven to be successful in 
the past such as special drug and mental health courts.17  The program aims 
at “rehabilitation rather than incarceration” for eligible veterans18 by using 
treatment programs.19  Today, more than ninety veterans treatment courts 
exist in the United States.20  Upon completion of the program, veterans could 
potentially have charges dropped or reduced.21 
  
 10. Lizette Alvarez & Deborah Sontag, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Bat-
tles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at A1 [hereinafter Alvarez & Sontag, Across America]. 
 11. Press Release, Witness Justice, supra note 7. 
 12. Alvarez & Sontag, Across America, supra note 10. 
 13. Candice M. Monson & Casey E. Taft, PTSD and Intimate Relationships, PTSD RES. 
Q., Fall 2005, at 1, 1. 
 14. Jillian M. Cavanaugh, Note, Helping Those Who Serve:  Veterans Treatment Courts 
Foster Rehabilitation and Reduce Recidivism for Offending Combat Veterans, 45 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 463, 463 (2011); Jim Spellman & Wayne Drash, Soldier’s Invisible War:  Iraq Vet 
Charged with Attempted Murder, CNN (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009 
/CRIME/08/06/accused.soldier.ptsd/index.html. 
 15. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., FLORIDA SENATE INTERIM REPORT 
2011-131, at 1 (2010). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Kathleen Haughney, Senate Report Suggests Veterans Court, ST. AUGUSTINE REC., 
Oct. 20, 2010, http://www.staugustine.com/news/local-news/2010-10-20/Senate-report-
suggests-veterans-court. 
 19. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 1. 
 20. Duncan MacVicar, Cal. Veterans Legal Task Force, Swords to Plowshares Seminar:  
Veterans Treatment Courts:  Dignified Handling of Traumatized Veterans, slide 3 (Mar. 6, 
2012), http://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Veteran-court-
presentation.pdf?df6bfc. 
 21. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 4. 
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A controversy arises in deciding whether domestic violence cases 
should be allowed in veterans treatment courts due to the nature of the of-
fense.22  “Only a few courts have [truly] addressed th[e] issue . . . .”23  Critics 
note that in a domestic violence case, it could be dangerous to continue to 
have the victim in contact with the offender, that courts must have access to 
offender’s records, and that specialized training is needed for those providing 
services.24  Due to these criticisms, the majority of cases involving violent 
crimes are being left to make their way through the traditional criminal jus-
tice system.25 
Abuse, when perpetrated by a veteran, has a unique distinctive pattern, 
which does not follow the cycle of abuse that is often found in books.26  This 
article argues—through the integration of psychological studies which link 
domestic violence with the experiences that military personnel are exposed 
to while deployed—that domestic violence cases should be allowed in veter-
ans treatment courts across the country as a form of restorative justice.  The 
majority of studies find that at least 50% of veterans seeking treatment for 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or mental disturbances related to com-
bat, batter their wives.27 
As a matter of public policy, we owe our veterans much more than a 
lock them up and throw away the key approach.  They should be offered fur-
ther intervention, considering that the domestic violence is a result of their 
stay overseas.28  Furthermore, restorative justice has proven effective in the 
past in repairing the harm done and reducing the rate of recidivism.29 
Part II of the article gives an overview of domestic violence as a global 
issue and mentions recent cases of domestic violence in the military that 
have added to the controversy.30  It also outlines unique issues faced by vic-
tims of domestic violence of a military veteran.31  Part III of the article fo-
cuses on the many issues faced by veterans of different wars upon return 
  
 22. Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home:  Accommodating the Special Needs of Mili-
tary Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 570 (2010). 
 23. Amy Fairweather et al., Veterans in the Justice System:  Treatment of Violent Offend-
ers, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 17, 2010, at 7. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Hawkins, supra note 22, at 571. 
 26. Bannerman, supra note 1. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Lizette Alvarez & Deborah Sontag, When Strains on Military Families Turn 
Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at A1 [hereinafter Alvarez & Sontag, When Strains on 
Military Families Turn Deadly]. 
 29. Restorative Justice Works, RESTORATIVE JUST. COUNCIL (Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://www.restorativejustice.org.uk/restorative_justice_works. 
 30. See infra Part II. 
 31. See infra Part II.B. 
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from combat and the experiences lived while in combat.32  This section em-
ploys psychological studies to emphasize the link that these recurring issues 
have in causing domestic violence.33  Part IV part of the article introduces 
veterans’ treatment courts and their purpose.34  It explores the controversies 
raised by cases of domestic violence in this type of court, and briefly dis-
cusses Florida, with special emphasis on the newly created Broward Coun-
ty’s Veterans Treatment Court.35  Part V and last part of the article argues 
that domestic violence cases should be allowed in veterans treatment courts 
in all jurisdictions as a form of restorative justice to repair the harm done by 
the veterans and the overseas deployment itself.36  It also brings to light some 
public policy considerations and provides some recommendations to allevi-
ate the criticisms that surround the issue of hearing domestic violence cases 
in this kind of court.37 
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  AN OVERVIEW 
Domestic violence—or, as some call it, intimate partner violence—is a 
pattern of behavior that someone uses to overpower and control another per-
son.38  “[D]omestic violence encompass[es] a . . . range of behaviors . . . .”39  
It can take the form of physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, and verbal 
acts.40  Physical violence includes “[p]ushing, shoving, grabbing, slapping, 
[and] punching,” among other acts of physical contact and intimidation.41  
Emotional domestic violence can range from coercive tactics to name calling 
and yelling.42  It knows no barriers and affects people anywhere in the world:  
Any age, religion, economic status, and nationality.43  Most of the time, the 
  
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See infra Part III.B. 
 34. See infra Part IV.A. 
 35. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 36. See infra Part V. 
 37. See infra Part V.A.1–2. 
 38. The Facts About Domestic Violence, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES 
(2010), http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/inbriefs/domesticviolence/ domesticvio-
lence.html. 
 39. Simeon Stamm, Note, Intimate Partner Violence in the Military:  Securing our Coun-
try, Starting with the Home, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 321, 323 (2009). 
 40. The Facts About Domestic Violence, supra note 38. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS (2007), 
www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf [hereinafter NAT’L COAL. 
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS]. 
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result is a trauma that can last a lifetime.44  Statistics show that one in four 
women will be faced with a domestic violence experience at least once in her 
lifetime.45 
Around the world, one in three women have been a victim of physical 
or sexual abuse and at least “half of the world’s women [suffer from] vio-
lence in intimate relationships.”46  “Domestic violence is . . . most common . 
. . against women and [represents a] major international health risk[] . . . .”47  
Unfortunately, countless domestic violence incidents are never reported to 
the authorities, because of fear or hope that the person will change, among 
others.48  In addition to causing emotional issues, domestic violence affects 
the economy by impeding the victims from attending work.49  Domestic vio-
lence causes increased health care spending, clogged courts, and losses in 
educational achievement in countries around the world.50  In fact, domestic 
violence was one of the first types of violence that gave rise to action at an 
international level.51 
A. Domestic Violence and War Veterans 
Domestic violence is an issue that affects all branches of the military in 
the United States.52  In a study performed among returning military from 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), an 
alarming 60% of families referred for mental health evaluations have had an 
episode of domestic abuse.53  Out of that 60%, 53.7% said that there had 
been shouting, pushing, or shoving.54  In 2006, a study revealed that among 
  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence, Health, and International Law, 22 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 61, 61–62 (2008). 
 47. Id. at 62. 
 48. The Facts About Domestic Violence, supra note 38. 
 49. See NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS, supra 
note 43. 
 50. Meyersfeld, supra note 46, at 61. 
 51. Id. at 77. 
 52. Pamela Kravetz, Note, Way off Base:  An Argument Against Intimate Partner Vio-
lence Cases in Veterans Treatment Courts, 4 VETERANS L. REV. 162, 169 (2012). 
 53. Star Lara, Women Veterans Coordinator, Inst. for Veteran Policy, Swords to Plow-
shares Seminar:  New Approaches for Addressing Domestic Violence in the Veteran Commu-
nity, slide 4, 9 (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/wp-content/ up-
loads/2012/03/DV-Intervention-Presentation_Swords-to-Plowshares.pdf?df6bfc; see also 
Steven L. Sayers et al., Family Problems Among Recently Returned Military Veterans Re-
ferred for a Mental Health Evaluation, J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 2009, at e1, e6, tbl.3, 
available at http://www.psychiatrist.com/privatepdf/2009/v70n02/v70n0202.pdf. 
 54. Lara, supra note 53, at slide 9; Sayers et al., supra note 53, at e6 tbl.3. 
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returning veterans with current or recently separated partners, 27.6% of part-
ners were afraid of the veteran.55  The following cases are recent examples of 
domestic violence in returning veterans. 
A few years after returning from Iraq in 2005, soldier and combat medic 
Thomas Delgado attempted to kill his wife, broke her nose, and tried to 
choke her.56  Delgado was charged with one count of first-degree attempted 
murder.57  Medical records revealed that Delgado had only limited memories 
of what happened that night.58  The records also showed that while in service 
in Iraq, he lost fellow soldiers twice and he had been “‘feeling numb and 
disconnected since’” the deployment.59  Prior to this incident with his wife, 
Delgado’s only record was a minor traffic violation.60  His wife, Shayla Del-
gado, insisted that her husband is a good person and deserves special treat-
ment despite what happened.61  In “2010, Delgado accepted a plea bargain 
for second-degree assault involving domestic violence, a felony, and misde-
meanor criminal mischief.  He was given a four-year deferred sentence, four 
years probation, a . . . fine . . . and . . . a mandatory restraining order.”62  
Since his conviction, Delgado has been charged with four other offenses, 
probably due to lack of treatment and following the traditional criminal jus-
tice approach.63 
In 2002, within only a six-week range, three sergeants who had just re-
turned from Afghanistan murdered their wives and then killed themselves.64  
A more local example took place recently.65  In April 2011, a former marine 
Paul Gonzalez, while in the chambers of Broward Judge Ronald Roths-
child,66 went into rage after being ordered to pay child support by the judge.67  
  
 55. Sayers et al., supra note 53, at e6. 
 56. Spellman & Drash, supra note 14. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Spellman & Drash, supra note 14. 
 62. CHARLES E. CORRY, EQUAL JUSTICE FOUND., VIOLENCE AND VETERAN COURTS 3, 
http://ejfi.org/PDF/Violence_and_veteran_court_flyer.pdf. 
 63. Id. (stating that the traditional criminal justice system is not prepared to deal with the 
symptoms associated with military problems). 
 64. Alvarez & Sontag, When Strains on Military Families Turn Deadly, supra note 28. 
 65. See Rafael A. Olmeda, Sentencing Postponed for Man Who Beat Wife, S. FLA. SUN 
SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 2012, at 6B. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Lydia Warren, Marine Who Beat Wife Unconscious in Front of Judge After Being 
Ordered to Pay Child Support at Divorce Proceeding Gets 15 Years Behind Bars, MAIL 
ONLINE (Mar. 3, 2012, 8:10 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2109858/marine-
gets-15-years-bars-viciously-beating-wife-unconscious-judge.html. 
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Gonzalez left his former wife with a fractured jaw and broken nose.68  The 
former marine says that he does not recall what happened.69 
Paul Gonzalez was sentenced to fifteen years behind bars.70  Perhaps if 
his PTSD was treated in time, this case could have been avoided.  Gonzalez 
apologized to his ex-wife and admitted that he had failed her.71  In court, 
there is a certain expectation of safety.72  Common sense tells us that a ra-
tional person would not beat anyone in court—certainly not in the presence 
of a judge—if there was not something wrong with him or her.  In fact, a 
psychiatric expert testified that the former marine was suffering from bi-
polar disorder and PTSD.73  His attorney expressed his concern that he might 
not be able to get the kind of help he needs to overcome his issues in pris-
on.74 
Overall, violent victimization rates among spouses of United States mil-
itary personnel have “increased from 18.6 to 25.5 per 1000” spouses.75  Some 
local observations corroborate that “intimate partner violence and related 
offenses [could be] up to one quarter of” the issues with which veterans enter 
the criminal justice system.76 
B. Unique Issues for Victims of Domestic Violence by a Veteran 
Deployment to war often includes long separations that in turn, place a 
tremendous amount of pressure on military families, no matter how healthy 
the relationship is.77  When these factors are added to the stress experienced 
in combat, and the injuries received, sometimes the perfect storm is created.78  
When there has been a deployment, the spouse who stays home—the wife 
most of the time—is likely to assume responsibility for the family and adapt 
  
 68. Olmeda, supra note 65. 
 69. Tonya Alanez, No Bond for Man Accused of Beating Wife at Divorce Hearing, S. 
FLA. SUN SENTINEL, June 6, 2011, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-06-06/news/fl-
divorce-beating-bond-reduced-20110606_1_divorce-hearing-stun-gun-domestic-violence-
cases. 
 70. Warren, supra note 67. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Facts and Statistics, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE MILITARY, 
http://userpages.aug.com/captbarb/violence.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 76. Fairweather et al., supra note 23. 
 77. Alvarez & Sontag, When Strains on Military Families Turn Deadly, supra note 28. 
 78. See id. 
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to new roles as head of the household.79  When the soldier returns, role rever-
sals might become a struggle for power.80  When veterans return and see the 
autonomy of their partner, they might try to coerce them in order to regain 
control.81 
Military spouses are also faced with the usual issues that civilian vic-
tims of domestic violence experience, such as fear, isolation, and economic 
concerns.82  However, in addition to these fears, there are other factors which 
are unique to military spouses, causing them not to report the abuse.83  For 
example, there is a chance that the information military spouses share will 
not be kept confidential.84  This adds to the unwillingness to report the vio-
lence because of the effect that it might have on the abusive veteran’s ca-
reer.85  Economic dependency on the veteran’s benefits, and the fear of losing 
them, could also be a cause of the lack of reports.86  Also, the military be-
comes some families’ identity, making spouses less likely to report domestic 
violence to preserve their honor.87 
III. COMING BACK HOME:  THE EFFECT OF EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE 
DURING OVERSEAS SERVICE 
Many returning “veterans have [been] witness[es to] violence while de-
ployed.”88  The training they receive, and combat itself animates aggressive 
behavior.89  Military personnel are trained to attack enemies frivolously and 
fast.90  A majority report that after deployment their family dynamics have 
  
 79. JUDITH E. BEALS, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, UNDERSTANDING THE 
MILITARY RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  TOOLS FOR CIVILIAN ADVOCATES 8 (Patricia 
Erwin ed., 2007), http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/articles/BWJP_Military_Part1.pdf; Stamm, 
supra note 39, at 325. 
 80. Stamm, supra note 39, at 325. 
 81. Michelle D. Sherman et al., Domestic Violence in Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder Who Seek Couples Therapy, 32 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 479, 487 (2006). 
 82. Stamm, supra note 39, at 325. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.; see also Lizette Alvarez, Despite Assurances from Army, an Assault Case Foun-
ders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A24. 
 86. See Claire McCullough, Swords to Plowshares Seminar:  La Casa de las Madres, 
slide 4 (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/La-
Casa-DV-Presentation.pdf?df6bfc. 
 87. See Stamm, supra note 39, at 325. 
 88. Press Release, Witness Justice, supra note 7. 
 89. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Nicole A. Stockey, Last Stand? The Criminal Responsibil-
ity of War Veterans Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 
85 IND. L.J. 87, 103 (2010). 
 90. Id. 
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changed.91  They report issues communicating and more frequent conflicts 
with their families.92  Wars are extremely intense and cause great damage not 
only to bodies, but also to minds.93  Deployment causes changes that lead to 
mood swings, hostile attitudes, and emotional numbness.94  Returning veter-
ans who were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq for recent conflicts—such as 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom—present higher rates of 
psychological injuries.95  Soldiers returning home bring with them a constant 
sense of danger.96 
A. What Military Personnel Are Exposed to While Deployed 
Recent years have seen the largest mobilization of troops to foreign 
soils since the Vietnam War.97  Since the tragic events of September 11, 
2001, troops’ deployment time to foreign countries has become more exten-
sive.98  Some troops were even deployed more than once.99  During their stay 
on foreign soil, military personnel are exposed to intensive combat.100  The 
military live in fear of possible ambushes or bombs that kill or injure their 
fellow soldiers and cause destruction.101  Killing civilians and other enemy 
  
 91. Press Release, Witness Justice, supra note 7. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Terri Tanielian et al., Introduction, in INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR:  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY 3, 3–4 
(Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. Jaycox eds., 2008), available at http://www.rand. 
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG720.pdf; Kravetz, supra note 52, at 
177. 
 96. Matthew J. Friedman, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Military Returnees from 
Afghanistan and Iraq, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 586, 587 (2006). 
 97. John Driscoll, Traumatic Brain Injury Among ‘Citizen Soldiers,’ 5 BRAIN INJ., no. 2, 
2009, at 18, 18; see also Lorri Hill, Traumatic Brain Injuries in US Soldiers—The Cognitive 
and Psychological Effects 2 (Fall 2011) (unpublished student paper, University of North Tex-
as), https://classes.lt.unt.edu/Summer_10W_2012/CECS_5420_020/lah0228/final-project/ 
school-projects/documents/Hill-Paper-Revised.pdf. 
 98. VANESSA WILLIAMSON & ERIN MULHALL, IRAQ & AFG. VETERANS OF AM., INVISIBLE 
WOUNDS:  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL INJURIES CONFRONT A NEW GENERATION OF 
VETERANS 6 (2009), available at http://iava.org/files/IAVA_invisible_wounds_0.pdf; see also 
LAWRENCE KORB ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY:  A 
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE OVERUSE OF THE ARMY IN THE ADMINISTRATION’S WAR OF 
CHOICE IN IRAQ 10 (2007). 
 99. WILLIAMSON & MULHALL, IRAQ & AFG. VETERANS OF AM., supra note 98, at 6; see 
also KORB ET AL., supra note 98, at 9. 
 100. See Friedman, supra note 96, at 586. 
 101. Id. at 586–87. 
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combatants is also a strong experience. 102  Soldiers come to feel helpless and 
fear these unpredictable attacks.103  While in combat, they also have to deal 
with the aftermath such as having to handle dead bodies, being the witnesses 
of destroyed communities and homes.104  The exposure to sounds and devas-
tating sights of people dying around them creates anxiety.105 
B. Problems Faced by Returning Veterans and the Link to Domestic Vio-
lence 
Upon return from war, and after being exposed to all of the stressors 
discussed above,106 the transition from an environment requiring hyper-
vigilence107 can be a tough one.  “‘One minute you are in Baghdad waiting 
for a bomb to go off and the next minute you are in Burger King . . . . There 
is a lot of disorientation.’”108  Combat trauma has a long-term impact in the 
proper functioning of a family.109  Some military returnees are just not able to 
leave all of these experiences behind and adapt to their home environment.110 
The witnessing of violence and death increases the likelihood of aggres-
sive behavior.111  Some studies show that frequent deployment makes it more 
likely that combat trauma will occur, which increases the risk of domestic 
violence.112  In other words, the more they have witnessed in combat the 
more likely the domestic violence is.113  Veterans who displayed more fear in 
the war zone tend to be more violent toward their partners.114  Also, a com-
prehensive study by the National Vietnam Veterans reveals that veterans 
  
 102. Id. at 586. 
 103. Id. at 586–87. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Friedman, supra note 96, at 587. 
 106. Id. at 586–87. 
 107. Id. at 587. 
 108. Alvarez & Sontag, When Strains on Military Families Turn Deadly, supra note 28 
(quoting Judge Pamela Iles, a superior court judge). 
 109. Sayers et al., supra note 53, at e1. 
 110. Friedman, supra note 96, at 587. 
 111. Thomas E. Church, Returning Veterans on Campus with War Related Injuries and 
the Long Road Back Home, 22 J. POSTSECONDARY EDUC. & DISABILITY 43, 44 (2009). 
 112. Alvarez & Sontag, When Strains on Military Families Turn Deadly, supra note 28. 
 113. Id. (quoting Dr. Jacquelyn Campbell, a professor of nursing who was a member of 
the Pentagon task force). 
 114. LYNDA A. KING & DANIEL W. KING, MALE-PERPETRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  
TESTING A SERIES OF MULTIFACTORIAL FAMILY MODELS, at II–7–10 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199712.pdf. 
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who participated in the Vietnam War “with high levels of war-related trau-
ma” had a greater risk of engaging in domestic violence.115 
The truth is, the same type of behavior that in a war zone can allow the 
veteran to survive is the same behavior that causes them trouble reintegrating 
upon return.116  The complex issue of reintegration brings with it psychologi-
cal and clinical complications such as depression, anger, blame, shame, sub-
stance abuse, or psychiatric disorders.117  Along with these disorders other 
factors that might cause difficulty and conflict at home could be:  Coolness 
and detachment as a result of controlling emotions in combat, inability to 
accept that some situations are out of his control, overreactions, and aggres-
siveness.118 
By the year 2014, at least “some 1.5 million members of the United 
States Armed Forces will have served in . . . active combat.”119  As many as 
one in five of them will suffer from traumatic brain injury (TBI), PTSD, se-
vere depression, or substance abuse.120  Studies have found that combat ex-
posure quadruples the risk of domestic violence.121 
1. PTSD in Different International Conflicts 
PTSD occurs when a person has experienced an event that involved 
death, injury to themselves and others, and the person reacts with horror and 
fear.122  As a result the affected individual will experience trauma over feel-
ings, dreams, detachment, and avoidance.123  As much as 30% of military 
personnel exposed to war zones show signs of PTSD.124 
Some studies show that there is a relationship between PTSD and the 
increase of domestic violence.125  One research study analyzed veterans who 
sought help with marital relationships and determined that those who had 
  
 115. Sayers et al., supra note 53, at e1–2. 
 116. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 2. 
 117. Friedman, supra note 96, at 588. 
 118. Lara, supra note 53, at slide 17, 20, 22. 
 119. Hawkins, supra note 22, at 563. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Eric B. Elbogen et al., Improving Risk Assessment of Violence Among Military Veter-
ans:  An Evidence-Based Approach for Clinical Decision-Making, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
REV. 595, 598 (2010); Holly G. Prigerson et al., Population Attributable Fractions of Psychi-
atric Disorders and Behavioral Outcomes Associated with Combat Exposure Among US Men, 
92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 59, 60 (2002). 
 122. Church, supra note 111, at 47. 
 123. Id. 
 124. What Is PTSD?, NEB. DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN’S AFF., http://www.ptsd.ne.gov 
/what-is-ptsd.html (last visited April 21, 2013). 
 125. Alvarez & Sontag, When Strains on Military Families Turn Deadly, supra note 28. 
216
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] THE AFTERMATH OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 643 
 
been diagnosed with PTSD “were significantly more likely to perpetrate vio-
lence toward their partners.”126  In fact, combat veterans with PTSD have a 
higher level of anger than those who have not been diagnosed.127  This anger, 
in turn, is reflected in acts of domestic violence. 128  Another study shows that 
around 63% of veterans with “PTSD had been aggressive to their partners in 
the last year.”129  When combined with other issues that returning military 
have to face—such as depression, substance abuse, and relationships dis-
tress—the risk of violence heightens.130  The veteran’s ability to see that what 
he is doing is wrong is impaired by PTSD.131  It has even been recognized in 
some criminal cases that PTSD is linked to diminished culpability.132 
a. World War II 
It is estimated that one in every twenty veterans who participated in 
World War II experienced symptoms of PTSD.133  Some of the symptoms 
include nightmares, irritability, and memories from the incidents.134 
b. Korea 
A study shows that “as many as 30 percent” of veterans of the Korean 
War that are still alive are suffering from PTSD.135 
c. Vietnam 
Thirty-one percent of Vietnam veterans were diagnosed with PTSD up-
on return from deployment, and almost half of male Vietnam veterans with 
PTSD had been arrested at least once after their return.136 
  
 126. Sherman et al., supra note 81, at 484. 
 127. Id. at 480. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 484. 
 131. Hafemeister & Stockey, supra note 89, at 105. 
 132. Id. at 126. 
 133. Jack Epstein & Johnny Miller, U.S. Wars and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, S.F. 
GATE, June 22, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/U-S-wars-and-post-traumatic-
stress-disorder-2627010.php. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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d. Afghanistan 
Veterans returning from deployments to Afghanistan have high rates of 
psychological disorders, including some presenting with PTSD.137 
e. Iraq 
In a study of 168,528 Iraqi Veterans, a total of 20% had some sort of 
psychological disorder, including PTSD.138  The Marines and Army had 
higher chances of developing PTSD because of their enhanced exposure to 
combat while deployed.139 
2. Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) 
TBI is a trauma to the head—such as one that military personnel receive 
while in combat—that could be temporary or permanent, and interferes with 
the proper functioning of the brain.140  Often, while in the combat field, vet-
erans receive injuries from bullets, hits to the head, or bomb blasts.141  When 
an explosion detonates, the blast could cause an invisible wound, which has 
the ability to damage the brain with no visible marks.142  This is important 
because the severity of TBI is determined by what occurred when the injury 
was received.143  Symptoms of TBI can be very similar to those of PTSD:  
Irritability, impatience, anger, and inability to control impulses.144  Other 
symptoms include increased verbal and/or physical aggression.145  TBI has 
the ability to make PTSD symptoms worse and vice versa.146  TBI has re-
cently become the “signature injury” that veterans returning from their de-
ployment in Iraq face.147  Some special issues faced by the soldiers in Iraq are 
  
 137. Id. 
 138. Epstein & Miller, supra note 133. 
 139. Id. 
 140. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 1–2. 
 141. WILLIAMSON & MULHALL, IRAQ & AFG. VETERANS OF AM., supra note 98, at 3. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Katherine H. Taber & Robin A. Hurley, OEF/OIF Deployment-Related Traumatic 
Brain Injury, PTSD RES. Q., Winter 2010, at 1, 1. 
 144. BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, VICTIM ADVOCATE GUIDE:  INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE (IPV) AND COMBAT EXPERIENCE 2 (2011). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. WILLIAMSON & MULHALL, IRAQ & AFG. VETERAN OF AM., supra note 98, at 1; Emily 
Singer, Brain Trauma in Iraq, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www. technologyre-
view.com/featuredstory/409938/brain-trauma-in-iraq/. 
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the electromagnetic pulse of explosions, in addition to the sound and light of 
the blast.148 
3. Depression and Substance Abuse 
Although there is no major cause of depression, environmental factors 
such as the ones that veterans are exposed to while present in the combat 
zone serve as an aggravating factor.149  War experiences can lead veterans to 
a great state of depression and increased suicidal thoughts.150  These high 
levels of depression in veterans are correlated with violence.151  A study 
shows that approximately 81% of veterans who suffered from depression had 
“engaged in at least one [violent] act toward their partner[] in the last 
year.”152  Thoughts of suicide seem to also play as a risk factor that increases 
partner violence.153 
In order to deal with the difficult experiences of combat, some veterans 
drink or abuse drugs.154  Although alcohol “abuse does not cause domestic 
violence, there is [certainly] a . . . correlation between” them.155  Domestic 
violence studies often show that there is an increase in the risk of becoming 
violent when the person is using drugs and alcohol.156  Also, drug and alcohol 
use is correlated with violence among intimate partners.157  A study in 2003 
“found that 56.6% of veterans had used alcohol and 7.5% reported heavy 
alcohol use.”158  In addition, there were indicators of “higher use of mari-
juana by veterans.”159  The use of substances represents an increased risk of 
lethal violence.160 
  
 148. WILLIAMSON & MULHALL, IRAQ & AFG. VETERANS OF AM., supra note 98, at 3. 
 149. See NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, DEPRESSION AND VETERANS FACT SHEET 
(2009), http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Depression&Template=/Content Man-
agement/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentID=88939. 
 150. BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 144, at 3. 
 151. Sherman et al., supra note 81, at 486. 
 152. Id. 
 153. BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 144, at 3. 
 154. Id. at 2. 
 155. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE, http://ncadv.org/files/SubstanceAbuse.pdf. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Russell, A Proactive Approach, supra note 8, at 358; see also Alcohol Use and Alco-
hol-Related Risk Behaviors Among Veterans, NSDUH REP. (Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration), Nov. 10, 2005, at 1, 2. 
 159. Russell, A Proactive Approach, supra note 8, at 358. 
 160. See BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 144, at 3. 
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IV. A DIFFERENT APPROACH:  VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS 
A. Creation and Purpose 
Veterans treatment courts arose in response to an alarming increase in 
veterans who upon return home from combat would commit crimes.161  
When judges across the country started to notice that veterans who appeared 
in court brought similar personal issues, they began to suspect that these is-
sues might have been related to the time they spent in service in foreign na-
tions.162  The inability to cope with problems on their own has sparked initia-
tives in some jurisdictions to promote and establish veterans treatment 
courts.163  Veterans treatment courts are modeled “after other [types of] spe-
cial[] courts [that have proven successful so far], such as drug courts and 
mental health courts.”164  The program aims at “rehabilitation rather than 
incarceration,”165 employing treatment programs.166 
“The first veterans’ court was established in Buffalo.”167  Veterans eli-
gible for the program were “identified using . . . assessments and . . . then 
given the [choice] to participate in the program.”168  Using a “combin[ation] 
[of] rigorous treatment and personal accountability”169 these courts give vet-
erans the sources to manage their issues and convert them into productive 
and law abiding citizens.170  Eligible veterans are identified and referred to 
the program by Veterans Justice Outreach Specialists (VJOSs).171  Since 
2008, California, Colorado, Texas, Nevada, Illinois, Connecticut, New Mex-
ico, New York, Minnesota, and Oklahoma “have either adopted or consid-
ered [adopting] legislation” to bring these courts into existence.172 
  
 161. Spellman & Drash, supra note 14. 
 162. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 1. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Haughney, supra note 18. 
 166. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 1. 
 167. Haughney, supra note 18. 
 168. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 3. 
 169. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FACT 
SHEET:  VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS 1 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/veterans_treatment_courts_fact_sheet_12-13-10.pdf. 
 170. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 3. 
 171. See Rachel M. Guerra & Elizabeth Brett, Swords to Plowshares Seminar:  Veterans 
Justice Outreach, slide 7 (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/VJO-Presentation_Rachael-and-Liz.pdf. 
 172. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 1. 
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Today, there are over ninety veterans treatment courts in the United 
States.173  Although, courts in all jurisdictions have slight variations, all of 
them follow a similar program.174  Veterans in the program have access to 
fellow veterans who serve as mentors.175  “The way veterans interact with 
each other is helpful.  They respond better and are more receptive when they 
feel understood.”176  “There have been reports [from] other [v]eterans 
[t]reatment [c]ourts that veterans adapt faster to these types of courts . . . .”177  
Upon completion of the program veterans could have charges dropped or 
lessened.178 
B. Controversies and Criticisms Regarding Domestic Violence Cases and 
Veterans Treatment Courts 
Veterans treatment courts encourage the family of the veteran to get in-
volved in the treatment as a way of support and motivation.179  Although it is 
generally accepted that our veterans should receive special treatment—
including “medical care, educational support, and employment” opportuni-
ties—that same special treatment seems to be causing the controversy.180 
For example, “[a]dvocates for victims of domestic [violence] in Ne-
vada” like the idea of veteran courts, however feel like the “escalating nature 
of [domestic violence] offenses” should not be within the reach of those 
courts.181  In 2009, a teleconference was held that included forty-nine organi-
zations and professionals to discuss in-depth the possibility of admission of 
violent offenders in veterans treatment courts.182  The following categories of 
cases were discussed:  Domestic violence, illegal possession of firearms, 
aggravated substance abuse and offenses, and cases of simple assaults.183  
Even though national advocates and justice professionals countrywide feel 
like domestic violence is an important problem among veterans, “only a few 
  
 173. MacVicar, supra note 20, at slide 3. 
 174. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 3. 
 175. Id. at 4. 
 176. Telephone Interview with Dr. Giovanna Delgado, Veterans Justice Outreach Coordi-
nator, Miami VA Healthcare Sys. (July 27, 2012) (on file with Nova Law Review). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 4; Hawkins, 
supra note 22, at 568. 
 179. Russell, A Proactive Approach, supra note 8, at 369. 
 180. Hawkins, supra note 22, at 569–71. 
 181. Id. at 570. 
 182. Fairweather et al., supra note 23. 
 183. Id. 
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courts have [truly] addressed th[e] issue.”184  Some courts, like the one in 
Orange County, California, have started to take on a case-by-case approach 
for offenders of intimate partner violence with the requirement that they 
demonstrate a clear relationship between the deployment and the violence.185 
Perhaps the most troubling fact of allowing domestic violence cases in 
veterans treatment courts seems to be the fact that the victim often continues 
to have some sort of contact with the offender and people fear they might be 
in additional danger.186  Critics also note that the court must have access to 
all of the previous information from the offender and deployment, and that 
specialized training will be needed.187 
All of these criticisms have had an effect on the type of cases accepted 
into these courts.188  The cases accepted have generally been limited to non-
violent offenses, leaving the violent ones to the traditional criminal justice 
system.189  In fact, to get an idea as to which courts do allow domestic vio-
lence cases to be heard is a challenge because programs are reluctant to re-
veal that information due to the controversial nature of the topic.190  Other 
programs are full of contradictions when it comes to defining whether they 
accept them or not.191 
C. Florida’s Veterans Treatment Courts and Domestic Violence 
Florida has past experience with special courts:  The drug courts and the 
mental health courts.192  Okaloosa County’s veterans cases primarily involve 
domestic violence and substance abuse.193  Palm Beach County is not cur-
rently taking domestic violence misdemeanors to be heard in their courts, 
and those cases are referred to another division.194 
The most recent addition to Florida’s veterans treatment courts has been 
in Broward County—opened April 30, 2012—presided by Judge Edward H. 
  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Fairweather et al., supra note 23. 
 188. Hawkins, supra note 22, at 571. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Kravetz, supra note 52, at 184. 
 191. Id. at 184–85. 
 192. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 4. 
 193. Id. at 6. 
 194. Robin I. Bresky, New Veteran’s Court Division, PALM BEACH COUNTY B. ASS’N 
BULL., Jan. 2011, at 5, 5. 
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Merrigan, a veteran himself.195  Broward County’s Veterans Treatment Court 
aims to provide returning veterans that enter the system through another divi-
sion, opportunities for rehabilitation.196  It consists of a twelve to eighteen 
month program to help veterans with “behavioral, mental health, or sub-
stance abuse disorders.”197 
Dr. Giovanna Delgado, a psychologist, is the Veteran Justice Outreach 
Coordinator (VJOC) for the counties of Miami-Dade, Broward, and Mon-
roe.198  As a VJOC, Dr. Delgado works with community partners such as 
judges, police departments, and other agencies to give them training and a 
better understanding of the issues affecting veterans.199  “We are part of the 
courtroom and we link veterans to services.”200  Regarding domestic violence 
cases Dr. Delgado said: 
I have not really dealt with any domestic violence cases.  I would 
say that they should be considered in a case-by-case basis.  If 
someone has a history of domestic violence pre-deployment, it is 
not the same case as someone who does not.  The court should de-
termine the criteria.201 
Broward County’s Veterans Treatment Court is currently willing to 
handle domestic violence cases; however, no case of this type has been pre-
sented yet.202  When asked his opinion about having domestic violence cases 
heard in veterans treatment courts, Judge Merrigan said: 
I think having domestic violence cases in Veterans Treatment 
Courts is a good idea because it will benefit them in a way that 
traditional courts cannot. . . . It does not matter how understanding 
the family is, there is some friction and they need professional 
help.  Whether or not they are successful is a different story, but 
we have to give them access to the program. 
  
 195. Veterans Court Begins in Broward County, 17TH JUD. CIRCUIT. CT. FLA., 
http://www.17th.flcourts.org/index.php/announcements/186-veterans-court-begins-in-
broward-county (last updated May 4, 2012). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Telephone Interview with Dr. Giovanna Delgado, supra note 176. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Interview with Edward H. Merrigan, Jr., Broward Cnty. Judge, Veterans’ Treatment 
Court, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserves (July 26, 2012) (on file with Nova Law Re-
view). 
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. . . . 
I think that even if they have a history previous to deployment, we 
should accept them.  I think it would still benefit them.203 
V. FIXING AT HOME WHAT WAS BROKEN ABROAD:  A RESTORATIVE 
APPROACH 
“Restorative justice is a [relatively] new [idea] in the fields of victimol-
ogy and criminology [that] [a]cknowledg[es] that crime[s] cause[] injury to 
people and communities.”204  It follows the idea that the harm done should be 
repaired and the parties involved should be allowed to participate in the pro-
cess.205  This initiative allows the victims and the offenders to be “involved 
in responding to the crime.”206  It takes a social, rather than isolated approach 
to criminal justice issues.207  The program encourages face-to-face meetings 
that address the injuries and what should be done to repair them.208  There is 
some evidence that the willingness of individuals to participate in restorative 
justice programs is high.209  It is likely that a victim of domestic violence 
whose partner was never violent pre-deployment, but has now become so, 
will be willing to give one last attempt to fix the issue.  This is particularly 
true if the victims become aware that the program involves trained experts. 
A. Veterans Treatment Courts as a Restorative Type of Justice in Domestic 
Violence Cases 
“Social support is a [very] powerful protective factor”210 and could help 
the returning military to feel accepted.  Veterans treatment courts seem 
promising when compared with much older therapeutic courts, such as drug 
  
 203. Id. 
 204. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION, PRISON FELLOWSHIP INT’L, WHAT IS 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE? 1 (2008), available at http://www.pfi.org/cjr/restorative-justice/ intro-
duction-to-restorative-justice-practice-and-outcomes/briefings/what-is-restorative-
justive/view. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. TONY F. MARSHALL, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH DEV. & STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:  AN OVERVIEW 5 (1999), available at http://tna.europarchive.org 
/20100413151441/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ-resjus.pdf. 
 208. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION, PRISON FELLOWSHIP INT’L, supra note 204, at 1. 
 209. MARSHALL, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH DEV. & STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, supra note 
207, at 8. 
 210. Friedman, supra note 96, at 589. 
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courts.211  Intervening early can serve to stop a cycle of violence.212  Further-
more, restorative justice allows the family and victim of the offender to re-
ceive emotional and spiritual support.213  Allowing meetings between the 
veteran with his or her spouse or partner on a regular basis can permit the 
offender to take responsibility for his or her actions and develop a plan to 
cope with the issue.214  Victims also receive a much needed apology and see 
the regret in the veteran, which can be healing.215 
Using veterans treatment courts as a restorative approach will allow of-
fenders to repair the harm done and reintegrate to society.216  Intimate part-
ners represent a great role in the maintenance of one’s health and could en-
courage the veteran to finish the treatment.217  So far the courts have proven 
effective and have even made positive changes in veterans lives.218  Some 
have also been able to fix their relationships and get “their lives back on 
track.”219 
Since veterans are a unique group of individuals and their needs are 
even more unique220—as with domestic violence—then it follows that special 
treatment of these individuals’ needs is required.221  Traditional courts do not 
consider the great interaction between the issues presented by veterans and 
domestic violence.222  “And to have the police catch these veterans, often at 
great danger, beat them with a conviction for some crime of which they may 
or may not be guilty, and then turn them out on the street without testing or 
treatment, as is common practice now, is insane.”223  Traditional courts also 
  
 211. See COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & DOMESTIC SEC., supra note 15, at 6. 
 212. Spellman & Drash, supra note 14. 
 213. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION, PRISON FELLOWSHIP INT’L, supra note 204, at 
1–2. 
 214. See id. 
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 220. Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts Developing Throughout the Nation, 
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do not consider the fact that these veterans are trained to be violent before 
their deployment.224 
Initial data on the effectiveness of these courts suggest that there is a 
decrease in re-offense for misdemeanors from 15% in veteran courts to 40-
50% in regular courts.225  For felonies the numbers also seem promising:  
15% in veteran courts versus 70% in regular courts.226 
Since military personnel have been disciplined and have had to follow 
orders before, they are likely to follow the program, even if domestic vio-
lence is included.227  Receiving help from other veterans with similar experi-
ences could be a motivating factor.228  The concern that the victim is in con-
stant contact with the offender and could be in further peril229 is one without 
merit.230  When presented with this issue, Judge Merrigan said:  “We still 
keep in place restraining orders and the no weapon policy.  Safety and pro-
tection of the victims should not be a concern, because it is the same as in 
traditional programs.”231 
It is likely that a veteran’s partner who has not had an issue of violence 
with the veteran before—but has an incident after deployment—will be will-
ing to be proactive and try to fix it.  Veterans that commit violent offenses 
whose conduct is a consequence of issues acquired during their stay overseas 
will be more suitable to be treated in veterans treatment courts.232  Also, they 
should be eligible because they are suffering from the same underlying con-
ditions that have led veterans that have committed non-violent offenses to do 
so.233  The mental illnesses presented by the returning veterans are a direct 
effect from the combat environment they were exposed to while on foreign 
soil, and treatment is likely to break the cycle.234  Fairness requires that the 
same system of rewards and sanctions be offered to domestic violence of-
fenders and non-violent offenders.235  “‘The violent offenders need help more 
than anybody . . . .’  If you are going to create special judicial programs to 
  
 224. See Lara, supra note 53, at slide 27. 
 225. MacVicar, supra note 20, at slide 13. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Cavanaugh, supra note 14, at 981. 
 228. Id. at 483–84. 
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226
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/1
2013] THE AFTERMATH OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 653 
 
help veterans, does it make sense to give special services only to those who 
need help the least?”236 
Using veterans treatment courts as a restorative justice approach seems 
promising because of previous results of restorative justice programs.237  
There is evidence that restorative justice can satisfy the needs of the victim 
and has the power to reduce the frequency that the offender will reoffend up 
to 27%.238  Instead of feeling that everyone wants to punish him, the veteran 
will be motivated to reform and have the feeling that society will reaccept 
him.239 
Some think that a restorative justice approach is “soft” or lenient.240  
However, many aspects of restorative justice programs are tougher than 
regular programs because they require the offender to take full responsibility 
for his actions and repair the harm done.241  The imposition of “[e]xcessive 
[punishment] does not equate with being tougher on crime.”242  Punishment 
has a tendency to work better when all of the parties involved accept it, and 
when it is carefully calculated to address the issue.243  This flexible approach 
could prove beneficial to veteran families in distress as a result of domestic 
violence.  It will heal them, instead of imposing a severe prison sentence on 
the veteran and placing an economic burden on the criminal justice system. 
1. Public Policy Considerations 
Americans all over the nation must be aware that we are indebted to our 
military veterans who have gone overseas to protect us.244  Even though there 
is imminent danger in combat, serious challenges await our veterans when 
they return home.245  If anyone in this country deserves to be treated in a spe-
cial manner—particularly when it comes to issues related to their families—
it is our veterans.  What we do for them is a reflection of who we are as a 
country.  Hearing domestic violence cases in veteran treatment courts will 
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not only make them productive citizens,246 but also return the peace of mind 
to their partners, who had to be strong through deployment and now have 
their relationships destroyed by domestic violence.247  Even if the task is 
challenging, it is no excuse to ignore the issue altogether.  Individuals who 
are involved with these types of courts agree that incarceration is not really 
the way to go in trying to solve the veterans issues.248  “I do not think they 
are being treated different, I think they are being given the benefits they have 
earned,” said Judge Merrigan.249 
2. Program Recommendations 
The traditional criminal justice system is not prepared to handle the 
symptoms associated with some of the issues the military face as a conse-
quence of deployment.250  This is why the veterans treatment courts special-
izing in these kinds of issues are able to more adequately solve them.  It is 
important for therapists and professionals to recognize the higher risk of do-
mestic violence presented by veterans suffering from depression and 
PTSD.251  Targeting the symptoms that have triggered the domestic vio-
lence252 instead of trying to convict veterans could be a more effective way to 
deal with the problem.253  Since treatments for domestic violence are differ-
ent from those to cure some mental health issues such as PTSD there should 
be a combination of those with specialized domestic interventions.254 
The assistance and collaboration of professionals is required, not only in 
regular cases, but also in domestic violence cases.  Family counselors should 
be used along with other trained personnel, like psychologists.  In an effort to 
avoid the problem before it arises, the courts should also offer military per-
sonnel and their partners pre-deployment “preparatory [and] educational 
materials,”255 which would help them cope with the distance while on inter-
national soil and prepare them to face post-deployment issues.  The critics 
complain that there is no protocol to follow;256 however, a lot of methods can 
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be integrated into the program that are already in existence.257  For example, 
Critical Interaction Therapy exists, which “focuses on . . . resolving [the] 
‘critical interaction’ that develop[] between spouses” as a result of trauma 
experiences.258  Also, Emotion Focused Therapy can be adapted to fit marital 
distressed couples.259  Some of these treatments have showed promising re-
sults260 and should be integrated to veterans treatment courts when dealing 
with domestic violence. 
As long as ongoing risk assessments and safety planning are done261 
admitting domestic violence cases to veteran treatment courts would do more 
good than harm.  Of course, limits should be placed.  Veterans who have no 
history of domestic violence, but upon return become violent towards their 
partner should be given priority to enter the program.  Veterans with a prior 
history of domestic violence should be considered on a case-by-case basis.  
Furthermore, currently efforts are being made by various organizations to 
solve these types of challenges by using studies, funds, and increasing com-
munity based-partnerships.262 
Domestic violence is a serious issue nationwide and the response should 
be as serious, while protecting the needs and the well-being of veterans and 
their families.263  Even if training and preparation is expensive, there is also a 
serious cost when nothing is done.264  Healthy and formerly functional fami-
lies are being torn apart by this unfortunate reality. 
Perhaps another consideration for the program would be to offer them 
mental treatment when returning home regardless of the likeliness of com-
mitting an offense.265  When approaching a domestic violence incident, the 
source of the conduct should be considered when deciding the appropriate 
way to intervene.266  It would be pointless to put the veteran through a vet-
eran program without first addressing the underlying issue.267  The interven-
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tion should be aimed at fitting not only the offense, but also the circum-
stances under which it occurred.268 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For a veteran, it is unfortunate to lose a friend in combat; but perhaps 
the most devastating part is returning home and losing his or her family as 
well.  Our veterans and their loved ones, who are often surrounded with un-
certainty in a deployment, should be able to at least rest assured that their 
family life upon their return will be safeguarded.269  It is an irony to train 
soldiers to survive in such a hostile environment, to kill and trust no one, and 
then expect them to come home and be peaceful without any type of inter-
vention.  The current aversion in some jurisdictions against cases of domestic 
violence involving veterans being admitted to veterans treatment courts 
should not continue.  The support for our troops should not be limited to 
sending them letters and food when they are away; it should continue when 
they come back and are on the verge of losing their families, facing time in 
jail, or both.  Allowing domestic violence cases in veterans treatment courts 
will serve one of the main purposes of restorative justice270 and contribute to 
the long-term commitment in this country to healing the internal wounds of 
war.271 
—“Freedom is not free.”272 
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